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Abstract 
 
Britain has undergone profound economic, social, cultural and political changes. Following 
the recession of 2008/09 and the consequent implementation of austerity measures, both 
poverty and inequality became more pronounced. The consequences of austerity 
measures are profound and have had a lasting impact, and this has been widely 
evidenced. What was less understood was how attitudes toward the redistribution of 
income, and of people experiencing inequality and poverty changed, if at all, during this 
period. This research sought to understand how attitudes toward the income gap, people 
experiencing poverty and support toward redistribution changed during austerity Britain 
between 2009-2015. In doing so, this thesis has contributed to a growing body of research 
intent on understanding the consequences of austerity measures. This was achieved by 
undertaking secondary data analysis of three sets of micro data from the British Social 
Attitudes Survey (2009, 2012 and 2015). The findings suggest that perceptions of the 
income gap amongst the public reflect widening income inequality between people with 
high and low incomes. However, support toward measures to combat this form of 
inequality through the redistribution of income increased but was less favourable amongst 
the public throughout this period. Negative attitudes toward benefit recipients were also 
prevalent, with support toward redistribution less likely amongst those that held 
individualistic attitudes toward people experiencing inequality and poverty. Based on these 
findings, this thesis highlights where efforts to bolster redistributional support may need to 
be targeted to reduce widening social inequalities. Recommendations for the need for 
further research that seeks to not only understand why attitudes reflect stereotypical 
discourse, but also seeks to challenge these perspectives, are also made.  
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Chapter 1 
 
Introduction 
 
1.1 Public perceptions of inequality, poverty and redistribution in austerity Britain  
 
Following the recession of 2008/09 and the introduction of austerity measures, inequality 
and poverty in Britain have increased, with the consequences of austerity now widely 
evidenced (Seymour, 2014; Mendoza, 2015; United Nations’ Committee on Economic 
Social and Cultural Rights [UNCESCR], 2016; Wren-Lewis, 2016; Dorling, 2017; Ellis, 
2017; London, 2017; O’Connell and Hamilton, 2017; O’Hara, 2017; Paton and Cooper; 
Stiglitz, 2017). Focusing on public perceptions of inequality, poverty and redistribution in 
Britain between 2009-2015, this thesis explores attitudes, alongside increasing social 
inequalities. Exploration of this is pertinent, given that although the “UK has a long history 
of anti-poverty policies, with detailed legislation stretching back over 400 years, since the 
Poor Law Acts of 1597 and 1601” (Monnickendam and Gordon, 2010:556), substantial 
levels of inequality and poverty remain (Coote, 2010; Penny and Slay, 2012; Dorling, 
2014; Oxfam, 2013; O’Hara, 2014; Seymour, 2014; Stiglitz, 2013; Toynbee and Walker, 
2015). 
 
These rising levels of wealth and income inequality can be described as the most 
substantial “social threat of our times” (Dorling, 2014:1), with the non-economic 
consequences arguably threatening to further polarise individuals and groups. The 
redistribution of income between groups, a method employed with the intention of reducing 
poverty and inequality, is however often contested with attitudes toward income 
redistribution amongst the British public, conditional, complex, subject to self-interest and 
change (Orton and Rowlingson, 2007; Curtis and Anderson, 2015; Wu and Chou, 2015; 
Bourguignon, 2018). Whilst redistributional support from the public does not guarantee the 
implementation of social policies to alleviate social issues (Hanley, 2009; Devine and 
Robinson, 2014), as others have suggested there is a strong connection between public 
perceptions and policy initiatives (Monnickendam and Gordon, 2010; Prabhakar, 2012; 
Devine and Robinson, 2014; Kulin and Seymer, 2014; Wu and Chou, 2015), with 
politicians and policymakers often “constrained by public opinion” (Kulin and Seymer, 
2014:1).  
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In focusing on attitudinal data between 2009-2015, this research provides an analysis of 
public perceptions during this period of austerity. Intent on understanding not only who is 
more likely to support income redistribution but also how negative attitudes toward people 
experiencing inequality and poverty reduce the public’s willingness to support 
redistribution, thereby impeding social change. The thesis begins by providing an 
introductory narrative of the economic, social, cultural and political environment, in what 
became austerity Britain. Austerity is introduced, alongside the consequences of this 
economic strategy, contextualising the importance of this research to gain an 
understanding of how attitudes changed (if at all) during this period. The focus of this 
introductory chapter is, thus, on setting out the plan of the thesis, highlighting the aims and 
objectives of this research, alongside some key findings and recommendations. 
  
1.2 Context: the social, economic, political and cultural environment in austerity 
Britain 
 
Over the last decade, Britain has encountered both economic and political changes, with 
the consequent challenges bringing forth social consequences. In the wake of the financial 
recession of 2008/09, Britain not only experienced the consequences of an economy 
slowing in growth, but also saw governmental changes, with two successive governments 
from 2010 implementing policies of austerity. In 2010, a Coalition government comprised 
of the Conservatives and Liberal Democrats, sought to enact Cameron’s vision of “social 
change” and to arguably make good on a previous Conservative pledge; to replace what 
they perceived as “Labour’s spendaholic government” with one of “thrift” (Cameron, 2009: 
no pagination). The Coalition, faced with a deficit, claimed that austerity was the only 
feasible way of rectifying the economy, restoring financial stability and undoing the 
damage done by the previous Labour government (HM Treasury, 2010). Five years later, 
the Conservative majority government continued to endorse austerity, noting how “the 
Great Recession” had “given way to a great revival”, but that austerity measures would 
continue, with more cuts to follow (Conservative Party Manifesto, 2015:7).  
 
Whilst austerity in practice means public spending is reduced and taxation is increased, in 
Britain, however, this was not the case. Whilst there have been attempts to lessen the 
burden of the welfare state, thus reducing public spending, increasing taxation appeared to 
be less of a priority (Konzelmann, 2012; Oxfam, 2013; Bailey and Bramley, 2018). 
Focusing on the welfare state, public spending cuts and changes to the tax and benefits 
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system were issued, where new restrictions were imposed, sanctioning those who failed to 
comply (Levitas, 2012; Penny, 2013; O’Hara, 2014; Lupton et al., 2015; Fitzpatrick et al., 
2016; Tucker, 2017).  
 
Whilst a programme of austerity initially received support from a number of economists 
(Attanasio, 2010; Besley, 2010; Bootle, 2010; Davies, 2010; Desai, 2010; Goodhart, 2010; 
Marcet, 2010; Meghir, 2010; Muellbauer, 2010; Newbery, 2010; Pesaran, 2010; 
Pissarides, 2010; Quah, 2010; Rogoff, 2010; Rosewell, 2010; Sargent, 2010; Sibert, 2010; 
Turnbull, 2010; Vickers, 2010; Wickens, 2010), as Eaton (2012) pointed out, many of 
these economists revoked their support, questioning both the timing and the pace of 
austerity measures (Besley, 2012; Bootle, 2012; Newbury, 2012; Pesaran, 2012; Quah, 
2012). Despite this retreat, others maintained that austerity was an efficient way of 
reducing the deficit (Warmedinger et al., 2015) or as the Centre for Macroeconomics 
[CFM] found, many (Smith, 2015; Milas, 2015; Oulton, 2015; Minford, 2015; Chadha, 
2015) were united in the belief that “the austerity policies of the coalition government…had 
a positive effect on aggregate economic activity” (e.g. employment and Gross Domestic 
Product [GDP]) in the United Kingdom [UK] (2015; no pagination).  
 
Focusing on the economy, the social costs of austerity were, thus, not their concern. The 
withdrawal of support from a number of leading economists appears, however, to 
strengthen the concerns of others, who from the onset and throughout, had cautioned that 
the need for austerity was contestable with unfair consequences (Coote, 2010; Slay and 
Penny, 2012; Oxfam, 2013; O’Hara, 2014; Seymour, 2014; Toynbee and Walker, 2015; 
Krugman, 2015; Wren-Lewis, 2016; Stiglitz, 2017), alongside “violent” (Cooper and Whyte, 
2017:2), “ineffective” and a “dangerous idea” (Blyth, 2013:5). By 2016, following six years 
of austerity measures, through the expression of “deep concerns” on a number of social 
issues in Britain, the United Nations’ Committee on Economic Social and Cultural Rights 
[UNCESCR] had reinforced these fears (2016:4). Emphasis was placed on how the effects 
of austerity measures were disproportionately impacting upon the lives of many 
“disadvantaged and marginalised individuals and groups” (UNCESCR, 2016:4). It was 
argued that the austerity led changes to taxation, social security payments, eligibility and 
sanctions, alongside the rise of zero-hour contracts, had multiple consequences, where 
the only solution was the reversal of both the cuts and changes (UNCESCR, 2016). 
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In short, not only was the recession considered “the worst…since the 1930’s” (Lupton et 
al., 2015:7), the effects of austerity measures were thus increasingly questioned, where 
fears over the consequences of the changes imposed by the Coalition and the 
Conservative government grew (Fawcett, 2013; Ginn, 2013; Women’s Budget Group 
[WBG], 2013; Rubery, 2015; Fisher and Nandi, 2015; UNCESCR, 2016). Three years on 
from this recommendation, not only has this reversal not occurred, the enduring 
consequences of this economic plan have now persisted for nearly a decade.  
 
Although the impact of austerity is profound, the consequences are not experienced in the 
same way, nor equally (Fitzpatrick et al., 2016; UNCESCR, 2016). The unequal 
experiences of austerity amongst members of the British public, have become the focus of 
research concerned with understanding the impact of austerity measures. This thesis 
contributes to this growing body of research. Not only has it been purported that “those at 
the bottom” are “drowning in austerity Britain” (Dorling, 2014:16), others have argued that 
as a result of the Coalition’s policies, it became clear that austerity Britain was comprised 
of two opposing groups, the “gainers” and the “losers” (Lupton et al., 2015:8), with one 
particular group facing more than economic inequality alone. Aside from facing economic 
inequality, people who are impoverished or facing inequality, were also routinely 
represented as one of the “key problem groups” (Mooney and Hancock, 2010: no 
pagination). The Joseph Rowntree Foundation [JRF] found that “harsh attitudes towards 
those experiencing poverty” thus persisted, including yet not limited to, “the notion of the 
undeserving poor”, despite the economic crash emphasising how many people “may 
suddenly experience hardship” (2016:8).  
 
It has, thus, been argued that the economic crash drove “people further apart” (Toynbee, 
2017: no pagination), with austerity led changes and coverage of the cuts, accused of 
heightening “class racism” (Atkinson et al., 2013:35). Whilst poverty and by extension 
inequality, “can be understood as having both a ‘material’ dimension (lack of income) and 
a ‘non-material’ dimension (e.g. poor health, experience of crime)” (Centre for Regional 
Economic Social Research [CRESR], 2014:27), it also has social consequences of which 
are of interest in this research. Given this, and echoing the concerns of others, it is argued 
that the welfare state and its recipients became “victims of austerity”, routinely and publicly 
depicted as ‘scroungers’ who are to “blame for their own predicament” (O’Hara, 2014:2) 
and to blame for the economic crash itself.   
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Although the existence of poverty and inequality in Britain is nothing new, what is new is 
how some of the British media, and by extension politicians, have “capitalised” on such 
societal issues during this period (Mooney and Hancock, 2010: no pagination). For 
Mooney and Hancock, the British tabloid press have profited from the rhetoric of the 
‘scrounger’, juxtaposed with the ‘tax payers’ who fund their endeavours (Mooney and 
Hancock, 2010). Arguably, this juxtaposition, for Beatty and Fothergill, was also 
observable within political rhetoric, where not only was attention within the political sphere 
more focused on “appealing to emotion, speculation and imagery” (Beatty and Fothergill, 
2016:1), as others have demonstrated, politicians were also accused of strengthening the 
rhetoric of the ‘undeserving’ and ‘deserving’ poor, rather than highlighting the 
consequences of life lived on inadequate incomes within their austere campaigns (Mooney 
and Hancock, 2010; Toynbee and Walker, 2015; Pantazis, 2016; Shildrick, 2018).  
 
Termed ‘poverty porn’ (Jensen, 2013), a number of broadcasted television programmes 
and documentaries, concerned with the portrayal of those experiencing poverty and 
inequality (Mooney and Hancock, 2010; Jensen, 2013) and of those ‘losing out’ in austerity 
Britain also emerged. This new genre of programmes, for the purpose of entertainment 
(Jensen, 2013), includes the series Benefits Britain: life on the dole (Channel 5) and 
Benefits Street (Channel 4). Though not the focus of this research, nor analysis, given that 
how poverty and inequality is presented to the public, often relates to perceptions of 
individuals and how the public understand poverty and inequality (McKendrick et al., 
2008), a brief critical narrative of the contents of these programmes is provided. Thus, 
allowing for a more thorough examination of the social and cultural climate in austerity 
Britain over this period. This is presented prior to highlighting public reactions to instances 
of ‘poverty porn’ (Jensen, 2013) or indeed, ‘poverty propaganda’ (Shildrick, 2018).   
 
This thesis thus highlights how culpability, rather than located in social structures, became 
re-focused on those facing inequality (Walker, 1981), with the “welfare apparatus” 
surrounded again by “more enemies than friends” (Golding and Middleton, 1982:205). 
Whilst this may not be new, both poverty and inequality are, arguably, becoming 
increasingly more like a “spectator sport” (Hanley, 2009:7) and this is significant. The 
consequences of heightened polarisation are particularly important, given the need of the 
public and their support to implement policies to combat inequality through the 
redistribution of income (Whitely, 1981; Burstein, 2003; McKendrick et al., 2008; Horton 
and Gregory, 2009; Wu and Chou, 2015). This support is critically examined in this 
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research. Intent on contributing to current research, emphasis is placed on understanding 
how negative perceptions of people experiencing inequality and poverty, relate to the level 
of support toward income redistribution expressed by the British public, over the course of 
austerity examined here. 
Whilst the effectiveness of austerity as an economic strategy remains debatable, this is a 
debate not entered into here. Instead this research echoes the concerns of Oxfam, 
positioning austerity as a programme that “threatens to solidify the UK’s position as a 
country of growing inequality and poverty” (Oxfam, 2013:4) and one that has resulted in 
both social and economic consequences. Accordingly, the following section positions this 
research, specifying the aims, objectives and research questions, noting the need for a 
sociological exploration of attitudes toward inequality, poverty and redistribution, over the 
course of austerity.  
 
1.3 Rationale and Research Questions 
 
This research both complements and contributes to the existing literature, by providing a 
critical narrative of how austerity impacted on the lives of a number of people and groups 
in Britain. Tracking the austere changes imposed and demonstrating how over the course 
of austerity, both inequality and poverty increased (Belfield et al., 2014; Dorling, 2014; 
Aldridge et al., 2015; Mckenzie, 2015), public perceptions of inequality, poverty and 
redistribution are thus explored, with a focus on social, cultural, political and economic 
changes.  
 
It is beyond the scope of this research to determine why members of the British public hold 
the attitudes they do or to pinpoint exactly how these are formulated. However, given that 
attitudes are social, formed through both interaction and often a lack of experience 
(Goffman, 1959; Orton and Rowlingson, 2007; Underwood, 2009; Voas, 2014), it is crucial 
to explore what could have contributed to the formation of attitudes toward redistribution 
and people experiencing inequality and poverty, during the period of austerity examined 
here.  
 
Over the course of austerity examined here, perceptions of people experiencing inequality 
and poverty increasingly reflected stigmatising discourse that have predominated for 
decades (Bamfield and Horton, 2009; Baker and McEnery, 2015; Brooker et al., 2015; 
Paterson et al., 2016; Shildrick, 2018; van der Bom et al., 2018). Arguably these were 
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intensified by a social, political, cultural and economic environment that was hostile, 
though as Chapter 2 demonstrates, not unchallenged. In providing an analytical approach 
towards social attitudes between 2009-2015, this research investigates the social impact 
of austerity, examining public perceptions towards poverty, inequality and people in receipt 
of benefits. Exploring, further, how these attitudes relate to the willingness of the public to 
support redistribution initiatives. This research, therefore, aims to offer insight into how (if 
at all) the austere period relates to attitudinal changes amongst the British public.  
Quantitative secondary analysis of data from the British Social Attitudes Survey [BSAS] is 
used to address these aims. Three different datasets are selected to conduct comparative 
analysis, with each year selected purposely. The first year (2009) depicts the opinions held 
following the recession and period prior to the introduction of austerity measures. The 
second year (2012) captures the years following the introduction of austerity measures in 
2010 and the related reforms and cuts. The final year (2015), records how attitudes 
changed (if at all), following three years of austerity in Britain.  
 
Four research questions have been crafted for the purpose of this research, alongside a 
number of sub-questions. The research questions for this research, are as follows: 
 How are people in receipt of social security benefits perceived by others? 
 To what extent have attitudes towards poverty and inequality changed following the 
introduction of austerity measures in 2010? 
 To what extent do negative attitudes towards those in receipt of benefits 
relate to the level of support expressed toward income redistribution? 
 To what extent do socio-economic and demographic characteristics relate 
to perceptions of inequality and poverty? 
To address these questions, a number of sub-questions related to poverty and inequality 
are explored. Through the analysis of secondary data, this research explores whether the 
public believed that the income gap is ‘too large’, whether the redistribution of income is 
supported, whether people believe the ‘generosity’ of benefits lead to dependency, 
whether fraud is perceived to be a common feature amongst many benefit recipients and 
whether the public feel people in receipt of benefits are ‘undeserving’ of help.  
 
The analysis explores whether these opinions have changed between the period of 
austerity examined here. Attitudes are investigated in relation to specific characteristics. 
This includes demographic characteristics (gender, age, ethnic background and 
educational attainment), and socio-economic characteristics (employment status, self-
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rated income band, benefit status and occupation). The British public’s attitudes are 
interpreted, alongside the literature. Redistributional theories are also drawn on, including: 
Risk-exposure and Risk-aversion (Leon, 2012), the Spiral of Silence Model (Scheufele, 
2008), Rational Choice Theory and the Government Protection Hypothesis (Wu and Chou, 
2017). Alongside these theories, attitudes are understood in relation to Cannadine’s binary 
“vernacular” model of “them and us” (1998:19-20), the impact of social values on attitudes 
(Orton and Rowlingson, 2007), need explanations (Whitely,1981), and the role of altruism 
(Goerres and Jaeger, 2016). Chapter 6 considers these critically in relation to the findings 
outlined in Chapter 4 and 5.  
 
With an emphasis on understanding how these attitudes relate to the level of 
redistributional support expressed amongst the British public between 2009-2015, British 
social attitudes toward people experiencing poverty and inequality are thus explored. 
Concurrently, this research tracks some of the changes and cuts imposed by the Coalition 
and the Conservative government, seeking to critically understand the consequences of 
public spending reductions, for a number of individuals and groups in austerity Britain. 
Aside from the economic consequences of austerity, emphasis is also placed on the social 
environment, where alongside economic polarisation and political rhetoric, the media also 
reinvigorated instances of “scroungerphobia” (Deacon, 1978:124) amongst the British 
public.  
 
Given the scale of this research, the following section sets out the structure of this thesis, 
detailing the focus of each chapter. Beginning with a discussion of this thesis’ approach to, 
and understanding of the formation of attitudes, a critical overview of some of the key 
findings is also provided. Following this, the final section provides a discussion of this 
thesis’ contribution to existing knowledge. Based on the research findings, a discussion of 
the need for and possible direction of future research is also provided. 
 
1.4 Thesis structure and overview of the findings 
 
This section focuses on detailing the structure of this thesis, describing the focus of each 
chapter, and providing an overview of some of the key findings. Before this, this section 
begins by explaining how attitudes are understood in this research. 
In this research, attitudes are understood as complex, antithetical and often tentative. 
Reflecting this, the formation and indeed adaption of attitudes is understood sociologically. 
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Thus, it is argued here, that attitudes are not formed in isolation. Instead the role of both 
indirect and direct interaction or indeed experience, should also be considered. Further, 
whilst it is not suggested the media, nor politicians directly influence social attitudes, as 
Evans and Kelley (2017) also consider, these encounters alongside direct experiences, 
may influence perceptions. In this way, to understand attitudes and to do so sociologically, 
is to consider the role of social identities, social networks, experiences, inexperience and 
often fear, and this stance is supported by the literature (Goffman, 1959; Orton and 
Rowlingson, 2007; Underwood, 2009; Dorling, 2014; Voas, 2014; Evans and Kelley, 
2017). Demonstrating the originality and indeed contribution of this research, it is for these 
reasons social attitudes are considered in relation to a changing social, cultural, political 
and economic environment, and this is evidenced further by the structure of this thesis. 
 
Chapter 2 begins by providing an analytical backdrop of the economic, cultural, political 
and social climate in Britain between 2009-2015. Building on this exploration, this chapter 
provides insight into why austerity was implemented, but also how austerity was perceived 
by others. Alongside this, an overview of some of the key austere policy changes is 
provided. With emphasis placed on the rhetoric of broken Britain, an account of the 
consequences of austerity measures for a number of individuals and groups, is also 
provided. Given that negative representations yield further consequences for those 
considered ‘losers’, this chapter also explores how people in receipt of social security 
assistance were represented in the media and how this group was perceived by the public.  
The final section explores the formation of social attitudes, and how perceptions are often 
related to aspects of identity, like socio-economic and demographic characteristics. 
Outlining how attitudes can be understood by incorporating theories of understanding 
behaviour and preferences, Rational Choice Theory, Risk aversion, need explanations, the 
role of altruism, the Government Protection Hypothesis, the Spiral of Silence Model and 
the role of social values are explored, prior to their contextual application in Chapter 6.  
 
Chapter 3 presents the methods, methodology and ethical considerations inherent to this 
research. The initial stages of the research and its design, alongside the strengths and 
limitations of the research design, are discussed critically. Emphasis is also placed on the 
rationale for choosing both secondary data analysis and the data source selected. The 
variable selection process, and how each variable featured in the analyse, is also 
presented. Providing an explanation of how the research has been conducted with both 
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integrity and with a strong ethical foundation, the final section focuses on the ethical 
guidelines adhered to, during each stage of this research.  
 
Chapter 4, the first of two findings chapters, explores how the British public perceive the 
income gap and income redistribution, and how these attitudes changed (if at all) over the 
course of austerity examined here. To foster a broader sociological understanding of social 
attitudes amongst particular groups, following this, Chapter 6 also considers these findings 
in relation to the literature, and the findings identified in Chapter 5. The findings outlined in 
Chapter 4 suggest that large proportions of the British public agree that income inequality 
between groups, is a gap they consider ‘too large’, but that support toward redistribution is 
less favourable amongst the public. What was also notable, however, is that support 
toward income redistribution is more likely amongst people who recognise the income 
inequality gap as ‘too large’.  
 
Whilst the findings suggest that large proportions of the British public were united in the 
belief that “the gap between people on high and low incomes is too large”, each year, and 
that support toward income redistribution is more likely amongst people who recognise the 
income inequality gap as ‘too large’, some attitudinal shifts are also notable. The findings 
suggest that the public became more concerned with the income inequality gap between 
2009-2012, and this is evidenced by an increase in the number of people holding this view. 
That said, this increase is relatively small (just 3.8pp). By 2015 and following five years of 
austerity measures, it might have been expected that the public’s opinions would reflect 
increasing inequality, and cuts to social security provision. Instead, concern amongst the 
public decreased by 6.4pp. Overall, between 2009-2015, concern toward the income gap 
remained substantial but fell to a level lower than in 2009, but again this change was 
relatively small (2.6pp).  
 
Attitudes toward the redistribution of income also changed, but to a greater extent over 
time. Notably, redistributional support, in comparison to the perceived need of intervention, 
was much lower each year. Redistributional support amongst the public did increase 
between 2009-2012, but this increase was less than 5pp. Between 2012-2015 support 
increased amongst the public once again, but this change was even smaller (2.6pp). 
Nevertheless, between 2009-2015 overall, the findings suggest that support toward 
income redistribution increased to a greater extent (7.4pp). Whilst this suggests public 
support toward the redistribution of income increased over time, at 44.7% redistributional 
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support remained low. Given the perceived need, alongside rising inequality, this was 
surprising; these changes are discussed in greater detail in Chapter 6. 
 
In approaching attitudes sociologically, attitudes toward the income gap and redistribution 
were investigated further in relation to aspects of identity, including age, gender and 
ethnicity, alongside socio-economic position, including benefit status. Chapter 4 
highlighted which groups were more likely to recognise income inequality and which 
groups were more likely to support income redistribution. In part, the findings supported 
the literature, strengthening the findings of others. For example, women are identified as a 
group susceptible to income inequality to a greater extent than men (Longhi and Platt, 
2008; Nandi and Platt, 2012; Conley; UKCES, 2014). In this way, it was expected attitudes 
toward the income gap by gender would reflect this, and this is apparent within the 
findings. That said, Goerres and Jaeger’s (2016) contention was not reflected in attitudes 
towards the redistribution of income by gender. Although it was expected that women 
would also be more likely to support the redistribution of income, a different picture 
emerged. Instead men were consistently more likely to support the redistribution of 
income.  
 
Further demonstrating the contribution of this research, without the sociological exploration 
provided within this research, this may have been surprising. However, as discussed in 
Chapter 6, changing attitudes amongst men appeared to reflect wider changes. As 
emphasised in Chapter 6, over the course of austerity examined here, men were identified 
as a group facing economic difficulty as a result of austerity measures (McKay et al.,2013). 
Exploration of labour market statistics, alongside the literature in relation to these findings, 
meant that attitudinal disparities amongst men and women could be interpreted in relation 
to self-interest. Thus, the findings suggest as changes occurred within the labour market, 
worsening the economic position of men, these changes though slight, appear to be 
reflected in attitudes toward the redistribution of income. 
 
Continuing to approach attitudes toward inequality, poverty and redistribution 
sociologically, these findings are considered further in the second findings chapter. To 
understand how negative attitudes toward social security recipients relate to support 
toward income redistribution, Chapter 5 focuses on how the public perceive benefit 
claimants. Drawing on the Literature, perceptions of deservingness, fraud and welfare 
generosity and dependency amongst the public are explored. The findings suggest that 
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stigmatising discourse remained prevalent during this period, with a significant proportion 
of the British public in agreement that people in receipt of social security assistance are 
undeserving of help, that benefit recipients are fraudulently claiming, and that the 
generosity of benefit payments lead to dependency. To illustrate, in 2009 over 35% of the 
British public felt that people in receipt of social security assistance did not deserve help, 
by 2012, the proportion holding this view had increased, that said this increase was 
particularly small.  
 
Greater changes are however notable between 2012-2015 where the proportion of people 
sharing this view fell by 7.5pp. Reflecting the same pattern over time, a similar proportion 
of the public also agreed with the statement “most people on the dole are fiddling in one 
way or another”, each year. Notably, the findings outlined in this chapter also identified 
concern toward welfare generosity and benefit dependency as greater than support toward 
redistribution. Thus, whist less than half the British public supported the redistribution of 
income each year, in 2009, 2012 and 2015, more than half agreed that “if welfare benefits 
weren’t so generous people would learn to stand on their own feet”. Whilst this perception 
became less likely over time, and following five years of austerity measures, as Table 
5.3.1.2 shows, these changes are particularly small. 
 
Focusing on the significant findings, as Section 5.1.1 and 5.2.1 demonstrate, an interesting 
pattern emerged within the data. In 2015, people in receipt of benefits or those with a 
spouse in receipt of benefits, were more likely to agree with the statement: “many people 
who get social security don’t really deserve help” and the statement “most people on the 
dole are fiddling in one way or another”, than those who did not claim benefits. In this 
research, it is posited that these findings can be explained by considering the social and 
cultural aspects of attitude formation, alongside Cannadine’s binary “vernacular” model of 
“them” and “us” (1998:19-20). Accordingly, based on these findings, and as a result of the 
ongoing stereotypical and stigmatising discourse highlighted in Chapter 2 and 6, it is 
argued that people in receipt of benefits (or those with a spouse in receipt) are aware of 
the “symbolic demarcations between them and us” (Bottero, 2005:234) and thus of 
growing social and cultural divisions, and as a consequence, appear to have positioned 
themselves to avoid the label “them” in relation to the prevailing “images of inequality” 
(Bottero, 2005:24). With this in mind, this chapter also investigates how negative attitudes 
toward benefit recipients relate to support toward redistribution amongst the public. The 
findings suggest that redistributional support is significantly reduced amongst people who 
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perceive of benefit recipients as undeserving or that the generosity of benefit payments 
leads to dependency and this is a problem in need of addressing.  
 
Chapter 6 brings together the findings outlined in Chapter 4 and 5. A range of the available 
literature is drawn on to discuss the findings analytically, whilst also considering the 
economic, cultural, social and political climate in austerity Britain. This chapter, thus, 
discusses the findings in relation to the research questions and wider social changes, 
drawing once again on redistributional theories, including: risk-exposure and risk-aversion 
(Leon, 2012), the spiral of silence model (Scheufele, 2008), Rational Choice Theory and 
the government protection hypothesis (Wu and Chou, 2017) to explore public perceptions. 
Alongside this, the findings are again considered sociologically, and thus in relation to 
Cannadine’s binary “vernacular” model (1998:19-20), social values (Orton and 
Rowlingson, 2007), need explanation’s (Whitely, 1981), and the role of altruism (Goerres 
and Jaeger, 2016). 
 
The consequences of austerity are restated in Chapter 7, noting how widening social 
inequalities have been observable throughout the period of austerity examined here. 
Emphasis is placed on the research findings, noting how much needed public support 
toward income redistribution (Monnickendam and Gordon, 2010; Prabhakar, 2012; Wu 
and Chou, 2015) is lacking. This chapter thus emphasises the need to address negative 
attitudes toward those in receipt of social security. With this in mind this chapter also offers 
recommendations as to how support could be bolstered and moreover, where this may 
need to be targeted.  
 
Whilst this section focused on detailing the structure of this thesis, describing the focus of 
each of the chapters, and on providing a critical overview of some of the key findings, the 
following chapter provides a succinct a discussion of this thesis’ contribution to existing 
knowledge, alongside the need for, and possible direction of future research.  
 
1.5 Research contribution and recommendations  
 
This section focuses on highlighting further, how this research contributes to and extends 
existing knowledge. Following this and based on the findings presented in Chapter 4 and 
5, research recommendations are also provided. 
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As already emphasised, this research sought to examine public perceptions of inequality, 
poverty and redistribution in austerity Britain between 2009-2015. However, rather than 
focusing on attitudinal differences amongst members of the British public alone, this 
research has been undertaken sociologically. Thus, to understand British social attitudes 
towards inequality, poverty and redistribution during this period, emphasis has also been 
placed on the social, cultural, political and economic environment and the impact of 
austerity measures on a number of groups in Britain. Accordingly, to enable a broader 
understanding of attitudes, and to contribute to and indeed extend existing knowledge, 
rather than focus on statistical consistencies or indeed changes in British social attitudes 
over time, emphasis has also been placed on social inequalities and disadvantage, 
alongside policy changes. By incorporating an extensive analysis of attitudinal data in 
relation to societal change and social inequalities, this approach thus extends existing 
knowledge.  
 
Reflecting this stance and a wide body of evidence drawn on throughout this research, this 
research considers attitudinal findings in relation to social identities. This includes gender, 
age, ethnic group, alongside wider social inequalities, and relevant social policy changes 
during the period of austerity examined in this research. The importance of this approach 
is further evidenced in Chapter 6, where a critical analytical discussion of the research 
findings outlined in Chapter 4 and 5 is also provided. In completing this thesis, this 
research has demonstrated that the consequences of austerity for a number of groups, 
both socially and economically, are profound. Whilst this research sought to understand 
attitudes both sociologically and critically, further exploration is, however, required. It is 
therefore posited that policy makers and commentators should seek to understand why 
members of the British public continue to express negative attitudes towards those who 
are experiencing economic hardship. Having achieved greater understanding of the 
formation of these attitudes, steps toward challenging these views may be taken. Thus, to 
gain more widespread support toward monetary redistribution, and successful equality 
policies, further research is necessary.  Without this, negative attitudes, reflective of 
stereotypical rhetoric, will continue to hinder steps toward a reduction in the prevailing 
levels of social inequality and poverty.  
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Chapter 2 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
Presented thematically, this research explores public perceptions of poverty, inequality 
and redistribution in Britain, following the economic recession of 2008/09 and the 
introduction of austerity measures in 2010. This Chapter begins by providing an 
introduction, exploring the backdrop to what became austerity Britain, before providing a 
critical narrative of the literature, followed by conclusion.  
 
2.1.1 Austerity Britain, overview   
 
As this Chapter demonstrates, incomes fell following the financial crisis (Clarke et al., 
2016), with the consequences of such economic difficulties still being witnessed across 
Britain and in the UK (Padley et al., 2017). The crisis had a “transformative effect on the 
UK economy”, with the repercussions of financial instability distributed unevenly (Catney 
and Sabater, 2015:15) and moving beyond economic disparities in income. As a result of 
the introduction of austerity measures, both the vulnerability towards and levels of social 
inequality and poverty, are expected to continue to have lasting impacts on the quality of 
life experienced by a considerable proportion of the British public (McKendrick et al., 2008; 
Oxfam, 2013; Lansley and Mack, 2015; Tucker, 2017; Alston, 2018).  
 
Although Britain should be a place where, irrespective of location nor characteristic, 
everyone is afforded the opportunity to lead a “secure” and “decent life” (JRF, 2016:4), as 
the evidence presented here suggests, for many this is not always the case. To illustrate, 
between 2009-2010, measured before housing costs [BHC], 10.4 million people were 
living the consequences of relative poverty in the UK, calculated after housing costs [AHC] 
this increased to 13.5 million individuals experiencing life in absolute poverty (Belfield et 
al., 2015:37). Comparatively, in 2013-14, the absolute poverty rate in the UK, calculated 
AHC was 21.6% of the population or 13.6 million individuals, whilst the UK relative poverty 
rate stood at 21.0% or 13.2 million individuals (Belfield et al., 2015:5). Not only did poverty 
increase between 2009-10 and 2013-4, by 2015 a little over one in five of the UK 
population were living in poverty (Barnard, 2017).  
 
32 
 
By 2016, disquiet with reference to a number of societal issues, including yet not limited to: 
homelessness, social security benefits, poverty, housing, food poverty and moreover the 
impact of austerity as a whole, were reinvigorated by the UNCESCR (2016). The 
consequences of such poverty and inequality are said to “lie at the heart of the struggle for 
social justice and a fairer society” (Bunyan, 2016:491), yet with the decision to exit the 
European Union, although the full impact remains “uncertain” (Emmerson et al., 2016:3) 
both inequality and poverty are expected to increase further (Springford, 2015). Brexit and 
the implications of such uncertainty, are moreover, occurring in a society in which over the 
last fifty years, “the gap between rich and poor has risen” (Belfield et al., 2015:3). 
Following the recession of 2008, the gap between the top 1 per cent and the remaining 99 
per cent of society became increasingly more pronounced (Dorling, 2014:2). 
Subsequently, it has been argued that whilst “the rich have grown richer”, Britain has 
become a more unequal society (Irvin, 2011:176).  
 
Tonkin illustrates this point further, noting that in the financial year ending 2015 (2014-15), 
the “average income of the richest fifth of UK households before taxes and benefits was 
£83,800”, fourteen times higher than that of the poorest fifth, who per year, had an 
average income of £6,100 (2016:2). Such statements are further compounded by findings 
from The Equality Trust [TET], whom purported that by 2016 alone, in Britain “the richest 
1,000 people own [owned] more wealth than 40% of households or 10.3 million families” 
(2016:2). Comparing the findings from a year earlier (between 2015-2016) also 
demonstrates that “the combined wealth of Britain’s 1,000 richest people increased by 
£28.508 billion, to…£576 billion” (TET, 2016:3). Thus, according to their calculations, the 
overall wealth of the 100 richest people in Britain, up by an increase of £14.98 billion from 
2015, amounted to £322.89 billion by 2016 (TET, 2016:3). Or presented differently, amidst 
rising vulnerability toward inequality and poverty, and increasing financial uncertainty for 
many, a comparison of the figures between 2015-2016, show an overall income increase 
for the few of 4.9 per cent or £473.78 per second or £40.934 million per day (TET, 2016:3).  
 
The findings from TET are demonstrative of the assertion made by Christie and Warburton 
(2001). Supporting their suggestion that what is particularly significant, is how rather than 
seeing wealth “trickle down”, it can be argued that it is instead, “coagulated around them 
[the wealthy]” and as a result, “the poor have been left to languish” (Christie and 
Warburton, 2001:28). These figures thus not only demonstrate the unequal distribution of 
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income in Britain, they also support the contention of theorists’ describing income 
polarisation more than a decade prior to their publication.  
Yet, for Christie and Warburton it is not the knowhow, capital, nor the ability or resources 
that is lacking “to lift the absolute poor out of poverty”, or to “reduce…divisions within and 
between societies”, it is instead a lack of “will to implement the changes made urgent by 
mounting evidence of widening gaps between rich and poor”, by governments worldwide 
(2001:2). More recently and in the context of austerity in the UK, Alston (2018:22-23) 
appears to support this contention, exclaiming:  
the experience of the United Kingdom, especially since 2010, underscores 
the conclusion that poverty is a political choice. Austerity could easily have 
spared the poor, if the political will had existed to do so. Resources were 
available to the Treasury at the last budget that could have transformed the 
situation of millions of people living in poverty, but the political choice was 
made to fund tax cuts for the wealthy instead. 
 
Christie and Warburton and Alston, writing nearly two decades apart, ergo highlight how 
‘problems’ such as income inequality and poverty, could be “solved by those in power for 
those without” (McKendrick et al., 2008:29) but that this is not considered a priority.  
 
Thus, whilst “improvements could be experienced by all”, the fact that this has not 
occurred, signifies failure for Christie and Warburton (2001:2). This failure is, moreover, 
further compounded by the fact that societies are becoming further segregated by income 
inequality and of “quality of life”, despite having the means to ensure that all have access 
to food and “decent” working and living conditions (Christie and Warburton, 2001:83). An 
illustration of this failure, and of how people in austerity Britain are losing out, can be 
drawn from the increasing use of food and clothing banks in Britain, both prior to and 
following the economic crisis of 2008/09 (Dorling, 2014; Todd, 2016; O’Hara, 2014, Butler, 
2015; Cooper et al., 2014; Toynbee and Walker, 2015, Alston, 2018). As highlighted within 
this research, following the introduction of austerity measures, food bank use increased 
considerably (Trussell Trust [TT], 2015; Loopstra et al., 2018). With the effects of the 
austerity measures identified in Section 2.3, suggesting further failure. 
 
Discussing poverty in the UK has, however, been described as “unfashionable” (Shildrick 
and MacDonald, 2013:293) and a subject considered “uncomfortable” for a number of 
people (Castell and Thompson, 2007:10). Yet, the increasing proportion of individuals 
donating to charity shops and food banks (Todd, 2016), appears to suggest recognition of 
rising inequalities and willingness to act to reduce adversity. For Butler, the charities and 
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volunteers behind these operations (food banks) are taking up their “role as a sticking 
plaster for gaps in the welfare state”, with such food insecurity and consequent rationing, 
being likened to the post World War II era in Britain (2014, no pagination). Moreover, the 
findings of a publication from the JRF, provide more “damming evidence” (Todd, 2016: no 
pagination), highlighting that there are more than one million people in the UK who are or 
have been destitute (Fitzpatrick et al.,2016).  
 
Thus, despite the UK being listed as the “world's fifth largest economy” (Alston, 2018:1), 
both inequality and poverty persist (Dorling, 2014; Oxfam, 2016a; Oxfam, 2016b). 
Discussing levels of poverty and destitution more recently, Alston asserted that “for one in 
every two children to be poor in twenty-first century Britain is not just a disgrace, but a 
social calamity and an economic disaster, all rolled into one” (2018:1). Notably, people are 
once again finding themselves living in, “in the midst of plenty…appalling conditions of 
poverty” (Christie and Warburton, 2001:83).  
 
Given the rise in volunteers seeking to feed, clothe and care for their fellow citizens, this 
suggests that although individualism may have increased following the “economic reforms 
of the 1980’s and beyond” (Stanley, 2016:18) it is yet to fully take hold. That said, as this 
chapter demonstrates, hostility toward people facing inequality and poverty has not 
dissipated amongst some members of the British Public (McKendrick et al., 2008; Dorey, 
2010; Levitas, 2012; Penny, 2013; O’Hara, 2014; Brooker et al., 2015; Toynbee and 
Walker, 2015; van der Bom et al., 2018), thus suggesting that individualistic attitudes 
toward poverty and inequality remain both prevalent, and as this research amongst others 
suggest, problematic (Fong et al., 2003; Mooney and Hancock, 2010; Monnickendam and 
Gordon, 2010; Lansley and Mack, 2015; Toynbee and Walker, 2015).  
 
Whilst a full historical account of inequality and poverty is not provided here, the research 
seeks to introduce and focus upon the five years prior to the election of the Conservative 
and Liberal Democrat Coalition Government in May 2010 (2005-10), before moving toward 
an explorative account of the years following their election (2010-15) and the election of 
the current, Conservative majority government in 2015, first headed by David Cameron, 
and now Teresa May. As Pemberton highlights, following the recession and the “bail out” 
of the banks, “political attention turned to the growing public deficit”, noting further how 
“public-sector austerity came to dominate the policy agenda” (2014:6). What was to follow 
were two successive governments, which in an effort to reduce public spending, issued 
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emergency budgets and set forth implementing austerity measures (O’Hara, 2014; 
Toynbee and Walker, 2015). This time frame is thus pertinent to this research, in that 
during those ten years, not only were there changes in governance but also a recession, 
with the consequences of the subsequent austerity measures, for a proportion of the UK at 
least, still being felt (Dorling, 2014; O’Hara, 2014; Tucker, 2017; Alston, 2018; TT, 2018).  
 
Although an austere programme of government was considered the best way forward by 
the Coalition and the Conservatives, for Toynbee and Walker, it marked instead the 
beginning of “a chain saw massacre of the welfare state” (2015:63), where despite the 
“primary purpose of the…welfare state” being the “alleviation of poverty” (Monnickendam 
and Gordon, 2010:571) and a provider of opportunity (O’Hara, 2014), the focus was 
instead placed on the reduction of its reach through austere budgets. Although the 
spending reductions outlined in each budget thereafter, were celebrated as an effective 
way to restore the economy, for Thomas these budgets signalled instead, a form of “class 
war”, being “waged with a calculator” (2014: xii), where “the need for austerity was one 
thing”, yet “who bore its wounds was another” (Toynbee and Walker, 2015:7).  
 
For Mooney and Hancock, the assault on people experiencing poverty, aside from 
economic hardship, occurs both socially and culturally in numerous ways (2010). This, 
they argue, is evident in the news media, print and television broadcasts, where “examples 
of dysfunctionality” are “seized” on, resulting in both the construction and the 
reinforcement of “dominant attitudes to poverty and welfare” (Mooney and Hancock, 2010: 
no pagination). For Mooney and Hancock, this framing has both consequences and a 
purpose, to “serve to harden attitudes to poverty” and importantly, “justify harsher welfare 
policies” as a result (2010: no pagination). Similarly, given the current climate of austerity, 
what is particularly concerning for Monnickendam and Gordon, is how “the relatively low 
levels of public support for…government actions to combat poverty may lead to an 
eventual reduction in the emphasis…placed on poverty eradication”, all together 
(2010:556-571). Thus, without public support for redistributive policies and an awareness 
of such changing perceptions, this may prove problematic for the future of Britain and the 
UK as a whole (Monnickendam and Gordon, 2010).  
 
Accordingly, with a focus on the economic, social, cultural and political environment, this 
research explores attitudinal changes toward inequality, poverty and redistribution in 
austerity Britain, sociologically. The following section provides a description of the 
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structure of this literature review, highlighting the necessity, alongside the focus of each of 
the sections included within the literature review. 
 
2.1.2 Structure of the literature review 
 
To foster a broader understanding of contemporary sociological debates of inequality, 
poverty and the redistribution of income, alongside “punitive attitudes toward the poor” 
(Levitas, 2012:322), there are several important elements to this research, and these are 
presented thematically throughout this Chapter. Each section begins with an introduction, 
setting out the scope of the section and ends with a summary. The final section of this 
chapter offers a conclusion, situating this research in relation to existing knowledge.  
 
The first section (2.2.1) provides an account of what austerity is and moreover, what 
measures have been introduced by the Coalition and Conservative governments. This 
section also begins to explore the rhetoric of both the Coalition and now Conservative 
government, providing an overview of the fiscal outlook from 2005 through to 2015. 
Focussing on public sector spending, the national deficit and tracking the changes of each 
government from 2010, throughout their terms in office. Further, emphasis is placed upon 
the ideological rhetoric of neo-liberalism. To provide a broader understanding of life in 
Britain during this period of austerity, Section 2.3.1 outlines the consequences of life lived 
in austere Britain, highlighting increasing social inequalities and thus exploring the impact 
of austerity led budget cuts, for a number of groups.  
 
To highlight the social and cultural climate prevalent in austerity Britain over this period, 
this section is followed by a brief overview of mediated rhetoric during austerity and the 
ways in which people living on low incomes have been framed, in both printed and 
broadcasted media. Focusing on the consequences of negative representations for the 
groups concerned, the third section thus (2.4) highlights how this coverage reduces the 
perceived importance of inequality in Britain and the UK, by instead shifting the focus of 
attention upon individuals and their apparent inadequacies.  
 
This is followed by section’s (2.5) which explore how social identities, perceptions and 
experiences often mean that social and economic distances widen, impacting further upon 
experiences but also on the attitudes people hold towards others and income redistribution 
(2.6). The final section (2.7) of this literature review not only introduces the following 
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chapter, but provides a conclusion, contextualising the importance of this research, in 
relation to what is already known. Thus, the purpose of this research will be restated.   
 
2.2 Creating austerity Britain, Introduction  
 
Providing a brief fiscal backdrop to the recession and implementation of austere policies, 
this section explores austerity in Britain. Defining and locating austerity as an economic 
plan that was to bring forth both economic and non-economic consequences, for already 
vulnerable groups. A number of the key changes implemented by the Coalition and 
Conservative governments, witnessed between 2010-2015 are also explored, alongside 
the provision of an explorative account of both support and resistance toward austerity.  
 
2.2.1 Austerity in Britain   
 
Previously, when the New Labour party were elected in 1997, following the recession of 
the early 1990s, public finances were already improving, due to both increases in tax and 
public spending cuts, instigated by the Conservative government from 1993 (Chote et al., 
2010). By 2007-08, public finances were reported to be in a “stronger position” than they 
had been when Labour arrived into office (Chote et al., 2010:10). Public spending 
increased from 39.9% in 1996-97, to 41.1% between 2007-08, with revenues also subject 
to a 2.3 percentage point growth, with total borrowing also decreasing by 1.0 percentage 
point over this period (Chote et al., 2010:10). The budget also strengthened, falling to a 
relatively small deficit of 0.3% of national income, down from 2.7% in 1996-1997 (Chote et 
al.,2010). For the same period, public sector net debt decreased from 42.5% of national 
income to 36.5%, with spending as a share of national income, increasing from 36.8% in 
2000-01 to 41.1% (Chote et al., 2010).  
 
Between 2007-2009 the then Labour Government, however, intervened to support a failing 
banking sector, providing £137 billion of public money in the form of capital, loans and 
guarantees, to not only instil confidence in the financial system, but to also restore stability 
(Mor, 2018). By Autumn 2008-09, the UK had entered recession (Vaitilingam, 2009; Allen, 
2010) where it was argued that the financial crisis had adversely affected the UK 
economy, on a scale not seen in many other countries (Crawford et al., 2012). During this 
period and through to 2009-2010, government borrowing “increased rapidly…as real 
economic activity in the UK…fell sharply”, with spending in this period said to reach “a 
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post-Second World War high” (Crawford et al., 2012:48-50). Following their election, the 
Coalition maintained that this increase in spending was problematic and in need of 
reduction (HM Treasury Spending Review, 2010). The Coalition declared that they had 
“inherited one of the most challenging fiscal positions in the world”, highlighting further how 
Britain’s deficit a year earlier “was the largest in its peacetime history”, amounting to 11 per 
cent of GDP, and warning that “the state was borrowing one pound for every four it spent” 
(HM Treasury Spending Review, 2010:13).  
 
Both at the beginning of the crisis of 2008 and in the twenty years prior to 2006-07, public 
spending averaged around 40 per cent of GDP (HM Treasury Spending Review, October 
2010). Reaching “a historically high level” by 2009-10, spending increased further to 48 
per cent (HM Treasury Spending Review, October 2010:13). As a consequence, the 
Coalition declared how over the decade “the UK’s economy became unbalanced and 
relied on unsustainable public spending and rising levels of public debt” (HM Treasury 
Spending Review, October 2010:6). Net public sector debt had reached £956.4bn (62 per 
cent of GDP) by the end of 2009/10, with a budget deficit amounting to 6.9 per cent of 
GDP or £103.9bn (Lupton et al., 2015:2).  
 
Subsequently, the government argued that the “most urgent issue facing Britain”, was the 
need to reduce the deficit swiftly and thus to continue to “ensure economic recovery” (HM 
Government, 2010:15). To deliver a reduction in the amount of borrowing, the Coalition 
planned “much like the previous Labour government” to “rely heavily on deep spending 
cuts” (Crawford et al., 2011:131). The Coalition were set to go ahead with what they stated 
was an “unavoidable deficit reduction plan”, proclaiming that this would be achieved in 
such a way that the country was to be both “strengthened” and “united” (HM Treasury 
Budget, June 2010:1).  
 
Their strategy was to lead the UK's economic recovery, through the implementation of 
austerity measures, where the “driving imperative of this policy” was to “force down public-
sector spending” (Levitas, 2012:322). Emphasis was thus placed on a reduction of public 
spending on the welfare state, where as Levitas notes, public money spent on the “bail out 
of banks” was not featured within this review (2017:5). Instead, as scheduled in October of 
2010, the then Chancellor of the Exchequer, George Osbourne, revealed further plans to 
save £7 billion each year (HM Treasury Spending review, October 2010). This was to be 
achieved by ensuring that both public services and the welfare state were placed on “a 
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sustainable footing for the long term” (George Osbourne Spending Review, October 2010: 
no pagination). This was going to be, as Osbourne declared, “a hard road” from the onset, 
yet he argued that it was one that would “lead to a better future” (George Osbourne 
Spending Review, October 2010: no pagination).  
 
The Coalition maintained that their core values were “freedom, fairness and responsibility”, 
that they wished to create a “Big Society”, whereby more power and opportunity was to be 
placed into “people’s hands” (Building the Big Society, 2010:1). Yet, as highlighted within 
the October Budget “particular focus” was to be “given to reducing welfare costs and 
wasteful spending” (HM Treasury 2010:5, my italics). Not only was this to be a long 
running feature of the Coalition government, this focus has since led others to argue that 
the Coalition’s policies seemed “ideologically driven, rather than economically sensible” 
(Trades Union Congress [TUC], 2015:2). Indeed, their austere plan to cut “public spending 
over the five years from April 2011”, was considered to “be larger in real terms than the UK 
has seen in any other five-year period since the end of the Second World War” (Crawford 
et al., 2011:131) and as Section 2.3 demonstrates, has had a lasting impact on many 
already disadvantaged individuals and groups.  
 
Although austerity “has a long and complicated history”, its “current significance derives 
directly from the multiple and multi-layered crisis of the financial system” (Clarke and 
Newman, 2012:300). For the purposes of this research, austerity and its implementation 
from 2010-2015, will remain the focus. Yet, rather than debate whether austerity ‘works’ or 
not, this research focuses on what austerity is and importantly, on the consequences of 
austerity for the British public. Indeed, whilst debate over whether austerity was and is a 
feasible option, or why it should not have been enacted (Coote, 2010; Penny and Slay, 
2012; Oxfam, 2013; Blyth, 2013; O’Hara, 2014; Seymour, 2014; Toynbee and Walker, 
2015; Krugman, 2015; Warmedinger et al., 2015; CFM, 2015; Wren-Lewis, 2016; Stiglitz, 
2017) have predominated, there has largely been a lack of “general agreement about what 
austerity is” in this context (Konzelmann, 2012:2). Room, however, explains succinctly that 
“austerity makes reduction of the public-sector deficit the principal economic goal”, noting 
further that this is pursued through public spending cuts, and that this “shrinkage of the 
public sector”, alongside reducing the deficit, will also “stimulate the private sector” 
(2015:3).   
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Thus, the “aim of economic austerity is to reduce a country’s deficit-the difference between 
what the government spends and the revenues it earns” (Konzelmann, 2012:2). 
Konzelmann highlights, further, how these measures ultimately involve a combination of 
increased taxation, alongside decreases in public spending (2012:2). Clarke and Newman 
note, however, that the financial crisis has been transmuted into a “fiscal crisis centered on 
government debt”, where the cause of the economic crash (bank bail outs) has been 
“ideologically reworked” as a political, rather than as an economic problem (2012:300). 
Thus allowing “blame and responsibility for the crisis” to be reallocated (Clarke and 
Newman, 2012:300). This ‘reworking’ has, in this view, shifted the focus from the banks 
and their “high risk strategies”, onto what is regarded as “unwieldly and expensive welfare 
state and public sector” (Clarke and Newman, 2012:300). By extension, this has had an 
impact on those struggling, and/or in receipt of social security provisions whom were 
“convicted” (Golding and Middleton, 1982:3) once more, and held to blame for the financial 
crisis and their own predicaments. 
 
The UK has, as purported by Clarke and Newman, “taken something of a vanguard 
position in austerity…cutting deeper and harder than most EU countries” (2012:300). 
Notably, there has been a number of instances whereby fiscal consolidation has been 
sought through a reduction or reforms within the welfare state, rather than through a 
commitment to increase income tax (Konzelmann, 2012; Oxfam, 2013; Bailey and 
Bramley, 2018). For instance, over their five years in office, the Coalition sought to 
introduce complex welfare reforms, reducing the level of “total public spending by 2.6 per 
cent between 2009/10 and 2014/15” (Lupton et al., 2015:1). Both “rapid and far reaching 
reforms were enacted”, such as the introduction of Universal Credit, the re-structuring of 
the NHS, Academy expansion, “pension reforms, widening non-state provision, increasing 
local autonomy and reducing eligibility for services and benefits” (Lupton et al., 2015:1).  
 
Whilst the Coalition in the aftermath of the recession, remarked “difficult decisions” would 
be made; stressing further how they would “ensure that fairness” was “at the heart of those 
decisions”, and ensuring “all those most in need” would be “protected” (HM Government, 
May 2010:7), as this research demonstrates, their promises appear to have been proven 
void, whereby instead of the “better off” carrying the “burden of austerity”, their changes to 
social security payments and tax credits, had a negative impact on the poorest (Lupton et 
al., 2015:1). Thus, whilst Lupton et al. highlighted that “there is no doubt that the 
Coalition…faced a very tough fiscal climate and ongoing social policy issues” (2015:8), as 
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Section 2.3 demonstrates, their choice to implement austerity measures resulted in further 
inequality and disadvantage. Notably, this has led to the argument that as a result of “fiscal 
consolidation”, the welfare state has been transformed (Hood and Oakley, 2014:3) as have 
the lives of those who depend on its shrinking, constricted services.  
 
As Lansley and Mack assert, the election of the Coalition government in 2010 and their 
consequent austerity programme, rather than reflecting the Coalitions’ mantra of each and 
every one being “in it together” (Building the Big Society, 2010:1), marks the “return to a 
more fully fledged individualistic approach”; whereby attention was given more so to 
individual behaviour, as the “key driver of poverty”, rather than “wider social and economic 
forces” (2015:67). This position meant further segregation and hostility. Toynbee and 
Walker argue that such individualistic explanations were “fanned by the government”, and 
as a consequence were “seeping into the nation”, where there was a noticeably “growing 
public intolerance” toward income taxation, welfare and those in receipt of social security 
provision (2015:109). What is thus also apparent, is that public attitudes towards the 
welfare state have also changed, seemingly reflecting the rhetoric of the Coalition and 
subsequent Conservative party.  
 
At the same time, however, the numbers of global protests also grew, with the focus of 
many of the demonstrations increasingly reflecting what Dorling refers to as “issues of 
economic justice” (2014:2). This is evidenced by an example from a demonstration held in 
London in 2011, organised by the TUC, where members of the British public declared their 
disapproval and contempt towards the rekindling of neo-liberalism, and notions of the ‘Big 
Society’. The signs wielded by demonstrators read “Cameron there is no such thing as 
your big society”, “Beware of the Big Society” and with an image of both Margaret 
Thatcher and David Cameron, “same shit, different decade” (Levitas, 2012:328).  
 
Others have, moreover, frequently expressed their discontent toward a programme of 
austerity, where declarations have included further references to individualisation and 
individual problems. Toynbee and Walker, for instance, argued that the Coalition’s legacy 
was one of cruelty and success in “hardening” the hearts of the nation, maintaining that 
“nothing stamps the character of the government as clearly as its assault on the welfare 
state and its campaign to turn public opinion against the needy” (2015:127). Similarly, 
O’Hara argued that both “privilege and dogma…framed the Conservatives thinking”, as 
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they began to “mount the greatest ever assault upon the welfare state and the poor since 
World War II” (2014: xiii).  
 
Indeed, although it was argued by the chancellor, that the cuts presented in the first 
emergency budget, and arguably thereafter, “laid the foundations for a more prosperous 
future” (Osborne, 2010: no pagination), others maintained that what really occurred was 
the welfare state being “cut with a rusty axe wielded with malice” (Toynbee and Walker, 
2015:111). O’Hara strengthens this point further, arguing that what has become 
increasingly clear is that those who are poor no longer matter, they are instead conceived 
of as “casualties of ideology”, both neo-liberal and austere (2014: xii). This latter point is 
supported by Farnsworth and Irving, whereby they describe “fiscal consolidation” as “a 
handy tool to craft the harsher and more residualised welfare model long preferred by 
market liberals” (2018:477). Despite this scrutiny and resistance, the Coalition continued 
their austere approach, arguing for a change in the direction and scope of the state, 
reiterating that what was required was a “Big Society” rather than a “Big State” (HM 
Treasury, 2010).  
 
Cameron maintained from the onset, however, that their vision of a ‘Big Society’ was “not 
about creating cover for cuts”, instead it was argued that this form of governance would 
unite the nation, who would stand together (2010: no pagination). On behalf of the 
Coalition, Cameron elucidated what was meant by their mantra “we are all in this 
together”, this he urged, was not to be considered “a cry for help”, but instead “a call to 
arms” (Cameron, 2010: no pagination). Grimshaw and Rubery, however, offer a different 
explanation of the Coalition’s ‘Big Society’, suggesting that:  
the key notion is that the amorphous and unaccountable ‘big society’ can be 
empowered to provide services instead of the state, to the extent that these 
are truly needed or required, without the state being blamed for any failings 
of service provision as it is the local community that will fill the gaps 
(2012:122). 
 
Grimshaw and Rubery (2012), not only point toward deepening individualistic ideals within 
this statement, they also appear to highlight how responsibility was removed from the state 
and placed instead on both individuals and their communities. For Grimshaw and Rubery 
not only was this a flawed approach (2012:122), which nevertheless was to continue, their 
reference to whether support is “truly needed” also appears to reiterate how notions of 
‘deservingness’ predominate.  
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Questioning deservingness and the redirection of accountability, was to continue 
throughout the period of austerity examined here. That said, such “anti-welfare ideology” 
had been in operation, prior to the introduction of austerity measures (Mack and Lansley, 
1985:227). Thus, much like protesters had observed (Levitas, 2012), Thatcher also sought 
to reduce the role of the state, by way of promoting “self-help and a greater emphasis on 
individuals, voluntary and charitable help” (Mack and Lansley, 1985:228). Indeed, each 
were key features in the Coalition’s notion of a ‘Big Society’ (HM Treasury, 2010).  
 
Nearing the end of the Coalition’s term in government, Lupton et al. warned that whoever 
was to succeed the Coalition, would be met by a “welfare state in flux” (2015:8). In May 
2015, the Conservative government was elected with a majority, and were keen to 
publicise the great gains they had won as part of the Coalition. David Cameron in his role 
as then Prime Minister, declared how over a five-year period they [the Coalition] had 
successfully “put our country back on the right track”, emphasising further that “five years 
ago, Britain was on the brink” but that Britain was “back on its feet, strong and growing 
stronger every day” (Conservative Party Manifesto, 2015:8). The Conservatives stressed 
that the gains made were “the product of a supreme national effort, in which everyone has 
made sacrifices, and everyone has played their part” (Conservative Party Manifesto, 
2015:8).  
 
Given this self-declared success, the Conservatives were set to continue their austere 
plan, “rolling out Universal Credit, capping benefits which would mean a household could 
receive no more than £23,000 per year”, in order to “make work pay”, alongside protecting 
the NHS (Conservative Manifesto, 2015:26). During the first budget, Osbourne declared 
that “the budget deficit” was at that point, “less than half the 10 per cent” that the Coalition 
had initially inherited, stressing further that “economic security” was returning (HM 
Treasury Summer Budget, 2015).  
 
By 2016, however, the economic outlook had deteriorated once again (HM Treasury May 
Budget, 2016:9), suggesting further that a programme of austerity was inadequate. 
Nevertheless, the Conservatives continued their quest to secure economic security, 
through making “additional savings”, which it was noted, equated to “0.5 per cent of total 
government spending”, with a view to ensuring that “the nation” was living “within its 
means” (HM Treasury May Budget, 2016:9). The Conservatives stressed that they would 
seek to ensure that they “keep a check” on the amount spent on welfare, thus enabling 
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them to provide a system that is “fair to those who need it, and fair to those who pay for it 
too” (Conservative Manifesto, 2015:27, my italics). This dualism, between those who pay 
into the welfare state and those who do not, was a distinction readily drawn upon by both 
the Coalition and the Conservative’s throughout the period of austerity focused on here.  
Whilst the Conservatives were “especially proud” that “hard decisions on public spending” 
had been made (Conservative Party Manifesto, 2015:8), Ryan (2015) offers a different 
perspective. For Ryan, the results of an austere approach in governance are clear, and for 
him, these results are held in stark contrast to the success conveyed by Cameron and the 
Conservatives (2015). Ryan thus argues, that in pursuit of austerity and economic 
recovery, those “already struggling” have been pushed “deeper into poverty”, noting further 
how this was set to worsen, given that the Conservatives plans were to continue to pursue 
cuts and make additional savings or as Ryan puts it, “to cut deeper next time” (2015: no 
pagination).  
 
Alongside this self-recognition of success, the reforming welfare section of the 
Conservative manifesto, arguably, made clear the party’s position going forward. 
Reflecting the binary rhetoric of the ‘striver’ and ‘skiver’, the manifesto featured phrases 
such as “hard working families”, “work hard” and “do the right thing”, alongside a vow to 
make “help for those who really need it” available (Conservative Party Manifesto, 
2015:26). Strengthening this rhetoric further, the Conservatives depicted how: 
under Labour those who worked hard found more and more of their 
earnings taken away in tax to support a welfare system that allowed and 
even encouraged people to choose benefits, when they could be earning a 
living (Conservative Manifesto, 2015:26, my italics). 
 
This, according to the Conservatives, “sent out terrible signals”, for this meant that “if you 
did the right thing you were penalised-and if you did the wrong thing, you were rewarded” 
(Conservative Manifesto, 2015:26). The Conservatives argued that such “right” and “wrong 
behaviour” and the “unfairness of it all”, was consequently “infuriating hardworking people” 
(Conservative Manifesto, 2015:26). Distinctions between ‘hard workers’ and ‘shirkers’, and 
‘undeserving’ and ‘deserving’ recipients, was arguably further embedded when the 
Conservatives stated that help would be available to support those “who really need it” 
(Conservative Manifesto, 2015:26). The Conservatives stressed further, that the “days of 
something for nothing” were, however, over (Conservative Manifesto, 2015:26).  
 
Borrowing from Patrick, these are examples of the “good worker-bad benefit claimant 
dualisms” (2012:10) that were readily drawn upon by politicians and the media. Here, 
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members of the British public are separated into two groups, where “those engaging in 
paid work are characterised as independent, responsible citizens”, whereas comparatively, 
“those out of work are…dependent, irresponsible and…even conceptualised as second-
class citizens, given their failure to fulfil the most central of citizenship obligations” (Patrick, 
2012:9). Much like the Coalition’s stance previously, this rhetoric is also an indicator of the 
prioritisation of “individual explanations for poverty” (Pantazis, 2016:4).  
 
Such distinctions and statements appear to have compounded further rising debates over 
and between, those who are considered ‘deserving’ and those perceived as ‘undeserving’ 
of support (Toynbee and Walker, 2015). Thus, what has become increasingly apparent, 
through both political and media rhetoric alike, is how those in receipt of social security 
payments, were separated into two opposing groups, the “deserving” or “moral” and the 
“undeserving” or “immoral”, it was at this point for Toynbee and Walker that “social 
cohesion was subverted” (2015:9), bringing forth further consequences. Making the 
relationship between economic and social polarisation clear, Dorling explains that “once a 
process of economic polarisation begins, it is very hard to turn it around” (2011:181). Once 
this process is in motion, Dorling emphasises how not only do hardened attitudes arise, 
but so does fear, fuelled by fear (2011). As this occurs, so does geographical polarisation 
which results in people knowing “less and less of each other” (Dorling, 2011:181). As 
Dorling explains, in place of this certainty “more and more” use their imaginations 
(2011:181) or perhaps the images routinely provided through mediated and political 
‘poverty propaganda’ (Shildrick, 2018).  
 
Emphasising how this may be problematic, Bottero argues that in “linking inequality to the 
moral capacities of individuals”, the problem becomes “the personal characteristics of the 
poor”, rather than being focused on poverty (2005:23). In austerity Britain, such moral 
views of inequality, now appear to have been firmly re-established. Groups have been 
distinguished and set apart by their apparent disagreeable “social and moral habits” 
(Bottero, 2005:24). As Bottero continues, this form of identification creates distance, 
whereby poverty is not considered a societal issue, but as one emanating from those 
whom “stand apart from society” (2005:24). According to this view, the poor are the 
“outcasts of society, the ‘other’ in ‘us’ and ‘them’ images of inequality” (Bottero, 2005:24), 
thus leading to both economic and social polarisation. Whilst such contentions are not 
new, over the course of austerity examined here, the rhetoric of the ‘striver’ and ‘skiver’ 
amongst other juxtapositions, have arguably however, became more common place 
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amongst politicians, whose actions as a result, seemed driven by a neo-liberal ideology, 
alongside an economic plan for recovery.  
 
Pantazis strengthens this point, suggesting that: 
the Coalition government drew upon well-trodden discourses, framed in 
terms of the ‘Broken Society’, focusing upon individual motivations, 
behaviour and pathology, and familiar critiques of the welfare state and 
dependency. On the one hand, government rhetoric sought to portray 
individuals, including those previously regarded as ‘deserving’ of social 
security support as ‘shirkers’ (in contrast to ‘strivers’), ‘lazy’ (in contrast to 
‘hard-working’), and ‘profligate’ (in contrast to ‘provident’), and responsible, 
in different ways, for bringing poverty on themselves and their families. On 
the other hand, the structural deficiencies of the benefits system were 
highlighted as encouraging dependency and, ultimately, leading to poverty 
(2016:4). 
 
For Pantazis, this can be understood both as “a perspective that is part and parcel of neo-
liberal economics” and as an example of the discourse also identifiable amongst the 
Conservatives following their election in 2015, where “the policy trajectory of the previous 
Coalition government” continued (2016:10-16). This contention is further supported by 
Farnsworth and Irving, where they succinctly argue: 
for social policy, the emergence of ‘austerity’ as a more convincing tool to 
delegitimise economic dissent…pursue yet deeper cuts and reforms in the 
public sphere, suggests that the post-crisis reconfiguration of the welfare 
state to its current economically-elite-driven, capital-centric, shrunken form 
must surely be a dream come true for neoliberalism (2018: 465).  
 
Notably, as this thesis explores, the consequences of an austere programme of 
government is far from a “dream come true” (Farnworth and Irving, 2018:465) for a 
substantial proportion of the British public. Sharing the view that “deepening social 
inequalities have induced both discomfort and discontent” upon members of the British 
public, worsening conditions and thereby reducing the declaration that ‘we are all in this 
together’, to one that is, as Clarke and Newman argue, “implausible” (2012:314). Within 
this research, austerity is thus positioned as an economic programme with severe 
consequences.                                                                                                                 
 
Following the result of the Brexit referendum, David Cameron resigned from his post as 
Prime Minister on the 24th June 2016. Teresa May took his place as the new Prime 
Minister and leader of the Conservative Party. May delivered a speech setting out her 
intentions (Asthana et al., 2016) and in doing so, further evidenced the prevalence of 
polarisation between groups in austerity Britain. Within this, and in what has been 
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described as “the hardest-hitting passage of the speech” in its entirety (Mason, 2016; 
Asthana et al., 2016), May declared that “we need a government that will deliver serious 
social reform-and make ours a country that truly works for everyone” (in Mason 2016; no 
pagination). Arguing this point further, May continued: 
if you’re born poor, you will die on average nine years earlier than others. If 
you’re black, you’re treated more harshly by the criminal justice system than 
if you’re white. If you’re a white working-class boy, you’re less likely than 
anybody else to go to university. If you’re at a state school, you’re less likely 
to reach the top professions than if you’re educated privately. If you’re a 
woman, you still earn less than a man (in Mason 2016; no pagination). 
As Asthana et al. note, Robert Halfon, deputy chairman of the Conservatives, intimated 
that what May had actually proposed was “a vision that placed his party’s tanks on Labour 
lawns” (2016: no pagination). Amidst Brexit negotiations, whether such a “centrist 
leadership pitch” (Mason, 2016: no pagination) will become reality, and thus entail a new 
approach to Conservative rule, remains questionable. Importantly, however, whilst some 
regarded the content of this speech to be “a one-nation pitch to work for everyone rather 
than the privileged few” (Asthana et al., 2016), others saw this as May’s recognition of how 
her predecessors had failed (Mason, 2016). 
2.2.2 Summary  
This section provided a brief fiscal backdrop to the research, covering the recession, 
tracking some of the challenges faced and changes implemented by each successive 
government, before their contextual application in Chapter 6. Emphasis was placed on 
austerity, and the rhetoric of the Coalition and Conservatives, particularly in the relation to 
the ‘big society’ and the Conservative’s manifesto. Noting how the language chosen, has 
largely resulted in the further distinctions being drawn between those that pay taxes and 
those that to do not. The latter is particularly important, in that as Bottero warns, “symbolic 
demarcations between them and us” bring forth important consequences for those whom 
are attributed such labels (2005:234).  
Accordingly, the following section outlines some of the consequences of austerity for a 
number of groups. To provide an analytical account of the social and economic issues 
prevalent in Britain over this period, emphasis is placed on the rhetoric of ‘Broken Britain’. 
Alongside this, the rising vulnerability towards the experience of inequality, poverty and the 
prevalence of food poverty, homelessness and destitution is also explored. 
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2.3 The Consequences of austerity, Introduction 
This Section begins to explore both the economic and social consequences of the 
introduction of austerity policies between 2010-2015. Beginning by providing a critical 
narrative of how people experiencing inequality and poverty were reimagined as 
individuals who deserved their plight, emphasis is thus placed on the rhetoric of ‘Broken 
Britain’, alongside the persistence of inequality and poverty in austerity Britain. Section 
2.3.1.1 focuses on exploring the prevalence of food insecurity, food bank use and the 
emergence of social supermarkets. Comparatively, Section 2.3.1.2 sets the scene further, 
considering the prevalence of destitution, homelessness, and the violence against 
homeless people.  
 
2.3.1 Broken? 
 
In such a climate of austerity, the rhetoric of “Broken Britain” encourages the view that 
Britain is broken, largely as a result of individual failures and unsavoury behaviours 
(Mckenzie, 2015:11). For Levitas, however, the neo-liberal ‘Big Society’ rhetoric and 
austerity policies, led her to recall the following verse from the 1914-18 war era:  
it’s the same the whole world over, it’s the poor wot gets the blame. It’s the 
rich wot gets the gravy, ain’t it all a bleedin’ shame (2012:339). 
 
Similarly, for Toynbee and Walker, what the neo-liberal ideology translates to is the poor 
being responsible for their depravity, they are “skivers and moral delinquents, redeemable 
only through a sharp dose of benefit reduction” (2015:66). It was and thus is, accordingly, 
a “kindness to relieve them of their dependency by cutting their benefits” (Toynbee and 
Walker, 2015:66). Pantazis (2016:4) puts forward an interesting anomaly, noting how this 
form of rhetoric “sat oddly” with the governments “commitment to tackling relative poverty”. 
Arguing further, that “such narratives played a crucial role in the framing of debates about 
the need for welfare reform”, and indeed who really needed help (Pantazis, 2016:4). 
 
Though not often the focus of political debate, the lived consequences of austerity 
measures were severe, resulting in cuts; to both services and financial provision, directed 
at people already struggling financially (O'Hara, 2014). Arguably for many, such cuts 
“wounded”, and continue to “wound” those who need assistance the most (Toynbee and 
Walker, 2015:3). The policies headed by the Coalition, led others to argue that the poor 
had “become too expensive” (Levitas, 2012; O’Hara, 2014; Hills, 2015:19). Although Hills 
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suggests that this perspective is one that may not be “expressed...directly”, he argues 
nevertheless, that this attitude “underlies much current policy towards benefits”, and 
further both notions of the welfare state and its role (2015:19).  
 
Golding and Middleton (1982), offer an explanation as to why this may occur. Writing in the 
early 1980’s, Golding and Middleton note how in times of recession, “public anxiety” often 
resurfaces (1982:3), describing further both the consequences and consistencies over 
time, where they state: 
as the economic slump bit deeper into daily life, venomous hostility to the 
supposedly protected and coddled charges of the welfare and social 
security schemes returned the welfare state into the centre of the political 
stage. 
 
Arguably, what Golding and Middleton described during the 1980’s provides an accurate 
narrative of the occurrences following the recession of 2008/9 and the implementation of 
austerity in Britain. Not only has the welfare state been brought to the forefront of political 
attention, Mckenzie argues, we have also witnessed the introduction of “draconian 
measures” into all aspects of the welfare state and these appear to be staying with us for 
the foreseeable future (2015:10). The cuts, rather than ensuring economic security for all, 
have had an impact “directly on the poor, the young…sick and…disabled” (Levitas, 
2012:322). This was also evidenced by the UNCESCR (2016).  
 
Others have, more recently, considered the “violence of austerity” (Cooper and Whyte, 
2017:2), highlighting the consequences of austerity measures through depicting a rise in 
food poverty (O’Connell and Hamilton, 2017), fuel poverty (London, 2017), personal debt 
(Ellis, 2017), alongside evictions and repossessions (Paton and Cooper, 2017). O’Hara 
(2017) also evidences increasing suicide rates, with Dorling describing an increase in 
mortality rates (2017). Whilst McCulloch (2017) analyses increasing homelessness and 
violence toward this group. 
 
Though much of this evidence is drawn on in Chapter 6, due to spatial limitations, it is 
beyond the scope of this research to include a detailed account of the all the evidence 
concerned with poverty and widening social inequalities as a result of austerity measures. 
Instead, to illustrate the extent of inequality and poverty in Britain, for the purpose of this 
section the rise of food banks, destitution and the prevalence of homelessness is 
considered.  
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2.3.1.1 Food insecurity  
 
For O'Hara, aside from the cuts to benefits, services and sanctions, increasing 
dependence on food banks are “one of the most visible totems on the austerity landscape” 
(2014:22). The prevalence of food inequality or “rising hunger” (Dorling, 2014:76) have 
been exemplified by the rise in the number of food bank providers in operation, including 
the TT and other charities, such as the Salvation Army (Livingstone, 2015). Demonstrating 
the severity and prevalence of food impoverishment further, Livingstone highlights that “in 
2013 the Red Cross began redistributing food in the UK for the first time since the Second 
World War” (2015:189), thus further signalling rising need. Oxfam and Church Action on 
Poverty estimated that in 2013/14 alone, 20,247,042 meals were given to people 
experiencing “food poverty” (Cooper et al., 2014:4) and this figure was set to increase 
(Butler, 2015: no pagination).  
 
Though Food bank usage has been on the increase from 2005, as Downing et al. (2014:1) 
note, between April-September 2013 alone, more than 350,000 individuals received food 
from TT food banks, this figure was “triple the number helped in the same period in 2012”. 
Whilst Berger, exclaimed that it is “a national scandal that…thousands of people are 
forced to go hungry” (2013: no pagination), this is an experience that has remained 
consistent for many. Leading others to suggest that food banks should be understood as 
“a metonym for the impoverishment of Britain” (O’Connell and Hamilton, 2017:98). 
 
MP Frank Field, in the report Britain’s not-so-hidden hunger, from the All-Party 
Parliamentary Group on Hunger, highlighted the lack of knowledge surrounding food 
insecurity and food banks (2016). Through an emphasis on providing details of the extent 
of hunger, more recently, research has shown how the fears above, appear to have 
become reality. According to The Independent Food Aid Network (2017), there are now 
approximately 2,000 independent food aid providers operating, alongside a further 2,036 
food banks. In the financial year 2017-2018, the TT (2018: no pagination) alone, report 
that 1,333,952 “three-day emergency food supplies” were provided to “people in crisis”, 
with 484,026 of these parcels being received by children. This, they report is 13 per cent 
higher than the previous year 2016-2017. The previous year, 2015-2016, there was a 6 
per cent increase in the provision of food banks (TT, 2018:no pagination).  
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Notably, however, there are issues with the reliability and accuracy of the data collected by 
food bank organisations. As Lambie-Mumford and Dowler (2014) and Forsey (2016) 
highlight, the statistics do not often capture the entire picture nor are they able to cast light 
on to the proportion of people unable to access adequate food supplies, who do not attend 
foodbanks. More robust data is, thus, required. The TT’s findings, nevertheless, do offer 
valuable insights into the proportion of people experiencing food inequality and how this 
has changed over the period of austerity examined here. Findings from the TT also further 
demonstrate some of the key reasons why people visit or are referred to foodbanks, 
suggesting that “the top four reasons for referral” to TT’s foodbanks between 2017-18 
alone, were “low income-benefits, not earning’, ‘benefit delay’, ‘benefit change’ and ‘debt’”. 
They also report that the reason most often given (with this reason becoming increasingly 
more common) is low income-benefits and “not earning” (2018:no pagination).  
 
Loopstra et al. sought to examine the possible impacts of benefit sanctions on food 
insecurity previously, and found some similarities, noting that a “strong, dynamic 
relationship exists between the number of sanctions applied in local authorities and the 
number of adults receiving emergency food parcels” (2018:7). Perry found similar 
evidence, noting benefit delays, sanctions and other life experiences, including yet not 
limited to low-incomes, job losses, bereavement, homelessness, poor mental health and 
debt, had resulted in a need to access support from food banks (2014). Killeya (2014) also 
found similar findings, highlighting benefit sanctions, delays and changes, as key factors 
resulting in need. Garthwaite also found this in her research, noting further that users did 
not “want” to attend foodbanks, it was “a last resort”, driven by “harsh benefit sanctions, 
precarious, low-paid jobs administrative delays” (2016:149).  
 
For Perry, “hunger and hard choices between heating, eating, paying bills and servicing 
debts” were both “real” experiences and an ongoing struggle amongst her research 
participants, what is more, the need to visit foodbanks was “often outside of an individual’s 
control”, (2014:13) rather than as a result of more individualistic explanations, like an 
inability to manage finances. Other alternative choices to food banks have also appeared, 
including café’s like FareShare and FoodCycle, amongst others (Downing et al., 2014). As 
Downing et al. note “social supermarkets” have also appeared, here people in receipt of 
low incomes are able to purchase food at reduced prices, “in a normal shop environment if 
they are in receipt of certain benefits and live in the area” (2014:4).  
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The first of its kind opened in South Yorkshire in 2013 (Downing et al., 2014), by 2017 
Saxena found that at least “seven ‘parent’ initiatives, each with several branches or 
franchises” had opened (2018, no pagination). Since both Perry (2014) and Killeya (2014) 
found that many of those accessing foodbanks felt stigmatised, ashamed and 
embarrassed as a result, these alternatives are said to reduce the discomfort faced by 
people who visit foodbanks. That said, this is only achievable if visitors are able to pay for 
the items, irrespective of whether they are reduced or not.  
 
For Saxena, both the strengths of this initiative and the positive effect on those accessing 
the stores, are clear, social supermarkets “emerged to fill a gap in austerity 
Britain…providing a social safety net” (2018: no pagination). Saxena continues to explain 
the “short term” advantages of these initiatives, noting how “a degree of choice and 
dignity” is provided, and how these initiatives can assist people in saving money, thereby 
helping to mitigate “the effects of poverty and social vulnerability” (2018: no pagination). 
However, Saxena also warns that these cannot function on a long-term basis, are 
“vulnerable” and focus on a reduction of food waste, alongside eradicating hunger (2018: 
no pagination). Whether visiting food banks or social supermarkets, the choice is also 
limited, as are the nutrients afforded to each visitor or indeed customer.  
 
In the wake of the recession and austerity measures, the use of both food banks and 
‘social supermarkets’ thus increased, with volunteers collecting food and other supplies for 
foodbanks, becoming more visible both within and outside supermarkets over the period of 
austerity examined here (Toynbee and Walker, 2015). Whilst McCarthy, warns that it is 
pertinent food banks do not, as they are in the Unites States, become permanent fixtures 
in the “welfare landscape” of Britain and the UK (2013, no pagination), nearing six years 
on, they appear to be far from temporary solutions. For O’Connell and Hamilton “given that 
food is fundamental to health and social participation, food poverty has violent 
consequences for individuals, households and society itself” (2017:94). 
 
Lambie-Mumford and Dowler (2014) appear to draw a connection between rising food 
insecurity, the notion of the ‘Big Society’, the state and ordinary citizens. This is apparent 
in their suggestion that the responsibility “for ensuring access to food are devolving from 
the state to charities, or churches and faith groups, or local communities” (Lambie-
Mumford and Dowler, 2014:1442). Whilst it could be argued that the support extended by 
community members, charitable organisations and leading supermarkets signal collective 
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action, rather than heightened individualism, as this chapter demonstrates altruism exists 
alongside highly individualistic attitudes amongst both the public and politicians. Indeed, 
this is supported by O’Connell and Hamilton (2017:95), who argue that despite an 
increasing body of evidence concerned with the extent of food poverty, this evidence has 
“largely been ignored or dismissed” by the government. Explanations for this issue are, 
instead, focused on behavioural traits, resulting in individualistic explanations of why 
members of the British public are unable to afford to provide food for themselves 
(O’Connell and Hamilton, 2017). These individualistic explanations have not only had an 
impact on attitudes toward foodbank users, but as this section has suggested upon food 
bank users themselves, who express “shame and embarrassment” having also been 
exposed to what can be understood as unhelpful discourse (Garthwaite, 2015:149).   
 
Whilst the focus of this section has been placed on the existence of and increasing levels 
of food insecurity, as the following section highlights, experiencing food insecurity is not 
the only consequence of life lived in austerity Britain. Focusing on the prevalence of 
destitution and homelessness, the next section explores the impact of austerity measures, 
further. 
 
2.3.1.2 Destitution and homelessness 
 
As Section 2.3.1.1 demonstrates, the rising costs of living and food prices, including 
benefit sanctions and delays, have resulted in more people struggling financially and the 
numbers of people experiencing food poverty have thus increased. The necessity of food 
banks and rising need for clothing and toiletry supplies, are not only indicative of the 
consequences of life lived in austere Britain, as Ryan argues, these are also becoming a 
“normalised” (2016: no pagination) aspect of society in this country. Alongside the rise of 
food insecurity, survey findings from JRF highlighted a further consequence of life lived in 
austere Britain. In 2016, JRF estimated the extent of destitution, finding that approximately 
“668,000 households, containing 1,252,000 people, of whom 312,000 were children, were 
destitute” (Fitzpatrick et al., 2016:2).  
 
People were, as Fitzpatrick et al. (2016:2) explain, considered destitute if “they, or their 
children, have been unable to afford and therefore lacked two or more” of the “six 
essentials” over the course of a month, or whether due to their income being “extremely 
low” that they were unable to purchase “essentials” (food, shelter, heating, electricity, 
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clothing and footwear and access to “basic toiletries”). For Fitzpatrick et al. “destitution is 
intrinsically linked to broader poverty” and “long-term experiences of poverty” (2015:27), 
which they argue, is “driven by low income from work or benefits, high cost of essentials, 
and debts associated with paying for these essentials”. Fitzpatrick et al. also suggest 
further complexities, noting that “in some cases” both addiction and/or “poor mental health-
factors” may have contributed toward the vulnerability and risk of experiencing destitution 
(2015:27). Fitzpatrick et al. appear to emphasise the existence of a relationship between 
destitution, homelessness, benefit sanctions and the use of foodbanks (2016). Suggesting 
that “a rising trend in a number of…factors…appear to be associated with destitution in the 
UK”, these can be understood “as a potential cause”, (the sanctioning of benefits), or “as a 
manifestation”, for example food bank usage, “homelessness and rough sleeping” 
(Fitzpatrick et al., 2016:27).  
 
Following 2010, it has moreover, been demonstrated that instances of rough sleeping, 
‘sofa surfing’ and homelessness have increased (Clarke et al.,2015; Fitzpatrick et al.,2017; 
Wilson and Barton, 2019). Further evidence has also highlighted the expressions of 
hostility from members of the British public, faced by a number of homeless people on a 
regular basis (Sanders and Albanese, 2016; McCulloch, 2017). Where Crisis found that 
members of the homeless population are subject to both verbal and physical abuse, from 
being physically targeted to burned, urinated on, mocked and ignored (2016). A lack of 
compassion toward homelessness can also be further demonstrated. Reports of hotel 
users, upon looking out of their hotel rooms and seeing homeless people, complaining of 
“spoiled” view’s (Osley, 2017:no pagination), and of feelings of intimidation when passing 
through areas with tents erected by homeless people (Greenfield, 2018). This, as Sparkes 
(2016: no pagination) argues, has occurred alongside instances of “hostile architecture” or 
“defensive architecture”. Examples include the installation of metal studs and metal spikes 
in the doorways of buildings, “anti-homelessness benches” and extend further to 
pavements and doorways being “watered-down” to deter rough-sleeping (Sparkes, 2016: 
no pagination).  
 
Whilst this section has focused on the prevalence of homelessness and destitution, 
evidencing how some members of the public perceive of people experiencing poverty over 
the course of austerity examined here, attitudes toward people experiencing inequality and 
poverty are discussed in more detail in Section 2.5. 
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2.3.1.3 Summary 
 
This section has introduced the rhetoric of Broken Britain, evidencing the consequences of 
austerity measures and in doing so has begun to provide a backdrop of austerity Britain 
during this period. As this section has highlighted, austerity measures have negatively 
impacted a number of individuals and groups, including people suffering from ill health, 
people with impairments, women and children (Levitas, 2012; UNCESCR, 2016). Fuel 
poverty (London, 2017), eviction and repossession rates (Paton and Cooper, 2017), 
alongside personal debt (Ellis, 2017) have all increased. As have suicide (O’Hara, 2014) 
and mortality rates (Dorling, 2017). These examples not only highlight the consequences 
of austerity measures, this evidence also supports the suggestion that for many individuals 
and families in the UK, the ‘reality’ of life lived on a low income, is one rife with struggle 
(Lansley and Mack, 2015).  
 
Focusing on a discussion of food insecurity and food bank use, alongside the prevalence 
of destitution and homelessness in austerity, this section has demonstrated how, as 
O’Hara argued, austerity has served to provide a “very bleak reality…for a considerable 
proportion of the British population” (2014:5), and this, moreover, is well documented 
(Wilkinson and Pickett, 2010; Hutton, 2011; Lansley and Mack, 2015; Fitzpatrick et al., 
2016). Despite this evidence, those who are impoverished are not always considered to be 
facing adversity, but are instead, held responsible for their own fate (Clarke and Newman, 
2012). As Ferdinand points out, a number of accusations have been attributed to those 
who are believed to occupy positions at the bottom of the British social hierarchy, and 
these include labels such as “immoral, godless, ignorant, feckless, infantile” (2010:175). 
Given these characteristics, such groups are also considered to be “unable to sustain 
family life, utterly heathen, incapable of absorbing education, unable to look after 
themselves economically…” (Ferdinand, 2010:175). In the context of food insecurity and 
homelessness, this stigmatising rhetoric has been evidenced in research amongst food 
bank users (Killeya, 2014; Perry, 2014; Garthwaite, 2015) and amongst those whom are 
homeless (Crisis, 2016; McCulloch, 2017).  
 
For Humpage, it can thus be argued that “neo-liberal welfare reforms” have once again, 
“reframed poverty and inequality as emerging from individual inadequacies and welfare 
dependency” (2016:91). Thus, in the midst of the recession, the political rhetoric noted 
above and the consequences of a programme of austerity, it has also been argued that 
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this has been “accompanied by a pervasive media assault” on those experiencing poverty 
(Mooney and Hancock, 2010:no pagination) which is expected to have divided members of 
the British public, further. Given this, alongside understanding changing social attitudes 
toward inequality, poverty and redistribution of income over the course of austerity, 
emphasis is also placed on popular culture. Accordingly, the following section introduces a 
number of controversial broadcasted programmes, exploring the content of these 
programmes, alongside the literature. 
 
2.4 Poverty and inequality in the media, Introduction   
 
This Section outlines how people experiencing inequality and poverty were represented in 
the media. Emphasis is placed on how televised ‘poverty porn’ (Jensen, 2013) and 
‘poverty propaganda’ (Shildrick, 2018) appeared, alongside the introduction of a number of 
austere changes, leading some commentators to share the belief, that in order to validate 
austere welfare changes, the consequent rising hostility between groups was also part of 
this economic plan (Mooney and Hancock, 2010; Penny, 2013; O’Hara, 2014; Shildrick, 
2018). 
 
2.4.1 Benefits and the media 
 
Bottero emphasises the importance of understanding how inequality is represented, this is 
evident where she highlights that “images of inequality” can be understood as “claims”, 
and that these claims reflect “whose interests align…who should be grouped…as virtuous 
or decent…who deserve power” or who is “unjustly excluded” (2005:18). These can be 
considered “campaigning strategies…over power social recognition, power and resources 
which help form the structure of inequality” (Bottero, 2005:18). In the same way, these 
“images of inequality” may attempt to position who is considered immoral and justifiably 
excluded (Bottero, 2005:18). As Bottero notes, therefore there is a need to “look closely at 
how images of inequality have been used in attempts to justify or transform social 
arrangements” (Bottero, 2005:18). With this in mind, emphasis is placed on how inequality 
has been mediated throughout the period of austerity examined here, using Benefits Street 
an example to illustrate, whilst also drawing on literature to suggest why this may be 
problematic.  
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The “images of inequality” (Bottero, 2005:18) drawn on over the period of austerity 
examined in this research, are far from new (Pantazis, 2016). It can however be argued 
that these have, however, re-emerged within a changing economic and political 
environment. As emphasised throughout this research, aside from an economic impact, 
the changes implemented under the guise of austerity, have had social consequences. 
Toynbee and Walker (2015) illustrate this point. Referring to changes to 
“tax…benefits…housing, health and education”, Toynbee and Walker (2015:1) argue that 
these austere changes have “prised further apart region, class, generation, gender and 
race”, thus “driving deeper wedges between town and country, old and young, deserving 
and undeserving, lucky and unlucky, left and right”.  
 
Penny, in a similar vein, acknowledges further ‘cruelty’ as a result of austere policies, 
where she argues:  
the cruellest thing about the benefits cap is not that it could make 
thousands of people homeless or force more families to depend on food 
banks…It’s that it’s not really about people on benefits at all…It’s about 
placating public rage (2013: no pagination). 
 
Here, Penny, is seemingly arguing that austerity provided a different function, one intent 
on fracturing social relations and cultivating an austere and divided Britain. Toynbee and 
Walker argue, further, that alongside austerity measures “the facts of poverty” have been 
“fended off by Manichean rhetoric about benefits scroungers versus hardworking families” 
(2015:18). Arguably, this distinction was further embedded in the 2015 Conservative 
governments’ manifesto (Section 2.2.1).  
 
In this austere Britain, the focus, thus, appeared less concerned with social inequalities 
and more concerned with presenting a particular “image of inequality” (Bottero, 2005:18). 
Indeed, alongside rising hostility toward taxation, benefit claimants, and the welfare state 
as a whole (Slater, 2012), there has also been a “proliferation of popular cultural output” 
which has arguably become “devoted to the expression of class relations” (Skeggs, 
2013:5). Although there have been a number of long running soap operas (The Archers, 
1950- present, Radio 4; Cathy Come Home BBC, 1966; EastEnders BBC1, 1985-present; 
Coronation Street ITV, 1960-present; and Emmerdale ITV, 1972-present), arguably 
depicting class lifestyles, more recently there has been a plethora of programmes and 
documentaries, portraying social class identities, with a markedly different tone.  
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Importantly, as Slater highlights, these have occurred alongside the consequences of the 
“institutional arrangements” outlined above, and subsequent “dramatic assault on the 
British Welfare state” during austerity (2012:950). It has, as a result, been argued that the 
following programmes provided an important function, beyond entertainment. Whilst the 
portrayal of social class disadvantage, have been observable in ‘comedy sketch’ shows 
(Little Britain’s’, ‘Vicky Pollard’), series’ like Shameless and chat shows such as The 
Jeremy Kyle Show (2005-to present) for some time, as Jensen highlights, a new form of 
classed reality televised entertainment has also emerged, ‘Poverty Porn’ (2013). This is 
descriptive of the rise in programmes concerned with the lives of real benefit claimants. To 
illustrate, Channel 5 (Ch5) has aired a number of programmes, including: On Benefits and 
Proud (2013) and the series, Benefits Britain: life on the Dole (2014), which included: 
Benefit Brits by the sea (2014), Benefits: 19 kids and counting the cost (2015), My Big 
Benefits Family (2015), Benefits: can’t Work, won’t work (2015) and Benefits: 37 Years on 
the Dole (2015), to name but a few.  
 
Although not exhaustive, other programmes also include Nick and Margaret: We All Pay 
Your Benefits (BBC1, 2013), Saints and Scroungers (BBC1, 2009-2015), and Tricks of the 
dole cheats (Channel 4, 2012). Many of these programmes arguably appear to seek to 
reinforce what van der Bom et al. (2018:3) refer to as “neo-liberal discourses related to the 
notion that poverty is a result of individual failures”. Previously, Mooney and Hancock had 
also, in a similar vein, argued that the programme Saints and Scroungers was aired to 
“remind us that ‘we’ law abiding taxpayers are being robbed by the scroungers” (2010: no 
pagination). As Section 2.5 highlights, such individualistic attitudes are also observable 
amongst members of the British public.  
 
Discussing the content of the programme Nick and Margaret: We Pay All Your Benefits 
(2013), Penny argues that what this programme sought to do was pit “the underpaid 
against the unemployed” (2013:no pagination). Penny highlights however, this programme 
also provided another function, that of “echoing the rhetoric of the Department for Work 
and Pensions” [DWP], as it sought to pit “taxpayers against shirkers” and placed further 
emphasis on the “make work pay” rhetoric (2013:no pagination). Penny (2013: no 
pagination) argues further that the broadcaster (The BBC), alongside the content of the 
show, was of concern, where she remarks: 
on any other channel...this could be written off as a crass cash-in on public 
mistrust of the welfare system, treating the unemployed as a telegenic cross 
between criminals and animals in a zoo. That it was given the green light by 
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the BBC, a publicly funded and supposedly impartial broadcaster, indicates 
something more. It suggests a culture shift: the wilful misdirection of public 
anger towards those who least deserve it. 
 
Whilst it is beyond the scope of this research to provide a thorough analysis of 
each of these programmes, one programme has been selected for the purpose of 
this discussion, Benefits Street. Continuing to thoroughly explore austerity Britain, 
the following section introduces Benefits Street, focusing on the portrayal of people 
in receipt of benefits and on research examining the content, impact, purpose and 
the timing of this programme. 
 
2.4.1.1 Benefits Street 
 
The first series of Benefits Street was filmed in Birmingham, incorporating (predominantly) 
the residents of James Turner Street. A second series also aired, filmed on the Tilery 
Estate (Stockton-on-Tees), just days after the election of the Conservative Government in 
2015 (van der Bom et al., 2018). Produced by Love productions, Benefits Street, is 
perhaps the most controversial of this genre of programmes (Channel 4). For this reason, 
the focus of this section is on providing a critical overview of the content of this series. 
 
According to Channel 4, “Benefits Street reveals the reality of life on benefits, as the 
residents of the streets in areas hit hard by recession invite cameras into their tight-knit 
communities” (2014, no pagination). The programmes present the critical viewer with a 
broad range of examples descriptive of the issues faced by a number of low-income 
individuals and families. This includes the prevalence of environmental degradation, poor 
quality housing, housing insecurity, a lack of education, language barriers, low paid work, 
underemployment, overcrowding and racist attitudes, alongside ill health. For others, it can 
be described as fulfilling a different function, the provision of ‘poverty porn’. As Jensen 
explains, such programmes are referred to as a pornographic, as their intention is to 
“arouse and stimulate the viewer” (2014:4). Thus, it is argued that the programmes aim to 
stimulate an “emotional sensation” amongst the public, “through a repetitive and affective 
encounter with the television screen” (Jensen, 2014:4). For Jensen, ‘poverty porn’ can 
thus be understood as “an all-surface, no-depth visual culture of immediacy and its 
semiotic cues” where “its red flags of moral outrage-require no interpretative work from the 
viewer” (2014:4). Public perceptions, reflective of such outrage and of wider social issues 
are discussed in Section 2.5.2. 
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Benefits Street can be understood as “harsher in its moral judgements” than other 
programmes portraying classed identities (Allen et al., 2014:2), with benefit recipients 
routinely portrayed negatively; “filming shoplifting, arrests”, and “attempts to buy drugs” 
(van der Bom et al., 2018:1). Reflective of political rhetoric during this period, as van der 
Bom et al. highlight “narratives in which people were dependent on welfare payments” and 
lacked “the motivation to seek employment” (2018:1) were focused upon. Brooker et al. 
(2015:3179) also noted similar findings, emphasising how “the dominant narrative from the 
show is that many of the street’s residents are dependent on welfare payments”. This, they 
point out, is: 
set against the backdrop of austerity imposed…following the global financial 
crisis, as well as…ongoing…controversial reforms designed to 
reduce…welfare and unemployment benefit spending (Brooker et al., 
2015:3179). 
 
Mooney and Hancock previously argued that programmes concerned with inequality and 
poverty, are often purposely narrated and framed in a way that direct the audiences’ 
attention, cultivating “revulsion among the viewing public” and by extension directing 
attention away from structural issues, toward those considered at fault for Britain’s “broken 
society” (2010: no pagination). Mooney and Hancock explain this ongoing process, 
alongside the wider implications further, whereby they purport: 
the cameras pay attention to the possessions of those experiencing severe 
poverty and through the cameras gaze on the plasma TVs and other goods, 
use of alcohol and tobacco, we learn that many of those in poverty are 
‘flawed consumers’, and that these are non-essentials, the benefits which 
claimants receive must be ‘too much’...in the absence of understanding any 
further context, the viewer responds with moral indignation and disgust 
(2010:no pagination). 
 
Similarly, and more recently, van der Bom et al. (2018) also draw on Bauman’s 
understanding of flawed consumerism (2007) in their research. van der Bom et al. 
(2018:15) note how the spending habits and possessions of those featured in Benefits 
Street was focused upon by cameras, with their research findings highlighting further how 
the public respond toward the “misjudged priorities” demonstrated by benefit recipients. 
Thus, much like Mooney and Hancock’s (2010) observation, items such as cigarettes 
remained “conceptualised as luxuries” amongst research participants, implying “that the 
poor should restrict their purchases only to the ‘essentials’, such as food and household 
bills” (van der Bom et al., 2018:9).  
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As Paterson et al. argue “framing of welfare recipients beside high-end electronic 
goods…casts them as undeserving and draws on prevalent ideologies of benefit 
scroungers/cheats” (2016:197). Alongside this familiar discourse, van der Bom et al. also 
emphasise how a “scrounger discourse and an underclass discourse” is observable, which 
subsequently portrays “people as morally repugnant and unaware of, or deliberately not 
conforming to, wider social norms” (2018:18). Here, people in receipt of benefits are not 
just labelled scroungers, but also “as non-human ‘creatures’ and objectionable beings” 
(van der Bom et al., 2018:18). The existence of these stereotypical labels are discussed in 
more detail in Section 2.5.2 and 2.4.1.2. 
 
In short, it can be argued that Benefits Street represented benefit recipients negatively, 
where abuse of benefits and illegal activity were focused upon, further intensifying public 
mistrust toward the welfare state and benefit recipients. Whilst this section has introduced 
one example of the negative discourse and representation of benefit recipients, and of 
people experiencing inequality and poverty, the following section considers how poverty 
and inequality are represented in the media, further, and how this may inform public 
debate. Whilst it is not suggested that the media influence attitudes directly, the media is 
understood as an outlet with many platforms, enabling information to be shared and 
debates to be framed. Exploring mediated portrayal, therefore, allows for a greater 
understanding of the social and cultural climate throughout this period in austerity Britain. 
  
2.4.1.2 Framed? Stigmatising discourse and the media 
 
As illustrated in the discussion of Benefits Street, issues of disadvantage are conveyed to 
the public in “voyeuristic and…exploitative” ways (Kyprianou, 2015:12), these 
representations and the frequency in which they occur may, consequently, reinforce 
perceptions of “them and us” (Cannadine, 1998: 19-20). Polarised in this way, it is 
expected that further consequences will arise, both for those who are impoverished and in 
gathering support to combat these issues.  
 
Perhaps it is for these reasons, Shildrick believes that these “misleading, damaging and 
divisive depictions of those experiencing poverty and related disadvantages might best be 
described as poverty propaganda” (2018:784). Shildrick explains that through the 
production of propaganda, people experiencing disadvantage are stigmatised and labelled, 
thereby hiding the “real causes and consequences of poverty” (2018:784). Shildrick, thus, 
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highlights how “poverty and economic disadvantage are rarely called out as being the 
result of policy and political decisions”, instead she maintains that these are depicted “to 
be the result of individual behaviours” (2018:787). This propaganda is generated by 
political rhetoric, reflected within policy and is “reinforced by the media, both print and 
television” (Shildrick, 2018:787). 
 
McQuail emphasises the most important functions of the media, noting that the media is 
powerful, acting as a prospective source of “influence, control and innovation”, this power 
derives from its ability to supply “definitions and images of social reality” alongside 
providing a place whereby “the changing culture and values of societies and groups are 
constructed, stored and most visibly expressed” (1994:1). Similarly, Hill (2014:129-130) 
discusses how audiences of reality programmes, as noted above, are presented with a 
“mix of fact and fiction’, a form of “structured reality”, which “draws on narrative, drama and 
direct experience of life”. Hill argues further that, “these cultural contexts to the genre” are 
both “fascinating and troubling at the same time”, offering “a huge menu of people, 
characters, emotions and performances”, but importantly also encouraging “moral and 
social judgement-often condemnation of people and their direct experiences” (2014:129-
130).  
 
The media thus has the ability to inform others, connecting people who lack “first-hand 
experience” of poverty allowing them to see the “reality of poverty” for many, and by 
extension having a “significant impact on how people with experience of poverty view 
themselves” (Hanley, 2009:7). Often, by extension, meaning that consumers of these 
shows, “mark boundaries between themselves and different kinds of people on television” 
(Hill, 2014:129). What is, however, often missing from these representations is the 
portrayal of the vast majority of people who struggle financially and as McKendrick et al. 
emphasise of people “struggling to make ends meet who do not descend into petty (or 
larger-scale) criminality…resort to violence…defraud the state”, or of those who “are 
hopelessly lacking in resources of other kinds” (2008:38). Due to this lack in focus, the 
social consequences are profound, resulting in the continuation of “demonising of poverty 
and those living in it” (McKendrick et al., 2008:38).  
 
Horton and Gregory refer to previous historical periods, where such a distinction 
between the “poor and non-poor” resulted in members of Victorian England 
perceiving those impoverished as “alien others” or a “submerged residuum that 
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was the object of fear” and equally, fascination (2009:22). Horton and Gregory 
(2009) thus highlight similarities over time. Drawing out further similarities between 
contemporary society and Victorian preoccupations, they also note how previously 
“well to-do Victorian ladies” would participate in “covert tours of East End slums”, 
whereas contemporarily they argue “we have Vicky Pollard and voyeuristic reality 
shows” like those identified above (Horton and Gregory, 2009:22). Similarly, for 
Clarke and Newman, such “contemporary obsessions” with people who are said to 
belong to the “urban underclass in its many guises (hoodies, chavs, single 
mothers, the feckless and the workshy)” bear “uncomfortable similarities” with 
Victorian fascinations of those they believed were “deprived and depraved” (2012: 
310-311). Others have argued, in a similar vein, that within such programmes 
“dystopian depictions of Britain’s underclass have been reinforced” (Dorey, 
2010:335).  
 
Though theorised before the production of Benefits Street, McKendrick et al., (2008), 
Horton and Gregory (2009), Dorey (2010) and Clarke and Newman (2012) highlight a 
continued public interest toward those experiencing inequality, alongside the prevalence of 
a dualism between those considered ‘deserving’ and those considered ‘undeserving’. The 
renewal of interest toward those living on inadequate incomes, can be evidenced by the 
extreme popularity of Benefits Street in the UK, with approximately seven million viewers 
at its peak (Plunkett, 2015: no pagination) and a second series, further presenting poverty 
both as entertainment and in a negative light (van der Bom et al., 2018).  
 
Alongside such programmes, some daily newspapers were also keen to continue to 
promote stories of benefit ‘scroungers’ and ‘fraudsters’ (Dorling, 2014), implying that the 
regular tax payer should be scornful of those who spend their hard-earned taxes, both 
frivolously and on the wrong things (Penny, 2013). Dorling refers to an important 
relationship between politics, political rhetoric and the media in framing societal issues, 
maintaining that “fears and belief systems are built up and altered through many media”, 
but that printed press is also “vital in this process” (2011:168). For Dorling, “the press does 
not promulgate prejudice simply because it sells more papers and gains more viewers in 
fearful times”, on the contrary “the press also takes its lead from the actions of politicians” 
(2011:168-169).  
 
64 
 
Indeed, for Kyprianou both politicians and the media have ensured that issues concerning 
welfare benefits have “never strayed far from the news headlines” (2015:46). Dorey further 
notes the importance of “persistently negative attitudes towards the poor” and how these 
have been “reinforced by deeply unflattering reports” which construct a narrative around 
“sink estates…rife with anti-social behaviour, chaotic and dysfunctional family 
relationships, alcohol and/or drug abuse” of which are further described as being inhibited 
by “feral children and adolescents…and widespread welfare dependency” (2010:335).  
 
Although the prevalence of poverty and the existence of inequality are more likely to be 
acknowledged by the public, “when it is described as such when presented through the 
mass media” (McKendrick et al., 2008:6), for O’Hara the representations and framing of 
disadvantage as noted above, served a different purpose, for her they were used as a 
“tactic to validate benefit changes” (2014:117). McKendrick et al. highlight how mediated 
sources, like “newspapers, television, films, blogs and radio, all present poverty to their 
respective audiences” (2008:6). However, it is argued, that many of the newspaper articles 
and televised specials mentioned above, are also “expected to let us know, perhaps only 
by the tone of voice”, used by the narrator’s voice over, “or a raising of the eyebrows, a 
grimace-but sometimes in words of one syllable what we should be thinking too” (Mullin, 
2009:49).  
  
Thus, rather than portraying the negative aspects of lives lived on or supported by social 
security benefits, such as a lack of an education, poor living conditions, poor nutrition and 
a lack of access to secure employment, the focus is on the behaviours of those “living off 
the social”, where there is a curious interest in knowing exactly what our taxes are “paying” 
for (Penny, 2013: no pagination). For Ferdinand “the popular media once represented the 
lower classes as sturdy, indomitable, responding to misfortune with a chirpy stoicism”, this 
however, he believes has changed, instead “the worse off” are now depicted as “sour, 
whingeing and defeatists” (2010:108), whom could have made better choices.  
 
Much like Golding and Middleton observed previously, it can be argued that the media 
held a significant role in both the identification of “targets and amplifying public indignation 
in a deep cutting and highly effective welfare backlash” (1982:4) following the 
implementation of austerity. Similarly, Mooney and Hancock argue that “the messages 
given are pervasive, reflecting and forging an anti-welfarism”, one that “fits neatly with 
state agendas for welfare reform and austerity policies and legitimates them” (2010: no 
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pagination). Such representations are particularly important, in that as Bottero maintains 
“images of the other don't just reflect social distance, they are also ammunition in 
strategies attempting to create or reinforce social distance” (2005:27).  
 
For Mullin “tabloid journalism…requires a constant supply of victims”, whereby “in recent 
years the tabloid virus has spread well beyond traditional tabloids, even into the broadcast 
media”, as noted above (Mullin, 2009:48). Over the course of the last two decades, the UK 
has also seen the rise of what Mullin refers to as a “new British phenomenon, the feeding 
frenzy” (2009:49). More recently it is argued that the media have used these victims, in 
seeking to sway public opinion and to justify cuts (O’Hara, 2014). Yet rather than the poor 
being portrayed as those victims, it has instead seen them vilified, where the true victim is 
represented by the taxpayer (Penny, 2013).  
 
For Larsen and Dejgaard, “the moral panic of the tabloid press” and now beyond, is often 
“constructed around the stereotype about the deviance of the poor” (2013:298) and this is 
not new phenomenon. Indeed, as Dorling points out, whilst a “large section of press 
feasted on benefit scroungers”, the same outlets were however, “strangely quiet about tax 
avoidance” (2014:112). Mooney and Hancock argue that there appears instead, to be a 
“fascination with poverty and the supposedly deviant lifestyle of those affected” (2010:no 
pagination), with this form of mediated vilification of recipients of welfare assistance 
evidently not new, instead programmes like Benefits Street are an example of the 
“notorious exploitation” of others (Toynbee and Walker, 2015:111). Thus, these 
programmes and indeed other mediated forms, serve as examples of those in need having 
once again been propelled into “media stocks for public stoning” (Golding and Middleton, 
1982:89).  
 
For Mooney and Hancock, not only are the public expected to feel “moral outrage” but they 
are also “encouraged to find the worst and weakest moments of people’s lives” both 
entertaining and amusing (2010: no pagination). Arguably, such “negative newsworthy 
stories about the deviant poor”, serve to provide the “perfect environment for building 
negative stereotypes about the poor” (Larsen and Dejgaard, 2013:289). Drawing on 
Shildrick and MacDonald, this is descriptive of a historically long process of “the social and 
political propensity to mark out some people as unworthy of support or culpable for their 
own hardship” (2013:293). This is further observed by Mckenzie, who noted how the 
demeaning language used to describe the poor is “powerful and has been with us for 
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many generations” (2015:9). Not only is the language now used in every day parlance, in 
both the formal medium and social media, as demonstrated in Section 2.2.1, it has also 
been favourable amongst politicians in their quests of “political capital” (Mckenzie, 2015:9). 
 
Although the impact of the way in which this is received by the public, is questionable 
(McQuail, 1994), for others the production of these articles, and programmes, alongside 
the political rhetoric and dwindling economy, have not emerged by accident but rather with 
specific intentions of influencing the publics’ perceptions (Kim et al., 2012; O’Hara, 2014; 
Shildrick, 2018). Indeed, Kim et al. highlight how in “framing a social problem in a specific 
way, the media can address the question of who is responsible for causing and solving the 
problem” (2012:101). Accordingly, questions arise in relation to whether the “government 
or society as a whole are responsible” for social problems presented (Kim et al., 
2012:101). Kim et al. argue further, that “journalists seek to reduce the complexity of 
issues”, by way of presenting them to the public in “easy-to-understand interpretive 
packages, framing functions as a packaging process” (2012:102). This process involves 
the selection of particular aspects of reality and increasing their saliency, whilst also 
omitting other aspects (Kim et al., 2012:102).  
 
As Kim et al. propose, it is within this “selection process” that the medium seek to “promote 
a particular definition of reality”, thus leading audiences to then “make attributions of 
responsibility” (2012:102). Shildrick makes a similar point, noting that ‘poverty propaganda’ 
manufacture “confusion about the root cause of inequality, blaming the supposedly 
feckless, the lazy and the workshy” and thereby draws people’s attentions away from the 
“real causes” (2018:791). Not only is responsibility shifted, the “life limiting effects and the 
role governments play in perpetuating or alleviating poverty and its effects remain largely 
hidden”, disguised by both “false” and “misleading caricatures about poverty and the 
people who experience it” (Shildrick, 2018:791). The consequent definitions of 
responsibility are thus “particularly important”, because this may also prove to “shape the 
overall policy approach taken to address issues, such as poverty” (Kim et al.,2012:102).  
Similarly, Alcock also purported that “ideologies structure the way in which all of us 
perceive and think about social events”, noting further that “they are as important in 
determining the form of policy as economic demands or political struggles” (1987:28).  
 
Thus, the many media available, has the capacity to become an imperative source of 
information and also serve as environment that enables debate, where inequality and 
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poverty is concerned (McKendrick et al., 2008). This power is, however, not without 
consequence (Shildrick, 2018). Through the consumption of poverty porn (Jensen, 2013) 
and by extension, the spread of poverty propaganda, Shildrick emphasises how: 
Poverty Propaganda is given voice, and…power, though the mainstream 
media, in ways that hard evidence about poverty or the grind of day-to-day 
life in low paid, insecure work that fails to take people away from poverty, 
either far enough or for long enough, to make a real difference to their lives, 
very rarely is. It is most often the affluent and the powerful (and in many 
cases those who have the power to resolve poverty or extend the condition 
to more and more citizens) who hold the cards about how poverty is 
presented in public arenas. The voices of those with first-hand experience 
are very rarely heard or where they are, they are moulded, shaped and 
represented in particular ways (2018:791).  
 
As Paterson et al. (2016:196) argue “the perpetuation of negative evaluations of poor 
people” may thus “be used as supporting evidence for governmental policies relating to the 
benefits system”, and whilst empathy may be extended to those perceived as living in 
poverty through no fault of their own, for those whom are perceived to be poor due to their 
own failings, they are marked ‘scroungers’, living off our taxes, and are thus undeserving 
of any assistance.  
 
This, as noted by Kim et al. is descriptive of the “two conflicting views on defining 
responsibility” in action (2012:102). Thus, one view regards social problems as being 
caused “by the deficiencies of individuals”, whereby due to the ‘problem’ being considered 
in relation to “flaws in individual behaviours”, suggestions to eradicate these issues “tend 
to focus on modifications of the problematic behaviours” (Kim et al., 2012:102). 
Conversely, the other view holds that attention should be given to “flaws in social and 
environmental conditions”, whereby solutions to the issues faced, are for instance, sought 
through recommendations in social policy changes (Kim et al., 2012:102). In 2011, a 
speech by Cameron, named Troubled families, arguable reinforced the former (Troubled 
Families Speech, 2011).   
 
Consequently, societal issues such as poverty can be framed in ways, whereby it is 
suggested that “political, economical or other social forces” are defined as “largely 
responsible” or in “in a way that stresses the responsibilities of the poor” (Kim et al., 
2012:102). It is for these reasons, Larsen and Dejgaard suggest that mediated output also 
serves to “form an important basis for creating opinions toward recipients of welfare 
schemes” (2013:288). Arguing further that such content “is likely to influence who we 
(politicians, journalists, social scientists and ordinary citizens) think the poor and welfare 
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recipients are” (Larsen and Dejgaard, 2013:288). Allport (1954) described this as the 
formation of labels and categorisation, where images and stereotypes are born.  
 
Larsen and Dejgaard described these images and stereotypes as “crucial for the moral 
judgements about whether the recipients are deserving or not” (2013:288). Shildrick (2018) 
explains the important function of such processes further, drawing on the work of Link and 
Phelan (2014). Link and Phelan (2014:24) assert that “when people have an interest in 
keeping other people down, in or away”, stigma can be used as a valuable “resource” that 
enables people to “obtain the ends they desire”. This, they name, “resource stigma power” 
(2014:24). As Shildrick (2018:793) purports, “the power of stigma and shame” that are 
widely attributed to the experiences of poverty, and by extension inequality, have meant 
that people who experience poverty themselves seemingly “disassociate themselves from 
the condition”. As Dorey emphasises, negative representations like those described here, 
fail to “elicit much sympathy” amongst those “who already harbour unsympathetic or 
judgemental attitudes towards the poor” (2010:335). This perhaps explains why people 
wish to distance themselves away from such stereotypical assumptions of the way in 
which lives are lived in periods of inequality or poverty, whether these are prolonged or 
temporary.  
 
Although it would be “naïve” to solely attribute the public’s attitudes towards poverty and 
inequality, to the media alone (McKendrick et al., 2008:7), for indeed “buried beneath the 
surface of attitudes about the welfare state lie centuries of experience and imagery” 
(Golding and Middleton, 1982:6), the media arguably “fulfils an important role in shaping, 
amplifying and responding to public attitudes toward poverty” and redistributive initiatives 
(McKendrick et al., 2008). As Shildrick (2018:787) emphasises, both “the pervasiveness 
and consistency of poverty propaganda’s core messages…that those experiencing poverty 
are somehow culpable for their own poverty”, veils the “realities of poverty”, its “causes 
and consequences”. As the following section demonstrates, such “cultural products such 
as television programmes”, also became a “popular topic of discussion on social media”, 
with attitudes toward those experiencing inequality and poverty reflective of longstanding 
negative perceptions (van der Bom et al.,2018:4).  
 
Concerned with the consequences of such mediated scrutiny, Larsen and Dejgaard, 
suggest that what is needed is further “welfare attitude research”, of which should “focus 
on stereotypes…of fellow citizens…as they are indeed both crucial and difficult to change” 
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(2013: 298). Indeed, Scott Paul (2013: no pagination) exclaims, “how can campaigners 
attempt to shift public attitudes, when the media is dominated by such [poverty porn] 
programmes?”. Accordingly, it can be argued that “efforts to engage public support for 
measures to tackle poverty” must first “consider the media’s role in informing and reflecting 
public opinion” (McKendrick et al., 2008:2).  
 
Though it is not the intention of this research to offer this examination, this section has 
outlined the broader social and cultural climate in operation in austerity Britain during this 
period. Emphasis has been placed on how people living life on low incomes are portrayed 
in negative ways, “as lacking skills, living life according to different value systems and 
being unproductive in the wider economy”, thus generating “an attainment value around 
dismissive distancing of the general public, from those living with poverty” (McKendrick et 
al. 2008:36) and thereby widening the social distance between groups. 
 
2.4.1.3 Summary                                                                                                              
 
With a focus on Benefits Street to illustrate, this section has shown how people 
experiencing inequality and poverty have been represented in the media. Emphasis has 
also been placed on the role of the media in framing societal issues, how the media are 
powerful and are also able to guide debates surrounding poverty and inequality. Allowing 
for a further examination of perceptions of inequality and poverty, responses to the 
programme Benefits Street are discussed in greater detail in the following section. Prior to 
this, however, it is also worth noting that despite an increase in programmes within the 
genre of poverty porn between 2010-2015 examined here, the focus appears to have 
changed over time. To illustrate this change, in 2014, Hungry Britain (Panorama) aired, 
followed by Battling with Benefits (BBC One, 2016) which sought to highlight how austerity 
driven cuts had impacted upon people’s lives. Similarly, Ken Loach’s I, Daniel Blake 
(2016) provided a similar narrative, reflecting the reality of the British Welfare State for a 
number of people.  
 
The content of these programmes, are in stark contrast to the framing of programmes like 
Benefits Street (Channel 4), depicting how, for many individuals and families, austerity in 
Britain means being unable to feed and clothe themselves, nor pay their bills. Accordingly, 
although it could be argued that the research presented in this section is outdated, it is 
argued here that this research instead, places emphasis on the social and cultural climate, 
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demonstrating changing discourse, over the course of austerity examined here. The 
following section seeks to build on this further, exploring the literature relating to public 
perceptions of inequality and poverty, drawing on research where public perceptions of 
Benefits Street, benefit recipient’s and the welfare state have been investigated. 
 
2.5 Perceptions of inequality and poverty, Introduction 
 
In austerity Britain, it is argued “intensely punitive” attitudes toward the poor are becoming 
increasingly recognisable (Levitas, 2012:322), this research, alongside others has 
demonstrated how this has occurred (Mooney and Hancock, 2010; O’Hara, 2014; Sparke, 
2016; Alston, 2018). Not only are negative representations of people experiencing the 
reality of economic disadvantage becoming more readily presented in the form of televised 
entertainment, these groups have been actively targeted, verbally and physically, by other 
members of the public (Baumberg et al., 2012; Who Benefits?, 2014).  
 
This Section critically explores public perceptions of inequality and poverty, noting how 
instances of ‘poverty porn’ (Jensen, 2013) or indeed ‘poverty propaganda’ (Shildrick, 2018) 
were both resisted as a form of vilification and accepted as an accurate depiction of life for 
many considered dependent on state support. The consequences of shared beliefs like the 
latter are also discussed, intent on gaining a broader understanding of how such attitudes 
relate to wider attitudes towards inequality, poverty and income redistribution in Britain. 
Section 2.5.2 provides a narrative of research concerning the public’s responses to the 
programme Benefits Street, considering further the wider implications of this programme 
and others like it.  
 
2.5.1 Divided? 
 
Much like Golding and Middleton cautioned in the early 1980’s, it can be argued that “the 
diffuse waves of public anxiety that rippled out from the storm centre of economic 
recession were closing in over the poor and the welfare systems on which they depended” 
(1982:4). Although written some time before the economic crash of 2008/09, this also 
appears to be the case following the recent recession, heightened further by the 
implementation of austerity measures. Hills argues further, that the word welfare itself is 
now increasingly “used to conjure up a picture that the source of Britain's budget deficit” 
(2015:19) were benefit recipients and their plentiful welfare payments. For Park et al. the 
71 
 
consequences of such a rhetoric are clear; we are living in a society inhibited by 
scepticism, where the “public appear unconvinced by…current collective responses to key 
social issues like welfare, inequality, housing or the environment” (2012a: xx). Hill 
continues, describing an increasingly polarised society, one comprised of the “strivers” and 
“skivers” (2015:1). Explaining this mentality further, Hills (2015:1) argues:  
it’s skivers against strivers; dishonest scroungers against honest 
taxpayers...benefits street against the rest of the country; undeserving and 
deserving. It's them against us. We are always in work, pay our taxes and 
get nothing from the state. They are a welfare-dependent underclass, pay 
nothing to the taxman [sic], and get everything from the state.  
 
The above is descriptive of what Bottero refers to as “symbolic demarcations between 
them and us” of which “have important consequences for the fate of people who become 
assigned to such categories” (Bottero, 2005:234). As noted above, this mentality not only 
perpetuate acts of “symbolic violence" (Mckenzie, 2015:16), such expressions also exist 
as a form of “class racism” (Atkinson et al., 2013:35). That said, however, these 
perceptions are not necessarily reflective of the British population in its entirety. What they 
do highlight, however, is how class abuse is both in existence and is problematic, arguably 
acting as both a symptom of and cause of class polarisation and thus operating as a 
barrier to successfully ending inequality. 
 
Notably, trends in perceptions of inequality and poverty, demonstrate that the proportion of 
people who believed there was “very little” poverty in Britain, based on BSAS data, 
increased from 28% in 1994, to 35% in 2000, before increasing further to 45% in 2006 
(Park et al., 2012a:166). This is whilst the proportion, who believed there was “quite a lot” 
of poverty, decreased over the same period, falling from 71% in 1994, to just 52% in 2006. 
Further, although in 2000 36% of people believed poverty had increased over a ten-year 
period, by 2006 just 32% believed it had, whereas 23% stated it had decreased (Park et 
al., 2012a:166). More recently, further changes have occurred. As Clery and Dangerfield 
(2019:11) highlight, by 2018, 62% of the British public agreed that poverty had increased 
over a ten-year period, and this is increase from just 48% in 2009. These attitudinal 
changes suggest that the British public have become more likely to recognise the extent of 
poverty in Britain over time. Further, by 2018, showing an increase from 2009, and 2006, 
65% of the British public felt that “quite a lot” of real poverty existed in Britain (Clery and 
Dangerfield, 2019:11).  
 
72 
 
Although both inequality and poverty remain substantial, the proportion of people who are 
aware of this, appears to fluctuate over time. Whilst the proportion of people able to 
recognise the extent of income inequality in the UK has increased over time, Clery and 
Dangerfield argue that this may be a result of “the rise in political and media discourse 
around poverty”, and this they argue further may have “influenced perceptions of its 
prevalence” (2019:11). That said, for a considerable proportion of the British public, 
poverty remains under recognised or perhaps misunderstood. Relatedly, Hall et al. found 
in their research, that the word poverty itself is “problematic” when used in the context of 
the UK (2014:4). People thus find the word poverty a “loaded” concept, one that often 
“evokes issues faced by people in the developing worlds, rather than in their own 
communities” and thus as a UK phenomenon (Hall et al., 2014:5). The failure to recognise 
inequality and poverty as a UK phenomenon could perhaps begin to explain why poverty 
in Britain is often under recognised (Hall et al., 2014).  
 
For the majority of people (82%) in 2000 however, the gap between those with high 
incomes, and those with low incomes was “too large” (Park et al., 2012a: 24). This figure 
fell, year on year, before increasing again to 74% in 2006, yet the proportion of people who 
believed that such differences were “about right” held at 15% in both 2000, and 2001, 
before increasing to 22% in 2002 and 2006 (Park et al., 2012a:24). More recent data 
shows some consistencies, in 2018, 78% of the public agreed that the gap between 
people on high and low incomes was “too large”, whilst far fewer (16%) felt that this gap 
was “about right” (Clery and Dangerfield, 2019:13). Comparatively, just 2% agreed that the 
gap was “too small” (Clery and Dangerfield, 2019:13). This data suggests that large 
numbers of the British public are consistent in the view that the income gap between 
groups is “too large”. 
 
Despite this, other research also suggests that there is a strong sense of inevitability 
found, when addressing all aspects of economic inequality, including the pay gap, where 
people express a “sense of fatalism”, noting that such occurrences are “inevitable” or 
explained by the assertion that this is “just the way it is” (Bamfield and Horton, 2009:15). 
Interestingly, as Bamfield and Horton found, despite relatively high numbers stating that 
the gaps between incomes are too large, perceptions of people on lower incomes are 
markedly “more negative and punitive”, in comparison to the views held of those at the 
“top” (2009:6). Their research revealed that the majority of people believe that individuals 
are responsible for their economic and social positions, noting further that 
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conceptualisations of those impoverished and receiving benefits, were largely drawn from 
stereotypical assumptions (Bamfield and Horton, 2009:6). So much so, that people 
“struggled to conceptualise them [the poor] in positive terms” (Bamfield and Horton, 
2009:6). Bamfield and Horton note that such opinions are not only widespread, but that 
these relate to the view that there are opportunities for all, yet these are effectively untaken 
by all.  
 
Thus, individualistic explanations of disadvantage are particularly prevalent.  
Such views are further compounded where individuals are believed to be feeding into the 
“something for nothing” criteria, where there is concern that not all people will make 
“reciprocal contributions back to society”, often in the form of future employment (Bamfield 
and Horton, 2009:6). Perhaps reflecting this view further, public support for the 
government redistributing income from the “better off, to the less well-off” also declined, 
from 38 per cent in 2000, to 32 per cent in 2007 (Park et al., 2012a:27). Park et al. also 
note that support for more taxation and a rise in public spending has also seen a reduction 
since 2001 from 61 per cent to 30 per cent in England in 2010 (2012a:28). Similarly, 
Bamfield and Horton highlight a strong sense of entitlement throughout their research, 
noting how people tend to resent “the idea of their hard-earned money going to support 
layabouts who were bleeding the state dry” (2009:22, my italics).  
 
Throughout the literature scrutinised to date, the idea of the ‘deserving’ and ‘undeserving’ 
remains consistent, as does the idea of ‘inevitability’ and ‘choice’. For instance, 
perceptions of why there were people living “in need”, highlighted that the numbers of 
people who believed “laziness and a lack of willpower” was the cause, rose from 23 per 
cent in 2000, to 28 per cent in 2003, before decreasing slightly to 27 per cent in 2006 
(Park et al., 2012a:166). The majority of people each year, however, believed that this was 
“inevitable in modern life”, whereas the third largest proportions of people were found to 
respond asserting “injustice in society” was the reason (Park et al., 2012a:166). For 
Bamfield and Horton “much of the UK population subscribes to some type of belief in fair 
inequality on the basis of desert” or described differently, “that some inequality is fair 
because it is deserved on the basis of differential effort and contribution” (2009:7).  
 
More recently however, Hall et al. found that people offered a number of potential causes 
for poverty (2014). They found that people believed that poverty had worsened following 
the 2008/09 recession, noting how both structural and economic reasons were drawn 
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upon, including the cost of living, a lack of job opportunities and the numbers experiencing 
in work poverty were cited (Hall et al., 2014). There was however a continuation of 
perceptions of people as ‘deserving’ and ‘undeserving’ their experiences. Those within the 
former groups, were seen to have “chosen a life of poverty”, whereas those falling within 
the latter category were seen to have “no control of their situation” (Hall et al., 2014:5) and 
therefore, did not deserve their plight.  
 
Curtice (2016:1) points to further attitudinal changes amongst the British public, where he 
believes “there are signs of a reaction against the fiscal discipline of recent years”. 
Strengthening this point, Curtice highlights how in 2016, 48% of the public agreed with the 
statement: “the government should increase taxes and spend more” (2016:1). Whilst less 
than half the British public subscribed to this view, the proportion of people holding this 
view increased each year from 2012, where just 34% of the public agreed that the 
government should spend more (Curtice, 2016). Thus, the level of agreement recorded in 
2016 was “a higher proportion than at any point during the last 10 years” (Curtice, 2016:1).  
These changes are reflective of the “Thermostat effect”, whereby the public, “like a 
thermostat”, begin to push against government policies, intimating that they do not wish a 
particular “policy direction” to continue to be pursued (Curtice, 2010:2). Alternatively, again 
utilising Curtice’s approach, had the public’s attitudes fit more closely with the 
“Weathervane effect”, attitudes towards an increase in taxation and greater spending by 
the government, may have been less popular amongst the public (2010:2). 
 
In the context of voters, Curtice explains the “Thermostat effect” succinctly where he 
states: 
if government starts spending more money on something, and as a result 
the quality and/or quantity of a service improves, voters gradually come to 
the view that no further action needs to be taken. If on the other hand, 
government cuts back on spending and as a result the service comes to be 
seen as less satisfactory, then there are calls for government to spend 
more (Curtice, 2016:3). 
 
Reflective of this latter point, as Curtice contends, the shift in attitudes toward an increase 
in taxation, and more spending over this period suggests that people were “beginning to 
react against the ‘austerity’ of recent years” (2016:11-12). Given this, it could be argued 
that the public are becoming increasingly aware of wider structural issues and how these 
impact on fellow citizens lives.  
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Reflecting much of the literature drawn on, the following section continues to draw out 
public perceptions of inequality and poverty, utilising research concerned with the content 
and impact of the series Benefits Street.  
 
2.5.2 Perceptions of Benefits Street 
 
Notably, there are consistent negative opinions held towards people experiencing poverty 
and inequality. However, there have been instances where the public have revolted, 
demonstrating a distinct sense of public distaste for the representation of people 
experiencing poverty and inequality in programmes such as Benefits Street. For instance, 
Red Faction, supporters of Middlesbrough Football Club, wielded a banner which read 
“being poor is not for your entertainment”, alongside an additional banner, which read 
“Fuck Benefits Street” (Love, 2014: no pagination). Reportedly, residents from Stockton, 
also expressed their disdain, throwing eggs and chasing Benefit Street’s film crews away 
(Cain, 2014).  
 
Research has also sought to understand how members of the public reacted to Benefits 
Street on social media platforms like Twitter (Baker and McEnery, 2015; Brooker et al., 
2015; Paterson et al., 2016; van der Bom et al., 2018). van der Bom et al. (2018:4) 
emphasise how “cultural products, such as television programmes, are one popular topic 
of discussion on social media”, with their research highlighting conflicting perspectives. 
With a focus on the second series of Benefits Street, van der Bom et al. followed 
“instantaneous reactions” from 4,086 different Twitter account holders, whom were 
tweeting in direct response to scenes, as they aired (2018:3). van der Bom et al. note 
“evidence of scrounger discourses, negative evaluation of individuals, generalisations 
about benefits claimants”, alongside individuals keen to question both the “hygiene and 
morals” of the people they encountered (2018:9).  
 
Issues of consumption also featured negatively within responses to the programme, to 
highlight this, van der Bom et al. cite one Twitter user’s response, whereby they wrote: 
“they are all struggling to pay bills and buy food. But where do they get their cigarettes 
from?! #benefitsstreet” (2018:9). Similarly, Bauman’s (2007) notion of ‘flawed 
consumerism’ was also identifiable during the festive period, with one user exclaiming: 
“this lot are deluded they don't work, squander what they get on fags and booze then 
complain they can't afford Christmas lol! [laughing out loud] #benefitstreet” (van der Bom 
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et al., 2018:9). Alongside this discourse, a “political commentary” also emerged, with users 
drawing on wider social implications (van der Bom et al.,2018:12). To illustrate, one user 
wrote: “new series of #BenefitsStreet on @Channel4 ... Bleak. Expect more poverty on 
your doorstep in #ToryBritain over the next 5 yrs.? Thanx4That”, with another referring to 
the Conservative election victory some days earlier, stating: “to celebrate the #Tories win, 
Iain Duncan Smith proudly brings you a brand-new series of #BenefitsStreet #IDS #DWP 
Pure Propaganda TV” (van der Bom et al.,2018:12).  
 
Despite scrutiny, the people featured on Benefits Street were nevertheless, depicted “as 
‘scroungers’, ‘scum cunts’ and ‘lazy twats’ who are given ‘lucrative’ amounts of money but 
are too lazy to find employment”, such depictions for van der Bom et al. are “typical of 
scrounger discourse”, implying that people in receipt of benefits “do not really need the 
money to survive” (2018:10) .Or, as van der Bom et al. succinctly suggest “that is to say, 
their flawed consumerism is further evidence of their general low worth as human beings”, 
pointing further to the prevalence of an ‘underclass discourse’, which is descriptive of “a 
cluster of human characteristics that are generally undesirable”, inclusive of characteristics 
such as “laziness, drug-taking, low intelligence and, sometimes, ‘scrounging’” (2018:10).  
 
The research thus emphasised how: 
the tweeting audience of Benefits Street II drew heavily on cultural 
stereotypes in forging indexical links between individuals’ social 
characteristics and an underclass identity (van der Bom et al., 2018:17). 
 
Whilst Baker and McEnery also found that Twitter users expressed outrage, hostility and 
drew on stereotypical assumptions of people in receipt of benefits in their research, they 
maintain that other posts revealed a “picture of online activism” (Baker and McEnery, 
2015:261). Expecting to see words like scrounger and poverty used in negative way, 
Baker and McEnery highlight how each of these words were actually often used 
sympathetically, noting that “two thirds of tweeters used the word scroungers in tweets that 
were critical of the word”, with one user stating that: “labelling all benefit recipients as 
scroungers…easy way out. Open your eyes instead of comparing them to those on 
Benefits Street” and another declaring that: “poverty porn sells better than community 
outreach” (2015:261). Other tweeters were keen to inform other Twitter users that they 
were being invited to “hate the wrong people” (Baker and McEnery, 2015:260). 
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Brooker et al. also highlighted within their study of Twitter responses to the first Benefits 
Street programme, that the public held both differing and contradictory opinions (2015). 
Whilst it was noted that a “large amount” of what they found “could be characterised as 
being abuse, or perhaps, joking pejorative”, it was noted that “this behaviour was mostly 
targeted towards people depicted in the programme, as well as towards the broader social 
class that those individuals supposedly represent” (Brooker et al.,2015:3185). This 
included their homes, clothes and again their consumer choices. Furthermore, public 
reaction to the programme Benefits Street, as they note, was actively encouraged 
amongst social media users of Twitter, via an “official hash tag #benefitsstreet” (Brooker et 
al., 2015:3177). Brooker et al. upon analysing 124,000 tweets from Twitter users, noted 
how Twitter acted as a “platform for both abuse of the people represented and to support 
discussion related to the wider political narratives surrounding welfare in the UK” 
(2015:3177-8).  
 
Comments from Twitter users, according to Brooker et al. were “predominantly negative”, 
again, comprising negative “observations relating to the appearance of the residents and 
the ways in which their homes and James Turner Street itself were presented” 
(2015:3180). Alongside the vilification of the residents on the street, tweeters were also 
concerned with their representation in the documentary, noting how some users felt that 
the footage was edited “to meet popular stereotypes”, one user for instance stated: 
“regardless of what people think of those ‘scroungers’ the truth is their [they are] 
vulnerable and channel 4 have set them up” (Brooker et al., 2015:3181). Interestingly, this 
particular twitter user appears to point to the framing of benefit recipients and indeed 
vulnerability, yet draws on negative, yet popular discourse to do so.  
 
Suggesting further instances of “online activism” (Baker and McEnery, 2015) Brooker et al. 
found a number of users who referred to fraudulent claiming of benefits, taxation and how 
other tweeters should consider: “REAL benefits cheats”, such as the “bankers and MPs” 
(2015:3182). The broadcasters “intentions” were considered, in relation to the number of 
viewers the show attracted and further questions as to who “had funded and 
commissioned the series”, such debates led one twitter user to state: “the govt 
[government] who owns the broadcaster that showed #benefitsstreet have a vested 
interest-cuts or abolition to welfare”, and another media user to argue that this programme 
had an agenda, where they wrote: “AGENDA: demonise those on welfare; introduce 
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reforms, desensitise injustice, fabricate consensus…ACTION: propaganda” (Brooker et al., 
2015:3182).  
 
Paterson et al. (2016) sought to understand differing public reactions to Benefit Street, 
further, analysing how participants responded to clips of Benefits Street in focus groups. 
Reportedly, “judgement” of those featured on the programme were passed by focus group 
participants, frequently reflecting a perceived “benefits culture in wider society” (Paterson 
et al., 2016:199-200). They also found that the respondents felt that a “very narrow view of 
people on benefits” was provided, prompting one individual to think of the television series, 
Shameless and another to assert that the programme was: “exploiting people …because 
they just show…a stereotype or ideology in society about maybe a sort of class or certain 
groups of people” (Paterson et al., 2016:199-200). 
 
Interestingly, Paterson et al. ponder whether these perceptions, and others where 
respondents have queried whether the programme could actually have “a positive effect”, 
with the participants believing that, given “the problems of people on benefits…somebody 
is actually taking an interest now rather than just sweeping it aside”, are indicative of: 
an awareness that the lives of those on Benefits Street are viewed through 
a particular lens can help to position some participants as resistant readers 
to the stereotypes that they claimed they saw portrayed (2016:199-200). 
 
Paterson et al. (2016: 212), however, also argue that a “case can be made for the position 
that poverty porn facilitates the evocation of negative evaluations”, given that particular 
clips played to respondents, led to a discussion of wider stereotypical assumptions, of 
which were not portrayed within the particular clips (including teenage pregnancies).  
Notably, the research also revealed a lack of “affinity with the people…on screen”, 
although benefit recipients were “slightly more sympathetic”, Paterson et al. note however 
“in all cases…our participants considered themselves to be separate from those 
represented on Benefits Street” (2016:212). Paterson et al. conclude that Benefit Street “is 
not just an entertainment programme”, instead it can be understood as a “site for 
ideological construction and the perpetuation of existing stereotypes about benefit 
claimants”, suggesting further that “the programme (and others like it) invites negative 
evaluations of those on benefits…” (2016:198). Indeed, by their own admission, the 
researchers “invited…participants to judge the people they saw on screen”, but they 
believe the analysis revealed much more, arguing that the participants “used the 
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individuals in Benefits Street to work collaboratively to construct an overarchingly negative 
stereotype of those on benefits” (Paterson et al., 2016:212).                                                                                      
 
Notably this research has shown mixed reactions from the public, with some people 
maintaining familiar discourses of the undeserving poor, and conversely others seeking to 
emphasise wider social and economic implications. The following section critically 
examines the consequences of stereotypical rhetoric, intent on understanding attitudes 
toward inequality and poverty further.  
 
2.5.3 Stereotypical rhetoric 
 
Section 2.5.2 demonstrated how perceptions of “inequality, poverty and economic 
disadvantage are complex and multi-layered” (Shildrick, 2018:785). Public perceptions 
appeared to challenge stereotypical labels and question the impact of social structures. 
However, attitudes also continued to reflect and reinforce stereotypical distinctions 
between the undeserving and deserving poor and of a dualism between the “good worker” 
and “bad benefit claimant” (Patrick, 2012:10). Drawing on relevant literature, including the 
work of Shildrick (2018), alongside Tyler (2008), this section focuses on the consequences 
of stereotypical rhetoric and the labels attributed to people experiencing inequality and 
poverty further. 
 
Borrowing from Golding and Middleton, it could be argued that the stereotypical public 
perceptions focused on in this research, are merely reflective of a fear held for some time; 
a fear that the “welfare umbrella has been extended over too wide a range…at great social 
and economic costs” (Golding and Middleton, 1982:85). However, whilst this is a view that 
may resonate amongst the British public, what has continued to occur, may best be 
described as “moralistic scapegoating”, where it can be argued that “there is a renewed 
political appetite for the condemnation of poor places and people” (Mooney and Hancock, 
2010: no pagination). Not only has this “condemnation” existed for some time, this 
“appetite” is identifiable amongst the attitudes of the British public (Mooney and Hancock, 
2010: no pagination), and this has also existed for decades (Horton and Gregory, 2009; 
Seabrook, 2015). It has, moreover, been suggested that the focus placed on people 
experiencing inequality and poverty over the course of austerity examined here, was both 
powerful and purposely driven, with a specific aim (Mooney and Hancock, 2010; Penny, 
2013; Jensen, 2014; O’Hara, 2014; Shildrick, 2018).  
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To reiterate, people experiencing inequality and poverty have been characterised as an 
underclass, whom are “immoral, godless, ignorant, feckless” and “infantile” (Ferdinand, 
2010:175). Alongside this, they have been labelled ‘undeserving’, ‘shirkers’, ‘profligate’, 
and ‘work shy’ (Pantazis, 2016). As Shildrick and MacDonald (2013), Jensen (2014) and 
Mckenzie (2015) noted, such degrading language is not new but is formidable. Analysing 
public attitudes toward benefit recipients featured in Benefits Street, van der Bom et al. 
found a continuation of this language, where those featured were described as “deluded”, 
“scroungers”, “scum cunts” and “lazy twats” (2018:10).  
 
For Jensen, these latter findings may not be surprising, for she believes the intention of the 
contents of these programmes was to both perpetuate and reinforce dominant 
stereotypical narratives: 
the national abjects of poverty porn serve to transform precarity into a moral 
failure, worklessness into laziness…social immobility and disconnection into 
an individual failure to strive and aspire…poverty porn does not only play on 
existing shameless curiosity about poverty, it…positions the lives of the 
poor as a moral site for scrutiny, something to be peered at, dissected and 
assessed. It reinvents the underclass for the purposes of welfare reform 
'debate'...It presents the 'others' on the screen as dysfunctional in their 
choices and behaviour…presenting a dysfunctional welfare state which 
rewards such ‘lifestyles’ (2014:4). 
 
The consequences of both hostility toward the welfare state and benefit recipients, and of 
stereotypical labels, impede “social relationships” (O’Brien and Kyprianou, 2017:8), where 
stereotypical assumptions serve to “guide” people in the formation of attitudes of others, 
but also influence behaviour towards other people (Glynn et al.,1999:148).  
 
The consequences of the ways in which people experiencing inequality and poverty are 
represented, discussed and characterised, can be explained by drawing on Shildrick’s 
understanding of ‘poverty propaganda’ (2018). Notably, as evidenced throughout this 
research, propaganda is reflected amongst public attitudes, presented in the media and 
reinforced by political rhetoric. For Shildrick, propaganda provides an important function 
and should be understood as “a mighty political tool that orchestrates widespread 
consent”, consent toward “a political system that affords punishing life opportunities 
(2018:793). Here, Shildrick is making a connection between the role of propaganda and 
the preservation of neo-liberal capitalist ideologies (2018). For Shildrick, “poverty 
propaganda plays an important role in its [neo-liberal capitalism] legitimation”, thus 
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“normalising class inequality”, whilst “helping to ensure its continuation” and presenting 
“inequalities of life chances and life conditions…as right, necessary and just” (2018:793).  
 
Shildrick (2018) not only stresses the importance of this tool but is also critical of the short 
and long-term consequences of such characterisations, and representations of people 
experiencing poverty and inequality. This concern is perhaps reflective of McKendrick et 
al’s caution that “how we encounter poverty shapes how we understand and respond to it” 
(2008:5). Furthermore, as Hanley emphasises, when perceptions are “based on 
misconceptions or limited information, these gaps…need to be filled” (Hanley, 2009:4) and 
it would appear both politicians and the media have attempted to fill these voids.  
 
Whilst the effects of mediated discourse are questionable (McQuail, 1994), and it is not 
argued that the media tell their audiences what to think, it can be argued that the media 
are “stunningly successful in telling its readers [or audiences] what to think about” (Cohen, 
in Glynn, 1999:389). Indeed, as Holman observed, the extent of the impact of the media in 
shaping attitudes and behaviour “is a matter of date” (1978:210), but this is one that is not 
entered into here. The focus is instead placed on the cost of popular stigmatising 
discourse (Shildrick and MacDonald, 2013) on both British social relations and attitudes 
towards those in receipt of social security provision and on support towards eradicating 
income inequality through redistributive measures.  
 
Bottero emphasised that “all accounts of hierarchy contain images of inequality, social 
pictures which classify, categorise and grade the members of society”, resulting in 
statements being made concerning “similarity or difference” (2005:15). This, it is argued, 
produces “distinctions of social worth”, where people set about establishing their “own 
social position relative to others…” (Bottero, 2005:15). What Bottero also suggests, 
however, is the importance of social position and previous interaction, and experience in 
relation to hierarchical depictions (2005). This is evident where Bottero states that these 
“social pictures” are “politically loaded descriptions”, noting further how “the images we 
draw partly depend on our own social location”, our own “attitudes and relations towards 
social unequals”, alongside “the agenda (and alliances) that we are pursuing” (2005:15).  
 
Much of the literature scrutinised to date reflects these “distinctions of social worth” 
(Bottero, 2005:15), where what can be regarded as “negative and punitive” attitudes 
(Bamfield and Horton, 2009:6) towards people experiencing hardship are reinforced and 
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have become more routinely expressed. In the context of reality-based television 
programmes and Benefits Street, audiences are afforded “multiple narratives, interactions 
and settings” or rather “a character menu” (Hills, 2014: 129). As Hills (2014:129) explains, 
audiences of reality programmes are thus provided with “an opportunity for relational and 
emotional work”, which often “fuses and reinforces social distinctions” further. It can be 
argued that these types of programmes set out with this intention and are thus, as  
Shildrick explains, “specifically orchestrated to present the participants very much as the 
irresponsible and feckless ‘other’” (2018:791), thereby reinforcing stereotypical attributions 
and positioning blame. 
 
Problematically, however, such “character menus” (Hills, 2014:129) may not be reflective 
of reality. Indeed, as Shildrick highlights, Benefit Street professed to provide “a true-to-life 
representation of unemployment and poverty” (2018:791). Yet, for Shildrick, these 
representations should only be understood as “partial” realities, “prone to extremes” and 
reflective of highly stereotypical assumptions, rather than understood as both “the 
everyday and the mundane” (2018:791). Whilst research has shown that some members 
of the public did see such programmes as exploitative and edited with a specific aim 
(hatred), others however, expressed hostility, amusement and disdain toward the 
individuals represented (Baker and McEnery, 2015; Brooker et al., 2015, Paterson et al., 
2016; van der Bom et al., 2018), distinguishing between and marking “boundaries” 
between those on the television and themselves (Hill, 2014:129).  
 
This boundary making is both significant and problematic. Borrowing from and adapting 
the work of Tyler (2008), may further explain the important role of ‘poverty propaganda’ 
(Shildrick, 2018) plays in attitudes toward inequality and poverty, and of the consequences 
of stereotypical rhetoric. Focusing on the portrayal of social class identities through the 
“figure” of the ‘chav’, Tyler suggests that “class disgust is invoked and deployed in 
instrumental ways, marking difference and blocking social mobility” (2008:19). For, Tyler 
emotions, like disgust and laughter, “in the mediation of social class” need to be reflected 
upon (2008:19). As Tyler explains, “an everyday definition of disgust would be an emotion 
experienced and expressed as a sickening feeling of revulsion, loathing, or nausea” 
(2008:19). These negative feelings not only appear to fit closely with the stereotypical 
labels attributed to those experiencing inequality and poverty, but are also descriptive of a 
substantial proportion of the public’s attitudes toward those featured on Benefits Street 
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(Baker and McEnery, 2015; Brooker et al., 2015, Paterson et al., 2016; van der Bom et al., 
2018). 
 
The importance of these reactions, and the associated consequences, can be explained 
by borrowing once again from Tyler, and her understanding of the popular cultural 
representations of the ‘chav’, where she argued “like disgust, laughter is community-
forming…often contagious, and it generates proximity” (2008:23). For Tyler:  
like disgust, laughter is community-forming…often contagious, and it 
generates proximity. Laughter is always shared with a real or imagined 
community. Laughter is often at the expense of another, and when we 
laugh, we effectively “fix” the other, as the object of comedy. Laughter 
moves us both literally and figuratively, we are averted, moved away from 
the thing, the object or figure, we laugh at. In the case of laughter at those 
of a lower class, laughter is boundary forming. It creates a distance 
between “them” and “us,” asserting moral judgments and a superior class 
position” (2008:23). 
 
In this way, laughter like disgust, may bring people together and yet exclude others at the 
same time.  The complexities of the issues faced by people to whom we are encouraged 
to laugh at or feel disgusted with are, as a consequence, reduced. Instead, stereotypical 
rhetoric and assumptions become further embedded.  
 
Similarly, Bakery and McEnery argued that members of the public, using the platform 
Twitter, were “engaging and uniting in ‘fun anger’ in their hostile and demeaning 
responses” to a programme debating Benefits Street (Charlie Brooker’s Weekly Wipe, 
BBC4, 16th January 2014). Drawing on Le Bon (1896), they argue that this may bring 
forward an alternative way of understanding stereotypical discourse and its consequences, 
where people are merely “following the crowd and seeking confirmation from others”  
thereby “heralding a new form of ‘herd mentality’”(Baker and McEnery, 2015:261), where 
stereotypical discourse, amusement and repulsion was a shared activity, driven by 
dominant stereotypical attitudes, yet not necessarily personal opinions. 
 
It can be argued that as a result of the negative portrayal of people experiencing inequality 
and poverty, a distinct sense of ‘othering’, stemming from stereotypical assumptions of 
people who experience poverty and inequality (Bottero, 2005) was evident during the 
period of austerity examined here. This is significant, as these continue to have important 
consequences for those to whom labels, such as ‘undeserving’, ‘deserving’, ‘worker’, 
‘shirker’ are attributed to (Bottero, 2005). As Mckenzie highlights, the negative labels 
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attached to people who experience inequality and poverty, act as a form of “symbolic 
violence”, which go beyond economic stigma (2015:6). Meaning not only do people 
experience economic hardship, they are also subject to disapproval and stigma over their 
tastes and consumer choices, including both their clothing and speech patterns (Mckenzie, 
2015). Not only is this evidenced in recent research (Baker and McEnery, 2015; Brooker et 
al., 2015; Paterson et al., 2016; van der Bom et al., 2018), this is suggestive of a deeper 
shift in attitudes in Britain; the rise of individualism, alongside a reinvigoration of blaming 
individuals and this poses a problem.  
 
Indeed, as Fong et al. highlight, whilst the public are considered “willing to help the poor”, it 
is stressed that this support is withdrawn when they suspect that “the poor may cheat or 
fail to cooperate by not trying hard enough to be self-sufficient and morally upstanding” 
(2003:3). The mediating framing of hardship discussed here, also highlights how the social 
context of attitude formation operates, and as Hall et al. note, how the “public attitudes to 
poverty matter a great deal” (2014:10). Not least because “public attitudes have a direct 
impact on the day-to-day experiences of people living in poverty” (Hall et al., 2014:10), but 
because public attitudes, to some extent, “inform the levels of support for action by 
government and others to tackle poverty” (Hanley, 2009:3). Whilst such support does not 
always result in successful policy implementation, as Stanley argues, it does however 
ensure that there is “sustained and increased action by all levels of government to take 
measures that will tackle poverty” (2009:3).  
 
Individualistic tendencies thus reduce peoples understanding and reduce their awareness 
of the inequality endured by others, acting as a barrier to the implementation of successful 
policy initiatives to eradicate inequality. Alston’s (2018:2) more recent findings appear to 
support this statement, whereby he remarked: 
British compassion for those who are suffering has been replaced by a 
punitive, mean-spirited, and often callous approach apparently designed to 
instil discipline where it is least useful, to impose a rigid order on the lives of 
those least capable of coping with today’s world, and elevating the goal of 
enforcing blind compliance over a genuine concern to improve the well-
being of those at the lowest levels of British society. 
 
Much like inequality and poverty, these punitive notions of people experiencing inequality 
or poverty, are however not new, nor are the associated discussions of dependency, self-
help and self-sufficiency. Cootes emphasises this point. Writing in the 1960’s Cootes 
described how people “shut their eyes to the problems and simply said it was is up to the 
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poor to help themselves” (1966:3). More recently, Dorling has drawn out contemporary 
similarities, noting that as inequality rises the number of people “turning a blind eye to the 
suffering of others” also increases, where the individuals looking on “become increasingly 
concerned about themselves and how they are seen” (2014:99). This research seeks to 
understand this process further, intent on exploring whether the public perceive the gap 
between high and low incomes as a gap ‘too large’. 
 
Alongside instances of rising indifference among the British public, people are also 
seemingly keen to ensure they avoid the consequences of the ‘symbolic violence’ 
Mckenzie (2015) describes. As Bottero highlighted previously, people often make 
“strenuous attempts to mark their social difference” from those who are deemed to fall 
“below them” (2005:28). Not only does this strengthen Dorling’s point of concern on an 
individual basis, but this as Bottero highlights is also “unsurprising” (2005:28). Both 
practices of concern and avoidance in this way, are reflective of the consequence of “the 
stigma” attributed to people “at the bottom of social hierarchies” (Bottero, 2005:29). For 
Mooney and Hancock, however, these practices signify a reinvigoration of something else 
also in operation (2010).This is clear where they argue that “once more we find ourselves 
amidst a war on the poor, not on the economic, structural cause of poverty” (2010:no 
pagination). 
 
As this research emphasises, the “gainers and losers” (Lupton et al., 2015:8) of austerity 
Britain have been routinely exemplified in the media and amongst politicians; presented as 
two groups of individuals who are in stark opposition to one another. Not only does this 
point to research suggesting that the UK is becoming increasingly more polarised 
(McKendrick et al., 2008; Mooney and Hancock, 2010; Irvin, 2011; Hills, 2015; Toynbee 
and Walker, 2015), this statement is also in direct opposition to the ethos drawn on by the 
Coalition and the Conservatives, throughout the period of austerity examined here.  
Indeed, as Clarke and Newman emphasise, the idea that “we all are in it together” 
(Cameron, 2010: no pagination) was a “collective imagery” which suggested “a nation 
united in the face of adversity” (2012:303). As Dorling maintains, it can be argued that “in 
the UK the bottom 99 per cent now have more in common than has been the case for a 
generation”, arguing further that “some 99 per cent of us are increasingly all in it together”, 
however this does not signify unity given that “the top 1 per cent…are not part of this new 
austerity norm” (2014:4). Instead, what has become increasingly apparent is how social 
relationships have been eroded further. Within the 99 per cent Dorling (2014) describes, 
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hierarchies exist, where “social inferiors are often still marked out as physically and morally 
distinct” despite often “close contact between social groups” (Bottero, 2005:27) or indeed 
similarities.  
 
Accordingly, this suggests that Britain, as a result of austerity, was not a nation united but 
one further divided both economically and socially. Given that “public consent” is required 
in order to enact “political change” (Horton and Gregory, 2009:19) and that a number of 
people perceive poverty as signalling a “lack of respectability” an “inability to manage” and 
a “moral failure worthy of blame” (Shildrick and MacDonald, 2013:293), this is problematic. 
Indeed, as Shildrick and MacDonald reiterate, following the election of the Coalition in 
2010 “political justification for austerity-driven cuts to welfare spending” have been 
legitimised by enabling a vision of welfare claimants as “undeserving” and as having 
chosen a life dependent on benefits, and this is a rhetoric that was also widely emphasised 
in the media (2013:295).  
 
That said, the mood amongst the public also began to change, Harding notes how 
attitudes towards welfare recipients and the redistribution of income, and austerity as a 
whole have shifted (2017).  Drawing on BSAS data from 2016, Harding shows how more 
people wish to see taxation and spending increased, and how negative attitudes towards 
people experiencing inequality also ‘softened’, with just 22% of the public asserting that 
claimants were fraudulently doing so; this fall in proportion is described as the lowest 
recorded since 1986, when the first question appeared in the BSAS (2017). Harding also 
highlights that a smaller proportion of people (21%) felt that the majority of social security 
recipients were undeserving of help (2016).  
 
As Hatzisavvidou (2018) also notes, resistance toward austerity has seemingly increased 
over time, with a number of political actors standing together with a collective aim, the end 
of austerity. This includes UK Uncut, the People’s Assembly, Scotland United against 
Austerity, the Radical Assembly, as well as Plaid Cymru, Left Unity, SNP, the Green Party, 
alongside other community led campaigns (2018). For Hatzisavvidou, each served as 
“agents of anti-austerity rhetoric”, in that “all rejected the necessity of austerity and sought 
to infuse collective political imagination with a common goal: the end of the era of 
austerity” (2018: no pagination). From 2015, leader of the Labour Party Jeremy Corbyn 
has also been an influential voice in the anti-austerity campaign, seeking to restore unity 
and bring forth the demise of austerity (Grierson and Slawson, 2017).  
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Indeed, whilst Alston notes, “tremendous resilience, strength, and generosity, with 
neighbours supporting one another”, is observable amongst the public, he also believes 
that “the compassion and mutual concern that has long been part of the British tradition 
has been outsourced” (2018: no pagination). 
 
2.5.4 Summary 
 
This section emphasised public perceptions of inequality and poverty, focusing on the 
portrayal of people in receipt of social security and the use of stereotypical rhetoric. The 
role of ‘poverty porn’ and ‘poverty propaganda’ have also been considered, drawing on 
Tyler’s research on ‘chavs’ and the emotions, disgust and laughter, to further understand 
attitudes and the consequences of stereotypical representations and rhetoric. Whilst the 
discussion of Benefits Street emphasised stigmatising discourse, resistance was also 
notable, though to a lesser extent. To summarise, it has been argued that propaganda is 
powerful, and that attitudes reflective of disgust or amusement toward those experiencing 
inequality and poverty are problematic. Where, as a result, complex social issues become 
reduced, discussed and consumed for the purpose of entertainment, reducing people’s 
understanding of the experiences of inequality. Though it is not the intention of this 
research to suggest that the media nor politicians directly influence attitudes toward 
inequality and poverty, the following section explores how social attitudes can be 
interpreted and how these are not formed in isolation.  
 
2.6 Exploring Attitudes, Introduction  
Poverty and inequality cannot be understood with the use of statistics alone, for each also 
“concerns personal experiences, feelings and attitudes” (Holman, 1978: 46). It is for these 
reasons, this research has not only highlighted how Britain faired economically post-
recession, through austerity, but has also placed emphasis on the social and cultural 
environment. Before their contextual application in Chapter’s 4-6, this section explains how 
exploration of socio-economic and demographic characteristics may aid an understanding 
of perceptions and by extension how these may change over time.  
 
2.6.1 Understanding social attitudes 
 
Understanding the process of perception formation from a sociological viewpoint, involves 
understanding how attitudes arise, as a result of the influence of both “beliefs, preferences, 
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behaviour and values at the individual level”, but also understanding that these influences 
are “formed through the interaction of culture, human nature and the world around us” 
(Voas, 2014: no pagination). Emphasis is thus placed on how perceptions are often social, 
acquired through, maintained and altered by social interaction, of which occurs either 
directly or indirectly (Hogg and Terry, 1980; Underwood, 2009). For the purpose of this 
research, attitudes are understood as enabling the provision of an evaluation as to 
whether something is conceived of, as good or bad, right or wrong or something that ought 
to occur or the opposite (Voas, 2014: no pagination). Attitudes are taken as “propositional” 
entities that are both “expressed or unexpressed”, of which may serve to “motivate or be 
influenced by behaviour” (Voas, 2014: no pagination). Further, attitudes are not 
understood as “static nor immutable”, they are on the contrary, understood as both 
“spatially and temporally variable” and thus subject to change, and so too are the “cultural 
and social conditions in which they develop” (Underwood, 2009:104-113). 
 
From a sociological standpoint, attitudes can be further understood as “entities on the 
same level as beliefs, feelings and behaviour”, in that attitudes may reflect both the 
“consequences and causes of beliefs, feelings and behaviour”, yet as Voas argues they 
are both observable and identifiable “independently of them” (2014: no pagination). In this 
view, understanding attitudes from a sociological stance, would mean that the “defining 
feature” of social attitudes is not missed (Voas, 2014: no pagination). The “defining 
feature”, Voas argues, is that “attitudes are evaluative judgements”, of which are applied 
“to others as well as ourselves” (2014: no pagination).  
 
Thus, people’s attitudes should not be regarded as simply reflecting “personal likes and 
dislikes”, because “they concern how people in general ought to think, feel and behave” 
(Voas, 2014: no pagination). Consequently, understanding attitudes in relation to 
“evaluative judgements” applicable not only to self, but to others (Voas, 2014: no 
pagination) may also involve consideration as to what the societal consequences of these 
attitudes may be for both the subject and attitude holder.  
 
What is increasingly evident throughout the literature, is how attitude formation is thus a 
complex endeavour, and is subject to a number of societal influences and experiences, 
alongside change. For the purpose of this research, and within the constraints of 
secondary analysis, attitudes are explored by specific characteristics. This includes 
demographic characteristics (gender, age, ethnic background and educational attainment), 
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and socio-economic characteristics (employment status, self-rated income band, benefit 
status and occupation). Focusing the analysis by characteristic not only allows for 
comparative analysis of attitudes based on group categorisation, this also allows for 
attitudinal differences to be considered in relation to wider changes over the course of 
austerity. What is of central interest in this research, is the extent of change in attitudes 
toward the income gap and redistribution, alongside attitudes towards those in receipt of 
social security, in the context of austerity Britain between 2009-2015.  
 
Understanding public attitudes and how these change over time is thus not only interesting 
from a research perspective, but it is also important, and this importance derives from the 
relationship between attitudes and public policy (Devine and Robinson, 2014; Kulin and 
Seymer, 2014). Devine and Robinson suggest that the relationship between attitudes and 
policy can be understood by further understanding that “policy is informed, but not 
governed by public opinion” (2014:1). In this way, they assert that “understanding the 
attitudes of the public is important, both to help shape and to evaluate policy priorities” 
(2014:1). Whilst Devine and Robinson express the importance of “factual” data use by the 
government in the process of “decision making and evaluation”, using the UK Family 
Resources Survey as an example, they also highlight the importance of attitudes (2014:2).  
 
Devine and Robinson, note, however that It is important to acknowledge that the 
relationship between policy making and survey data can work in both directions”, in this 
way “data can have an impact on policy making, whilst policy making can have an impact 
on data creation (2014:8).They argue further, that inconsistencies in survey questions over 
time, is reflective of this latter point and this, as the following chapter highlights, is also 
reflected in the BSAS (Section 3.4.1).  
 
More recent research by Hudson et al. (2016a; 2016b) note, however, that caution should 
be exercised when considering policy support or indeed their lack and public opinion. 
Hudson et al. highlight an element of ‘nostalgia’ whereby “analyses of contemporary 
welfare (state) discourse are often rooted in an implicit presumption that the tone and 
nature of popular and political debate today” actually differs from those observed in the 
past (2016a:10). Arguing further that: 
in the ‘golden days’ of the Welfare State, the broad willingness to endorse 
higher spending was qualified by a high degree of public scepticism 
towards some aspects of the Welfare State and a suspicion amongst many 
that some services were being abused and particular groups were marked 
out for public disapproval (Hudson et al., 2016a:7).  
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In their research, Hudson et al. (2016a) extend their analysis of attitudes toward welfare 
policies and include an examination of attitudinal data collected in the 1950s,1960s and 
1970s, concluding that because “widespread pejorative attitudes to welfare” were 
apparent, during what is now regarded “the ‘golden era’ of welfare state expansion”, this 
thus suggests “that the existence of similar views” amongst the public more 
contemporarily, “need not be a barrier to expanding social policy provision today”. 
Further, yet related research by Hudson et al. (2016b:693) point to what can be 
understood as “often contradictory and ambivalent attitudes to welfare”, that are 
“held…now” and were apparent “during the golden age”. Thus, based on their findings, 
Hudson et al. suggest that “the welfare state is rarely a matter at the top of the agenda for 
the public” and that much of the public possess “a rather hazy knowledge of the details of 
policy” (2016b:706). Thus suggesting that the role of public opinion and policy, and indeed 
social attitudes more generally, is questionable, where changes in welfare may be better 
focused upon the political and elite classes.  
Kulin and Seymer (2014:1), however, suggest a stronger link between attitudes and policy, 
asserting that: “whether seeking to implement, maintain, or roll back social 
policy…policymakers and politicians are constrained by public opinion”. Wu and Chou, 
also highlight the significance of the public’s attitudes, particularly in relation to support 
toward redistributional initiatives to narrow or indeed seek to eradicate income inequality 
(2015). However, as McKendrick et al. also note, although the support of the public may 
be a “precondition for effective anti-poverty measures”, they highlight how the British public 
are often “only conditionally supportive” (2008:7). Indeed, as emphasised in Section 2.5.3 
whilst the public are often said to be “willing to help the poor”, if people “fail to cooperate” 
in the sense that they are not considered to be “trying hard enough to be self-sufficient and 
morally upstanding” this support is retracted (Fong et al.,2003:3). Drawing on the 
characteristics of the public, attitudes toward inequality, poverty and redistribution are 
considered in relation to both literature and theory, and these are outlined in the following 
section.  
 
2.6.2 Interpreting attitudinal differences, Introduction 
 
As Orton and Rowlingson note, as income inequality rises, there is also an expectation 
that “public concern about inequality”, will also increase (2007:11). That said however, 
such relationships between inequality and social attitudes, and indeed “policy responses” 
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like that of redistribution, are both “complex and ambiguous”, as well as subject to 
contradiction (Orton and Rowlingson, 2007: ix). Indeed, as Evans and Kelley point out, 
“there are many important aspects of people’s perceptions, interpretations, and evaluation 
of societal inequality” (2017:350). What is more, despite the contention that “the less 
money you have, the more likely you are to support redistribution” (Glynn et al., 1999:227), 
as Alcock and May argue, there is also “strong ideological current of hostility to taxation” in 
operation in the UK (2014:267), which is expected to reduce support toward redistribution 
initiatives.  
 
Alongside this and amid rising inequality, it is argued that individualism and individualistic 
explanations have been increasing steadily amongst the British public (Christie and 
Warburton, 2001; Dorey, 2010; Pantazis, 2016). Alongside providing an understanding of 
how particular ‘images of inequality’ (Bottero, 2005) have been made available to 
members of the British public over the course of austerity, this is reflected in this chapter. 
Much like before, the prevalence of inequality and poverty has been questioned, as have 
the need of those in receipt of help.  With this is mind, one consequence of growing 
income disparities, is the widening of the “social distance” between those who are more 
affluent and those who are not (Orton and Rowlingson, 2007:3). Thus, it has been argued 
that such distance may also impede feelings of “responsibility” towards those who may 
need help the most (Orton and Rowlingson, 2007:3), meaning that support for the 
redistribution of income may be less widespread. This section explores how ‘poverty 
propaganda’ (Shildrick, 2018) and particular ‘images of inequality’ have resulted in stigma, 
which may influence attitudes toward people experiencing inequality and poverty. 
 
2.6.2.1 Discussion  
 
Irwin noted both “unease with extensive inequality” and moreover, “concern about 
exclusion”, evidencing the contention “that inequality is seen as an issue for everybody, 
not just a problem for the poor” (Irwin, 2016:15). Others have similarly reported that people 
also acknowledged how a “climate of economic uncertainty” impacted upon the financial 
position of households (Fahmy et al., 2012:6). However. as Section 2.5 demonstrated, 
despite this, negative attitudes also prevail. As Dorey suggests, increasing inequality, as 
found in Britain, has been occurring alongside “increasingly conservative economic 
attitudes among much of the British public” (Dorey, 2010:338), these shared attitudes are 
also reflected in political rhetoric and in research concerned with the portrayal of people 
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experiencing poverty, inequality, alongside people in receipt of benefits (Mooney and 
Hancock, 2010; Baumberg et al., 2012; Penny, 2013; Jensen, 2013; Who Benefits?, 2014; 
O’Hara, 2014; Mckenzie, 2015; Shildrick, 2018). Thus, whilst it can be argued that people 
do seemingly “care about inequality and the distribution of opportunity and about fairness 
and inclusion” (Irwin, 2016:15), this may only be applicable to those who are undeserving 
of their circumstances (Pantazis, 2016). 
 
Within this research it is posited that attitudes toward inequality, poverty and redistribution 
may be reflective of the ‘images of inequality’ (Bottero, 2005) drawn on over the course of 
austerity. As McKendrick et al. (2008) and Shildrick (2018) emphasise, these pictures are 
not reflective of the majority of individuals who experience inequality and disadvantage. 
Instead, as Section 2.5 illustrates, these images were selective and framed in a particular 
way. For Shildrick, this portrayal means that “inequalities of life chances and life conditions 
are presented as right, necessary and just” (2018:793). Accordingly meaning, that to 
experience inequality and poverty, is to “lack…respectability”, to express an “inability to 
manage”, and is thus considered a “moral failure worthy of blame” (Shildrick and 
MacDonald, 2013:293).  
 
This, thus implies, that those who are not experiencing inequality are the opposite, they 
are instead the ‘strivers’ (Hills, 2014). Bottero (2005), drawing on the work of Cannadine 
(1998) allows for a clearer understanding of how these processes can be understood. As 
Bottero emphasises, Cannadine (1998) proposes a “binary, dichotomous model”, where 
society is separated into “two opposed camps” (2005:2017). This is explained as a 
“dichotomous, adversarial picture, where society is sundered between ‘us’ and ‘them’” 
(Cannadine, 1998:19-20, in Bottero, 2005:15). Not only is this divide evident within the 
literature drawn on in this thesis, it is arguably also reflected in attitudes toward inequality, 
poverty and redistribution. Where individuals are further segregated by another, related 
dualism, between the “good worker” and the “bad benefit claimant” (Patrick, 2012:10). 
Wu and Chou explain this further, noting that social values are often “reflected in concrete 
attitudes towards income inequality or poverty” (2015:6) and by extension redistribution.  
 
Accordingly, perceptions of redistribution are often influenced by what is considered to be 
the cause of poverty, or rather why there is a need for the redistribution of income. Given 
this, whilst the purpose of redistributive initiatives is to reallocate resources between 
groups, the “trigger” being some form of “social need” (Busemeyer et al., 2009:198), when 
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people hold the individual accountable, as opposed to wider societal constraints, 
redistributional support will be reduced. As Wu and Chou suggest, this may be particularly 
so amongst people who regard individual “problems”, such as “laziness” or “character 
failing”, “poor parenting”, poor choices or “financial mismanagement”, as the reasons 
behind their circumstances (2015:6), and this is a problem.  
 
Comparatively, people who believe that structural issues and “social injustice” create 
poverty and inequality, and thus the need for redistribution, are more likely to both support 
redistributive initiatives, and also to believe that the government should intervene (Wu and 
Chou, 2015:6). For many, this latter point, “the government protection hypothesis”, rests 
on the assumption that people feel that it is the duty of the government to protect its 
citizens from “economic shocks” and other “crises” and to do so through the use of welfare 
provisions (Wu and Chou, 2015:6). In this view, the demand for this form of “social 
insurance” through redistribution, would be found to increase in times of economic 
insecurity, and “bad times, such as recessions” (Wu and Chou, 2015:6).  
 
In this way, although people may not see the returns of, or receive the same as what they 
are prepared to give, people often consider others, and that it is in their own interest to 
ensure “basic needs dissatisfaction” does not result in “increased social conflict or 
violence” (Leon, 2012:201). Although this form of altruism, arguably feeds into the stigma 
surrounding people experiencing inequality and poverty, there is evidence to suggest that 
inequality results in detrimental effects on crime, alongside health, happiness, social 
mobility and indeed, social cohesion (Rowlingson and Orton, 2010:1). It is, thus, argued 
that as inequality rises in a society, people from “all economic conditions” are found to be 
more supportive, in order to “alleviate its consequences” (Anderson and Curtis, 2015:268).  
 
For Anderson and Curtis, disparities amongst levels of support between social classes 
thus “converge at high levels of income inequality” (2015:268). Here, the “social ills 
associated with inequality become unbearable”, irrespective of economic positioning 
(Anderson and Curtis, 2015:284). As Anderson and Curtis argue, as the severity of income 
inequality increases, the effects of inequality “climb up the class ladder as inequality 
grows” (2015:270). In this way, the possession of altruistic values in times of heightened 
inequality, mean that despite the fact some individuals stand to lose out from, or gain very 
little from redistribution economically, people are also more able to “notice and understand 
its [inequality] consequences for society as a whole” (Anderson and Curtis, 2015:283). 
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Thus, these concerns reflect “non-economic consequences for themselves”, as well as 
others (Anderson and Curtis, 2015:283).  
 
Policy preferences also often have a “rational economic basis” (Curtis and Anderson, 
2015:5), where support toward redistribution is thus also expected to be subject to the role 
of self-interest, where individual’s will often consider their own financial position, and thus 
how support for redistribution could impact their own lives, despite their discomfort in 
relation to the growing income gap (Orton and Rowlingson, 2007:29). Wu and Chou 
explain the logic of self-interest hypothesis, suggesting that people are “utility-maximising 
agents”, and will therefore seek to act in ways that will benefit them (2015:4). Therefore, 
both people who will and people who may become beneficiaries, should therefore support 
the redistribution of income and resources (Wu and Chou, 2015). Preferences, alongside 
attitudes toward inequality and poverty and redistribution, are thus also expected to differ 
by characteristic group.  
 
This may include socio-demographic characteristic, such as the gender an individual 
identifies with, their ethnic background, their level of educational attainment, their age, and 
geographical characteristics, such as where they live (Castell and Thompson, 2007). This 
can also include socio-economic characteristics, such as whether someone is unemployed 
or employed (Wu and Chou, 2015), whether they claim social security benefits, their 
occupation and further, though interrelated, the level of their monetary income. Further, 
other aspects of identity and attitudes, although not dealt with in this research, can be 
understood in relation to behavioural characteristics, such as political party affiliation and 
the type of newspaper an individual consumes (Castell and Thompson, 2007). These 
theories are discussed in relation to the socio-economic and demographic variables 
included within the analyse, and the findings in Chapter 6. 
As Busemeyer et al. stress income is an important factor in understanding preferences 
toward redistribution (2009). As Fong et al. also note, people who are not concerned with 
how they will make ends meet and pay their bills “are significantly less supportive of 
redistribution”, in comparison to those who do worry (2003:13). Similarly, it is also argued 
that people who have higher incomes, and often a higher status, are more inclined to be 
accepting of higher rates of inequality (Medgyesi, 2013).In part, this may be explained by 
the role of self-interest, where individuals “might lose” through the redistribution of income 
(Medgyesi, 2013:3). Williamson readdresses the role of self-interest, stating that it is in the 
best interests of people “at the upper end of the socio-economic distribution to find fault 
95 
 
with and oppose any major effort to improve the conditions of the poor” (1974:635), 
arguably in this way their position is not threatened by increased social mobility. Further, 
any motivation amongst those in receipt of higher incomes, is often “far weaker…because 
it typically results in…paying higher taxes” (Anderson and Curtis, 2015: 267). Conversely, 
people on lower incomes, such as unemployed people, people fulfilling lower paid jobs and 
benefit claimants, tend to be less accepting of inequality (Medgyesi, 2013; Wu and Chou, 
2015). Evans and Kelley make a similar point, noting that “high status people tend to 
perceive a relatively egalitarian society, whereas those low in status perceive a relatively 
unequal, elitist society” (2017:322).  
 
Yet, irrespective of the proportion of people facing inequality in society, it is argued that 
people with “low economic standing have the most to gain from supporting government 
intervention” (Anderson and Curtis, 2015:267). Thus, people on lower incomes are said to 
be both more motivated to, and more inclined to support redistributive policies; because 
they will often benefit from monetary redistribution (Williamson, 1974; Habibov, 2013). 
Accordingly, it is often expected that those from lower socio-economic positions would 
favour redistribution more so than others. But and perhaps further reflecting the 
complexities, people experiencing poverty and/or those in receipt of lower incomes, are 
however, not always found to support policies that advocate income redistribution, despite 
the fact they may be the beneficiaries (Orton and Rowlingson, 2007:33). It is posited that 
this could be understood as reflecting the role of self-interest. It could however also be 
explained regarding both “empathy and socio-cultural distance”, as noted above (Orton 
and Rowlingson, 2007:34). This is discussed in relation to Cannadine’s (1998:19-20) two-
way “vernacular model” in more detail in chapter 6.  
 
Not only are women considered more altruistic than men, they are often considered so, 
due to greater experiences of disadvantage (Goerres and Jaeger, 2016). Whilst the role of 
altruism in relation to gendered attitudinal differences is considered in Chapter 6, the 
experience of gender can be used to explain another theory considered in this research, 
“risk-aversion” and “risk-exposure” (Leon, 2012). In this way, because women are often 
perceived as more vulnerable to the experience of poverty and inequality (risk-exposure) 
this group will therefore seek to minimalise their risk (risk-aversion), by supporting 
initiatives to combat inequality and poverty through monetary redistribution (Leon, 2012). 
Equally, in comparison to men, it is in the self-interest of women as a group to support 
initiatives they will perhaps benefit from. These assumptions also highlight how ‘need 
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explanations’ are useful in determining preferences and attitudes, with those more likely to 
be in need, more likely to offer support (Whitely, 1981). 
 
For Evans and Kelley (2017: 345) public perceptions can be understood as reflecting “a 
complex mix of objective experience with subjective projections from their own reference 
group”. Drawing on the work of others (Stouffer et al.,1949; Merton and Kitt, 1950; 
Lockwood, 1966; Runciman, 1966), Evans and Kelley begin by explaining the reference 
group theory, noting that people’s “social perceptions include as main ingredients their 
own experiences and the experiences of their families, friends, and co-workers” 
(2017:320). Given this, what is limited or may be missing entirely, is “information about 
society as a whole”. This can be understood in relation to the “availability heuristic”, where 
others (Tversky and Kahneman, 1981; Kahneman et al., 1982) drawing on the work of 
Kelley (1967), suggest that “a systematic perceptual bias” is in operation (Evans and 
Kelley, 2017: 320). In this way, individuals acquire their “impressions from their small 
social circle” and as a result they engage in their own “informal survey of themselves” and 
moreover their “social networks” (Evans and Kelley, 2017: 321). What people observe is 
then translated and applied to society as a whole, or as Evans and Kelley put it, following 
this survey, people summarise “their observations by a subjective regression analysis and 
then generalize to the broader society” (2017:321). 
 
Evans and Kelley consider perceptions of “class imagery” further, noting how the impact of 
reference group processes though influential, are not the only influences observable 
(2017:322). Instead, “people’s interactions and information exposure” extend beyond 
social networks and “include a myriad of small events and impressions” and this includes 
“interactions with strangers to encounters with institutions to media stimuli” and this, for 
Evans and Kelley, “make the actual social structure an insistent presence, sometimes 
subtle, sometimes brash” (2017:322). Citing previous work (Evans et al., 1992; Kelley and 
Evans, 1995; Evans and Kelley, 2004b) Evans and Kelley suggest a mix or rather “a 
reference group and reality blend theory” where both “reference group forces” and the 
“material structure of society” are both considered influential, combining “to generate 
images of society’s social class composition” (2017:322). Thus, for Evans and Kelley 
“reference groups are shaped not only by the individual’s position in the socioeconomic 
hierarchy but also by the social locations of potential network members in the society” 
(2017:323).  
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Accordingly, the reference group and reality blend theory, suggests further a need to 
understand attitudes sociologically, considering both direct experiences but wider social 
and cultural influences. This is also supported by Smith and Hogg who argue that since 
“attitudes are grounded in group memberships…attitude research must consider more 
completely the way in which attitudes are socially formed, configured, and enacted” 
(2006:3). Both the reference group theory and the reference group and reality blend theory 
are discussed in relation to the findings in Chapter 6.  
 
What is also particularly interesting to consider further within this research, is how the 
spiral of silence model operates, alongside “fear of isolation” (Scheufele, 2008:175). Not 
unlike Goffman’s (1959) theory of impression management, the spiral of silence model 
holds that people are cognisant of the perceptions of others and will therefore seek to 
adapt their behaviours and opinions accordingly. Thus, this model predicts that people are 
often fearful that their opinions will not match those of the majority, and they will as a result 
be positioned “on the losing side of a public debate” (Scheufele, 2008:175). In this way, 
people may act alongside the majority. In doing so, they may not necessarily express their 
own personal views due to a “fear of isolation”, where the true perceptions held may illicit 
unfavourable responses from others (Scheufele, 2008:175). Thus, it is suggested that 
individuals from minority and marginalised groups, who hold views that are different from 
the majority of the public, are often “less vocal and less willing to express their opinions” 
(Scheufele, 2008:175).  
 
2.6.3 Summary 
 
Attitudes have been positioned as both complex and subject to a number of possible 
influences. It has been argued that there is a need to consider the social, economic, 
cultural and political environments in which attitudes are formulated, maintained and 
altered. This thesis reflects this need. It has been demonstrated that negative attitudes and 
stereotypical rhetoric toward people experiencing inequality may have an impact on 
policies and policy making. Given that public opinion is fundamental in order to implement 
social policies successfully, this is an issue (Monnickendam and Gordon, 2010; Prabhakar, 
2012) and one that needs to be addressed.  
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2.7 Conclusion 
 
To conclude, this chapter provides an overview of the social, cultural, political and 
economic environment in what became austerity Britain, between 2009-2015. Emphasis 
has been placed on the Coalition’s term in office, before moving to include the election of 
the Conservative government in 2015. The rationale for pursuing austerity measures and 
the consequences of this economic plan according to others, has also been considered 
critically. Mediated coverage of benefit cuts, sanctions and benefit recipients have also 
been included, in order to understand how the recession and as a consequence, austerity, 
created further gaps between people and groups, of which move beyond economic 
disparities in income. The views of the public toward people who are poor and the 
perceived views of why poverty persists, highlight how the “legitimation of social and 
economic inequality” operates (Oorschot and Halman, 2000:3). Whilst it has been argued 
that negative perceptions of inequality and poverty have existed for a long time, what is 
largely unknown is how a programme of austerity relate to attitudinal changes toward 
inequality and poverty, and the redistribution of income. This research contributes toward 
existing knowledge by filling this gap. Enabling an exploration of where future support 
targeting may be needed and doing so whilst further stressing that understanding why 
people support or refute redistribution measures is paramount in order to enact change 
(Leon, 2012; Rowlingson and Orton, 2010). The following chapter brings together the 
research questions presented in Chapter 1 and explains in more detail how the research 
has been approached ethically and methodically.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
99 
 
 
Chapter 3 
 
3.1 Methodology, methods and ethical considerations, Introduction 
 
To explore perceptions of inequality, poverty and support toward redistribution, explorative 
quantitative secondary data analysis has been conducted using BSAS microdata from 
2009, 2012 and 2015. This Chapter provides a rationale for the chosen research 
methodology, noting both the strengths and weaknesses in the research design, alongside 
previous research considerations (Section 3.2). This chapter also critically presents the 
foundations and scope of the BSAS (Section 3.3), alongside the research methods. 
Discussing the selection process of variables for analysis, describing data manipulation 
and limitations (Section 3.4.1) and providing an explanation of how ethical considerations 
were realised throughout the research process (Section 3.6). 
 
3.2 Research methodology, the rationale  
 
This section presents the rationale for choosing quantitative secondary data analysis. 
Highlighting the strengths and weaknesses of this approach, this section also provides an 
evaluation of this research methodology.  
Pursuing quantitative secondary data analyse of three sets of micro data, meant that 
changing attitudes over time could be measured and interpreted, in relation to the 
changing social and economic landscape in austerity Britain. Thus, allowing past data from 
2009, 2012 and 2015 to be drawn upon, to measure changing social attitudes toward 
inequality, poverty, redistribution and recipients of welfare support, and this would not have 
been possible had this method not been adopted (Vezzoni, 2015). Comparative secondary 
analysis of three large datasets also meant that access to a broader demographic was 
also possible (May, 2011). If this research was primary or mixed in methods, this would not 
have been achievable. This is a feature widely acknowledged as an advantage of pursuing 
secondary data analysis (Blaikie, 2003; Gomm, 2008), whereby official statistics are 
renowned for the provision of both complex and expansive sources of data (Gorard, 2003; 
May, 2011).  
 
Secondary data analysis, thus meant a substantial volume of reliable data could be 
accessed, downloaded and recoded, ready for new analysis. In the context of this 
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research, a further strength of opting for secondary analysis can be drawn in relation to the 
methods employed in the initial research stages of the chosen data source. As Section 3.2 
highlights, each year it is undertaken, BSAS data collection is subject to the same 
methods and includes a number of consistent questions and statements. As a result of the 
repetition of these measures, valuable comparisons can be drawn out over a specific time 
frame (Balnaves and Caputi, 2001). Allowing for consistency and further, an understanding 
of how social attitudes change over time.  
 
There are also criteria data instruments used in research should demonstrate, including 
issues relating to both face and content validity (Balnaves and Caputi, 2001; Gorard, 
2003). As evidenced in the following sections, the BSAS meets such criteria in that it 
exhibits both forms of validity. Face validity is ensured because the BSAS measures what 
it initially set out to do, in this case, British social attitudes. Likewise, content validity is also 
achieved, in relation to how well each of the survey’s measure the intended attitudinal data 
(Gomm, 2008).  
 
Opting for the secondary analysis of data from a longstanding survey of this size, also 
strengthens the research as a whole. This is due to the intricate sampling methods and 
methodological rigor (Dale et al., 2008) exercised by secondary data providers, like the 
National Centre for Social Research [NatCen], in their preliminary research. Therefore, 
despite longstanding criticism (Blumer, 1956), opting for the use of secondary inferential 
analysis, based on this reliable data, means important comparisons can be drawn between 
the variables (Frankfort-Nachmias and Nachmias, 2006), seeking out possible 
relationships and identifying trends over time (Pole and Lampard, 2002) and this is a key 
objective of this research. By extension, this also means that where statistically significant, 
the findings will be both repeatable and generalisable (Blaikie, 2003). Due to variable 
consistency over time, BSAS data thus not only incorporated both the desired socio-
economic and demographic characteristics of interest in this research, but also included a 
number of survey questions, central to the themes within this research. 
 
As Section 3.3 explains, these questions also directed the selection process of the 
independent variables [IV’s] and dependent variables [DV’s]. Therefore, both informing 
and enabling an exploration of changing attitudes. Although this research is explorative, to 
guide the research and maintain both “clarity” and “specificity” (Frankfort-Nachmias and 
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Nachmias 2006:53) four research questions were crafted for the purpose of this research. 
These research questions are as follows:  
 How are people in receipt of social security benefits perceived by others? 
 To what extent have attitudes towards poverty and inequality changed 
following the introduction of austerity measures in 2010? 
 To what extent do negative attitudes towards those in receipt of benefits 
relate to the level of support expressed toward income redistribution? 
 To what extent do socio-economic and demographic characteristics relate 
to perceptions of inequality and poverty? 
Despite these strengths, however, this method is not without its difficulties nor criticisms. 
One of the difficulties applicable to this research, is the considerable time lag in the 
availability of the data, following data collection. The survey data selected for analysis is 
comprised of data collected in 2009, 2012 and 2015, although these datasets allow for 
comparative analyse, more recent data now exists. This time lag means that although the 
social attitudes of the public in Britain are available via the NatCen website and are 
published in reports, the raw data is unavailable for access, nor download in the Statistical 
Package for Social Sciences [SPSS 24], from the UK Data Service Archive [UKDSA] for a 
considerable time after the initial data is collected. Although more recent datasets were 
unavailable at the time this research was initially undertaken, more recent BSAS data now 
exists and these data would have perhaps offered further insights into the changing nature 
of attitudes in austerity Britain over the course of nearly two decades.  
 
Aside from this time lag, secondary data analysis often presents further issues, including a 
lack of control over what data is collected and in turn, how this is undertaken during the 
data collection process (Boslaugh, 2007). In the context of this research, there are a 
number of inconsistent variables, meaning that some variables are not included in each 
survey, each year. Furthermore, as Gorard notes, there is also a loss in access to “field 
notes” and “incidental observations” that may have been drawn out by researchers during 
primary data gathering (2003:25). Again, in the context of this research, the attitudinal data 
is accessible, but the non-verbal cues (if any) from respondents were not. That said, 
secondary quantitative analysis of data from a large, pre-established institute, ensured that 
the most reliable data was drawn upon for the purposes of this analysis. This was, 
moreover, achieved within both the time and cost constraints of postgraduate study 
(Gorard, 2003; May, 2011).  
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Prior to the decision to undertake secondary data analysis, the production of a primary 
piece of research was, however, considered. It was hoped that this would enable the 
collection of raw attitudinal data, aimed at understanding the experiences of austerity 
measures and the consequences, for a number of people. However, due to both resource, 
cost and time constraints, alongside sampling issues related to the creation of an online 
survey, this method and research design was discounted. Having reconsidered how best 
to approach the research questions, the research design changed shape and became 
mixed in methods. It was hoped that quantitative secondary data analysis of BSAS data, 
alongside the use of qualitative methods, through the facilitation of focus groups, would 
enable a clearer understanding of the British publics’ attitudes toward inequality, poverty 
and redistribution. This research design was, however, problematic, for practical reasons. 
Although focus groups would have enabled the collection of primary attitudinal data, this 
would not have enabled an understanding of how attitudes had changed over time. Thus, 
secondary data analysis, has been chosen largely as a result of the research questions 
selected for analysis, the time frame and the overall theme of the research.  
 
Throughout the research, however, other questions were raised, with answers beyond the 
scope of this thesis. For instance, were those surveyed in the BSAS aware of programmes 
like Benefits Street? If yes, how did they perceive this programme and others like it? Why 
did people believe welfare recipients were undeserving of help? Was this based on 
experience or a reflection of wider stereotypical discourse? Whilst the findings do suggest 
that support toward redistribution is lower amongst people who held negative attitudes 
toward benefit recipients, aside from this, why is support toward redistribution so low? Is 
this based on their own financial constraints, their objection to taxation or a fear that those 
receiving redistributed income will be undeserving? Though this research has identified 
patterns in attitudinal data, further research is needed to explore these questions and to do 
so with the intention of generating debate, providing knowledge and seeking to inform 
policy makers in the process. This is discussed in more detail in Chapter 7. 
 
The use of attitudinal data from social surveys has also been considered critically and this 
includes the presentation of the questions featured in social surveys, alongside their 
interpretation amongst respondents. Jann and Linz (2016) highlight a fundamental 
assumption that is made in both the construction, and the analysis of attitudinal social 
survey data; the accuracy, and indeed relevance of the answers provided by survey 
respondents. More specifically, that the “respondents are assumed to provide meaningful 
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and correct answers” during the research process (Jann and Linz, 2016:105). Whilst it is 
not possible to determine whether respondents surveyed within each of the BSAS included 
within this analysis, provided researchers with “meaningful and correct answers” (Jann and 
Linz, 2016:105), closer inspection of the attitudinal questions provided to respondents, 
enables a critical exploration of the possible difficulties encountered, and how these may 
impede or indeed prove advantageous during later analysis. 
 
Notably, the wording of questions and respondent comprehension may prove problematic 
(Miller and Willis, 2016). One of the ways researchers seek to mitigate this possible issue, 
is by ensuring that the questions included in surveys are constructed carefully and that the 
respondents are able to comprehend what is being asked of them (Miller and Willis, 2016). 
Avoiding vague or complex terminology is also paramount, as is ensuring that the words 
selected are “simple and familiar”, and that “as few words as possible” are used, and that 
these are presented in “sentences with simple structures” (Miller and Willis, 2016:221). In 
the context of this research, Section 3.4.2 demonstrates that each of the DV’s included 
within this analysis, are clearly articulated, avoiding unnecessary specialist terminology 
throughout.  
 
As Section 3.4.2 demonstrates, the five DV’s selected for analysis seek to explore 
people’s attitudes toward income inequality, income redistribution and attitudes towards 
people experiencing inequality and poverty. Whilst the DV’s selected allow for an 
understanding of how the public perceive of these issues, as they are presented, as Mc 
Call (2013:53) asserts, to determine whether people care, or conversely, “do not care 
about income inequality, rests on a critical assumption”, that people “know enough about 
the issue to form an opinion about it”. Mc Call, however, draws further attention to a key 
related issue, “how much information is enough to develop sensible ideas about an issue?” 
and indeed, where was this information gathered from? (2013: 53). Relatedly, others 
suggest that individuals “do not hold structured attitudes toward inequality…they have 
idiosyncratic emotional responses”, instead (Walster, 1976, p. 4 in Kelley and Evans, 
1993:78). As Kelley and Evans succinctly point out, for Converse (1964) “public opinion is 
flighty, disorganized, and random”, rather than reflective of coherence. These critical 
points bring back into question the accuracy of the attitudes and responses surveyed 
within such research (Jann and Linz, 2016).  
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Mc Call (2013), cites a related issue in the context of exploring attitudes toward inequality, 
poverty and redistribution, questioning how much knowledge can thus be gained from 
attitudinal survey questions. Mc Call (2013) considers the inherent complexities of both 
inequality and poverty, noting how each are areas of life and indeed study, that have 
perplexed leading figures in each field, and this has been ongoing. Kelley and Evans 
support this, noting that “income inequality is a central issue in social stratification and has 
been a topic of normative debate and political dispute since the time of Aristotle” 
(1993:75). Thus, consideration of the wording of questions is emphasised as a necessity, 
but particular attention should also be given to the topic under study, and whether as Mc 
Call ponders, “it is possible to infer much of anything…” given the complexity of the topic, 
for both lay audiences and indeed specialists (2013:54).  
 
Miller and Willis (2016) take this further, considering question interpretation by 
respondents. They argue that “one of the most salient factors related to data quality is the 
process by which respondents interpret survey questions” (Miller and Willis, 2016:210) and 
how this may differ. Thus, whilst the questions included within this analysis may be clear 
and comprehensible, what is less so, is whether each individual interpreted each of the 
questions in the same way. Income inequality impacts “different groups, in different ways, 
at different times” (Mc Call 2013:57), and question interpretation is not separate to this. In 
this way, Miller and Willis (2016:212) explain that a socio-cultural stance should be 
adopted, with particular focus placed on the possibility that “the same question may not be 
understood in the same way by everyone”. In the context of comparative attitudinal 
research, this may mean that the quality of research based on attitudinal data may be 
reduced. 
 
Emphasis thus must be placed on the contention that: 
The interpretation of a question depends on the context of respondents’ 
lives. Meanings and thought patterns do not spontaneously occur within the 
confines of a respondent’s mind, but rather those meanings and patterns 
are inextricably linked to the social world (Miller, 2011; Miller et al, 2014; in 
Miller and Willis, 2016:212).  
 
Again, in the context of this research, and as demonstrated in Chapter 2, alongside 
Section 3.4.3, the IV’s selected for analysis reflect this complex relationship and the 
adoption of a socio-cultural stance (Miller and Willis, 2016). Each of the IV’s and DV’s 
selected for analysis have thus been chosen with purpose, intent on enabling an 
exploration of social inequalities, alongside social attitudes between 2009-2015. Thus, 
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whilst it is not always possible to avoid “fluidity of meaning” and interpretational disparities, 
inclusion of these variables extended the analysis, allowing for a broader understanding to 
be drawn out from the findings over time, and this would not have been possible, had this 
method not been adopted (Miller and Willis, 2016:214). 
Aside from these limitations, the creation of statistics and their consequent analysis by 
others, perhaps with a different research objective than originally intended, are also not 
free from methodological issues. Statistical analysis, nevertheless, affords researchers 
with the resources to produce well informed research, intent on understanding 
relationships (Aldridge and Levine, 2001; Frankfort-Nachmias and Nachmias, 2006; May, 
2011) and this was the case in this research. Not only did comparative quantitative 
secondary attitudinal data analysis meet the requirements of this research, the research is 
strengthened by the consistent quality of the data accessed. Strengthened further by the 
quality and careful construction of the questions and statements, presented to members of 
the British Public, during data collection.  
 
In the context of this research, secondary data analysis of survey data, made it possible to 
both “describe the characteristics of social phenomena” but also afforded the opportunity 
to “understand, explain and predict patterns in social life or in the relationships between 
aspects of social phenomena” (Blaikie, 2003:28). This is achieved with the assurance that 
these data were collected by established social researchers, who had undertaken training 
to successfully obtain and measure social attitudes amongst the British public and to do so 
without causing harm. As Section 3.4 explains, from the onset and throughout, this has 
been a priority within this research.  
 
However, despite the clear advantages of utilising secondary sources, longstanding 
criticism and caution remain prevalent. Theorists like Blumer (1956) have criticised the 
study of attitudes and of exploring social life in accordance with an analysis of variables. 
Similarly, Mills described these processes, and the social survey itself, as a form of 
“abstract empiricism” (1959: 60), with the related analysis too focused on “statistical 
software”, rather than critical thinking for others (Amrhein et al., 2019:307). Gorard has 
also cautioned that secondary sources should be approached critically or as he puts it, 
treated with “tentative scepticism” (2003:26). Gorard thus believes that to bring any 
meaning to a study involving secondary data analysis, researchers should thoroughly 
investigate the “pedigree of its raw material” (2003:26). This includes scrutinising the initial 
intention of the research, alongside its design and implementation (Gorard, 2003). With 
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these precautions in mind, the following section critically introduces the BSAS, its 
establishment, sampling frame and scope. 
 
3.3 A critical overview of the BSAS  
 
This section provides a critical overview of the BSAS, describing the purpose of the 
survey, how many people were included in each sample, the sampling frame and the data 
collection method. 
 
The BSAS is an annually repeated, cross-sectional study, established with the intention of 
gathering “peoples changing social, political and moral attitudes” (NatCen, 2015:4). 
Publishing reports, disclosing these publicly and annually, following its establishment in 
1983, NatCen encouraged secondary analysis from the onset (NatCen, 2015). The scope 
of the survey is large, inviting “households…from across England, Scotland and Wales” to 
participate (NatCen, 2018: no pagination). As a method, the BSAS is comprised of two 
parts, a face-to-face interview conducted by Computer-Assisted Personal Interviewing 
[CAPI] and a self-completion questionnaire, where the latter element includes attitudinal 
questions which could be construed as “particularly sensitive” (NatCen, 2015:6).  
 
To ensure a representative sample of adults, residing in private households and over the 
age of eighteen is obtained for the purposes of the research, the survey employs a multi-
stage stratified random sample. This sample is based on the Postcode Address File [PAF]; 
of which is comprised of a list of addresses and/or postal delivery points that are available 
to researchers. The sampling method is described as a multi-stage design, with three 
distinct selection stages. Postcode sectors in Great Britain are systematically selected 
from a list during the first stage, and then stratified on a basis of the density of the 
population, with “probability proportional to the number of addresses, in each sector” 
(NatCen, 2015:7).  
 
Addresses were then selected by beginning “from a random point on the list of addresses 
for each sector and choosing each address at a fixed interval” (NatCen, 2015:7). During 
the final stage, each address selected, was frequented by an interviewer. After noting all 
eligible residents at an address, the respondent was then selected through a computer-
generated random selection procedure (NatCen, 2015) with a sample size of 3,421 in 
2009, 3,248 in 2012 and 4,328 in 2015. Given this sampling method, researchers are 
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instructed to only conduct interviews with members of the public who had been selected 
randomly.  
 
Though the scope of the survey is large, and there are notable positive aspects to the 
administration of surveys, lack of response poses, however, a real issue and is cited as a 
disadvantage of choosing this method (Seale 2004; May 2011). Responding to this 
criticism and acknowledging possible issues in data analysis, NatCen explain that because 
samples were obtained from the PAF, weighting can be used to offset this issue, thus 
using the weight ‘WTfactor’ prior to each analysis attempted (2015:11). Further issues are 
cited, which may also hinder the analysis following data collection. Although weighting the 
data prior to analysis will counteract this problem, despite employing a random sample, as 
a result of just one eligible individual being required to participate in the research interview 
and complete the questionnaire, “people in small households…have a higher probability of 
selection” than those who reside in larger households (NatCen, 2015:11). Given that the 
research involves people residing in households, this sampling frame also excludes people 
without addresses or indeed those residing in communal establishments. This highlights a 
further disadvantage in research design, and by extension, a disadvantage of opting for 
secondary data analysis of sources which use this method.  
 
That said, NatCen Social Researchers are committed to collecting data and analysing 
social change and doing so whilst protecting their participants. As Section 3.4 outlines in 
more detail, the respondents are aware of the reason for their participation, how they will 
participate and their rights throughout.  
 
This commitment is further evidenced by NatCen where they state: 
for many questions you will be asked to pick from a selection of common 
answers. Your interviewer will ask you about a range of topics including 
healthcare, education, welfare and transport. And don’t worry-you don’t 
have to answer any questions you don’t want to (2018: no pagination). 
 
Nevertheless, the data collection method for the BSAS, CAPI and self-completion 
questionnaires, were also scrutinised. To understand the research process, the survey 
questions were accessed, paying particular attention to the questions and statements that 
would later become the variables chosen for analysis in this research. The survey 
consisted of a wide range of attitudinal, closed questions and statements, inviting 
participants to select their answers from a range of pre-determined multiple-choice 
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options, further incorporating the use of Likert scales. These are discussed in more detail 
in Section 3.4.  
 
As Section 3.4 also highlights, although there were some initial issues in the formation and 
consistency of the questions featured in each round of data collection process, it is argued 
that the BSAS provide a number of researchers with a variety of useful data, intent on 
understanding the attitudes of the British Public, tracking how these vary (if at all) over 
time. This is despite the contention that “secondary data analysis verges on being nothing 
more than virtual sociology” and that “there is no connection to the social world” where 
“social life” merely becomes transformed in to “the world of secondary data” (Murphy and 
Schlaerth, 2010:388). Instead, it is argued that the secondary analysis of large datasets 
over time, enables a more detail focused understanding of a number of societal issues, 
enabling new research of which would not have been possible, as was the case in this 
research (Gorard, 2003). The following section provides a detailed explanation of how 
BSAS data was accessed and analysed, introducing the key variables chosen for this 
research.  
 
3.4 The analysis of BSAS data, Introduction                                                                   
 
To conduct comparative explorative analysis, a selection of consistent IV’s and DV’s have 
been selected from each of the BSAS datasets, following downloading the data from the 
UKDSA, into SPSS. This section focuses on the selection process of the variables, 
alongside highlighting the issues encountered in the initial stages of the research. The 
variables of interest in this research, alongside the IV’s and DV’s selected for analysis, are 
introduced, discussing the recoding of variables (where required), before a final section 
explains how the variables were analysed.  
 
3.4.1 Variables of interest in the BSAS                                                                            
 
Prior to discussing the chosen IV’s and DV’s, it is worth highlighting the selection process 
of the DV’s and the problems encountered in the initial stages of the research. With this in 
mind, this section focuses on exploring the variables of interest in this research that would 
have, had they been included in the analysis, enabled further important comparisons to be 
drawn from the data, noting why their inclusion was not possible. 
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Due to the scope and direction of the BSAS, many of the datasets include a number of 
attitudinal variables concerned with understanding social attitudes towards poverty and 
inequality in Britain. Although this too is an objective of this research, having downloaded 
each selected dataset, a reoccurring issue became apparent, the changing nature of some 
of the questions and statements over time. Highlighting a disadvantage of opting for 
secondary data analysis, rather than each of the questions and statements being 
reproduced each year, many of the available variables varied year to year or altered 
slightly.  
 
Table 3.3.1.1 illustrates this issue, highlighting variables that were of interest, yet could not 
be included as DV’s, due to inconsistency across the datasets.  
 
Table 3.3.1.1: Inconsistent variables of interest in the BSAS, not included in the 
analysis 
Variables of interest 2009 2012 2015 
How much poverty in Britain today? ✓ ✗ ✗ 
Over the past ten years, think proportion of children in Britain changed? ✗ ✓ ✗ 
In GB how much conflict between unemployed people/people with jobs? ✓ ✗ ✗ 
Over the next ten years, think proportion in child poverty will change? ✗ ✓ ✗ 
How much child poverty in Britain today?  ✗ ✓ ✗ 
How important or unimportant do you think it is to reduce child poverty? ✗ ✓ ✗ 
Government should spend more money on welfare benefits for the poor  ✗ ✗ ✓ 
Child poverty in Britain because…  ✗ ✓ ✗ 
Closest to respondent’s feeling about their household income these 
days? 
✓ ✗ ✗ 
Most people see themselves as belonging to a particular class. Which 
social class you belong to? 
✓ ✗ ✗ 
✓ indicates the question was present, ✗ indicates the question was not present  
                                                                                                                                             
Many of these questions sought to track how views of poverty and inequality have evolved 
over time (if at all) yet were not available each year. Nor were the questions that asked 
participants to explain why child poverty existed in Britain, to specify how they felt about 
their household income and to allocate themselves to a class category. Though the 
responses to these questions reflected the literature in Chapter 2 and would have provided 
valuable knowledge, to ensure comparative analyse could be conducted, each variable 
needed to be present in each of the datasets selected.  
 
There were however a number of consistent variables that were selected for analysis. For 
the purpose of the following two sections, these variables have been separated into DV’s 
and IV’s. The following section introduces the consistent DV’s in each dataset, providing 
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the responses presented to the survey’s participants and any changes made to these 
variables prior to analysis. Following this, the IV’s are introduced, before a final section 
describes how these featured within the analysis. 
 
3.4.2 The DV’s in the analysis 
 
This section introduces each of the DV’s included in the analysis, explaining the selection 
process, alongside the responses available for each participant in 2009, 2012 and 2015. 
Alongside this, variable recoding is also outlined, demonstrating how each variable was 
recoded, prior to analysis. 
 
Five DV’s were selected for analysis in this research (Table 3.3.2.1). With exception to the 
first variable (1), four of the five variables offered each of the participants the same 
response (2-5) in each dataset. The first question asked participants to state whether they 
thought the ‘gap between high and low incomes’ is: ‘too large’, ‘about right’ or 
comparatively ‘too small’. Participants’ were also given the option to skip the question, 
refuse to answer or to respond, ‘don’t know’. 
 
Table 3.3.2.1: The DV’s selected for analysis (source derived from: BSAS 2009, 2012 and 
2015). 
                                                                                                                                           
Comparatively, the remaining DV’s (2-5), provided participants with a Likert scale, the 
choice of responses available to each respondent are shown in Table 3.3.2.2. Each of the 
DV’s were selected with purpose, reflecting the literature in Chapter 2, but also allowed for 
the research questions to be explored thoroughly. The variables were also recoded to 
enable a more focused analysis. For those questions that gave respondents a Likert scale 
(2-5) to select their response, each Likert scale was reduced and recoded into a new 
variable with two categories, those who ‘agreed’ (people who said they ‘agree’ or stated 
‘strongly agree’) and those who ‘disagreed’ (those who said they ‘disagree’, or stated 
Consistent variables selected as DV’s 2009 2012 2015 
1: The gap between high and low incomes is… ✓ ✓ ✓ 
2: The Government should redistribute income between the better-
off and the less well-off 
✓ ✓ ✓ 
3: Many people who get social security don't really deserve any 
help 
✓ ✓ ✓ 
4: If welfare benefits weren't so generous, people would learn to 
stand on their own feet 
✓ ✓ ✓ 
5: Most people on the dole are fiddling in one way or another ✓ ✓ ✓ 
✓ indicates that each question was present in each of the datasets: 2009, 2012 and 2015.  
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‘strongly disagree’, ‘neither agree nor disagree’). The remaining categories, ‘don’t know’ 
and ‘refusal/skip’ were coded as missing. This was repeated in each dataset.  
 
The justification for these recodes is based on the direction of the research questions, and 
the desire to understand who is in agreement, rather that the strength of this agreement or 
indeed its lack. Though recoded, the findings following analysis were not compromised by 
the recoding of this variable (Blaikie, 2003), recoding did however focus the analysis. 
 
Table 3.3.2.2: Likert Scale responses available to all participant’s in 2009, 2012 and 2015. 
Likert Scale responses for DV’s 2, 3, 4 and 5  
 
‘Agree’ 
‘Strongly 
Agree’ 
‘neither agree nor 
disagree’ 
 
‘Disagree’ 
‘Strongly 
Disagree’ 
‘Don’t 
know’ 
‘Skip/ 
refusal’ 
 
The recoding process for the first question (1) was, however, slightly different. Rather than 
focusing on the proportion of people who felt the income gap was ‘too small’ or indeed 
‘about right’, the research is focused upon the proportion of the British public who agreed 
that this gap was ‘too large’. Not only does this question, and its new focus, reflect 
literature which suggests that income inequality in the UK is rising (Orton and Rowlingson, 
2007; Clarke and Newman, 2012; Tyler, 2013; Seymour, 2014; Mckenzie, 2015; Savage, 
2015), recoding allowed greater focus. Understanding whether the British public felt that 
the income gap is ‘too large’ is also of central interest to this research, with Section 4.1 
exploring how attitudes toward the income gap changed (if at all) over the course of 
austerity examined here. To achieve this, this DV was recoded. Whilst ‘too large’ remained 
the same, the categories ‘about right’ and ‘too small’ were merged. Respondents who 
stated ‘don’t know’ or ‘refused’ were coded as missing. This was repeated in each dataset.  
 
The second DV (2), the ‘government should redistribute income between the better-off and 
the less well-off’ (BSAS 2009, 20012, 2015) was included in order to understand whether 
people supported the redistribution of income, which is evidenced as a measure to combat 
income inequality between groups, often inciting debate (Monnickendam and Gordon, 
2010; Prabhakar, 2012; Wu and Chou, 2015). This DV is included in the first findings 
chapter, in Section 4.2 and is also of central interest to this research. Including the first two 
variables also enabled further analysis, as outlined in Section 3.3.4. The third DV (3) 
selected for analysis ‘many people who get social security don't really deserve any help’ 
(BSAS 2009, 20012, 2015) was included in the analysis, as it represents a longstanding 
process of the public and others, distinguishing between the deserving poor and the 
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undeserving poor (Bottero, 2005; Mooney and Hancock, 2010; Hall et al., 2014; Toynbee 
and Walker, 2015).  
 
Reflecting a further theme within the literature, the fourth DV invited participants to indicate 
their attitudes toward the generosity of benefit payments and the perceived consequent 
dependency amongst claimants. The statement: ‘if welfare benefits weren't so generous, 
people would learn to stand on their own feet’ thus enabled an understanding of how 
people perceived benefit claimants and how this changed (if at all) over the course of 
austerity examined here. The final DV (5) sought to understand how people perceived 
fraud amongst benefit claimants, inviting respondents to specify whether they thought that 
‘most people on the dole are fiddling in one way or another’. Again, this question also 
reflects literature which suggests that the public often perceive benefit claimants as 
fraudulently receiving social security assistance (McKendrick et al., 2008; Dorling, 2014; 
Brooker et al., 2015).  
 
Due to the limitations of postgraduate study, alongside inconsistencies in the available 
BSAS data, focussing on five consistent DV’s, alongside a number of IV’s, allowed for a 
more thorough understanding of changing social attitudes in austerity Britain. Whilst this 
section has focused on the DV’s included for analysis, the following section introduces the 
socio-economic and demographic variables included within the analysis and explains how 
these variables were recoded prior to analysis.  
 
3.4.3 IV’s in the analysis 
 
Eight socio-economic and demographic variables were selected for analysis. This section 
introduces these variables, explaining why each were selected and recoded prior to 
analysis (Table 3.3.3.1). 
 
Given that previous research has shown that attitudes to poverty, inequality and 
redistribution vary by gender, age, ethnicity, social class (economic position), economic 
activity, levels of educational attainment and geographical location (Habibov, 2013; Park et 
al., 2012a; Wu and Chou, 2015; Goerres and Jaeger, 2016), the IV’s incorporated in this 
research reflect this literature. The eight IV’s selected, include the age of respondents, 
their gender, employment status, benefit status, occupation, educational attainment and 
self-rated income group. During the initial stages of data analysis, region of residence was 
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also included, however, this analysis did not provide any clear trends, thus region of 
residence was removed prior to the final stages of the analysis.  
 
In adopting this approach to the analysis of attitudes, this research may be accused of 
“additive thinking”, in that categories are included within the analyse separately (Sigle-
Rushton and Lindström, 2013:131). This is explained in relation to the theory of 
intersectionality, where “different dimensions of social life (hierarchies, axes of 
differentiation, axes of oppression, social structures, normativities) are intersecting, 
mutually modifying and inseparable” (Sigle-Rushton and Lindström, 2013:131). As Dubrow 
explains, succinctly, people “belong to multiple demographic categories, the same 
individual has a specific gender, an ethnicity, and a social class position, among others”, 
and some of these “categories provide advantages and some disadvantages, with each 
having roots in social stratification structure” (2008:86). In this way, by considering gender, 
age, ethnicity and other characteristics separately, is to be accused of ignoring the 
intersecting layers of disadvantage (or indeed privilege) often faced by individuals. These 
layers of disadvantage are, however, not ignored within this research. Instead, this 
research practices “intersectional sensitivity” (McBride et al., 2015:334), where the 
literature drawn upon, reflects these layers of disadvantage.  
 
For the purposes of this section, the variables are separated into demographic and socio-
economic variables and are presented in two separate tables. Due to the sparse nature of 
the data, recoding was necessary (Table 3.3.3.1) in order to avoid small groups and to 
facilitate statistical tests. Care was however taken to ensure that the accuracy of 
measurement was not diminished (Blaikie, 2003). Table 3.3.3.1 shows the demographic 
variables included in the analysis. The first column shows the variable categories prior to 
recoding, the second column shows the variable categories following recoding, with the 
merged categories presented in brackets. As Table 3.3.3.1 shows, the demographic 
characteristics include: gender, age, ethnic background and educational attainment.  
 
Age was selected as a characteristic and aspect of social identity that often influences 
attitudes towards redistribution (Busemeyer et al., 2009). Across the BSAS datasets, the 
age categories originally consisted of seven categories, for the purpose of this research 
these were recoded into three new groups. The new age groups were selected to avoid 
small group sizes, but also to provide more manageable groups consisting of a young age 
group (18-34), a middle age group (35-64) and an older group (65+). The gender variable 
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remained male or female, with any refusals recoded as missing, along with responses 
recorded as ‘don’t know’.  
Table 3.3.3.1: Demographic BSAS variables in the final analysis, original categories and 
new recoded variable categories. 
 
Original Variable categories New variable categories in the analyse  
Coding 
1 
2 
8 
9 
Gender 
Male 
Female 
DK 
Refusal  
Recoding 
1 
2 
M 
Gender 
Male  
Female 
(8,9) 
Coding 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
Age 
18-24 
25-34 
35-44 
45-54 
55-59 
60-64 
65+ 
DK/Refused/NA 
Recoding 
1 
2 
3 
M 
Age 
18-34 (1-2) 
35-64 (3-6) 
65+ (7) 
(8) 
Coding 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
98 
99 
Ethnic group 
BLACK: of African origin 
BLACK: of Caribbean origin 
BLACK: of other origin 
ASIAN: of Indian origin 
ASIAN: of Pakistani origin 
ASIAN: of Bangladeshi origin 
ASIAN: of Chinese origin 
ASIAN: of other origin 
WHITE: of any origin 
MIXED origin 
Other 
DK 
Refusal 
Recoding 
1 
2 
M 
Ethnic group 
BAME groups (1-8, 10, 11) 
White ethnic groups (9) 
(98,99) 
Coding 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
Qualifications 
Postgraduate degree 
Degree 
Higher education below 
degree 
A level or equivalent 
O Level or equivalent 
CSE or equivalent 
Foreign or other 
No qualifications 
DK/Refusal/NA 
Recoding 
1 
2 
3 
M 
Education 
Degree and above (1-2) 
Below degree (3,4,5,6) 
None & Other (7,8) 
(9) 
DK – Don’t Know, NA – not answered, M – missing (Brackets show merged categories) 
                                                                                                                                            
Due to sparse data, and to avoid small group sizes, the original ethnicity variable 
categories were also recoded, transforming these into two categories, a BAME group and 
a White ethnic group. The educational attainment variable was also recoded and 
transformed from a variable with eight categories, into a new variable comprised of three 
categories. The new category ‘degree and above’ included people with a postgraduate 
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degree and/or a first degree, whereas ‘below degree’ comprised of people with higher 
levels of education below degree level. This included people with A level’s, O level’s, 
CSE’s or Equivalent qualifications. To avoid sparse groups, the category ‘none and other’, 
incorporated respondents with no qualifications, foreign qualifications or ‘other’ 
qualifications. 
 
The socio-economic characteristics selected as IV’s include employment status, self-rated 
income band, benefit status and occupation (Table 3.3.3.2). The inclusion of these 
characteristics reflect the contention that people on low-incomes are more likely to support 
social security spending and redistributive efforts, than those in the higher-income bracket 
(Glynn et al., 1999; Fong et al. 2003; Anderson and Curtis, 2015), and the relationship 
between income and educational attainment, occupation and employment status (Fong et 
al., 1999; Busemeyer, 2009; Hills et al., 2010; UK Commission for Employment and Skills 
[UKCES], 2014).  
 
Further, given the relationship between low incomes and the receipt of benefits, the benefit 
status of respondents (or their spouses), were also of interest. For the purposes of this 
analysis, due to the sparse nature of the data in some categories, many of these IV’s were 
recoded into different variables. For example, benefit status was recoded into two groups, 
labelled ‘yes’ for those in receipt (or whose spouse was) and ‘no’ for those who were not in 
receipt of any benefits. Responses where participants had declined to answer or had 
specified ‘don’t know’ were recoded as missing. Although it would have been of interest to 
understand what kind of benefits respondents or their spouses were in receipt of at the 
time of data collection, and how these influenced (if at all) their opinions, given the 
relatively small sample sizes and due to the time and spatial limitations of postgraduate 
study, this was not feasible.  
 
Respondents were also asked to specify whether they were in the receipt of a high, middle 
or low income, these categories remained the same during this analysis. However, 
responses detailing those who refused to answer the question or stated they did not know 
were recoded as missing. Notably, the process of inviting individuals to self-rate their 
income may result in inaccuracy. In this way, the three groups, may not necessarily 
accurately reflect high, middle and low incomes.  
 
The respondents’ employment status was also recoded in each dataset, merging the 
categories into two groups labelled ‘in employment’ (those in work or waiting to take up 
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work) and ‘not in employment’ (those not in work and not waiting to enter paid 
employment). This latter group not only featured respondents who stated they were 
unemployed, it also encompasses people looking after their home/family, in education or 
training, and those who have retired. The new two categories became the focus of the 
analysis, enabling an understanding of the differences (if any) in attitudes amongst people 
in work and those not in employment. 
 
Table 3.3.3.2: Socio-economic BSAS variables in the final analysis, original categories 
and new recoded variable categories. 
 
Original Variable categories New variable categories in the analyse  
Coding 
1 
2 
3 
8 
9 
Self-rated income group 
High income 
Middle Income 
Low income 
DN 
Refusal 
Recoding 
 
1 
2 
3 
M 
Income 
 
High 
Middle 
Low 
(8,9) 
Coding 
1 
2 
8 
9 
Benefit Status 
Yes 
No 
DK 
Refusal 
Recoding 
 
1 
2 
M 
Benefit status 
 
Yes 
No 
(8,9) 
Coding 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
9 
Economic Activity Summary 
Full Time education/training 
In work/ waiting to take up work 
Unemployed 
Retired 
Other 
DK/ Refusal 
Recoding 
 
1 
2 
M 
Employment Status 
 
In employment (2) 
Not in employment (3,5) 
(9) 
Coding 
1 
2 
3 
 
4 
 
5 
 
8 
NSSEC (5 category) 
Managerial and Professional 
occupations 
Intermediate occupations 
Employers small organisations own 
account workers 
Lower supervisory & technical 
occupations 
Semi-routine Occupations and 
Routine occupations 
Not classified 
Recoding 
 
1 
 
2 
3 
 
 
Occupation 
 
Managerial & Professional 
Occupations (1) 
Intermediate occupations (2, 
3) 
Routine & Manual 
occupations (4, 5,8) 
 
DK-Don’t Know, NA-not answered, M-missing (Brackets show merged categories) 
 
Similarly, the participants’ occupational position (NSSEC) was also recoded into three 
categories within a new variable (Occupation). The new occupation variable, retained the 
original first category, leaving this unchanged (‘managerial and professional’). 
Comparatively, as Table 3.3.3.2 shows, the second category ‘intermediate’ was recoded to 
include people working in intermediate occupations, employers in small organisations with 
own account workers. The final category, ‘routine and manual’ included people who held 
lower supervisory roles, technicians, people who were employed in semi-routine 
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occupations and finally those who could not be placed in one of these categories (‘not 
classified’). Recoding in this way in each of the datasets was necessary to avoid sparse 
data and allow for statistical analysis. 
 
Much of the focus of this chapter so far has been on the methodology and providing a 
critical introduction to the BSAS, alongside the variables in this analysis. The following 
section critically discusses the methods, explaining the focus of the variables included in 
the analysis alongside the statistical test incorporated. 
 
3.5 Analysis and focus, introduction  
 
This section critically presents the research methods, explaining which statistical tests 
were undertaken within the analysis and why these were incorporated. In doing so, this 
section will also discuss how the eight socio-economic and demographic variables, 
alongside the five DV’s, featured in the analysis.  
 
To understand changing attitudes over time, this research has been completed in stages. 
Having selected the time frame of the research, BSAS data from 2009, 2012 and 2015, 
was accessed through the UKDSA and downloaded into SPSS 24. All consequent tables 
and graphs were created in Excel. Each of the datasets were explored, seeking variables 
that would enable an understanding of how people perceived income inequality, 
redistribution and benefit recipients. Having selected the variables, each variable was 
inspected, noting the sizes in each category and recoding where necessary. Following this 
process, inferential analysis was possible. Following data download, cleaning and 
recoding where necessary, univariate, bivariate and multivariate analysis was conducted.   
 
3.5.1 Testing for Statistical Significance 
 
Keen to avoid what Gorard (2004:219) refers to as “superfluity”, this Chapter has thus far, 
been presented in such a way that the methods and methodology are accessible, ensuring 
that explanations are clear, and terminology is explained. This section continues to adopt 
this approach, discussing how and why confidence intervals featured in the analysis [CI] 
and how the statistical test, Chi-squared was also used to explore the data, each to 
determine possible relationships between groups and over time. 
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E 
Presented at the beginning of each findings section, to understand the significance of 
changing attitudes over time, confidence intervals were included in the analysis of the 
DV’s. This included the DV’s: ‘the gap between high and low incomes is too large’ (Section 
4.1), ‘the government should redistribute income from the better-off to the less-well-off’ 
(Section 4.2), ‘many people who get social security don't really deserve any help’ (Section 
5.1), ‘most people on the dole are fiddling in one way or another’ (Section 5.2) and ‘if 
welfare benefits weren't so generous, people would learn to stand on their own feet’ 
(Section 5.3). Having established the proportions in agreement each year, individually, CI’s 
were constructed around the point estimates in each year, reporting the 95% confidence 
intervals and comparing these findings to determine whether the changes between 2009-
2012, 2012-2015 and 2009-2015, were significantly different (at the 5.0% level).  
 
The next stage of the analysis involved using crosstabs and employing the statistical test, 
Pearson’s Chi-square test to determine whether statistically significant relationships 
between variables were evident and whether trends were notable (Gorard, 2004; Adeyemi, 
2009; Field, 2012). As Adeyemi (2009:48) explains, “the chi-square test is a nominal level 
non-parametric test of significance…used to test the differences or relationship between 
two variables”, using the formula:  
χ2 =∑ ( 0 - E 2  ) 
         
Here, χ2  = Chi-square, O = Observed frequency; E = Expected Frequency. As Adeyemi 
(2009) and Field (2012) acknowledge, as a convention, the significance value or alpha [α], 
is often set at less than 0.05, using hypotheses (H0 and H1) to guide the research findings.  
H0 = there is no association between the IV (s) and the DV 
H1 = there is an association between the IV (s) and the DV 
If the p value (observed significance level) is equal to or less than the alpha [α], the null 
hypothesis (that there is no relationship) can be rejected (Adeyemi, 2009; Field, 2012), 
thus suggesting that there is a relationship between the IV(s) and the DV.  
 
In this research, this was also the case. However, rather than focusing on whether the 
significance value was less than 0.05 (p<0.05), the values were also identified if these 
were less than 0.01 (p<0.01), and less than 0.001 (p<0.001). The level of statistical 
significance (where applicable) is emphasised within each of the tables (p<0.05*, p<0.01**, 
p<0.001***). For significant findings, these are further indicated within the narrative, 
expressing significant differences in attitudes between groups as ‘more likely’ or ‘less 
likely’. For results, where p>0.05, these were discussed clearly as not significant findings 
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(ns), meaning that the null hypothesis (of no relationship) cannot be rejected (Gorard, 
2004).  
 
Recent literature, however, not only suggests the need to exercise caution when 
employing tests of statistical significance, including the use of confidence intervals 
(Amrhein et al., 2019:306) but also calls for an abandonment of the “concept of statistical 
significance” entirely. This desire for abandonment rests on the assumption that the use of 
statistical significance in a dichotomous way results in the production of “misleading” 
findings (Amrhein et al., 2019:306). This occurs when researchers are presented with a P 
value over 0.05 (P>0.05), leading the researcher to declare there is no difference or no 
association or perhaps that there is no significant difference. For Amrhein et al. (2019:307) 
researchers should instead “embrace uncertainty”, avoiding making “overconfident claims” 
based on statistical analysis. Amrhein et al., (2019:307) thus advocate that P values 
should be reported with “precision”, rather than indicated with “adornments such as stars 
or letters to denote statistical significance and not as binary inequalities (P>0.05 or 
P<0.05)”.  
 
In this research, the language of statistical significance is retained, with the realisation that 
whilst a test may show no associations between variables, this is not necessarily reflective 
of social relationships. Thus, caution is exercised when interpreting the findings of 
statistical tests, striving to avoid “misleading” findings (Amrhein et al., 2019:306). To 
promote precision in the presentation and interpretation of these research findings, the 
results of statistical tests are also presented within the findings chapters and although 
stars are utilised, with exception to the BLRA findings, so too are specific P values.  
 
The analysis and findings are grouped by chapter, incorporating available literature, 
alongside theory to understand changing attitudes. Chapter 4, Section 4.1 involves the 
analysis of BSAS data from 2009, 2012 and 2015, highlighting the proportion of people 
who agreed that ‘the gap between high and low incomes is too large’. Section 4.2 explored 
the proportion of people who agreed that ‘the government should redistribute income from 
the better-off to the less well-off’. Crosstabulation meant that the levels of agreement 
toward each statement could be understood in relation to socio-economic and 
demographic characteristics, thus highlighting which groups were more likely to hold each 
view and by extension which groups were less likely. To maintain consistency and enable 
comparison, this was repeated in each dataset.  
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The findings presented in Section 4.1 and 4.2 extended the analysis further, leading to the 
introduction of a new question of interest, intent on understanding why support toward 
income redistribution remained so low, despite so many members of the British public 
agreeing that income inequality between groups was ‘too large’. Section 4.3, thus, 
highlights which groups are more likely to support redistribution, amongst those who also 
agreed that income inequality was too great. This was achieved by filtering the data, using 
the variable ‘the gap between high and low incomes is too large’, and then using crosstabs 
to place the variable ‘the government should redistribute income from the better-off to the 
less well-off’ as the DV, and the socio-economic and demographic characteristics of 
interest as IV’s. This was repeated in each dataset. Following a discussion of the findings 
in each table initially, Chapter 6 provides an analytical discussion of the data alongside the 
literature, enabling interpretation.  
 
Chapter 5 presents the findings from the analysis of three of the DV’s, concerned with 
understanding what attitudes were held toward social security recipients and how these 
changed (if at all). The statements included for this chapter include: ‘many people who get 
social security don't really deserve any help’ (Section 5.1), ‘most people on the dole are 
fiddling in one way or another’ (Section 5.2) and ‘if welfare benefits weren't so generous, 
people would learn to stand on their own feet’ (Section 5.3). Having initially sought to 
understand how socio-economic and demographic characteristics relate to attitudes in the 
first three sections, Section 5.4 sought to understand these findings further.  
 
Filtering the data by the variable ‘many people who get social security don’t really deserve 
any help’, the crosstabs function was used to determine what the proportion of people who 
said people were undeserving, also agreed that ‘the government should redistribute 
income from the better-off to the less well off’. The redistribution variable was used as the 
DV, with each of the socio-economic and demographic variables acting as IV’s. Similarly, 
Section 5.5, filtered the data by the DV ‘if welfare benefits weren't so generous, people 
would learn to stand on their own feet’, using crosstabs to determine what proportion of 
people who felt that welfare generosity resulted in dependency also supported the 
redistribution of income. To allow for comparative analysis, this was repeated in each 
dataset.  
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3.5.2 Binary Logistic Regression Analysis [BLRA] 
 
Following the independent analysis of data from the 2009, 2012 and 2015 datasets as 
discussed above, the datasets were merged to create one new dataset, ready for the final 
statistical analyse, BLRA. This section explains this process, noting why BLRA was 
employed in the research. 
 
As Gayle and Lambert (2009:3) explain, regression can be used to “explore the effects” of 
multiple (and categorical) IV’s on a binary outcome variable (DV). Accordingly, this 
enabled further exploration of the DV’s in the analysis. Rather than modelling for best fit, 
however, within this research the results of the BLRA are interpreted in relation to odds 
ratios [OR], p values and 95.0% CI’s. As Szumilas note, OR’s are a measure of the 
association between an exposure variable (IV) and an outcome variable (DV), in this way 
the OR “represents the odds that an outcome will occur given a particular exposure, 
compared to the odds of the outcome occurring in the absence of that exposure” 
(2010:227).  
 
In this analysis, the 95% CI is employed to estimate the accuracy of the calculated OR 
(Connelly et al., 2016). As Szumilas contends, where a “large CI indicates a low level of 
precision of the OR”, comparatively, a “small CI indicates a higher precision of the OR” 
(2010:227). Given that a positive OR does not “necessarily indicate that this association is 
statistically significant”, both CI’s and p value’s are used to establish whether or not 
significant findings are observable (Szumilas, 2010:229), though the latter is not presented 
in the tables. Due to variation and a lack of firm guidelines, findings from each BLRA are 
presented in tables, reporting the Exp Beta (ß) or OR and the 95% CI’s (Connelly et al., 
2016). Though this form of data analysis is not without its difficulties (Gayle and Lambert, 
2009; Szumilas, 2010; Connelly et al., 2016; Amrhein et al., 2019), to enable further 
exploration of the data, this was considered the most appropriate. 
 
Prior to each BLRA, to ensure that the DV’s were binary (having just two categories), 
further data management was, however, necessary. Each DV was recoded, using ‘0’ and 
‘1’, renaming each variable in each dataset, to ensure these were consistently labelled 
throughout. To simplify the analysis, the IV income, was also recoded into a two-category 
variable, comprised of people in receipt of middle-high incomes (merging the two 
categories) and people in receipt of low incomes (remaining the same). Having completed 
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this process, the individual datasets (2009, 2012 and 2015) were merged to create a new 
dataset, comprising all the data. Following this, the two DV’s presented in Section 4.1 (‘the 
gap between high and low incomes is too large’ and 4.2 (‘the government should 
redistribute income from the better-off to the less well-off’) were selected for analysis. This 
analysis was also repeated in Chapter 5, with the three main DV’s selected for BLRA 
(Section 5.1, 5.2 and 5.3). Focusing on six IV’s (year, age, gender, benefit status, 
employment status and income), BLRA was included to explore what relationships were 
evident, if any, having taken into account other variables in the analysis. The findings of 
the BLRA are presented and discussed in each chapter, before inclusion within the 
analytical discussion section. 
 
This chapter has, thus far, provided a critical discussion of the methods and methodology, 
intent on highlighting the strengths and weaknesses of this research design and on clearly 
outlining the variables featured within the analysis. The following section focuses on 
emphasising the ethical considerations inherent to this research, outlining the ethical 
guidance and practices adhered to throughout this research 
 
3.6 Ethical considerations, Introduction 
 
This Section outlines the ethical guidance and practices adhered to throughout this post-
graduate research. Importantly, this research has been conducted in accordance with the 
guidance purveyed by three different research bodies. The guidance afforded by the 
ethical frameworks of both the Social Research Association’s [SRA] and British 
Sociological Association’s [BSA] ethical guidelines, as well as those of the organisation 
who made this research possible through funding, the Economic and Social Research 
Council [ESRC] has thus been followed. Aside from these organisations, support and 
guidance was also received by the University’s Ethical Committee, where ethical approval 
for the purposes of postgraduate study was granted, following review by the University of 
Leeds Ethical Committee.  
 
3.6.1 Research ethics 
 
Each aspect of this research abided to the ethical guidelines presented in each of the 
above frameworks. Thus, demonstrating a commitment to ensuring social research 
continues to be meaningful to society, through the care continually taken to ensure that 
research participants remain unharmed and that legislation of any given country is not 
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contravened as a result of research conducted (SRA, 2003). The purpose of this research 
was to make meaningful contributions. Not only through the production of 
recommendations of future research and policy, but to do so in a way that is accessible to 
all. Thus, this research has been conducted with the intention of enabling a firmer 
understanding of how people feel toward inequality, poverty and how attitudes towards 
social security recipients relate to support toward income redistribution. Not only is this a 
prerequisite of the funding body of this post-graduate research, as laid out in their 2015 
Framework for Research Ethics [FRE], in an effort to provide insight into social inequalities 
and social issues, this is also something the funding body strives to achieve in their own 
research. 
 
Alongside this and the guidelines provided by SRA and BSA, The FRE (2015:4) set out six 
core principles for all research to adhere to, this is also a mandatory expectation of 
research conducted by individuals and bodies in receipt of ESRC funding. Each of these 
principles will be discussed in relation to the research, demonstrating how each of these 
principles were incorporated into the “research lifecycle” to date (FRE, 2015:2). The first of 
six principles set out the expectation that all research should ensure the safety of research 
participants, where their contributions are based on voluntary participation, free from 
coercion with their rights and their dignity remaining the focus of the research. Secondly, 
the consequent research should proceed with caution, ensuring that the outcome of the 
research is worthwhile and that all those involved, do so free from risk and harm (FRE, 
2015).  
 
Given that the research and analysis is based on secondary data, the research method 
previously employed at the time of data collection in 2009, 2012 and 2015, was critically 
explored. Due to the nature of this analysis, this involved examining the ethical procedures 
in place at the time of BSAS data collection. NatCen evidenced stringent ethical research 
practices, gaining informed consent from the participants, and making the respondents 
aware that any questions they did not wish to answer, they could refrain from doing so.  
These statements can be further evidenced from NatCen’s ‘Taking part’ advice page. 
NatCen introduce the purpose of the survey to each possible participant, specifying that 
although the data will be anonymised, “the results of the survey will go on to feature in the 
newspapers, on TV and radio, and will be discussed in Parliament” (NatCen, 2018: no 
pagination).  
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Prior to the research taking place, the selected sample received a postcard, informing of 
their selection and that a researcher was intent on visiting each address, noting again the 
purpose of the study and the prospective respondent’s rights to refuse to participate. This 
information was and remains readily accessible online, with a number of further important 
points of information included. NatCen emphasise that the “legal basis for processing the 
data” is on the basis of “legitimate interest”, that NatCen controls the data for the BSAS, 
with a clear stance on the sharing of any personal information being on the basis of 
consent (NatCen, 2018: no pagination).  
 
Prospective participants and participants are assured that their details will be treated “in 
the strictest confidence under current data protection legislation” (NatCen, 2018: no 
pagination). Participants or prospective participants are thus both informed and are further 
able to access information related to both the BSAS and data dissemination. Further, as a 
result of anonymisation during the data collection process, it is not possible to identify 
participants based on the information shared during this process. Not only is informed 
consent gained, each of the respondents are over the age of eighteen and were only 
deemed eligible if they fit these criteria, thereby avoiding the need to gain parental 
agreement (SRA, 2003; BSA, 2017).  
 
In taking further steps to ensure no harm to the participants, each interviewer carried an 
identification tag and were also subject to checks from Disclosure and Barring Service 
(NatCen, 2018). As a reward, thanking all respondents, each household was sent a Post 
Office voucher, to be exchanged for money (NatCen, 2018). Not only does this 
demonstrate the first two principles afforded by the FRE (2015), this also highlights how 
the third and fourth ethical principles have also been adhered to. The third principle 
explains that all those involved in the research should be made aware of the methods, 
what the research will be used for, what their role in the research process is and whether 
there are any possibilities of risk or indeed benefits (FRE, 2015). This expectation has 
been met. The fourth principle clarifies that the research process maintains the anonymity 
of participants, with respect to the confidential information and/or personal data (FRE, 
2015). This expectation has also been met. 
 
A commitment to ensuring that the data used in this research adheres to the ethical 
principles set out by the ESRC in their FRE (2015) framework, highlights how this research 
demonstrates a “personal responsibility for undertaking research to the highest ethical 
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standards” (FRE, 2015:4). The final two expectations set out by the FRE (2015) have also 
been demonstrated throughout this research process, this is evidenced in the design of the 
research. The research design was thus constructed in relation to ethical frameworks, was 
reviewed in the early stages, maintaining integrity, quality and transparency throughout.  
 
Although secondary data analysis was conducted with a view to fulfilling a research 
objective and fulfilling the requirements of post-graduate study, there remains no conflicts 
of interests (FRE, 2015). In the context of this research, this has been achieved by 
employing these guidelines, strictly and by maintaining “high scientific standards in the 
methods employed in the collection and analysis of data and the impartial assessment and 
dissemination of findings” (SRA, 2003:13). Throughout this research, all findings from 
secondary analysis are reported and interpreted both “accurately” and “truthfully” (BSA, 
2017:4), with all participants and those involved in the research, remaining free from harm. 
 
The ESRC note within their FRE, a research integrity Checklist featured within the UK 
Research Integrity Office [UKRIO] Code of Practice for Research [COPR]. The ESRC 
advise that all those undertaking research funded by them should abide by the 
recommendations presented in this COPR checklist. The first question addressed 
concerns the purpose and scope of the research. More specifically, whether “the proposed 
research address pertinent question(s)” and whether “is it designed either to add to 
existing knowledge about the subject in question or to develop methods for research into 
it?” (UKRIO, 2009: no pagination). The research questions outlined in Chapter 1 and  
 
Section 3.1 demonstrate the purpose and importance of this research in the pursuit of 
knowledge and contributing to existing knowledge. The UKRIO (2009) also question 
whether the research design is appropriate for the research questions stipulated. As 
demonstrated in this Chapter the research design is appropriate, with further questions 
arising as a result of the findings, the “necessary skills and resources” required to “conduct 
the research” are furthermore, demonstrated throughout this thesis (UKRIO, 2009: no 
pagination).  
 
The “best practice for the collection, storage and management of data” is also considered, 
alongside appropriate risk assessments, prior to data collection and the research (UKRIO, 
2009: no pagination). Although the questions and statements presented to each 
respondent were attitudinal, seeking to understand perceptions those featured in the CAPI 
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and personal questionnaire were free from ethical issues, each were comprehensible and 
of an unobtrusive and inoffensive nature (Gomm, 2008). Not only did the data collected by 
NatCen adhere to ethical guidelines, the consequent secondary data analysis in this thesis 
also sought to uphold the same ethical rigour.  
 
At the point the data for each year was downloaded from the UKDA, this has been stored 
securely, as a result of both the requirements of the End User Licence agreement [EUL] 
but also in ensuring the data remains anonymous. The data has been stored, with any 
physical copies of the data collected, stored in a locked cabinet, behind a locked office 
door. The data, once no longer necessary will be destroyed securely. As specified by the 
UKDS (where this micro data was stored prior to being downloaded into SPSS) in the EUL 
(2018:3), the research in this way will “preserve at all times the confidentiality of 
information pertaining to individuals and/or households in the data collections where the 
information is not in the public domain”.  
 
Following the end of the access period, all copies of the data stored, irrespective of format, 
will be destroyed (EUL, 2018). This necessity is also highlighted within the Microdata 
Handling and Security Guide to Good Practice (2014). This agreement and guide also 
emphasise that all publications (in all formats), should provide acknowledgements and 
citations, making it clear where the data was derived from. This includes “the original data 
creators, depositors or copyright holders [NatCen]”, alongside “the service funders [ESRC] 
and the data service provider(s) [UK Data Service] in the form specified on the data 
distribution notes or in accompanying metadata received with the dataset” (EUL, 2018:4).  
 
Further, the EUL also specifies that “bibliographic details of any published work based 
wholly or in part on the data collections” should also be provided (2018:4). Not only has 
this research been produced on a not-for-profit research basis, given PhD theses are also 
published online, with a copy also retained by the University library, the thesis incorporated 
the necessary citations throughout and references. In line with EUL regulations, prior to 
publication, the EUL will be updated, requesting a change to the originally specified use. 
 
3.7 Conclusion 
 
To summarise, this Chapter outlined the research methods, methodology and ethical 
guidelines inherent to this post-graduate study. Whilst the final Section outlined the ethical 
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guidance adhered during the research process, Section 3.1 explored the research 
methodology, providing the rationale for the research and some of the initial issues 
encountered, alongside the strengths and weaknesses of opting for secondary data 
analysis of three sets of micro data. A critical overview of the BSAS, including the sample 
frames and sizes for each year of micro data has also been provided. Section 3.3 
discussed the analysis of the BSAS, presenting the variables for analysis, changes to the 
data, and the statistical analysis employed throughout. Despite criticism, it has been 
argued that the methods employed in this research have enabled the creation of an 
original piece of research, of which contributes to a growing body of literature, concerned 
with public perceptions of inequality, poverty and redistribution. The following Chapter 
presents the first of two findings chapters, exploring perceptions of the income gap and 
redistribution, alongside how perceptions of income inequality relate to redistributional 
support.  
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Chapter 4 
Research findings 1 
 
4.1 Perceptions of income inequality and redistribution, Introduction 
 
This chapter explores public perceptions of the income gap in Britain, alongside support 
towards initiatives to combat inequality, through the redistribution of income. The first 
section explores whether people agreed that ‘the gap between people with high and low 
incomes is too large’ (4.1.1). Comparatively, the second section explores the extent of 
agreement with the statement: ‘the government should redistribute income from the better-
off to the less well-off’ (4.2.1). The third section (4.3.1) builds on the analysis presented in 
Sections 4.1.1-4.21, exploring the proportion of people who said that the income gap is 
‘too large’, alongside the proportion of people who also supported redistribution. These 
findings are also discussed in Chapter 6, drawing on a range of the available literature, to 
provide an analytical discussion of the findings illustrated in Section’s 4.1.1-4.3.1 and 
Section’s 5.1.1-5.5.1.  
 
As Section 2.6 emphasises, although people’s perceptions are often inconsistent and 
subject to change (Orton and Rowlingson, 2007; Underwood, 2009; Voas, 2014), due to 
the possession of a number of social identities, their behaviour and by extension their 
attitudes, can be gauged (Luttig, 2013). Accordingly, changing attitudes were investigated 
in relation to specific characteristics. This includes demographic characteristics (gender, 
age, ethnic background and educational attainment) and socio-economic characteristics 
(employment status, self-rated income band, benefit status and occupation). Presented 
thematically, the analysis explores whether perceptions have changed, between groups 
and over time.  
 
4.1.1 Perceptions of income inequality, findings 
 
Chapter 2 demonstrated how income inequality in the UK has grown substantially and is 
set to worsen further (Belfield et al., 2014; Dorling, 2014; Mckenzie, 2015; Springford, 
2015). Prior to the recession and implementation of austerity measures, inequality 
persisted alongside rising affluence and these differential consequences for many, 
became increasingly more pronounced (Irvin, 2011; Dorling, 2014; Belfield et al., 2015; 
TET, 2016). Not only were services cut, many saw their household incomes fall as their 
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living expenses increased, for others cuts to benefits and sanctions meant their benefits 
became frozen or reduced due to ineligibility (Levitas, 2012; Penny, 2013; O’Hara, 2014; 
Lupton et al., 2015; Fitzpatrick et al., 2016). The use of food and clothing banks, providing 
basic necessities to individuals and families (O’Hara, 2014), are now not only considered a 
permanent fixture, but a stark reminder that members of the British public are struggling to 
“keep afloat financially” (O’Brien and Kyprianou, 2017:120).  
 
Despite growing income inequality, however, for many people both poverty and inequality 
are considered experiences that exist outside of the UK, rather than within it (Park et al., 
2012b; Hall et al., 2014) and this is problematic. As evidenced throughout this research, 
public support is paramount to ensure social policies and measures to tackle such growing 
inequality of income and of opportunity, are not only implemented but sustained 
(Monnickendam and Gordon, 2010; Prabhakar, 2012; Wu and Chou, 2015). Whilst it has 
been argued that people are concerned about the prevalence of inequality (Irwin, 2016), 
this does not, however, necessarily mean that this concern will increase, as inequality 
intensifies (Orton and Rowlingson, 2007). On the contrary, ignorance towards the suffering 
of others operates as a barrier to successfully removing obstacles, like that of inequality of 
income and of opportunity.  
 
Alongside a lack of acknowledgement toward inequality and poverty and an acceptance of 
their existence, Kyprianou contemplates whether people have simply “become inured to 
the statistics on poverty” (2015:12). Kyprianou’s query points to the suggestion that for 
those able to acknowledge their presence, both poverty and inequality have become 
something that is considered inevitable and as something that will always be with ‘us’. 
Suggesting that to confront mounting income inequality, prevailing levels of inequality 
alongside their causes must also be understood by the public. Suggesting, further, that if 
people are unable to conceive of the extent of income inequality, they will be less likely to 
support initiatives to combat problems they do not believe exist. Subsequently, progress 
towards income equality will be halted.  
 
In light of this, this section explores whether members of the British public recognised 
widening income inequality between groups as an issue. To do this, BSAS data from 2009, 
2012 and 2015 is analysed, intent on understanding which groups are more likely to agree 
that ‘the gap between high and low incomes is too large’ and the extent of change, if at all, 
over the years studied. To understand the changes between the years, CI’s are first 
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constructed around the point estimate for each year. To determine significant relationships 
between groups based on shared social identities and their attitudes toward the income 
gap, this analysis is followed by MVA and finally, BLRA.  
 
Table 4.1.1 shows the CI’s constructed around the point estimates in each year. The 
findings show that in 2009, 80.6% stated that ‘the gap between high and low incomes is 
too large’, the 95% CI is between 78.9% and 82.2%. By 2012, the proportion of people in 
agreement that the income gap is ‘too large’ increased to 84.4%, the 95% CI is between 
83.1% and 85.6%.  
 
Table 4.1.1: Percentages and percentage point [pp] difference of levels of agreement with: 
‘The gap between high and low incomes is too large’, by year, with C.I’s (analysis based 
on BSAS 2009, 2012 and 2015) 
The gap between high and 
low incomes is too large 
Agree 
(%) 
pp change by year and CI by year 
(95%) 
Year 2009 2012 2015 2009-12   2012-15 2009-15 
All 80.6 84.4 78.0 +3.8 -6.4 -2.6 
CI                            Lower 
Bound                                                                                                        
U                             Upper 
Bound 
78.9 
82.2 
83.1 
85.6
76.5 
79.4
 
sd
 
Sd 
 
ns 
CI – Confidence Interval, sd-significant difference (at 5.0% level), ns-not significant 
                                                                                                                                           
Table 4.1.1 shows that the differences between 2009 and 2012 are significantly different at 
the 5.0% level. These findings suggest that the attitudinal change (increase in agreement) 
between 2009-2012 is significantly different. By 2015, however, attitudes changed. The 
proportion of people in agreement (78.0%) decreased by 6.4% from 2012. The findings 
also suggest that the changes between 2012-2015 are significantly different (at the 5.0% 
level), suggesting that there was a significant decrease in levels of agreement between 
2012-2015. However, these findings also suggest that the overall decrease in agreement 
between 2009-2015 is not significantly different. To summarise, these findings suggest 
that changing attitudes toward income inequality between 2009-2012 and 2012-2015 are 
significantly different at the 5.0% level, but that the changes between 2009-2015 are not 
significantly different. To understand these findings further, MVA was conducted. 
Highlighting the proportion of people in agreement, Table 4.1.2 and Figure 4.1.1, show the 
results of this analysis.  
 
Figure 4.1.1 shows that in 2009, 2012 and 2015, a considerably large proportion of the 
British public recognised the polarisation of income between groups in the UK. Thus, 
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suggesting that the majority of the British public in 2009 (80.6%), 2012 (84.4%) and 2015 
(78.0%), recognised the significance of income inequality between groups. The proportion 
of people in agreement increased between 2009 to 2012, before declining in 2015, to a 
level lower than observed in 2009 (pp decrease of 6.4). Whilst the proportion of people 
recognising the scale of income inequality as ‘too large’ remained substantial, increasing 
initially into 2012, by 2015 attitudes appeared to have changed. Whilst the findings 
outlined in Figure 4.1.1 show how attitudes changed over time, Table 4.1.1 shows that not 
all of these changes were significant.  
 
These findings suggest two things. First, since a considerable proportion of people 
recognised income inequality between groups as a gap ‘too large’, this appears to 
reinforce Irwin’s point that the public “do care about inequality” (2016:15) or at the very 
least, are able to recognise it. 
Figure 4.1.1: Levels of agreement with: ‘the gap between high and low incomes is too 
large’, by year (analysis based on BSAS 2009, 2012 and 2015) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The findings also suggest, however, that despite large proportions of people holding this 
view, concern for the inequality of income between groups fell significantly, as the impact 
of austerity measures became more pronounced (2012-2015). 
 
To explore which groups were more likely to perceive the income gap as ‘too large’, Table 
4.1.2 shows how this perception varied by socio-economic and demographic 
characteristics. As emphasised in Chapter 2 and Chapter 6, experiences of inequality by 
and between groups diverge and these differential experiences are expected to impact on 
perceptions of income inequality (UKCES, 2014; Fisher and Nandi, 2015; UNCESCR, 
2016). Notably, the experience of inequality for men and women is often different, which 
should be reflected in their attitudes towards inequality. Women continue to face 
inequalities of income and of opportunity (Longhi and Platt, 2008; Nandi and Platt, 2012; 
Conley, 2012; UKCES, 2014), consequently women are expected to express more 
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concern towards others and hold views based on the principles of fairness and equality of 
opportunity, to a greater extent than men (Goerres and Jaeger, 2016).  
 
Table 4.1.1.2: Percentages and percentage point difference of agreement with: ‘The gap 
between high and low incomes is too large’, by year and socio demographic and economic 
characteristics (analysis based on BSAS 2009, 2012 and 2015) 
 
Socio-demographic and 
economic characteristics 
‘Too Large’ 
% 
pp change 
 2009 2012 2015 2009 -12   2012 – 15 2009 –
15 
All 80.6 84.4 78.0 +3.8 -6.4 -2.6 
Gender 
Male 
Female 
ns 
79.8 
81.4 
ns 
83.0 
85.7 
* 
77.9 
78.1 
 
+3.2 
+4.3 
 
-5.1 
-7.6 
 
-1.9 
-3.3 
Age 
18-34 
35-64 
65+  
*** 
73.9 
82.0 
86.3 
*** 
79.3 
86.4 
86.7 
*** 
71.9 
79.4 
82.4 
 
+5.4 
+4.4 
+0.4 
 
-7.4 
-7.0 
-4.3 
 
-2.0 
-2.6 
-3.9 
Ethnic group ns ns *    
White ethnic groups 76.3 84.7 78.9 +8.4 -5.8 +2.6 
BAME groups 81.1 81.9 72.4 +0.8 -9.5 -8.7 
Income 
High 
Middle 
Low 
*** 
67.4 
77.3 
85.4 
*** 
76.8 
80.9 
89.4 
*** 
71.0 
75.4 
81.9 
 
+9.4 
+3.6 
+4.0 
 
-5.8 
-5.5 
-7.5 
 
+3.6 
-1.9 
-3.5 
Benefit status 
Yes 
No 
*** 
82.9 
76.8 
** 
85.8 
82.3 
*** 
79.9 
75.8 
 
+2.9 
+5.5 
 
-5.9 
-6.5 
 
-3.0 
-1.0 
Employment Status 
In employment 
Not in employment 
*** 
78.1 
84.2 
** 
83.5 
85.5 
ns 
78.3 
77.4 
 
+5.4 
+1.3 
 
-5.2 
-8.1 
 
+0.2 
-6.8 
Qualifications ns ns *    
Degree and above 80.3 82.8 80.6 +2.5 -2.2 +0.3 
Below degree 81.2 85.0 77.2 +3.8 -7.8 -4.0 
None & Other 79.9 83.6 77.1 +3.7 -6.5 -2.8 
Occupation 
Managerial & Professional 
Occupations 
Intermediate occupations 
Routine and Manual 
occupations 
ns 
81.1 
 
80.7 
80.7 
ns 
84.8 
 
84.3 
85.1 
*** 
78.1 
 
79.1 
78.3 
 
+3.7 
 
+3.6 
+4.4 
 
-6.7 
 
-5.2 
-6.8 
 
-3.0 
 
-1.6 
-2.4 
Statistical Significance test results represented by asterisk symbol: *p<0.05 **p<0.01 
***p<0.001 ns – not significant 
 
In the context of this research, two assumptions can be made. Firstly, women will not only 
be more likely to recognise growing income inequality and thus more likely to agree than 
men, but secondly, that these proportions will also increase. As expected, the proportion of 
women in agreement, is greater than amongst men in 2009, 2012 and 2015. Despite this 
attitudinal gender gap narrowing in 2015; during this period women were more likely to 
agree that the income gap is ‘too large’ in comparison to men (χ2 =7.131, df =2, p=0.028).  
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Although these findings support Goerres and Jaeger’s (2016) contention, the secondary 
assumption that levels of agreement will increase at a faster pace amongst women, is not 
supported by the findings. Instead, these findings demonstrate that by 2015, as inequality 
of income increased, declining levels of agreement are observable not only overall (pp 
decrease of 6.4), but also amongst men (pp decrease of 5.1) and to a greater extent, 
amongst women (pp decrease of 7.6).  
 
Varying levels of agreement are also notable by age group. As Chapter 2 and Chapter 6 
illustrate, age also impacts upon perceptions of income inequality (Busemeyer et al., 
2009). Identified as a group more vulnerable to age related ill health and disabling 
conditions, pensioners are often subject to greater levels of inequality and poverty (Ginn, 
2013; Habibov, 2013). For these reasons, it can be assumed that people aged 65 and over 
will be more likely to recognise income inequality. As Table 4.1.2 and Figure 4.1.2 show, 
opinions towards the income gap in Britain vary significantly by age.  
 
Figure 4.1.1.2: Levels of agreement with: ‘the gap between high and low incomes is too 
large’, by year and age (analysis based on BSAS 2009, 2012 and 2015) 
 
 
 
Whilst people aged 18-34 were least likely to agree, despite economic difficulties during 
these periods, older members of the public (65 and over) were, as expected, more likely to 
agree than both people aged 18-34 and 35–64 in 2009 (χ2 =28.556, df =2, p<0.001), 2012 
(χ2 =27.935, df =4, p<0.001) and 2015 (χ2 =31.865, df =4, p<0.001). In 2015, a notable 
shift in overall levels of agreement amongst older members of the public (65 and over) is 
observable, where despite increasing levels of agreement in 2012, levels of agreement fell 
amongst this group.  
 
This result may be surprising, given the assumption noted above. However, as also 
demonstrated in Chapter 2 and Chapter 6, despite ongoing vulnerability to poverty and 
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inequality amongst older individuals, positive changes have occurred, meaning that 
pensioners incomes have in part been protected (Tucker, 2017). That said, greater 
protection for older members of the public has not ceased vulnerability (Ginn, 2013; JRF, 
2016), which perhaps explains the higher proportions of agreement amongst this group 
and a greater recognition of income inequality, in comparison to people aged 18-64. As 
Figure 4.1.1.2 shows, between 2009-2012, whilst levels of agreement increased amongst 
people aged 18-34 and 35-64, they fell again between 2012-2015 and at a faster pace 
amongst younger people aged 18-34 (pp decrease of 7.4).  
 
The lowest levels of agreement each year are observable amongst younger members of 
the public (18-34), who are the least likely to assert that the income gap is ‘too large’. 
Following the assumption that people more susceptible to inequality are often more likely 
to recognise income inequality and recent findings illustrating how younger members of 
the public fared worse during austerity (Belfield et al., 2014; MacInnes et al., 2015), it 
would have also been feasible to suggest that this would have been reflected in the 
analysis, with levels of agreement increasing amongst this group. However, results in 
Table 4.1.1.2 and Figure 4.1.1.2, do not support this.  
 
Alongside women, pensioners and young adults, people from BAME backgrounds are also 
identified as a group more vulnerable to the experience of poverty and inequality, due to 
ongoing disadvantage and prejudice (Platt, 2007; Longhi and Platt, 2008; Hills et al., 
2010). People from BAME backgrounds are often subject to injustice and greater 
experiences of inequality, and as a consequence of such disadvantage, it can be assumed 
that the likelihood of agreement will be higher, than in comparison to people from white 
ethnic backgrounds, who are less likely to face ethnic prejudice. As Table 4.1.1.2 shows in 
2009 people from BAME groups were more likely to agree that the income gap is ‘too 
large’ compared with people from white ethnic backgrounds. However, in both 2012 and 
2015, attitudes appeared to change with people from white ethnic backgrounds more 
inclined to state that the income gap is ‘too large’ (in 2015 χ2 =10.469, df =2, p=0.005).  
 
Between 2009-2015 levels of agreement declined amongst people from BAME 
backgrounds, thus although the gap between those in agreement from white ethnic 
backgrounds and people from BAME backgrounds appeared to narrow 2009-2012, 
between 2012-2015 they more than doubled. This suggests that in 2015, at least, the 
assumptions put forth above, were not supported by the findings. Instead, despite ongoing 
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ethnic disadvantage (Fisher and Nandi, 2015; Khan, 2015; Catney and Sabater, 2015; 
Equality and Human Rights Commission [EHRC], 2015; TUC, 2017) amongst many 
people from BAME backgrounds, people from white ethnic backgrounds were more likely 
to agree that income inequality between groups is ‘too large’. 
 
Notably, both perceptions of inequality and the experience of inequality, differ between 
men and women and also by age and ethnicity. Although not the focus here, these aspects 
of identity intersect, impacting upon perceptions of inequality and complicating the 
experiences of disadvantage for many (Fisher and Nandi, 2015; Khan, 2015; Catney and 
Sabater, 2015). What is also emphasised is how other aspects of identity, like that of 
socio-economic positioning, also impact both perceptions and experiences. Notably, a 
number of groups sharing the same aspects of social identities, are more vulnerable 
toward the onset of inequality and poverty than others (UKCES, 2014; Fisher and Nandi, 
2015; UNCESCR, 2016). Furthermore, other factors, like educational attainment, 
occupation and level of income, often play a part in the likelihood of these experiences but 
also impact on attitudes towards inequality (Park et al., 2012b).  
 
Table 4.1.1.2 shows how opinions toward income inequality varied by socio-economic 
characteristics, including the level of income received, benefit and employment status, the 
level of educational attainment achieved, and the type of occupation undertaken. Notably, 
where people are situated in relation to socio-economic characteristics, often influences or 
indeed, impedes the type of lifestyle individuals and families are able to lead (Holman, 
1978; Esping-Anderson, 1999; UKCES, 2014; Finch, 2015; Padley et al., 2017). In this 
way, because unemployment and benefit take up often results in a low income or indeed 
are a consequence of low income, it can be assumed that people in the low-income group, 
those in receipt of benefits (or whose spouse is) and those who are not in employment, will 
be more likely to recognise growing economic inequality, due to their own experiences of 
need and limited incomes (Holman, 1978; Finch, 2015).  
 
It is, therefore, reasonable to suggest that low-income earners, benefit recipients and 
people who are not in employment, will be more likely to agree that ‘the gap between high 
and low incomes is too large’. Whereas, people in receipt of higher incomes, people who 
do not receive benefits and those in paid employment, will be by comparison, less likely to 
recognise income inequality, perhaps because they are often both economically and 
socially distant from these experiences (Orton and Rowlingson, 2007). As Table 4.1.1.2 
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and Figure 4.1.1.3 show, there is a significant relationship between self–rated income level 
and perceptions of the gap between high and low incomes.  
 
Figure 4.1.1.3: Levels of agreement with: ‘the gap between high and low incomes is too 
large’, by year and income group (analysis based on BSAS 2009, 2012 and 2015) 
 
 
 
As expected, in 2009 (χ2 =32.224, df =2, p<0.001), 2012 (χ2 =53.652, df =4, p<0.001) and 
2015 (χ2 =43.158, df =4, p<0.001), people who specified that they had a low income, were 
significantly more likely to state that the income gap is ‘too large’. Further, as an 
individuals’ financial position improves, thus moving them further away from income 
vulnerability, the proportion believing that the income gap is ‘too large’ decreases. In 
summary, although levels of agreement increased (by 3.6 pp) amongst people in receipt of 
high incomes between 2009-2015, this group who are less likely to experience inequality 
directly and perhaps socially, are less likely to perceive the income gap as ‘too large’.  
 
These findings do however suggest that between 2009-2015, high-income earners 
became more likely to recognise income inequality. Nevertheless, despite falling levels of 
agreement between 2009-2015 (3.5 pp) people who are in receipt of low incomes, who are 
more likely to experience the consequences of economic inequality, due to lower incomes, 
are more likely to assert that the income gap is ‘too large’. Not only were declining levels of 
agreement notable amongst low-income groups between 2009-2015, levels of agreement 
also fell by 1.9 pp amongst the middle-income group.    
 
Similarly, perceptions differed by employment and benefit status. As highlighted in Chapter 
2 and Chapter 6, because benefit recipients (or their spouses) are often in receipt of lower 
incomes, it was expected that this would be reflected in the analysis. As expected, people 
in receipt of benefits (or whose spouse was), were more likely to state that the income gap 
is ‘too large’, in comparison to those not in receipt of benefits in 2009 (χ2 =12.385, df =1, 
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p<0.001), 2012 (χ2 =11.111, df =2, p=0.004) and 2015 (χ2 =15.084, df =2, p=0.001). 
Interestingly, although levels of agreement decreased amongst both groups, the decline in 
agreement between 2009-2015, is three times higher amongst those who were in receipt 
(or whose spouse was) of benefits, in comparison to people who were not receiving 
benefits. Thus, suggesting that despite increasing levels of inequality and changes to the 
receipt, eligibility and sanctions imposed upon benefit recipients, people who were in 
receipt or whose spouse was, became less inclined to see the income gap as ‘too large’. 
Perhaps reflecting their own financial insecurity and vulnerability toward the experience of 
inequality, despite falling levels of agreement amongst this group, people who claimed 
benefits or whose spouse did, were as expected, more likely to recognise income 
inequality, than those not receiving benefits.  
 
Much like people in receipt of benefits are expected to be in receipt of lower incomes, 
Chapter 2 and Chapter 6 stressed how people who are not in employment, are also 
expected to receive and feel constrained by less than adequate financial resources 
(Holman, 1978; McKendrick et al., 2008). Given this, it can be assumed that people who 
are not in employment will be more likely to agree, reflective of their own experiences of 
income inequality. As Figure 4.1.1.4 shows this was, in part, reflected in the findings. In 
2009 (χ2 =12.751, df =1, p<0.001) and 2012 (χ2 =12.660, df =2, p=0.002), as expected, 
people who were not in employment were more likely to state that the income gap is ‘too 
large’. By 2015, however, this had changed with people in employment more inclined to 
hold this view, than those not in employment. That said, this difference was not statistically 
significant.  
 
Figure 4.1.1.4: Levels of agreement with: ‘the gap between high and low incomes is too 
large’, by year and employment status (analysis based on BSAS 2009, 2012 and 2015) 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Overall, between 2009-2015, people in employment became more likely the state that the 
income gap is ‘too large’. Conversely, as Figure 4.1.1.4 shows, levels of agreement 
Year 
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amongst those not in employment declined between 2009-2015 (by 6.8 pp). The gap in 
agreement levels between those in and those not in employment in 2009, appeared to 
narrow into 2012 and 2015. 
 
As emphasised in Chapter 6 these changing attitudes amongst people in employment 
mirror research which has shown that ‘in work poverty’ is increasing (Patrick, 2012; 
Kingman, 2014; MacInnes et al., 2015; JRF, 2016; Oxfam, 2016a; Oxfam, 2016b; 
Kingman and Seager, 2014), with some positions poorly paid, insecure, often offered on 
the basis of zero hours contracts and with wages not covering the financially commitments 
of both individuals and families. With these factors in mind, people who are in employment 
may also be experiencing income inequality and therefore, may also be increasingly more 
likely to recognise the extent of income polarisation. To summarise, despite attitudinal 
shifts, in both 2009 and 2012, perceptions of income inequality were related to 
employment, with people who were employed less likely to agree that the income gap is 
‘too large’ compared with those outside the labour market.  
 
Highest level of education achieved and type of occupation, may also prove useful 
indicators of monetary position and thus exposure to the experience of inequality (Holman, 
1978; Hills et al., 2010; UKCES, 2014; Finch, 2015). As people with lower qualifications 
often work in lower-paid occupational roles and are therefore, more vulnerable to income 
inequality, it is expected that this group will be more likely to state that the income gap is 
‘too large’. Comparatively, people with higher level qualifications and those in higher paid 
occupational roles, who are often protected by higher incomes, will be less likely to 
recognise income inequality. Figure 4.1.1.5 shows how attitudes differed by the type of 
qualifications held. The highest proportion of agreement in 2009 is amongst people 
qualified to degree level and above. By 2012, this had changed, people with qualifications 
below degree level were instead most likely to agree (although in both these years the 
differences were not statistically significant).  
 
By 2015, attitudes mirrored those in 2009, with people with higher levels of educational 
attainment (a degree or above) more likely to agree (80.6%), followed by people with 
below degree level qualifications (77.2%) and people without or with other forms of 
qualifications, who were the least likely to agree (77.1%, χ2 =42.753, df =2, p<0.001). 
These findings suggest that the assumption that lower educational attainment would result 
in greater levels of agreement, is not supported by the findings. Instead, in 2015, at least, 
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the opposite is observable, with levels of agreement increasing as the level of educational 
attainment increased.   
 
Figure 4.1.1.5: Levels of agreement with ‘the gap between high and low incomes is too 
large’, by year and educational attainment (analysis based on BSAS 2009, 2012 and 
2015) 
  
 
As Table 4.1.1.2 and Figure 4.1.1.6 show, opinions varied by occupational position. 
Because occupational position often dictates the level of income received, it can be 
assumed that people employed in managerial and professional roles will be less likely to 
recognise income inequality and to experience poverty and in the context of this research, 
less likely to state that the income gap is ‘too large’. By extension it can also be assumed 
that people occupying routine and manual roles, often in receipt of lower pay, will be more 
likely to recognise income inequality. However, a different picture emerged, with no 
significant differences in the proportion of agreement by occupation in 2009 and 2012.  
 
However, in 2015 (χ2 =27.064, df =4, p<0.001) people working in intermediate professions, 
were more likely to agree that the income gap is ‘too large’, compared with those in 
managerial and professional occupations and those in routine and manual jobs.  
 
Figure 4.1.1.6: Levels of agreement with ‘the gap between high and low incomes is too 
large, by year and occupation (analysis based on BSAS 2009, 2012 and 2015) 
This suggests that in 2015, at least, people working in managerial and professional 
occupations, who are more likely to receive greater monetary rewards, were less likely to 
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perceive of the income gap as ‘too large’, perhaps because they occupy socially and 
economically distanced positions, that are some way away from the experiences of income 
inequality. This also suggests that people employed in intermediate occupations, whom 
are closer to the experiences of inequality, due to lower incomes than those in managerial 
and professional roles, were more likely to recognise income inequality and in this context, 
more likely to regard the income gap between groups as ‘too large’ in 2015. 
 
To summarise, these findings not only suggest that perceptions of income inequality vary 
by socio-demographic and economic characteristics, but also that there is a relationship 
between social identities and attitudes. To understand attitudes toward income inequality 
further, the following section uses merged data to explore relationships using BLRA. 
 
4.1.2 BLRA 
 
To understand these findings further, the individual datasets from 2009, 2012 and 2015 
were merged to create one dataset. Following this process, BLRA is used to not only 
describe the data, but to also explain the relationship between one dependent binary 
variable, in this case ‘the gap between high and low incomes is too large’, and a selection 
of IV’s (year, age, employment status, benefit status, gender and income group).  
 
Table 4.1.2.1 shows the findings of the BLRA, along with C. I’s. Taking into account all the 
other variables in the analysis, the findings suggest that people were more likely to agree 
that the income gap was ‘too large’ in 2012 (p<0.001) and 2015 (p<0.05), than in 2009, 
with the C.I ’s also suggesting a significant relationship. Further, this analysis also 
suggests that whilst men and benefit recipients (or those whose spouse was in receipt) 
were also more inclined to agree that the income gap was ‘too large’ in comparison to 
women and non-claimants, these findings are not significant (p>0.05). The relationship 
between employment and perceptions of the income gap, is however, significant.  
 
Again, taking all the other variables in the analysis into account, compared with people 
who were not in employment, people who were in employment were more likely to agree 
(p<0.05). Factoring in all the variables in the analysis, the associated C.I ’s, further suggest 
a significant effect between employment status and attitudes. 
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Table 4.1.2.1: BLRA of the levels of agreement with: ‘The gap between high and low 
incomes is too large’, with C.I ’s, by variable (analysis based on BSAS 2009, 2012 and 
2015)  
Variables included in the analysis 
 
Variable                       Categories    
Odds 
Ratio (OR) 
 
Exp (B) 
95% C.I. for Exp 
(B) 
 
Lower        Upper 
Year                              2009 
                                      2012 
                                      2015 
1.000 
1.338 *** 
0.867 * 
    -                  - 
 1.157          1.547 
 0.756          0.995 
Gender                         Male 
                                      Female (base category) 
0.934 ns 
1.000 
 0.835          1.045 
     -                  - 
Age                               18-34 
                                      35-64 
                                      65+ (base category) 
0.483 *** 
0.813 * 
1.000 
 0.401          0.583 
 0.679          0.972 
    -                  - 
Income                         middle-high income 
                                      low income (base category) 
0.536 *** 
1.000 
 0.475       0.606 
    -                   - 
Benefit status              Yes 
                                      No (base category) 
1.090 ns 
1.000 
 0.963       1.234 
    -                  - 
Employment Status    In employment 
                                     Not in employment (base category) 
1.186 * 
1.000 
 1.035       1.359 
     -                  - 
                                     Constant 7.551 ***      -                  - 
Statistical Significance of OR’s represented by asterisk symbols: *p<0.05 **p<0.01 ***p<0.001, 
ns not significant, - no figure to display 
 
Comparatively, compared with people aged 65 and over, younger people aged 18-34 
(p<0.001) and 35-64 (p<0.05), were significantly less likely to agree. Based on this 
analysis, a significant relationship between income and attitudes toward the income gap is 
also evident. Compared to people who are in receipt of low incomes, people in receipt of 
middle-high incomes are also significantly less likely to agree (p<0.001). A significant 
effect is further supported by the C.I’ s.  
 
4.1.3 Summary 
 
To summarise, this section has demonstrated that based on this analysis, in 2009, 2012 
and 2015, large proportions of the British public described the income gap as ‘too large’. It 
has also shown how attitudes changed over time and differ between groups, with some 
patterns emerging in the data. BLRA has also shown, once taking into account all the 
other variables in the analysis, that people were more likely to agree that the income gap 
is ‘too large’ in 2012 and 2015, than in 2009. This section has also demonstrated how 
people in employment are more likely to agree than those who were not in employment, 
but that middle-high income earners are less likely to agree, in comparison to people in 
receipt of low incomes. Finally, the analysis has demonstrated, taking all these all 
variables into account, that age and attitudes toward the income gap are also related, 
where compared with people aged 65 and over, younger people aged 18-34 and those 
aged 35-64 are significantly less likely to agree. These findings are discussed in more 
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detail in Chapter 6. Intent on understanding perceptions of redistribution, the following 
section introduces the second DV, ‘the government should redistribute income from the 
better-off to the less well-off’, before bringing both variables together for further analysis in 
Section 4.3.1. 
 
4.2 Perceptions of redistribution, introduction 
 
Drawing on the literature outlined in Section 2.6.2, this section focuses on exploring 
attitudes toward income redistribution. Exploring attitudinal differences by year, but also 
socio-economic and demographic characteristics, to understand not only how attitudes 
may have changed over the course of austerity, but to also understand who is more likely 
to support redistribution.  
 
4.2.1 Perceptions of redistribution, findings 
 
As Chapter 2 has already explained, whilst people are able to conceive of income 
inequality, this does not necessarily mean they are fully supportive of redistribution (Orton 
and Rowlingson, 2007). Given this and the high proportions of the British public who noted 
that the income gap is ‘too large’, the second question analysed explored the extent of 
agreement with the statement: ‘the government should redistribute income from the better-
off to the less well-off’. As identified in Chapter 2, people’s perceptions are often conflicting 
and change over time, they are however often gaugeable due to the possession of specific 
social identities (Orton and Rowlingson, 2007; Underwood, 2009; Luttig, 2013; Voas, 
2014). In the same way it is possible to deduce that peoples’ attitudes toward income 
inequality will differ depending on their susceptibility to, and their experiences of inequality, 
it is also likely attitudes towards redistribution will vary, based on similar principles.  
 
As Section 2.6.2 illustrated, attitudes towards redistribution can be understood in different 
ways. Given this, this section draws on the theories identified in Section 2.6.2 to explore 
attitudinal differences toward the redistribution of income. These theories and attitudinal 
differences are considered alongside Anderson and Curtis’s (2015) postulation, that as 
inequality increases in any given society, this will positively influence the perceptions of 
fellow citizens, who will then increasingly desire more redistributive spending. Following 
this, and because large proportions of the British public felt that the income gap in Britain 
is ‘too large’, it may have been feasible to suggest that similar proportions of people would 
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support the redistribution of income and that support for redistribution would increase, as 
the consequences of austerity measures continued to impact people in Britain. Table’s 
4.2.1.1 and 4.2.1.2 show the results of the analysis. 
 
Table 4.2.1.1 first shows the CI’s constructed around the point estimates in each year, 
demonstrating that in 2009, 37.3% supported the redistribution of income (the 95.0% 
confidence interval is between 35.5% and 39.0%). By 2012 support toward income 
redistribution had increased to 42.1%. Based on this analysis, the findings suggest that the 
changes between 2009-2012 are significantly different at the 5.0% level, and thus that 
there was a significant increase in the proportion of the British public in support of income 
redistribution, between 2009-2012.  
 
Table 4.2.1.1: Percentages and percentage point difference of levels of agreement with: 
‘The Government should redistribute income from the better-off to the less-well-off’, by 
year, with C.I’s by year (analysis based on BSAS 2009, 2012 and 2015) 
 
The Government should 
redistribute income from the 
better-off to the less-well-off 
Agree 
(%) 
pp change by year and CI by year (95%) 
Year 2009 2012 2015 2009 -12   2012 – 15 2009 –15 
All 37.3 42.1 44.7 +4.8 +2.6 +7.4 
CI                        Lower Bound                                                                                                        
U                         Upper Bound 
35.5
39.0 
40.2
43.9 
43.0 
46.3  sd ns 
 
sd 
CI – Confidence Interval, sd – significant difference (at 5.0% level), ns-not significant 
                                                                                                                                             
By 2015, support toward redistribution had increased again. That said, the changes 
between 2012-2015 do not appear to be significantly different (at the 5.0% level), the 
changes between 2009-2015 are, however, significantly different. To summarise, these 
findings suggest that the change in levels of support toward income redistribution between 
2009-2012 and 2009-2015 are significantly different, suggestive of significant increases in 
support toward income redistribution.  
 
Table 4.2.1.2 shows the proportion of people in agreement by year, and socio-economic 
and demographic characteristics. The findings suggest the assumption that given the 
considerably large proportions of people in agreement that the income gap is ‘too large’, 
similar proportions of people would support the redistribution of income and that support 
toward income redistribution of income would increase over the period of austerity 
examined here, was partly reflected in the analysis. Support towards the redistribution of 
income did increase, supporting the contention put forward by Curtis and Anderson (2015). 
Yet, in comparison to the perceived need for monetary redistribution to bridge the gap 
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identified in Section 4.1.1, support amongst the British public is also particularly low. In 
2009 less than half of the respondents (37.3%) supported the redistribution of income. 
Though this proportion increased in 2012 (42.1%) and increased further in 2015 (44.7%), 
the increase between 2012-2015 is not significantly different. Nevertheless, the findings 
suggest that the desire to redistribute income between groups increased as inequality did.  
 
Table 4.2.1.2: Percentages and percentage point difference of levels of agreement with: 
‘The Government should redistribute income from the better-off to the less-well-off’, by 
year and socio demographic and economic characteristics (analysis based on BSAS 2009, 
2012 and 2015) 
 
Socio-demographic and economic 
characteristics 
‘Agree’ 
% 
pp change 
 2009 2012 2015 2009-12 2012-15 2009-15 
All 37.3 42.1 44.7 +4.8 +2.6 +7.4 
Gender 
Male 
Female 
*** 
40.9 
34.0 
* 
44.4 
39.9 
*** 
50.2 
39.6 
 
+3.5 
+5.9 
 
+5.8 
-0.3 
 
+9.3 
+5.6 
Age 
18-34 
35-64 
65+  
ns 
36.5 
37.6 
37.9 
ns 
42.3 
40.5 
45.7 
ns 
43.6 
44.8 
46.0 
 
+5.8 
+2.9 
+7.8 
 
+1.3 
+4.3 
+0.3 
 
+7.1 
+7.2 
+8.1 
Ethnic group ns *** *    
White ethnic groups 42.0 40.8 44.0 -1.2 +3.2 +2.0 
BAME groups 36.9 53.5 49.8 +16.6 -3.7 +12.9 
Income 
High 
Middle 
Low 
*** 
27.8 
30.8 
44.9 
** 
38.1 
39.2 
45.7 
*** 
43.9 
39.5 
50.0 
 
+10.3 
+8.4 
+0.8 
 
+5.8 
+0.3 
+4.3 
 
+16.1 
+8.7 
+5.1 
Benefit status 
Yes 
No 
ns 
38.3 
35.8 
* 
43.7 
39.8 
* 
46.9 
42.2 
 
+5.4 
+4.0 
 
+3.2 
+2.4 
 
+8.6 
+6.4 
Employment Status 
In employment 
Not in employment 
* 
35.5 
39.9 
*** 
37.4 
47.9 
* 
42.7 
47.2 
 
+1.9 
+8.0 
 
+5.3 
-0.7 
 
+7.2 
+7.3 
Qualifications *** ** ***    
Degree and above 39.9 44.1 52.1 +4.2 +8.0 +12.2 
Below degree 34.5 39.0 40.1 +4.5 +1.1 +5.6 
None & Other 43.3 47.3 49.3 +4.0 +2.0 +6.0 
Occupation 
Managerial & Professional 
Occupations 
Intermediate Occupations 
Routine & Manual Occupations 
ns 
35.6 
 
35.7 
42.6 
** 
39.0 
 
38.0 
45.6 
*** 
44.0 
 
39.7 
47.9 
 
+3.4 
 
+2.3 
+3.0 
 
+5.0 
 
+1.7 
+2.3 
 
+8.4 
 
+4.0 
+5.3 
Statistical Significance test results represented by asterisk symbol: *p<0.05 **p<0.01 ***p<0.001 ns 
– not significant 
 
These findings also, however, show that this was an opinion shared by less than half of 
the British public. Given that support from members of the public is an important factor in 
both policy implementation and the eradication of inequality (Whiteley, 1981; Burstein, 
2003; Monnickendam and Gordon, 2010; McKendrick et al.,2008; Leon, 2012; Wu and 
Chou, 2015), these findings are problematic. To understand which groups are more likely 
145 
 
to support the redistribution of income and where future targeting for support may be 
necessary, the findings outlined in Table 4.2.1.2 are analysed thematically throughout, 
intent on understanding who is more likely to support redistribution and conversely which 
groups are less likely to do so.  
 
Table 4.2.1.2 and Figure 4.2.1.1 shows how attitudes differed by gender. As explained 
previously, due to ongoing disadvantage women are expected not only to be more likely to 
recognise inequality, but also more likely to experience it (Browne, 2011; Oxfam, 2012; 
O’Hara, 2014; Rubery, 2015; De Henau and Reed, 2016).  
 
Figure 4.2.1.1: Levels of agreement with: ‘the Government should redistribute income 
from the ‘better-off’ to the ‘less-well-off’, by year and gender (analysis based on BSAS 
2009, 2012 and 2015)  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
As a result, it is often assumed that women will be more likely to support the redistribution 
of income, in part due to their reliance on the services provided, but also because they 
hold more egalitarian, altruistic values than do men (Goerres and Jaeger, 2016). At the 
same time, because men are less likely to experience inequality and less likely to need, 
nor anticipate the need for services offered by monetary redistribution in comparison to 
women, they are expected to be less likely to support redistributive measures.  
 
Based on these assumptions and because Table 4.1.1.2 showed that women were more 
likely to state that income inequality was ‘too large’ in 2015, it was expected that women 
would be more likely to support the redistribution of income, in comparison to men. 
Instead, men were more likely to agree with the redistribution of income, than women in 
2009 (χ2 =15.044, df =1, p=0.001), 2012 (χ2 =5.803, df =1, p=0.016) and 2015 (χ2 =40.859, 
df =1, p<0.001). The gap between the levels of agreement between men and women 
widened further by 2015, with the proportion of men agreeing that the government should 
redistribute, increasing both between 2009-2012 (3.5 pp) and 2012-2015 (5.8 pp). 
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These findings suggest that despite women being more likely to recognise income 
inequality, men were more likely to support the redistribution of income than women.  In 
the context of this research at least, these findings therefore, do not support those 
identified by Goerres and Jaeger (2016). Instead, these findings appear to reflect those 
drawn on in Chapter 6, which identify men as a group struggling in austerity Britain. In this 
way and strengthening the assumptions of need explanations, theories of risk aversion 
and self–interest, as more men moved towards the vulnerability and experience of 
inequality, this group became increasingly more likely to support measures to combat 
inequality. That said, this explanation does not explain why men were more likely to 
support the redistribution of income in 2009. This is explored in more detail in Chapter 6. 
 
As Table 4.2.1.2 shows, support for the redistribution of income also varied by age. 
Emphasis has been placed on the experience of inequality by age, noting that older people 
are often perceived as more vulnerable to poverty and subsequently, are also more likely 
to need services related to adverse health (Busemeyer et al., 2009; Ginn, 2013; Age UK, 
2014; Vass, 2014; JRF, 2016). It is postulated that older people will be more likely to 
support the redistribution of income because they are likely to benefit from redistributional 
measures (Busemeyer et al., 2009). In the context of this research and reflecting similar 
findings to the previous question, the older the recipient, the greater the support for the 
redistribution of income. Comparatively, although in 2009 and 2015, younger members of 
the public (18-34) were the least inclined to agree, in 2012 people aged 35-64 were the 
least inclined to agree. Moreover, support toward the redistribution of income increased 
amongst each age group, across each year. These differences reflect some of the findings 
drawn out in Section 4.1.1 and support the assumptions of Busemeyer et al. (2009).  
 
Amongst the groups identified as more vulnerable to poverty and inequality, people from 
BAME backgrounds feature, more so than people from white ethnic backgrounds (Fisher 
and Nandi, 2015; Khan, 2015). Following the recession and the implementation of 
austerity measures, concern grew that the consequences of austerity would further impede 
the lives of people from BAME backgrounds, resulting in already unequal positions, 
deteriorating further (Platt, 2007; Longhi and Platt, 2008; Hills et al., 2010; Oxfam, 2012; 
EHRC, 2015; Jasper, 2015; TUC, 2017). Much as it is expected that women, as a group 
more vulnerable to inequality, will be more likely to support redistributional measures, by 
extension it can also be assumed that due to prevailing levels of ethnic disadvantage, 
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people from BAME groups will also be more likely to support the redistribution of income, 
than people from white ethnic backgrounds.  
As Figure 4.2.1.2 shows, perceptions did differ by ethnic group. Support for the 
redistribution of income decreased between 2009-2012, before increasing to the highest 
level in 2015 (44.0%) amongst people from white ethnic backgrounds. 
 
Figure 4.2.1.2: Levels of agreement with: ‘the Government should redistribute income 
from the better-off to the less well-off’, by year and ethnicity (analysis based on BSAS 
2009, 2012 and 2015)    
                  
 
 
   
 
 
 
Comparatively, support amongst the BAME group, increased considerably between 2009–
2012 (16.6 pp), before declining to 49.8% in 2015. Whilst levels of support increased 
amongst people from white ethnic backgrounds between 2009-2015, the change was 
greater amongst the BAME group (12.9 pp). Although in 2009 people from white ethnic 
groups were more inclined to agree than those from BAME groups, this finding was not 
statistically significant. In comparison, in both 2012 (χ2 =15.535, df =1, p<0.001) and 2015 
(χ2 =5.128, df =1, p=0.024), perhaps reflecting continuing positions of disadvantage, people 
from BAME groups were as expected, more likely to agree than people from white ethnic 
backgrounds. 
 
Support for the redistribution of income, also varied by socio-economic characteristics, 
such as income and benefit and employment status. As emphasised in section 4.1.1, 
where people are situated in relation to their income, either strengthens or impedes their 
opportunities and choices. In comparison to people with higher levels of income, people 
who are in receipt of lower incomes, are therefore considerably more restricted both 
economically and socially. Accordingly, it can be assumed that people who specified they 
were in receipt of low incomes, were in receipt of benefits (or their spouse was), and 
people not in employment, will be more restricted financially than those on a high income, 
non-benefit claimants and people in employment and as a result more vulnerable to the 
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experience of inequality. It was expected that this would be reflected in the analysis, with 
people in receipt of low incomes, in receipt of benefits (or whose spouse was) and not in 
employment, more likely to support the redistribution of income, based both on 
vulnerability and the need to access services provided and the protection offered by 
income redistribution.   
 
Figure 4.2.1.3: Levels of agreement with: ‘the government should redistribute income from 
the better-off to the less-well-off’, by year and income group (analysis based on BSAS 
2009, 2012 and 2015)  
 
 
As Figure 4.2.1.3 shows, perceptions differed by income group. People on low incomes 
were more likely than those on higher incomes to agree with the redistribution of income, 
reflecting the social and economic distance from income inequality (in 2009 χ2 =40.997, df 
=2, p<0.001, 2012 χ2 =12.236, df =2, p=0.002 and in 2015 χ2 =28.110, df =2, p<0.001) and 
the higher the income band, the less likely people were to support the redistribution of 
income. However, the gap between those on high and middle incomes narrowed from 
2009 to 2012. By 2015, rather than people in receipt of high incomes being the least likely 
to agree, this group were the second most likely to agree after people on low incomes.  
 
Although levels of agreement across each income band increased between 2009-2012 
and 2012-2015, the largest increase in levels of agreement are observable amongst 
people with high incomes (16.1 pp). These findings suggest that despite people in receipt 
of low incomes being more likely to support the redistribution of income, the proportion of 
those in agreement increased most amongst those who received middle and high 
incomes, suggesting that as inequality increased, so too did the desire for the 
redistribution of income, by income band.  
 
Similarly, whether an individual is in receipt (or their spouse is) of benefits, also has an 
impact on the level of income received with those in receipt of benefits (or whose spouse 
is in receipt) expected to be in receipt of lower incomes than those who do not claim 
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benefits. Further, because benefit recipients stand to gain more from redistribution, it can 
be assumed that this group will be more likely to wish to see income redistributed. Table 
4.2.1.2 and Figure 4.2.1.4 show how attitudes differed by benefit status.  
 
Figure 4.2.1.4: Levels of agreement with: ‘the Government should redistribute income 
from the ‘better-off’ to the ‘less-well-off’, by year and benefit status (analysis based on from 
BSAS 2009, 2012 and 2015)                                                                                            
Although support toward redistribution increased amongst both non-claimants and 
claimants, these increases are higher amongst those in receipt (or whose partner was). 
Higher levels of support for the redistribution of income in 2009, 2012 and 2015, are as 
expected, seen amongst people who receive benefits (or whose spouse is in receipt). 
People who received benefits (or whose spouse did) were as expected, more likely to 
agree than non-claimants (a difference that is statistically significant in 2012, χ2 =4.116, df 
=1, p=0.042 and 2015 χ2 =8.028, df =1, p=0.005). These findings illustrate that benefit 
status is related to support for the redistribution of income, with people more vulnerable to 
income inequality and the most likely to benefit from the redistribution of income, more 
likely to support redistribution. 
 
Similarly, people who are not in employment are expected to be in receipt of lower 
incomes and therefore more likely to be restricted by a low income, in comparison to 
people in employment (Holman, 1978; McKendrick et al., 2008). Given this and that Table 
4.1.1.2 illustrated how people who were not in employment were more likely to agree that 
the income gap is ‘too large’, it was expected that similar findings would be reflected in this 
analysis. Table 4.2.1.2 shows how levels of agreement increased amongst people who 
were working between 2009-2015 (7.2 pp), For those not in employment, however, levels 
of agreement declined between 2012-2015.  
 
Despite increasing levels of agreement amongst both groups, in comparison to people 
who were working, those not in employment were as expected, consistently more likely to 
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agree with redistribution of income (in 2009 χ2 =5.729, df =1, p=0.017, 2012 χ2 =31.044, df 
=1, p<0.001 and 2015 χ2 =7.042, df =1, p=0.008). Notably, not only are people not in 
employment more likely to assert that the income inequality is too great, this group are 
also more likely to support measures to combat income inequality, like that of 
redistribution.   
 
Much like perceptions of inequality are related to educational attainment, as Figure 4.2.1.5 
shows, the level of qualification is also related attitudes. The type of educational 
attainment received, often dictates the type of role fulfilled within the labour market and 
thus upon the level of income received. It can be assumed that people who hold degree 
and above level qualifications, will be less likely to experience income inequality compared 
to people who hold no (or other) qualifications, because they are afforded more choice and 
have more opportunities for better paid work in the labour market (Hills et al., 2010; 
UKCES, 2014; Finch, 2015; JRF, 2016). 
 
Figure 4.2.1.5: Levels of agreement with: ‘the government should redistribute income from 
the ‘better-off’ to the ‘less-well-off’, by year and educational attainment (analysis based on 
BSAS 2009, 2012 and 2015)  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
By extension, it can be assumed that people with higher levels of educational attainment, 
will be less inclined to support the redistribution of income, not only because they are less 
likely to benefit from redistributive measures, but also because they will subject to greater 
levels of taxation, due to higher earnings (Whiteley, 1981). Thus, support for redistribution 
will be lower, due to concern toward the level of taxation necessary to sustain monetary 
redistribution between groups. This also implies that the opposite will be observable 
amongst people without qualifications (or other types of qualifications). This group, whom 
face restricted job opportunities and poorer access to better paid roles, are thus expected 
to be more likely to support the redistribution of income.   
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As expected, the findings suggest there is a relationship between educational attainment 
level and support for income redistribution (2009 χ2 =15.249, df =2, p<0.001, 2012 χ2 
=12.250, df =2, p=0.002 and 2015 χ2 =42.753, df =2, p<0.001) and in 2009 and 2012, 
greater levels of support for the redistribution of income, are observable amongst people 
with no (or other) qualifications. However, rather than the group with the highest level of 
educational attainment (degree or above) being the least likely to support the redistribution 
of income, people with qualifications below degree level, were instead less likely to support 
redistribution.  
 
This is an unexpected finding. Whilst support toward redistribution increased between 
2009-2015 within each attainment group, the greatest change is evident amongst people 
with higher levels of educational attainment (pp increase of 12.2 between 2009-2015). 
Whilst people with no or other types of qualifications were the most likely to support the 
redistribution of income in 2009 and 2012, by 2015 this had changed. Instead, people with 
higher levels of educational attainment (degree or above) were most likely to support the 
redistribution of income. This latter finding is similar to that observed in Table 4.1.1.2, 
where people with higher levels of educational attainment in 2015, were also more likely to 
agree that the income gap is ‘too large’. 
 
The type of occupational position held, also dictates the level of income awarded to 
individuals. Thus, it was assumed that people in managerial and professional roles, who 
are less likely to experience inequality due to higher incomes and therefore less likely to 
need nor benefit from the redistribution of income, will be less likely to support 
redistribution. By extension, it can also be assumed that people occupying routine and 
manual occupations, who are expected to be more vulnerable to the experiences of 
inequality, will be more likely to support the redistribution of income, reflected by the 
anticipated future need due to lesser incomes or indeed current need (Whitely, 1981). This 
expectation is reflected in the findings, where support toward redistribution is related to 
occupation, and is highest amongst people employed in routine and manual occupations.  
 
These differences were statistically significant in 2012 (χ2 =12.708, df =2, p=0.002) and 
2015 (χ2 =13.240, df =2, p<0.001). Although in 2009 the lowest levels of support toward the 
redistribution of income, as expected are seen for those working in managerial and 
professional occupations, in 2012 and 2015 this changed. Instead, people working in 
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intermediate occupational roles were the least likely to agree. Although support toward 
redistribution increased between 2009-2015, the greatest change in attitudes were found 
amongst those in managerial and professional occupations, who became increasingly 
more likely to agree over the period of austerity examined here.  
 
In summary, this section has shown how support toward redistribution differs over time 
(2009-2012 and 2009-2015) and between groups. The findings suggest a relationship 
between qualifications, occupations and attitudes is evident, and that compared to women, 
men were more likely to support the redistribution of income in 2009, 2012 and 2015. The 
analysis has also shown how, compared to people from white backgrounds, people from 
BAME backgrounds were more likely to support redistribution in 2012 and 2015. Low 
income earners and people who were not in employment, were also more likely to agree 
than those in receipt of middle or high incomes or those in employment. In 2012 and 2015, 
benefit recipients (or those with a spouse in receipt) were more likely to agree than those 
who do not claim benefits. The next section builds on this analysis, using merged data to 
further explore the relationships between attitudes and characteristics.  
 
4.2.2 BLRA  
 
To understand these findings further, BLRA is used to not only describe the data but to 
also explain the relationship between one dependent binary variable, in this case “the 
government should redistribute income from the better-off to the less-well-off and a 
selection of independent variables (year, age, employment status, benefit status, gender 
and a two category, income group). Alongside C.I ‘s, Table 4.2.2.1 shows the results of the 
BLRA by variable.  
 
Taking into account all the other variables in the analysis, based on this analysis, age 
group and benefit status do not appear to have a significant effect on attitudes toward the 
redistribution of income. Thus, although the results show that benefit recipients (or those 
with a spouse in receipt) are more inclined to support the redistribution of income, than 
those who did not claim benefits, this finding is not significant. Further, though not 
significant, the findings also suggest that people aged 18-34 and 34-64, are more inclined 
to support monetary redistribution than older people. Notably, however, significant 
relationships are identifiable between attitudes and income, employment status, gender 
and year.  
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Table 4.2.2.1: BLRA of the levels of agreement with: ‘the government should redistribute 
income from the better-off to the less-well-off’, with C.I ’s, by variable (analysis based on 
BSAS 2009, 2012 and 2015)  
 
Variables included in the analysis 
 
Variable                       Categories    
Odds 
Ratio (OR) 
 
Exp (B) 
95% C.I. for Exp 
(B) 
 
Lower        Upper 
Year                              2009 
                                      2012 
                                      2015 
1.000 
1.242 *** 
1.383 *** 
    -                  - 
 1.099          1.402 
 1.224          1.564 
Gender                         Male 
                                      Female (base category) 
1.421 *** 
1.000 
 1.292          1.563 
     -                  - 
Age                               18-34 
                                      35-64 
                                      65+ (base category) 
1.114 ns 
1.118 ns 
1.000 
 0.952          1.304 
 0.970          1.289 
    -                  - 
Income                         middle-high income 
                                      low income (base category) 
0.710 *** 
1.000 
 0.643       0.784 
    -                   - 
Benefit status              Yes 
                                      No (base category) 
1.094 ns 
1.000 
 0.983       1.218 
    -                  - 
Employment Status    In employment 
                                     Not in employment (base category) 
0.722 *** 
1.000 
 0.643       0.811 
     -                  - 
                                     Constant 0.618 ***      -                  - 
Statistical Significance of OR’s represented by asterisk symbols: *p<0.05 **p<0.01 ***p<0.001, 
ns not significant, - no figure to display 
 
Table 4.2.2.1 shows, having taken into account all the other variables in the analysis, 
people were more likely to support the redistribution of income in 2012 (p<0.001) and 2015 
(p<0.001), than in comparison to 2009. This relationship is strengthened by the C.I ‘s. In 
comparison to women, men were also more likely to support the redistribution of income 
(p<0.001). People in receipt of middle-high incomes were significantly less likely to agree 
than those in receipt of low incomes (p<0.001). Similarly, in comparison to people not in 
employment, people in employment were less likely to agree that income should be 
redistributed (p<0.001). These findings suggest that taking into account all the other 
variables in the analysis, significant relationships are identifiable between attitudes and 
aspects of identity like that of employment status, but also income, gender and year. 
 
4.2.3 Summary 
 
To summarise, attitudes towards the income gap and the redistribution of income differ 
amongst groups and change over time. Thus far, the findings suggest that there is a 
relationship between attitudes toward inequality and redistribution, and some aspects of 
identity. The analysis found that the majority of the British public agreed that income 
inequality between people with high and low incomes is ‘too large’, across each of the 
years studied. However, what is also demonstrated is that despite increasing levels of 
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support toward redistribution, support remains low. This could be a problem, given that 
public support is needed to ensure social policies to tackle inequality are implemented 
(Whiteley, 1981; Burstein, 2003; McKendrick et al.,2008; Monnickendam and Gordon, 
2010; Leon, 2012; Prabhakar, 2012; Wu and Chou, 2015). To understand these findings 
further, the following section focuses the analysis on the proportion of people (by group) 
who stated that the income gap is ‘too large’, to explore whether these people also 
supported the redistribution of income.   
 
4.3 Introduction: Perceptions of income inequality and redistribution, revisited 
 
Section 4.1.1 demonstrated that the majority of the public agreed that the income gap is 
‘too large’. Section 4.2.1 suggested, however, that the support needed to reduce this gap, 
was lacking amongst the British public. These findings appeared both contradictory and 
concerning, thus raising a question already queried by others (Rowlingson et al., 2010); if 
concern toward the inequality of income between groups is so large, why is support toward 
redistribution so low? Given that the redistribution of income is one of the methods used to 
combat income inequality, and that public support is a necessary component, this section 
focuses on understanding what proportion of people, whom specified that gap between 
high and low incomes is ‘too large’, also supported redistribution.  
 
4.3.1 Refocusing the analysis 
 
Figure 4.3.1.1 illustrates the large proportions of the British public in agreement that the 
gap between high and low incomes is ‘too large’, alongside the proportion of the public in 
support of the redistribution of income. Whilst the proportion of people agreeing that the 
income gap between groups is ‘too large’ increased significantly between 2009-2012, by 
2015 this proportion fell to a level lower than observed in 2009 (this was also a significant 
finding). Although increasing support for the redistribution of income is also observable, 
less than half of the British public supported this combative measure in each year.  
 
To further explore this disparity, Table 4.3.1.1 shows the proportion of people who agreed 
that the income inequality gap is too large, and also supported redistribution. A 
comparison of these findings in relation to those in Table 4.2.1.2 suggest that support 
toward income redistribution is more likely amongst people who also agree that the income 
gap is ‘too large’, and that support toward redistribution increased significantly from a little 
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over two fifths in 2009 (χ2 =42.761, df=1, p<0.001) to 45.8% in 2012 (χ2 =75.354, df=2, 
p<0.001). By 2015, a little over a half of the British public stated that not only is the income 
gap ‘too large’, but that income should be redistributed between groups (χ2 = 138.182, 
df=2, p<0.001).  
 
Whilst these findings do suggest that support toward redistribution is stronger amongst 
people who hold this perception, further comparison of the findings presented in Section 
4.1.1 and 4.2.1, also highlight how the public’s attitudes appeared contradictory. To 
illustrate, whilst 80.6% agreed that the income gap was ‘too large’ in 2009, just 40.1% also 
supported redistribution. In 2012, a little under 85% stated that the income gap is ‘too 
large’, with just 45.8% also in support of redistribution. By 2015, people became less 
inclined to conceive of the income gap as ‘too large’, of this proportion support for the 
redistribution of income increased to a little over half (50.5%).  
 
Figure 4.3.1.1: Levels of agreement with: ‘the gap between high and low incomes is too 
large’, and ‘the government should redistribute income from the better-off to the less-well-
off’, by year (analysis based on BSAS 2009, 2012 and 2015) 
 
  
 
These findings further reiterate how despite the majority of the British public agreeing that 
the gap between high and low incomes is ‘too large’, not everyone who shares this 
attitude, is also in agreement that income should be redistributed. Thus, this may signify a 
lack of support toward the eradication of income inequality and, this may pose a problem. 
To explore these findings further and to outline which groups are more likely to support the 
redistribution of income, the socio and demographic characteristics of the public were also 
explored.  
 
0
20
40
60
80
100
Agree that the income 
gap is 'too large'
Support for the 
redistribution of 
income
Changing attitudes, by year
2009
2012
2015
P
e
rc
e
n
ta
g
e
%
156 
 
Section 4.1.1 demonstrated how attitudes toward income inequality and redistribution 
varied by gender, Table 4.3.1.1 and Figure 4.3.1.2 show how variation continued in this 
analysis. Whilst women were more likely than men to agree that the income gap is ‘too 
large’ in 2015, men were consistently more likely to support the redistribution of income. 
Table 4.3.1.1 and Figure 4.3.1.2 show a similar pattern is evident in this analysis, with men 
more likely to support the redistribution of income, if they also agree that the income gap is 
‘too large’. These findings further highlight how attitudes change over time, but also draw 
attention toward their inconsistency. 
 
Figure 4.3.1.2:  Levels of agreement with the ‘gap between high and low incomes is ‘too 
large’, and ‘the government should redistribute income from the ‘better-off’ to the ‘less-
well-off’, by year and gender (Analysis based on BSAS 2009, 2012 and 2015) 
 
                                   
 
To illustrate, in 2009 79.8% of men said that the income gap is ‘too large’, however just 
45.2% also supported the redistribution of income. Further, of the 81.4% of women in 
agreement that the ‘gap between high and low incomes is too large’, just 35.6% supported 
redistribution. Such disparities are observable in 2012 and 2015, where the gap between 
men and women’s level of support toward redistribution also changed. Although both men 
and women became more likely to support the redistribution of income, if they also felt that 
the income gap is ‘too large’ over time, the gap in levels of agreement between men and 
women by 2015 had increased by 12.6 pp.  
 
To summarise, of the proportion of men and women who stated that the income gap is ‘too 
large’, support for the redistribution of income is much lower than the perceived income 
inequality gap, particularly amongst women. Men, however, remained more likely than 
women to agree with the redistribution of income (2009 (χ2 =14.286, df=1, p<0.001), 2012 
(χ2 =10.800, df=1, p=0.001), and 2015 (χ2 =32.693, df=1, p<0.001). These findings suggest 
that amongst those who also agreed income inequality between groups is ‘too large’, there 
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is a relationship between support toward redistribution and gender, where support toward 
redistribution is greater amongst men and women whom share the view that the income 
gap is ‘too large’. 
 
Table 4.3.1.1: Percentage and percentage point difference of agreement with: ‘the gap 
between high and low incomes is too large’, and ‘the government should redistribute 
income from the better-off to the less-well-off’, by year, socio demographic and economic 
characteristics (analysis based on BSAS 2009, 2012 and 2015) 
 
Socio - demographic and 
economic characteristics 
‘Agree’ 
% 
pp change 
 2009 2012 2015 2009 -12   2012 – 15 2009 – 15 
All ***40.1 ***45.8 ***50.5 +5.7 +4.7 +10.4 
Gender 
Male 
Female 
*** 
45.2 
35.6 
*** 
49.4 
42.6 
*** 
57.0 
44.4 
 
+4.2 
+7.0 
 
+7.6 
+1.8 
 
+11.8 
+8.8 
Age 
18-34 
35-64 
65+  
ns 
42.0 
39.6 
39.6 
ns 
44.6 
44.8 
49.8 
ns 
52.2 
49.7 
50.1 
 
+2.6 
+5.2 
+10.2 
 
+7.6 
+4.9 
+0.3 
 
+10.2 
+10.1 
+10.5 
Ethnic group ns * ns    
White ethnic groups 39.9 44.9 49.9 +5.0 +5.0 +10.0 
BAME groups     42.7 54.0 55.2 +11.3 +1.2 +12.5 
Income 
High 
Middle 
Low 
*** 
35.8 
35.6 
46.0 
* 
50.6 
43.1 
48.5 
*** 
56.6 
46.0 
54.8 
 
+14.8 
+7.5 
+2.5 
 
+6.0 
+2.9 
+6.3 
 
+20.8 
+10.4 
+8.8 
Benefit status 
Yes 
No 
ns 
40.0 
40.4 
ns 
47.1 
43.9 
ns 
52.2 
48.3 
 
+7.1 
+3.5 
 
+5.1 
+4.4 
 
+12.2 
+7.9 
Employment Status 
In employment 
Not in employment 
ns 
38.2 
42.8 
*** 
42.2 
50.2 
*** 
47.4 
54.6 
 
+4.0 
+7.4 
 
+5.2 
+4.4 
 
+9.2 
+11.8 
Qualifications ns ** ***    
Degree and above 41.9 50.4 58.6 +8.5 +8.2 +16.7 
Below degree     37.5 42.8 45.5 +5.3 +2.7 +8.0 
None & Other 45.1 49.9 54.6 +4.8 +4.7 +9.5 
Occupation 
Managerial & Professional 
Occupations 
Intermediate occupations 
Routine and Manual 
occupations 
ns 
32.9 
 
31.9 
34.8 
** 
42.9 
 
42.7 
50.0 
*** 
50.6 
 
42.2 
53.7 
 
+10.0 
 
+10.8 
+15.2 
 
+7.7 
 
-0.5 
+3.7 
 
+17.7 
 
+10.3 
+18.9 
Statistical Significance test results represented by asterisk symbol: *p<0.05 **p<0.01 ***p<0.001 
ns – not significant 
 
As demonstrated in Section 4.1.1 and 4.2.1, age also influences attitudes towards income 
inequality and redistribution. Table 4.3.1.1 reflects similar findings, with higher levels of 
support for the redistribution of income observable amongst older members of the public 
(65 and over) in 2012. Yet, of the 86.7% of people aged 65 and over, who stated that the 
income gap is ‘too large’ in 2012, just 49.8% also supported the redistribution of income. In 
contrast, despite lower levels of agreement that the income gap is ‘too large’, in 2009 and 
2015 greater levels of support for redistribution are observable amongst younger members 
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of the public (18-34). Though these findings suggest that support for redistribution of 
income grew as inequality amongst this group did, these findings are not significant 
(p>0.05).  
 
Section 4.1.1 and 4.2.1 suggested a relationship between ethnic background and 
perceptions of inequality and redistribution, but no patterns emerged. Table 4.3.1.1 also 
shows conflicting attitudes by ethnic group. This analysis suggests that of the proportion of 
people who agreed that the income gap is ‘too large’, people from BAME groups were 
consistently more inclined to support the redistribution of income, than those from white 
ethnic groups.  
 
Though not significant in 2009 and 2015, in 2012 of the proportion of people in agreement 
that income inequality between groups is too great, compared to people from white ethnic 
backgrounds, people from BAME groups were significantly more likely to support the 
redistribution of income (χ2=6.410, df=1, p=0.011).   Notably, attitudes differ by income 
group. As demonstrated in Section 4.1.1 and Figure 4.3.1.3, people who stated they 
received low-incomes were more likely to agree that the income gap was ‘too large’ in 
2009, 2012 and 2015. Comparatively, people with high incomes were less likely to agree.  
 
Figure 4.3.1.3: Levels of agreement with the ‘gap between high and low incomes is ‘too  
large’, by year and income band (analysis based on BSAS 2009,2012 and 2015) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
These findings were not surprising, given income often influences the likelihood of 
experiencing or indeed being aware of the inequality of income between groups. It was 
expected that similar trends would be observable in this analysis. As Figure 4.3.1.4 shows, 
in 2009 based on the proportion of people in receipt of a low income, who also agreed that 
the income gap is ‘too large’ (85.4%), 46.0% also felt that income should be redistributed. 
As expected, people in receipt of low incomes were more likely to support the 
redistribution of income if they also believed that the income gap is ‘too large’.  
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The findings outlined in Figure 4.3.1.4 further reiterate how attitudes are often inconsistent 
and that because individuals are able to recognise income inequality, does not necessarily 
also secure their support towards initiatives to combat income inequality. As an example of 
such contradictory attitudes, in 2009 people from the low-income band group were more 
likely to agree (χ2=16.443, df=2, p<0.001) with the redistribution of income, if they also 
agreed that the income gap is ‘too large’. Comparatively, both Table 4.3.1.1 and Figure 
4.3.1.4 show how attitudes changed.  
 
By 2012 (χ2=7.280, df=2, p=0.026) and 2015 (χ2=16.975, df=2, p<0.001) of those who 
agreed that the income gap is ‘too large’, people on self-specified high incomes were more 
likely to support the redistribution of income, followed closely by those on low incomes. 
Despite the lowest levels of agreement in 2012 (76.8%) and 2015 (71%), people who 
stated they received a high income were more likely to support the redistribution of 
income, if they also agreed that the income gap was ‘too large’. These findings show that 
in 2009, 2012 and 2015, of the proportion who agreed that the income gap is ‘too large’, 
people on middle-incomes were less likely to support redistribution.  
 
Figure 4.3.1.4: Levels of agreement with the ‘gap between high and low incomes is ‘too 
large’, and income redistribution, from the better-off to the less-well-off’, by year and 
income band (analysis based on BSAS 2009, 2012 and 2015)  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
To summarise, the findings presented in Table 4.3.1.1 and Figure 4.3.1.4 suggest that as 
consequences of austerity measures became more pronounced, people on high-incomes 
who stand to lose, rather than gain financially from the redistribution of income, became 
more supportive of measures to combat income inequality. These findings also show how 
people on middle-incomes, became less likely to do so. These findings further suggest that 
there is a relationship between support toward redistribution and income group, amongst 
people who also agree that income inequality between groups is too great. These findings 
are discussed in more detail in Chapter 6.  
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Notably, Section 4.1.1 also suggested the existence of a relationship between benefit 
status and attitudes toward inequality, with those in receipt of benefits (or whose spouse 
was) more likely to perceive of the income gap as ‘too large’ than those who were not in 
receipt of benefits. Similarly, in 2012 and 2015, benefit recipients (or those with a spouse 
in receipt) were also more likely to support the redistribution of income, than those who did 
not claim any benefits. It was expected that this analysis would highlight similar findings, 
with benefit recipients more likely to support income redistribution, if they also agreed that 
income inequality between groups is ‘too large’. Although the benefit status of the public 
did initially appear to show a relationship, with benefit recipients in both 2012 and 2015 
more inclined to support the redistribution of income, if they also agreed that the ‘gap 
between high and low incomes is too large’, these changes are not statistically significant.  
 
As Table 4.3.1.1 shows, there is however, a significant relationship between employment 
status and attitudes toward inequality and redistribution. Section 4.1.1 also showed how 
employment status is related to attitudes toward income inequality, with people not in 
employment more likely to recognise the income gap as ‘too large’, in comparison to those 
employed in 2009 and 2012. Similarly, Section 4.2.1 also found that people not in 
employment were more likely to support redistribution in 2009, 2012 and 2015, in 
comparison to those who were in employment. A similar pattern emerged in this analysis. 
As Figure 4.3.1.5 shows, support toward income redistribution is higher amongst those 
who believe income inequality between groups is ‘too large’, whether they are in 
employment or not in employment.  
 
Further, of the proportion of people who stated that the income gap is ‘too large’, people 
not in employment were the most likely to support the redistribution of income in both 2012 
(χ2=14.845, df=1, p<0.001) and 2015 (χ2=10.414, df=1, p=0.001). This was expected, given 
that people not in employment are often in receipt of lower incomes than those in 
employment. This also shows how support for the redistribution of income amongst people 
in and not in employment, whom also said that the income gap is ‘too large’, increased in 
2012 and 2015, yet is still considerably lower than the proportions observed in Table 4.1.2. 
By way of an illustration, in 2012 85.5% of people not in employment felt that the income 
gap was ‘too large’, whereas just 50.2% also felt that income should be redistributed 
between groups.  
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Despite the gap between levels of support between people in and not in employment, by 
2015 people in employment who stand to lose the most through taxation-based income 
redistribution, were less inclined to support initiatives to combat inequality and the income 
gap they recognised in 2012 and 2015. 
 
Figure 4.3.1.5: Levels of agreement with the ‘gap between high and low incomes is ‘too 
large’, and income redistribution, from the better-off to the less-well-off’, by year and 
employment status (analysis based on BSAS 2009, 2012 and 2015) 
 
                  
Comparatively, people not in employment who stand to gain the most from redistributive 
processes were more likely to do so. Thus, in 2012 and 2015, amongst people who agreed 
that the income gap is ‘too large’, employment status significantly influenced the likelihood 
of support toward redistribution, with people not in employment the most likely to support 
income redistribution.  
 
As Table 4.3.1.1 and Figure 4.3.1.6 show, perceptions differed by educational attainment. 
Previously, Section 4.1.1 demonstrated how attitudes toward the income gap were related 
to qualifications in 2015, with people with higher levels of educational attainment (degree 
or above) more likely to state that the income gap is ‘too large’. This was unexpected, 
given that people with no or few qualifications often have limited access to better paid 
employment roles, thus increasing their susceptibility to income inequality. In this way it 
was expected that this group would be more likely to hold this opinion, than those who are 
more socially and economically distant from this experience.  
 
Section 4.2.1 also showed how in 2015 support toward income redistribution was also 
greater amongst those with high level qualifications (degree or above), though in 2009 and 
2012, support toward income redistribution was greater amongst people with no (or other) 
qualifications, and less likely amongst people with below degree level qualifications. As 
Figure 4.3.1.6 shows, some similarities are observable in this analysis. Of the proportion of 
people who agreed that the income ‘too large’, in 2009 people who held no (or other) 
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qualifications, were more likely to support redistribution (χ2=5.758, df=2, p=0.056). 
Comparatively, reflecting similarities to the findings outlined in Section 4.2.1, people with 
below degree level qualifications were the least likely to agree. By 2012 and 2015, 
however, a slightly different picture emerged. Levels of agreement were significantly 
greater amongst those with higher levels of attainment, with levels of agreement remaining 
lower amongst those with below degree level qualifications.  
 
Figure 4.3.1.6: Levels of agreement with the ‘gap between high and low incomes is ‘too 
large’, and income redistribution, from the better-off to the less-well-off’, by year and 
educational attainment (BSA Survey: 2009, 2012, 2015)  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Not only did people with higher levels of educational attainment become more likely to 
agree over time, in 2012 (χ2=11.365, df=2, p=0.003) and 2015 (χ2=28.497, df=2, p<0.001), 
this group were more likely to support the redistribution of income, followed by those with 
below degree level qualifications. These findings also emphasise the disparities in 
attitudes towards inequality and support for combative measures, given that of the 80.6% 
of people with a higher level of attainment who agreed that the income gap is ‘too large’ in 
2015, just 58.6% also supported the redistribution of income.  
 
As demonstrated in Section 4.1.1, in 2015 people working in intermediate occupations 
were more likely to perceive the income gap as ‘too large’. Comparatively and as 
expected, people working in managerial and professional occupations were the least likely 
to agree. These findings were explained in relation to the income yielded by occupation 
and the differential experience of inequality amongst people in these types of employment. 
It was expected that similar patterns would be observable in this analysis, and that people 
employed in managerial and professional occupations, would be less likely to support the 
redistribution of income, despite large proportions maintaining that income inequality 
between groups is ‘too large’. It was assumed that these attitudes could be explained in 
relation to both income and perceived benefit, thus often in receipt of a higher income, 
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people in professional and managerial roles stand to lose more through the process of 
redistribution, than they would gain.  
 
By comparison it was expected that the opposite would be observable amongst people 
working in routine and manual occupations. As Table 4.3.1.1 shows, although not 
statistically significant, in 2009 levels of agreement were higher amongst those in routine 
and manual occupations as expected. This demonstrates that of the 80.7% of people 
working in routine and manual occupations, who stated that the income gap is ‘too large’, 
just 34.8% also agreed with the redistribution of income. By 2012 and 2015, this pattern 
remained unchanged. In 2012, rather than those in managerial and professional roles, 
people working in intermediate occupations were less likely to support the redistribution of 
income (χ2=10.855, df=2, p=0.004). Thus, in both 2012 as noted above and 2015, people 
working in routine and manual occupations, who are expected to stand to gain the most 
from redistributive processes, were more likely to agree, followed by those in managerial 
and professional occupations (χ2=14.719, df=2, p=0.001). These findings suggest that in 
2012 and 2015, occupational position is related to attitudes toward inequality and 
redistribution. 
 
4.3.2 Summary 
 
This section has shown how attitudes toward income redistribution differ amongst people 
who also agree that the income gap is ‘too large’. Whilst support toward redistribution is 
greater amongst people who also perceive the income gap as ‘too large’, the level of 
support expressed by the public remains low.  Having focused on extending the analysis 
by exploring support toward income redistribution amongst people who perceive of the 
income gap as too large in this section, the following section brings each of the findings 
section of this chapter together. Prior to introducing the final findings chapter, the following 
section, thus, restates the key findings identified in this chapter. 
 
4.4 Conclusion 
 
To conclude, this chapter sought to understand whether members of the public are aware 
of growing income inequality and whether they also support combative measures like 
income redistribution. In doing so, this chapter has demonstrated where support toward 
redistribution may need to be targeted. This chapter has also demonstrated the extent of 
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changing attitudes over time and between groups. Perceptions of the income gap and 
support for redistribution differed amongst groups, in and between 2009, 2012 and 2015. 
What is clear from the analysis is that despite large proportions of people specifying that 
the income gap is ‘too large’, taken together much smaller proportions supported the 
redistribution of income.  
 
This analysis has, however, also shown that support for the redistribution of income is 
greater amongst people who perceive the income gap as ‘too large’ (Table 4.3.1.1), but 
nevertheless remains low, despite this recognition. Table 4.1.1.1 showed that between 
2009-2012, the public became increasing more likely to recognise the income gap as ‘too 
large’, but between 2012 and 2015, this concern appeared to decline. Concurrently, Table 
4.1.2.1 also showed that between 2009 and 2015, support toward redistribution increased, 
but remained low. Of those more likely to recognise the income gap as ‘too large’, women 
were more likely in 2015, than men, comparatively and consistently, people aged 65 and 
over were also more likely. In comparison, men were consistently more likely to support 
the redistribution of income. Whilst people in the white ethnic group were more likely to 
agree that income inequality was a gap too large in 2015, in 2012 and 2015, people from 
BAME groups were more likely to support the redistribution of income.  
 
Unsurprisingly, people on low incomes were consistently more likely to recognise the 
extent of income inequality and were also more likely to support redistribution. People in 
receipt of benefits (or those with a spouse in receipt) were also, unsurprisingly, 
consistently more likely to recognise income inequality. This group was also more likely to 
support income redistribution in 2012 and 2015, a similar pattern is evident amongst 
people who are not in employment. Further attitudinal variations are recognisable based 
on occupation and educational attainment. Thus, this Chapter not only highlights how 
attitudes change, this chapter has also demonstrated how attitudes are often contradictory. 
 
To understand these findings further and provide a more nuanced account of these 
attitudes, alongside the social, political, cultural and economic environment, these findings 
are discussed in Chapter 6. Given that how people perceive of the causes of disadvantage 
are related to their attitudes toward combative measures (Mack and Lansley, 1985), the 
following chapter draws on key themes identified in Chapter 2 to explore negative 
perceptions of people experiencing inequality and poverty, and how these relate to 
redistributional support.   
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Chapter 5 
 
Research Findings 2 
 
5.1 Perceptions of welfare recipients and support toward redistribution, Introduction 
 
Chapter 4 demonstrated how attitudes changed over time and appeared contradictory. 
Although the majority of the British public agreed that the income gap is ‘too large’, they 
were less inclined to reduce this gap. Given that public support toward redistribution is 
necessary to ensure inequality of income is eradicated, these findings are problematic 
(Monnickendam and Gordon, 2010; Prabhakar, 2012; Wu and Chou, 2015). Although 
support toward redistribution was greater amongst people who also agreed that income 
inequality between groups is ‘too large’, support toward the redistribution of income 
between groups, remained low. The ‘puzzle’ noted by Rowlingson et al., (2010) became 
evident within this research and reinvigorated a question already held by others; why, if so 
many believe income inequality is too great, do so few support initiatives to combat this 
form of inequality? 
 
Keeping this question in mind, this chapter builds on these findings. The stereotypical 
rhetoric identified in Chapter 2, is drawn on this chapter, focusing on negative attitudes 
toward social security recipients and the relationship between negative attitudes and 
support toward redistribution. The first section explores how many people agreed with the 
statement: ‘many people who get social security don't really deserve any help’ (5.1.1). 
Comparatively, the second section explores the extent of agreement with the statement: 
‘most people on the dole are fiddling in one way or another’ (5.2.1). The third section 
examines responses to the statement: ‘if welfare benefits weren't so generous, people 
would learn to stand on their own feet’ (5.3.1). The final two sections explore possible 
relationships between negative attitudes toward social security recipients and support 
toward redistribution (5.4.1-5.5.1).  
 
The analysis explores whether opinions have changed over the period of austerity 
examined here and the extent of change (if at all) between groups. Attitudes were 
investigated in relation the literature outlined in Chapter 2 and in relation to specific 
demographic (gender, age, ethnic background and educational attainment), and socio-
economic characteristics (employment status, self-rated income band, benefit status and 
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occupation). The following section begins the analysis, focusing on public perceptions of 
‘deservingness’ amongst benefit recipients. 
 
5.1.1 Public perceptions of deservingness 
 
It has been emphasised that attitudes toward social security recipients are often negative 
(Alcock,1987; Bennett, 2012; Mckenzie, 2015; Beatty and Fothergill, 2016; JRF, 2016), 
with social security recipients’ level of need questioned, and their neediness often not 
considered genuine. Indeed, as Stanley remarks, it has become increasingly apparent that 
“conflicts over the uses and abuses of taxpayers’ money” once again “come to the fore, 
with concerns over seemingly unfair redistribution to those deemed undeserving of it 
particularly prominent” (2016:393). These accusations and conflicts are, however, not new 
but were arguably reinvigorated during the period of austerity examined here. Following 
the implementation of austerity measures, questions of need and deservingness, thus 
resurfaced. As evidenced in Chapter 2, this was a topic discussed more readily on social 
media platforms, within broadcasted and printed media and reflected in political rhetoric.  
 
People in receipt of social security benefits were met with increasing scrutiny, as were 
their life and consumer choices. Newspaper headlines, political rhetoric and broadcasted 
media became replete with the negative portrayal of classed identities, of people whom 
were labelled as morally and culturally impoverished and who were, as a result of their 
own failings, relying on a social security system they did not truly need, nor truly deserve 
(Mooney and Hancock, 2010; Penny, 2013; Jensen, 2013; O’Hara, 2014; Toynbee and 
Walker, 2015).   
 
This rhetoric is expected to impact on people’s perceptions of inequality and poverty, 
alongside those experiencing them (Mooney and Hancock, 2010; Penny, 2013; Shildrick, 
2018). To understand the extent of negative sentiments toward people in receipt of social 
security assistance, and how this changed (if at all) over the period of austerity examined 
here, this section focuses on exploring the extent of agreement with the statement: ‘many 
people who get social security don't really deserve any help’. Given that much of the 
literature suggests that attitudes toward social security recipients are negative, it was 
expected that this would be reflected in the analysis, with large proportions of people 
believing that recipients are undeserving, with this proportion increasing over the period of 
austerity investigated here. Yet, as Table 5.1.1.1 and 5.1.1.2 show, this was not the case. 
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Intent on understanding the significance of attitudinal changes between 2009-2012, 2012-
2015 and 2009-2015, Table 5.1.1.1 shows the CI’s constructed around each point 
estimate in 2009, 2012 and 2015. The findings show that in 2009, 35.3% of the British 
public stated that benefit recipients were undeserving, the 95.0% CI is between 32.2% and 
38.4%. By 2012, the proportion of people in agreement increased to 36.2%, the 95.0% CI 
is between 34.4% and 38.8%. These findings suggest, however, that the increases 
between 2009-2012 are not significantly different. In 2015 attitudes appeared to change. 
Between 2012-2015, the proportion of people in agreement fell by 7.5 pp, to 28.7%. The 
proportion in agreement also fell between 2009-2015, as Table 5.1.1.1 shows, these 
findings suggest that the changes between 2012-2015 and 2009-2015 are statistically 
significant. 
 
Table 5.1.1.1: Percentages and percentage point difference of levels of agreement with: 
‘many people who get social security don't really deserve any help’, with CI’s by year 
(Analysis based on BSAS 2009, 2012 and 2015) 
 
many people who get social 
security don't really deserve any 
help’ 
Agree 
(%) 
pp change by year and CI by year 
(95%) 
Year 2009 2012 2015 2009-12   2012-15 2009-15 
All 35.3 36.2 28.7 +0.9 -7.5 -6.6 
CI                            Lower Bound                                                                                                        
U                             Upper Bound 
32.2
38.4 
34.4
38.0 
26.9
30.3 
ns
  
sd 
 
sd 
 
CI – Confidence Interval, sd – significant difference (at 5.0% level), ns – not significant 
                                                                                                                                       
Thus far, the findings suggest that the assumption that the proportion of people in 
agreement would increase, reflecting the literature which suggest negative attitudes are 
prevalent, was reflected in the analysis between 2009-2012, but that this attitudinal change 
between years is not significantly different. The findings also highlight how, in 2009 in the 
aftermath of recession, over a third of the public (35.3%) agreed that people were 
undeserving of help. By 2012, when austerity measures led to changes to the tax and 
benefit system, cutting the public spending budget further, more members of the British 
public shared the view that social security recipients did not deserve the help they were 
receiving (36.2%), though this change was small.  
 
By 2015, inequality increased, with austere cuts continuing to impact the provision of 
benefits and services. Concurrently, the proportion believing that people did not ‘really 
deserve any help’ fell by 7.5 pp to 28.7%, a level lower than observed in 2009. Thus, 
despite an initial increase in levels of agreement, the British public became less inclined to 
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agree that the majority of people in receipt of benefits were undeserving of help. Despite 
falling levels of agreement, these findings nevertheless suggest that for a considerable 
proportion of the British public, people in receipt of benefits are perceived as ‘undeserving’ 
of help. This further supports the contention that benefit recipients in Britain evoke feelings 
of negativity, and the attribution of stereotypical assumptions amongst the public 
(Baumberg et al., 2012; Shildrick and MacDonald, 2013; Hall et al., 2014; Hills, 2015; 
Toynbee and Walker, 2015; JRF, 2016).  
 
To understand which groups were more likely to agree that most social recipients are 
undeserving of help, attitudes were investigated in relation to specific characteristics. 
These findings are discussed more extensively in Chapter 6. Table 5.1.1.2 shows the 
proportion of people in agreement by socio-economic and demographic characteristics.  
 
Table 5.1.1.2: Percentages and percentage point difference of ‘many people who get  
social security don't really deserve any help’, by year and socio demographic and 
economic characteristics (analysis based on BSAS 2009, 2012 and 2015) 
Socio demographic and 
economic characteristics 
‘Agree’ 
% 
pp change 
 2009 2012 2015 2009-12   2012–15 2009 –15 
All 35.3 36.2 28.7 +0.9 -7.5 -6.6 
Gender 
Male 
Female 
ns 
36.5 
34.3 
ns 
36.0 
36.4 
ns 
30.4 
27.1 
 
-0.5 
+2.1 
 
-6.4 
-9.3 
 
-6.1 
-7.2 
Age 
18-34 
35-64 
65+  
*** 
34.7 
31.3 
47.2 
*** 
31.1 
33.9 
49.0 
*** 
20.5 
28.4 
39.0 
 
-3.6 
+2.6 
+1.8 
 
-10.6 
-5.5 
-10.0 
 
-14.2 
-2.9 
-8.2 
Ethnic group ns *** ns    
White ethnic groups 35.5 37.5 28.6 +2.0 -8.9 -6.9 
BAME groups 33.3 23.8 28.9 -9.5 +5.1 -4.4 
Income 
High 
Middle 
Low 
ns 
27.7 
36.7 
34.5 
ns 
30.7 
36.0 
37.1 
* 
20.3 
30.5 
27.4 
 
+3.0 
-0.7 
+2.6 
 
-10.4 
-5.5 
-9.7 
 
-7.4 
-6.2 
-7.1 
Benefit status 
Yes 
No 
ns 
36.1 
34.1 
ns 
36.8 
35.4 
*** 
31.5 
25.3 
 
+0.7 
+1.3 
 
-5.3 
-10.1 
 
-4.6 
-8.8 
Employment Status 
In employment 
Not in employment 
ns 
34.9 
36.2 
ns 
35.7 
36.9 
ns 
27.6 
30.1 
 
+0.8 
+0.7 
 
-8.1 
-6.8 
 
-7.3 
-6.1 
Qualifications *** *** ***    
Degree and above 25.5 23.9 20.1 -1.6 -3.8 -5.4 
Below degree 33.8 35.6 29.1 +1.8 -6.5 -4.7 
None & Other 45.3 50.6 39.5 +5.3 -11.1 -5.8 
Occupation 
Managerial & Professional 
Occupations 
Intermediate occupations 
Routine and Manual 
occupations 
ns 
36.4 
 
34.3 
41.0 
*** 
30.8 
 
41.8 
39.7 
*** 
23.3 
 
34.8 
31.6 
 
-5.6 
 
+7.5 
-1.3 
 
-7.5 
 
-7.0 
-8.1 
 
-13.1 
 
+0.5 
-9.4 
Statistical Significance test results represented by asterisk symbol: *p<0.05 **p<0.01 
***p<0.001, ns – not significant 
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Attitudes toward social security recipients varied by gender. Section 4.1.1 illustrated that 
women were more likely to regard the income gap as ‘too large’ in 2015, Comparatively, 
as Section 4.2.1 and 4.3.1 highlighted, whilst a relationship between attitudes toward 
inequality and redistribution is also observable, in comparison to men, women were 
consistently less likely to support the redistribution of income. Given that the literature 
pointed to ongoing and intensifying experiences of disadvantage as a result of austere 
changes amongst women (Conley, 2012; Oxfam, 2012; Ginn, 2013; O’Hara, 2014; De 
Henau and Reed, 2016) this may be surprising. Men, identified as a group in a far better 
position than women, were expected to feel the consequences of austerity to a lesser 
extent than women (Seguino, 2010). However, as McKay et al. (2013) noted, this group 
were not consequence free.  
 
Nevertheless, as illustrated throughout the research, women are identified as a group 
more susceptible to income inequality, and as a group more likely to access social security 
provisions, relative to men (Longhi and Platt, 2008; Nandi and Platt, 2012; UKCES, 2014). 
In light of these factors, it may be feasible to suggest that women, in comparison to men, 
will be less likely to agree that the majority of people in receipt of social security provisions 
are undeserving of the help received. Whilst in 2009 and 2015, more men than women 
agreed that many benefit recipients were undeserving of help, Table 5.1.1.2 shows the 
opposite in 2012. Though these findings suggest that men, as a group less likely to access 
social security provisions, are largely more inclined to view people in receipt of 
undeserving, these findings are not statistically significant. Thus, the analysis suggests 
that there is not a significant relationship between attitudes toward benefit recipients and 
gender. 
 
The likelihood of agreement also varied by age group. Chapter 2 and 4 demonstrate that 
older members of the public, are not only a group more vulnerable to inequality but are 
also a group more likely to access social services (Ginn, 2013; JRF, 2016; Age UK, 2017). 
Reflecting these positions, people aged 65 and over were not only more likely to recognise 
income inequality between groups, this group were also more inclined to support 
redistribution. Given these factors, it might be expected that people aged 65 and over 
would be less likely to agree that social security recipients were undeserving of assistance.  
As Figure 5.1.1.1 shows, this was not the case. Instead, in 2009 (χ2 = 14.196, df =2, 
p=0.001), 2012 (χ2 = 52.949, df =2, p<0.001) and 2015 (χ2 = 56.551, df =2, p<0.001), 
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people aged 65 and over were more likely to agree that benefit recipients were 
undeserving of help, than people aged 18-64.  
Given the factors identified above, this is particularly surprising. Whilst in 2012 and 2015, 
the likelihood of agreement decreased as age did, in 2009 people aged 35-64 were the 
least likely to agree. Between 2009-2015, attitudes amongst those aged 35-64 and 65 and 
over, appeared to change.  
 
Decreasing levels of agreement were observable amongst both 35-64-year olds (2.9 pp) 
and people aged 65 and over (8.2 pp). The greatest changes were observed amongst 
younger members of the public, where levels of agreement decreased at a much faster 
pace (14.2 pp). 
 
Figure 5.1.1.1: Levels of agreement with ‘many people who get social security don't really 
deserve any help’, by year and age group (analysis based on BSAS 2009, 2012 and 2015)  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
These findings may be reflective of young people’s own insecure economic positions 
during the course of austerity examined here (Kingman and Seager, 2014; MacInnes et 
al., 2015; Catney and Sabater, 2015; Kingman, 2016). That said, this not explain why 
people over the age of 65 are more likely to state that people in receipt of benefits are 
largely ‘undeserving’ of help. These findings are explored in greater depth in Chapter 6. 
 
Table 5.1.1.2 illustrates that perceptions of need amongst claimants are related to 
ethnicity, alongside age. People from BAME groups are identified as a group subject to 
ethnic penalties within the labour market, prejudice and greater levels of inequality, relative 
to people from white ethnic backgrounds (Platt, 2007; Longhi and Platt, 2008; Hills et al., 
2010; O’Hara, 2014; Fisher and Nandi, 2015; Catney and Sabater, 2015; EHRC, 2015;  
Khan, 2015; TUC, 2017). For these reasons, it might be expected that people from BAME 
backgrounds would be less likely to agree. In 2012, this expectation was reflected in the 
0
20
40
60
2009 2012 2015
Changing attitudes, by year and age group
18-34 35 -64 65 and over
P
e
rc
e
n
ta
g
e
 %
171 
 
findings. Between 2009-2012, whilst levels of agreement were seen to increase amongst 
those in the majority ethnic group, levels of agreement fell by 9.5 pp amongst the ethnic 
minority group.  
 
In 2012 at least, ethnic background were related to perceptions of deservingness. People 
from white ethnic backgrounds were more likely to agree than people from BAME 
backgrounds (χ2 =19.099, df =1, p<0.001). These findings suggest that in 2012 perceptions 
of deservingness were related to the ethnic backgrounds of the public, with the majority 
ethnic group more likely to perceive of benefit recipients negatively. This was also 
observable in 2009, but by 2015 the opposite was found, with the minority group slightly 
more inclined to hold this view, though neither are statistically significant.  
 
The findings outlined in Table 5.1.1.2 also suggest that income is related to perceptions of 
deservingness in 2, with Figure 5.1.1.2 showing changing attitudes by income group, over 
time. As Chapter 2 and 4 emphasised, people who are in receipt of low incomes are more 
vulnerable toward inequality, and more likely to need social security provision, than those 
with higher incomes. Not only were people on low incomes more likely to recognise 
income inequality as a gap ‘too large’, they were also more likely to support the 
redistribution of income. 
 
Figure 5.1.1.2: Levels of agreement with ‘many people who get social security don't really 
deserve any help’, by year and income band (analysis based on BSAS 2009, 2012 and 
2015)  
 
 
 
 
 
            
 
 
Given these factors, and that people on low incomes are more likely to access social 
security provisions, it was expected that this group would be less likely to agree that 
people in receipt of social security payments are undeserving of help. By extension, it was 
expected that those who are less likely to access nor need social security assistance (high 
income groups), would be more likely to hold this view.  
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As Table 5.1.1.2 and Figure 5.1.1.2 show, a different picture emerged. Between 2009-
2012, people in receipt of high and low incomes became more inclined to perceive of 
those in receipt of benefits as ‘undeserving’, whereas middle-income earners became 
slightly less inclined to agree. By 2015, this view became less prevalent amongst the 
public based on their income group, particularly amongst high income earners (10.4 pp). 
People who specified they received a high income, were also the least inclined to agree in 
2009, 2012 and 2015. Whilst the findings were not significant in 2009 and 2012, in 2015 
attitudes were related to income. High income earners were less likely to agree, and 
middle-income earners more likely to hold this view (χ2 =8.466, df =1, p=0.015). 
  
Although low-income earners were more inclined to agree that benefit recipients were 
largely ‘undeserving’ of help in 2012, in both 2009 and 2015, people in receipt of middle 
incomes were more likely to agree. Between 2009-2015, attitudes changed, with falling 
levels of agreement observable amongst high (7.4 pp), middle (6.2 pp) and low-income 
earners (7.1 pp). These findings show that this opinion became less popular over the 
course of austerity examined here but was more likely amongst middle income earners in 
2015.  
 
As Figure 5.1.1.3 shows, opinions also differed by benefit status. In comparison to those 
who do not claim benefits, the receipt of benefits often signifies a lower income.  
 
Figure 5.1.1.3: Levels of agreement with ‘many people who get social security don't really 
deserve any help’, by year and benefit status (analysis based on BSAS 2009, 2012 and 
2015)  
 
 
 
 
 
                                  
 
This, as illustrated in Chapter 4, offered an explanation as to why benefit claimants or 
those whose spouse received benefits, were more likely to agree that the income gap is 
‘too large’ and more likely to support the redistribution of income. 
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It was posited that this group held these attitudes, based on their personal experiences of 
income inequality, and because they were a group who would benefit directly from 
redistribution. Given these factors, and that benefit recipients are in receipt of social 
security payments themselves (or their spouse is), it might have been expected that this 
group would be less likely to hold negative views toward benefit recipients, Figure 5.1.1.3 
show the results of this analysis. 
 
In comparison to non-claimants, people in receipt of benefits (or whose spouse was) were 
instead more inclined to agree in 2009, 2012 and 2015. Compared to benefit recipients (or 
those with a spouse in receipt), between 2009-2015, non-claimants also became 
increasingly less inclined to agree. Not only did the gap between claimants and non-
claimants widen in 2015, these findings were also significant. In 2015 a relationship 
between benefit status and perceptions of deservingness is thus evident, with people in 
receipt of benefits (or whose spouse was) more likely to agree that benefit recipients are 
undeserving of help, in comparison to non-benefit claimants (χ2= 12.473, df =1, p<0.001). 
This was particularly surprising given that the group more likely to agree that most benefit 
claimants did not deserve help, were in receipt of this assistance themselves (or their 
spouse was). These findings are discussed in more detail in Chapter 6. 
 
Changing attitudes were also observable by employment status and educational 
attainment. People who are not in employment are identified as a group who are largely, 
more likely to experience inequality of income, compared to those who are in employment 
(Holman, 1978; Finch, 2015; Wu and Chou, 2015; JRF, 2016). Unemployed people were 
more likely to perceive of the income gap as ‘too large’ in 2009, 2012 and 2015, and more 
likely to support the redistribution of income in 2009 and 2012. Given these findings and 
that unemployment often signifies a low-income or indeed may result in the take up of 
benefits, it was expected that this group would be less likely to agree that people in receipt 
of benefits were ‘undeserving’ of help. Instead, as Table 5.1.1.2 shows, in comparison to 
people in employment, levels of agreement are consistently higher amongst people who 
were not in employment. These findings suggest that the group, often more susceptible to 
income inequality, are more inclined to believe that benefits claimants are ‘undeserving’, 
though these findings are not significant.  
 
As Table 5.1.1.2 and Figure 5.1.1.4 show, a relationship between educational attainment 
and attitudes towards benefit recipients is evident. Given that educational attainment often 
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dictates the type of employment undertaken and affords greater access to better paid 
employment roles (Hills et al., 2015; Finch, 2015; JRF, 2016), it is reasonable to suggest 
that individuals who have no (or other qualifications) may be more likely to be in receipt of 
a low income and/or perhaps more likely to access social security assistance. Accordingly, 
it was expected that this group would be less likely to agree, than those with higher level 
qualifications. 
 
Figure 5.1.1.4: Levels of agreement with ‘many people who get social security don't really 
deserve any help’, by year and educational attainment (analysis based on BSAS 2009, 
2012 and 2015) 
 
 
As Figure 5.1.1.4 shows, the opposite is observable. People with people with no 
qualifications (or other) were more likely to agree in 2009 (χ2=14.117, df =2, p=0.001), 
2012 (χ2=83.144, df =2, p<0.001) and 2015 (χ2=51.563, df =2, p<0.001). Comparatively, 
levels of agreement were significantly lower amongst people with higher levels of 
educational attainment each year.  
 
These findings suggest that the higher the level of educational attainment gained by 
members of the public, the lower the likelihood of agreement. Further, whilst levels of 
agreement fell amongst people with higher level qualifications between 2009-2012 (1.6 
pp), they increased amongst people with below degree level qualifications (1.8 pp) and 
those with no or other types of attainment (5.3 pp). Opinions appeared to change amongst 
each group between 2012-2015, and between 2009-2015, suggesting that the likelihood of 
agreement fell over time and between groups.  
 
Given that the type of occupation fulfilled, often determines income, it might have been 
expected that people working in managerial and professional roles, who are less likely to 
experience inequality and more likely to be socially distant from the consequences of 
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inequality, would be more likely to agree. As Table 5.1.1.2 shows, this is not reflected in 
the analysis. Instead in 2012 (χ2=26.840, df =2, p<0.001) and 2015 (χ2=29.143, df =2, 
p<0.001), the type of occupation undertaken by members of the public, is related to 
attitudes, with people employed in intermediate occupations most likely to agree, followed 
by those in routine and manual occupations. Comparatively, people working in managerial 
and professional roles were the least likely to agree. Whilst levels of agreement decreased 
amongst people working in managerial and professional occupations each year, and 
amongst those working in routine and manual occupations, people occupying intermediate 
positions became more inclined to hold this view between 2009-2012 (increase of 7.5 pp) 
and overall between 2009-2015.  
 
In summary, these findings suggest that the group less likely to receive benefits and more 
likely to pay higher rates of taxation, were the least likely to hold negative attitudes towards 
those in receipt of social security recipients. These findings are discussed in relation to the 
literature in Chapter 6. Bringing together attitudes from 2009, 2012 and 2015, the following 
section explores attitudes toward benefit recipients further. 
 
5.1.2 BLRA 
 
Intent on exploring these findings further, merged data from 2009, 2012 and 2015, allows 
for the inclusion of BLRA. In this section, the focus is on exploring the relationship between 
six independent variables (year, age, employment status, benefit status, gender and a two-
category income band group) and the dependent binary variable: “many people who get 
social security don't really deserve any help”. Table 5.1.2.1 show the results of this 
analysis.  
 
Taking all the other variables in the analysis into account, in comparison to people in 2009, 
people were significantly less likely to agree that many benefit recipients were undeserving 
of help in 2015 (p<0.001). Though people appeared more inclined to agree in 2012, than in 
2009, these findings are not significant (p>0.05). Similarly, based on all the factors in the 
analysis, whilst men appeared more inclined to agree than women, this finding is not 
significant (p>0.05). Based on this analysis, there is however a significant relationship 
between age and attitudes. In comparison to people aged 65 and over, people aged 18-34 
were 0.389 times less likely to agree, whereas people aged 35-64 were 0.466 times less 
likely to agree that benefit recipients were undeserving of help (p<0.001).  
176 
 
Table 5.1.2.1: BLRA of the levels of agreement with: ‘many people who get social security 
don't really deserve any help’, with C.I ’s, by variable (analysis based on BSAS 2009, 2012 
and 2015)  
Variables included in the analysis 
 
Variable                       Categories    
Odds 
Ratio (OR) 
 
Exp (B) 
95% C.I. for Exp 
(B) 
 
Lower        Upper 
Year                              2009 
                                      2012 
                                      2015 
1.000 
1.047 ns 
0.717 *** 
    -                  - 
 0.894          1.227 
 0.610          0.843 
Gender                         Male 
                                      Female (base category) 
1.069 ns 
1.000 
 0.961          1.190 
     -                  - 
Age                               18-34 
                                      35-64 
                                      65+ (base category) 
0.389 *** 
0.466 *** 
1.000 
 0.325          0.466 
 0.397          0.547 
    -                  - 
Income                         middle-high income 
                                      low income (base category) 
0.956 ns 
1.000 
 0.855       1.069 
    -                   - 
Benefit status              Yes 
                                      No (base category) 
0.964 ns 
1.000 
 0.854       1.089 
    -                  - 
Employment Status    In employment 
                                     Not in employment (base category) 
1.316 *** 
1.000 
 1.149       1.507 
     -                  - 
                                     Constant 0.900 ns      -                  - 
Statistical Significance of OR’s represented by asterisk symbols: *p<0.05 **p<0.01 ***p<0.001, 
ns not significant, - no figure to display 
 
Though not significant, once all the other variables have been controlled for, middle-high 
income earners and people in receipt of benefits also appeared less inclined to agree, in 
comparison to the low-income group and non-claimants. Based on this analysis, 
employment position does significantly relate to attitudes, with people in employment 
1.316 times more likely to agree than those not in employment. In summary, these findings 
suggest that once all the other variables in the analysis are controlled for, year, age and 
employment status are related to attitudes toward people in receipt of benefits.  
 
5.1.3 Summary 
 
To summarise, this section has not only shown how attitudes toward benefit recipients 
changed, the analysis has also illustrated how social identities are related to attitudes 
toward benefit recipients. Table 5.1.1.1 showed how between 2009-2012 the proportion of 
people in agreement increased, but that this change between years was not significantly 
different. Between 2012-2015 and 2009-2015, however, the proportion of people in 
agreement fell, and these changes are significantly different. Table 5.2.1.1 showed that 
negative perceptions are more likely to be expressed amongst particular groups, and this 
included people aged 65 and over, people from white ethnic backgrounds, people on 
middle incomes, people in receipt of benefits (or whose spouse is), people employed in 
intermediate occupations and those with no (or other) qualifications. BLRA further showed 
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how, having taken all the other factors into account, year, age and employment status had 
a significant effect upon attitudes toward benefit recipients.  
 
Remaining focused on negative attitudes toward those in receipt of benefits, the following 
section explores a further negative perception associated with the social security system; 
the prevalence of fraud amongst benefit claimants.  
   
5.2 Public perceptions of benefit fraud, introduction 
 
Alongside perceptions of deservingness, another negative assumption is also associated 
with social security provision; fraud. This section focuses on exploring the extent of 
agreement with the statement: “most people on the dole are fiddling in one way or another” 
and on building on the perceptions emphasised in Section 5.1.1, to further understand 
attitudes toward social security recipients over the period of austerity examined here.  
 
5.2.1 Perceptions of benefit recipients and fraud   
 
Tables 5.2.1.1 and 5.2.1.2 show the results of the initial analysis. Table 5.2.1 begins by 
showing the CI’s constructed around the point estimates in each year, suggesting that in 
2009, the 95.0% CI is between 32.0 and 38.1%. Table 5.2.2 also shows how attitudes 
changed between 2009-2012, with the proportion of people in agreement in 2012 
increasing from 35.1%, to 37.9%. These findings also show that the 95.0% CI for 2012 is 
between 36.0% and 39.6%.  
Table 5.2.1.1: Percentages and percentage point difference of levels of agreement with: 
‘Most people on the dole are fiddling in one way or another’, by year, with confidence 
intervals by year (analysis based on BSAS 2009, 2012 and 2015) 
 
Most people on the dole are 
fiddling in one way or another 
Agree 
(%) 
pp change by year and CI by year 
(95%) 
Year 2009 2012 2015 2009 -12   2012 – 15 2009 –15 
All 35.1 37.9 29.8 +2.8 -8.1 -5.3 
CI                            Lower Bound                                                                                                        
U                             Upper Bound 
32.0
38.1 
36.0
39.6 
28.0
31.5 
ns
  
sd 
 
sd 
 
CI – Confidence Interval, sd – significant difference (at 5.0% level), ns – no significant difference  
 
That said, the changes between 2009-2012 are not significant at the 5.0% level. By 2015, 
attitudes appeared to have shifted again, with the proportion of people in agreement that 
benefit claimants were fraudulently claiming in some way, decreasing by 8.1 pp, to 29.8%. 
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Table 5.2.1.1 also shows that the 95.0% CI in 2015 is between 28.0 and 31.5%, and that 
the changes between 2012 and 2015 are significantly different at the 5.0% level. These 
findings show that the changes between 2009-2015 are significant at the 5.0% level. To 
summarise, Table 5.2.1.1 shows a significant decrease in the proportion of people in 
agreement between 2012-2015 and overall, between 2009-2015. 
 
Table 5.2.1.2 shows attitudinal changes between years, by group. The findings suggest 
that following the onset of the recession in 2008/09, in 2009 more than a third of the British 
public agreed that people on benefits were fraudulently claiming (35.1%). By 2012 this 
proportion had increased to 37.9%, before falling again in 2015 to 29.8% (8.1 pp). 
Comparative analysis of the findings in Table 5.1.1.2 and Table 5.2.1.2 highlight some 
similarities. In 2009 a similar proportion of the public agreed that social security recipients 
were undeserving of help (35.3%), with slightly fewer people in agreement that recipients 
are ‘fiddling in one way or another’ (35.1%). In 2012 and 2015, however, a larger 
proportion of the public agreed that ‘most people on the dole are fiddling in one way or 
another’.  
 
Whilst the proportion of people agreeing that recipients were undeserving of assistance 
increased only slightly (0.9 pp), larger increases are observable amongst those who stated 
that many of those in receipt of benefits were fraudulently doing so (2.8 pp). These 
findings suggest that, whilst initially, the prevalence of undeserving welfare recipients was 
more of a concern amongst members of the British public in 2009, by 2012, the public 
appeared to be more concerned by the prevalence of fraud amongst benefit claimants. 
Between 2012-2015, levels of agreement fell, with the proportion of the public believing 
that the majority of benefit claimants were undeserving falling (7.5 pp) and the proportion 
of people agreeing that most in receipt of social security were defrauding the system also 
falling, but at a faster pace (8.1 pp). Thus, despite falling levels of agreement, perceptions 
of fraud amongst claimants, appear to be an issue perceived by a greater proportion of the 
British public.  
 
To understand which groups are more likely to perceive of benefit recipients as defrauding 
the system in some way, the socio-economic and demographic characteristics of the 
public were also explored, intent on understanding how attitudes changed (if at all) 
between groups and over time. Table 5.2.1.2 shows how attitudes varied by gender. 
Comparing both perceptions of recipients as undeserving of help amongst men and 
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women, and further perceptions of fraudulence amongst claimants by gender, appear to 
show some similarities. Though it could be assumed that women would be consistently 
less likely to hold negative perceptions towards social security recipients than men, given 
that women are more likely to access services relative to men and are a group more likely 
to need financial assistance (Longhi and Platt, 2008; Nandi and Platt, 2012; Conley, 2012; 
UKCES, 2014), this is not reflected in the findings.  
 
Table 5.2.1.2: Percentages and percentage point difference of ‘Most people on the 
dole are fiddling in one way or another’, by year and socio demographic and 
economic characteristics (analysis based on BSAS 2009, 2012 and 2015)  
 
Socio demographic and 
economic characteristics 
‘Agree’ 
% 
 
        pp change 
 2009 2012 2015 2009 -12   2012 – 15 2009 – 15 
All 35.1 37.9 29.8 +2.8 -8.1 -5.3 
Gender 
Male 
Female 
ns 
37.0 
33.2 
ns 
36.5 
39.0 
ns 
31.2 
28.5 
 
-0.5 
+5.8 
 
-5.3 
-10.5 
 
-5.8 
-4.7 
Age 
18-34 
35-64 
65+  
*** 
44.0 
27.8 
41.7 
*** 
40.6 
34.7 
42.4 
* 
32.5 
27.0 
32.7 
 
-3.4 
+6.9 
+0.7 
 
-8.1 
-7.7 
-9.7 
 
-11.5 
-0.8 
-9.0 
Ethnic group ns ns *    
White ethnic groups 35.4 37.8 29.0 +2.4 -8.8 -6.4 
BAME groups 28.6 37.3 35.6 +8.7 -1.7 +7.0 
Income 
High 
Middle 
Low 
* 
15.2 
37.5 
34.6 
*** 
23.9 
35.2 
41.9 
* 
17.7 
30.0 
31.0 
 
+8.7 
-2.3 
+7.3 
 
-6.2 
-5.2 
-10.9 
 
+2.5 
-7.5 
-3.6 
Benefit status 
Yes 
No 
ns 
34.6 
35.8 
ns 
37.9 
37.6 
* 
31.7 
27.6 
 
+3.3 
+1.8 
 
-6.2 
-10.0 
 
-2.9 
-8.2 
Employment Status 
In employment 
Not in employment 
ns 
35.4 
34.8 
ns 
37.7 
38.0 
ns 
30.9 
28.3 
 
+2.3 
+3.2 
 
-6.8 
-9.7 
 
-4.5 
-6.5 
Qualifications *** *** ***    
Degree and above 19.5 24.5 17.8 +5.0 -6.7 -1.7 
Below degree 37.6 36.8 31.3 -0.8 -5.5 -6.3 
None & Other 41.8 52.9 41.8 +11.1 -11.1 0 
Occupation 
Managerial & Professional 
Occupations 
Intermediate occupations 
Routine and Manual 
occupations 
ns 
33.1 
 
36.2 
39.0 
*** 
27.8 
 
38.8 
46.9 
**** 
22.3 
 
33.9 
35.4 
 
-5.3 
 
+2.6 
+7.9 
 
-5.5 
 
-4.9 
-11.5 
 
-10.8 
 
-2.3 
-3.6 
Statistical Significance test results represented by asterisk symbol: *p<0.05 **p<0.01 
***p<0.001, ns – not significant 
 
Instead, in 2009 larger proportions of men, than women, agreed that many recipients were 
fraudulently claiming. By 2012, the proportion of agreement fell amongst men, with men 
becoming less inclined to state that benefit recipients were undeserving of assistance and 
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fraudulently claiming, comparatively the proportion of women in agreement increased. 
Thus, in 2012, women were more inclined to state that fraud was an issue, alongside 
perceiving recipients as undeserving to a greater extent than men. By 2015, however, 
attitudes by gender appeared to change again. Reflecting the same pattern observed in 
2009, men became more inclined to believe that the majority of social security recipients 
were ‘fiddling in one way or another’. Though these findings are not significant, these 
findings suggest that negative perceptions of social security recipients were less 
favourable amongst women, than men. Reflecting a similar pattern to the findings outlined 
in Table 5.1.1.2, as Table 5.2.1.2 shows, with exception to 2012, more men than women 
agreed. 
 
As Table 5.2.1.2 and Figure 5.2.1.1 show, perceptions also varied by age group. Notably, 
older members of the public are identified as a group who suffer the consequence of 
economic inequality and of ill health, and rely on social security provisions, often to a 
greater extent than younger members of British public (Ginn, 2013; JRF, 2016; Padley et 
al., 2017).   
 
Figure 5.2.1.1: Levels of agreement with: ‘most people on the dole are fiddling in one way 
or another’, by year and age group (analysis based on BSAS 2009, 2012 and 2015)  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
That said, research has also shown that inequality amongst younger generations has 
increased, with younger people as a group, facing inequalities of opportunity and of 
income, and as a group feared to have fared worse during the period of austerity 
examined here (MacInnes et al., 2015; Catney and Sabater, 2015).  
 
It was expected that these changes would be reflected in the analysis, yet as Chapter 4 
demonstrated, older members of the public, aged 65 and over, were not only more likely to 
perceive of the income gap as ‘too large’, but also more likely to support the redistribution 
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of income. Whilst it was expected that this group (65 and over) would be the least likely to 
purport that social security recipients are undeserving of help, based on these findings, 
this group was instead found to be the most likely to hold this view. As Figure 5.2.1.1 
shows, this pattern reoccurred, in part, in this analysis.  
 
In 2012 (χ2= 13.591, df =2, p=0.001) and 2015 (χ2=10.239, df =2, p=0.006) people aged 
65 and over were more likely to agree. In 2009, however, younger members of the public 
(18-34) were more likely to agree (χ2= 24.331, df =2, p<0.001). Thus, in 2012 and 2015, 
despite being identified as a group more vulnerable toward the onset of inequality and a 
group more likely to access social security provisions, older members of the public (aged 
65 and over) were more likely to agree that fraud is an issue amongst the majority of 
benefit recipients. Comparatively, people aged 35-64 were the least likely to agree each 
year.  
 
In 2015, ethnicity was related to perceptions. It was expected that levels of agreement 
would be lower amongst people from BAME backgrounds, reflecting ongoing ethnic 
disadvantage, relative to people from white ethnic backgrounds (Platt, 2007; Longhi and 
Platt, 2008; Hills et al.,2010; Fisher and Nandi, 2015; Khan, 2015). Again, attitudinal 
similarities toward benefit recipients, by ethnicity are observable. Largely mirroring the 
findings outlined in Section 5.1.1, in 2009 and 2012 people from white ethnic backgrounds 
were more inclined to agree that most benefit claimants were doing so fraudulently, though 
these changes were not statistically significant. By 2015, however, these findings had once 
again reversed. In comparison to people from white ethnic backgrounds, people from 
BAME groups were not only more inclined to agree that benefit recipients were 
undeserving, this group was also more likely to agree that “most people on the dole are 
fiddling in one way or another” (χ2= 5.875, df =1, p=0.015). This was particularly surprising 
given the relationship between inequality and ethnic background.  
 
As Figure 5.2.1.2 shows, attitudes varied by income group. Whilst it would have been 
feasible to assume that those in receipt of high-incomes, would be more likely to perceive 
of benefit recipients negatively, this is not reflected in this analysis. Largely mirroring the 
findings outlined in Table 5.1.1.2, in 2009, 2012 and 2015, despite increasing levels of 
agreement overall, people who stated that they had high incomes were less likely to agree 
than people in the middle or low-income groups. Comparatively, although in 2009 (χ2= 
9.356, df =2, p=0.009) people in receipt of middle incomes were more likely to agree that 
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may benefit recipients were ‘fiddling’, by 2012 (χ2= 22.297, df =2, p<0.001) and 2015 (χ2= 
11.123, df =2, p=0.004), this had changed, with people stating they had low-incomes more 
likely to agree.  
 
Thus, suggesting that people in receipt of high-incomes, who are further removed from the 
experiences of inequality and poverty, and less likely to need to claim benefits, are less 
likely to hold negative attitudes towards social security recipients.  
 
Figure 5.2.1.2: Levels of agreement with: ‘most people on the dole are fiddling in one way 
or another’, by year and income group (analysis based on BSAS 2009, 2012 and 2015)  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Much like low-income earners are vulnerable toward the experience of inequality and 
poverty, whether or not an individual (or their spouse) receives benefits, also impacts on a 
household’s income. Whilst it would have been feasible to suggest that benefit recipients 
(or those with a spouse in receipt) would be less likely to perceive of benefit claimants as 
fraudulently claiming in some way, as Table 5.2.1.2 shows this was not reflected in the 
findings. Between 2009-2012, the proportion of people agreeing increased amongst both 
non-claimants (increase of 1.8 pp) and those who were in receipt of benefits themselves or 
their spouse was (3.3 pp). Though this increase was greater amongst benefit recipients 
themselves (or those with a spouse in receipt). 
  
In 2009 people who did not claim benefits were more inclined to agree, by 2012 the gap in 
levels of agreement began to close, with benefit claimants themselves more inclined to 
agree that fraudulent claiming was something most benefit recipients engaged in. Between 
2012-2015, attitudes changed, with a considerable decrease in the proportions of 
claimants (decrease of 6.2 pp) and non-claimants (decrease of 10.0 pp) in agreement. 
Thus, by 2015, the gap between those in agreement by benefit status widened, with 
people in receipt of benefits (or whose spouse) more likely to agree that people on benefits 
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were ‘fiddling’ the system (31.7%), than people who did not claim benefits (27.6%) and nor 
did their spouse (χ2= 5.338, df =1, p=0.021).  
 
These findings suggest that, despite being in receipt of benefits, or their spouse being in 
receipt of social security assistance, perceptions of benefit claimants as ‘fiddling in one 
way or another’ were more likely amongst those who did claim, than those that were not in 
receipt of benefits. This is a similar finding to that identified in Section 5.1.1, where benefit 
recipients (or those with a spouse in receipt) were also more likely to perceive the majority 
of benefit claimants as undeserving of help in 2015, despite their apparent shared status 
as benefit recipients. These findings are discussed in more detail in Chapter 6. 
 
Attitudes also differed by employment status, educational attainment and occupation. 
People not in employment, people with no (or other) qualifications and those in routine and 
manual occupational roles, are often expected to receive lower levels of pay. These 
groups are also expected to be more likely to need to access social security provisions 
due to low incomes. Given this, it can be assumed that these groups would be less likely 
to agree. By extension, as groups further away from the vulnerability of inequality and 
more likely to pay a higher level of income tax (Anderson and Curtis, 2015), it was 
expected that people in employment, people with higher level qualifications and people in 
managerial and professional occupations would perhaps be more likely to share negative 
attitudes toward benefit recipients. The findings in Table 5.2.1.1 show that although levels 
of agreement between people in employment and not in employment fell between 2009-
2015, people in employment in 2009 and 2015 were more inclined to agree than those 
who were not in employment, as expected. Though these findings were not significant.  
These findings differ to those identified in Section 5.1.1, whereby people who were not in 
employment were more inclined to state that benefit recipients were largely undeserving of 
help in 2009, 2012 and 2015. 
 
Mirroring the findings outlined in Table 5.1.1.2, exploring attitudes toward benefit claimants 
and the prevalence of fraud by educational attainment, suggest further relationships. 
People with degree and above level qualifications were, consistently, the least likely to 
agree, whereas people with the lowest levels of educational attainment (none or other) 
were the most likely to agree in 2009 (χ2= 22.780, df =2, p<0.001), 2012 (χ2=93.114, df =2, 
p<0.001) and 2015 (χ2= 80.975, df =2, p<0.001). As the level of educational attainment 
declined, the likelihood of agreement increased. Given that qualifications often dictate 
184 
 
access to employment and better paid roles, limiting choices, this was surprising. These 
findings suggest that educational attainment is related to attitudes, with those more likely 
to access social security benefits, due to low income earnings and restricted labour market 
access, more likely to share negative perceptions of benefit recipients.  
As Figure 5.2.1.3 shows, similar findings are notable in relation to occupational position. 
Not only were people working in managerial and professional occupations less likely to 
perceive the majority of benefit recipients as undeserving of help in 2012 and 2015, this 
group were also less likely to agree that the majority of benefit recipients were fraudulently 
claiming benefits. This is particularly surprising given the relationship between 
occupational position and income.  
 
Figure 5.2.1.3: Levels of agreement with: ‘most people on the dole are fiddling in one way 
or another’, by year and occupation (analysis based on BSAS 2009, 2012 and 2015)  
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
Given that managerial and professional roles often result in greater economic rewards 
(usually signalling higher tax brackets), it could be assumed that this group would be more 
likely to share negative perceptions, further reflective of how this group are both 
economically and socially distant from the experience of inequality, poverty and the need 
for social security assistance. Instead, people in lower occupational groups were more 
inclined to agree than those in higher occupational categories across each year, followed 
by people in intermediate occupations.  
 
To summarise, this analysis thus suggests that in 2012 (χ2= 81.642, df =2, p<0.001) and 
2015 (χ2= 48.222, df =2, p<0.001), people working in routine and manual occupations 
were more likely to agree that people in receipt of benefits were fraudulently doing so in 
some way. Comparatively, people in managerial and professional occupations were the 
least likely to agree. With a focus on year, gender, age, income group, and benefit and 
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employment status, the following section explores attitudes towards the prevalence of 
fraud amongst benefit recipients further. 
 
5.2.2 BLRA 
 
In this section, the focus is on exploring the relationship between the IV’s (year, age, 
employment status, benefit status, gender and a two-category income band group) and the 
DV: “most people on the dole are fiddling in one way or another”. Table 5.2.2.1 shows the 
results of this analysis. Controlling for all the other variables (age, employment status, 
benefit status, gender and income), in comparison to 2009, people in 2015 were 0.776 
times less likely to agree (p<0.01). Whilst people in 2012 appeared more inclined to agree 
than those in 2009, this finding is not significant. Though not significant, based on this 
analysis, men were also more inclined to agree than women (p>0.05).  
 
Table 5.2.2.1: BLRA of the levels of agreement with: ‘most people on the dole are fiddling 
in one way or another’, with C.I ’s, by variable (analysis based on BSAS 2009, 2012 and 
2015)  
 
Variables included in the analysis 
 
Variable                       Categories    
Odds 
Ratio (OR) 
 
Exp (B) 
95% C.I. for Exp 
(B) 
 
Lower        Upper 
Year                              2009 
                                      2012 
                                      2015 
1.000 
1.120 ns 
0.776 ** 
    -                  - 
 0.959          1.309 
 0.662          0.910 
Gender                         Male 
                                      Female (base category) 
1.017 ns 
1.000 
 0.915          1.131 
     -                  - 
Age                               18-34 
                                      35-64 
                                      65+ (base category) 
0.848 ns 
0.605 *** 
1.000 
 0.713          1.009 
 0.515          0.710 
    -                  - 
Income                         middle-high income 
                                      low income (base category) 
0.820 *** 
1.000 
 0.735       0.916 
    -                   - 
Benefit status              Yes 
                                      No (base category) 
1.092 ns 
1.000 
 0.969       1.230 
    -                  - 
Employment Status    In employment 
                                     Not in employment (base category) 
1.378 *** 
1.000 
 1.208       1.572 
     -                  - 
                                     Constant 0.640 ***      -                  - 
Statistical Significance of OR’s represented by asterisk symbols: *p<0.05 **p<0.01 ***p<0.001, 
ns not significant, - no figure to display 
 
In this analysis, age is also related to attitudes. Whilst 18-34-year olds were less inclined 
to agree, than older people (aged 65 and over) this was not a significant finding (p>0.05). 
As Table 5.2.2.1 shows, however, based on this analysis, people aged 35-64 were less 
likely to agree in comparison to people aged 65 and over (p<0.001). Having taken all the 
other variables in the analysis into account, income also significantly affected attitudes, 
with people in receipt of middle-high incomes less likely to agree (p<0.001). Whilst benefit 
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claimants (or those with a spouse in receipt) appeared more inclined to agree than those 
not in receipt of benefits, this finding was not significant (p>0.05). People in employment, 
were however, significantly more likely to agree than those not in employment (p<0.001). 
 
5.2.3 Summary 
 
In summary, the analyse presented in this section suggest that a number of groups are 
more likely to agree that people in receipt of benefits are, in some form, claiming benefits 
fraudulently. These include: people from BAME backgrounds, largely those aged 65 and 
over, people in receipt of low incomes, those in receipt of benefits (or whose spouse is), 
those with no (or other) qualifications and those occupying routine and manual 
employment positions. Table 5.2.1.1 shows that the increase in the proportion of those in 
agreement increased between 2009-2012, but that this change is not significantly different.  
Declining levels of agreement between 2012-2015 (falling from 37.9% to 29.8%) and 
2009-2015 (falling from 35.1%) are however significantly different. Suggesting that, despite 
an initial peak in levels of agreement in 2012, the British public became less likely to agree 
between 2012-2015 and over all between 2009-2015.  
 
Table 5.2.2.1 also shows how, once controlling for all the other variables in the analysis, 
year, age, income and employment status also significant effect attitudes. Based on this 
analysis, not only were people less likely to agree in 2015, than they were in 2009, people 
aged 35-64 were also less likely to agree compared to those aged 65 and over. The 
findings also show that middle-high income earners were less likely to agree, than those in 
receipt of low incomes. Whereas, comparatively, people in employment were more likely to 
agree that benefit recipients were fraudulent claiming in some way, in comparison to 
people not in employment.  
 
Not only are these findings discussed in Chapter 6, these findings are subject to further 
comparisons in the following section. Exploring responses to a further negative evaluation 
of social security provision, the following section explores attitudes toward the level of 
provision awarded, intent on understanding whether the public think that welfare 
generosity results in dependence amongst social security recipients. 
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5.3 Public perceptions of generosity and dependence, Introduction   
 
This section focuses on exploring the levels of agreement with the statement ‘if welfare 
benefits weren't so generous, people would learn to stand on their own feet’. The direction 
of this analysis is thus focused on another claim made against the welfare state and its 
recipients; that people are reliant on support from the state and that if social security 
provision was not as generous, people would no longer rely on benefits. Thus, the removal 
of over generous benefit provision would both promote and enable independence amongst 
individuals (Wiggan, 2012).  
 
For Wiggan this is descriptive of one of the key narratives of welfare, which centres around 
the existences of “a culture of dependency…that is supported by costly, yet ineffective and 
damaging state intervention” (2012:385). Similarly, Shildrick and MacDonald found that 
“moral assessments” were frequently imposed upon social security recipients, amongst 
their participants they found that the prevalence of poverty was thus “viewed as a 
consequence of individual ineptitude or moral failure” (2013:292). Those in need were 
accused of monetary incompetence, “blamed for their inability” or indeed their apparent 
“unwillingness to manage” (Shildrick and MacDonald, 2012:292). In accordance with these 
views, the reach of the welfare state has rendered too many dependent, whereby the 
“welfare net is seen to have been spread too far” (Golding and Middleton,1982:85).  
 
The view that generous benefit payments reduce peoples “incentive to work” or that this 
generosity results in people becoming “content with life on the dole” (Holman, 1978:71) are 
not, however, new. As Golding and Middleton pointed out, people believe that the point of 
the welfare state has been missed, or indeed corrupted, this is evident where they state 
that “what should have been a restricted emergency service for the helpless” has been 
accused of developing “uncontrollably into the [a] nanny state” (1982:85). In this way, 
welfare for some members of the British public, “is not merely reaching the wrong people 
but has totally outgrown its utility to the point where it is weakening our whole social fabric” 
(Golding and Middleton, 1982:87). Indeed, as Dorey highlights, poverty is often 
“pathologised by being attributed to defective or dysfunctional individuals” (2010:334), 
where poor choices thus signify “a fundamental moral weakness and/or a lack of guiding 
vision” (Castell and Thompson, 2007:17).  
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What is therefore seemingly evident is how narratives portray people as the “authors of 
their own downfall and deprivation by virtue of their alleged lack of industriousness, 
motivation or moral fibre” (Dorey, 2010:334). Dorey argues further that much of the “British 
people believe that social security benefits are either now at an appropriate level or are too 
high” and that this means benefits act as “a disincentive for the poor to become more self-
reliant and/or obtain employment”. (2010:337). Given these longstanding narratives, it was 
expected that this would be reflected in the analysis, with large proportions of the British 
public in agreement with the statement: “if welfare benefits weren’t so generous, people 
would learn to stand on their own feet”. The following section presents the findings of this 
analysis. 
 
5.3.1 perceptions of benefit generosity and dependence  
 
Table 5.3.1.1 shows the proportion of agreement each year, alongside CI’s constructed 
around the point estimates in each year. In 2009, 53.5% agreed that dependency was a 
feature amongst welfare claimants due to generous payments. The 95.0% CI is between 
50.2 and 56.5%. Notably, by 2012, there was a slight increase in the proportion of 
agreement amongst the sample. The findings also show that for this period the 95.0% CI is 
between 52.0% and 55.7%. This analysis also shows that the differences between 2009-
2012 are however not significantly different. In 2015 the proportion of people in agreement 
fell slightly to 52.9%, the 95.0% CI is between 51.0 and 54.7%. As Table 5.3.1.1 shows, 
however, the increase in agreement between 2012-2015 and 2009-2015 are not 
significantly different.  
 
Table 5.3.1.1: Percentages and percentage point difference of levels of agreement with: ‘if 
welfare benefits weren't so generous, people would learn to stand on their own feet’, by 
year, with confidence intervals by year (analysis based on BSAS 2009, 2012 and 2015) 
 
if welfare benefits weren't so 
generous, people would learn to 
stand on their own feet 
Agree 
(%) 
pp change by year and CI by year (95%) 
Year 2009 2012 2015 2009-12   2012-15 2009-15 
All 53.5 53.9 52.9 +0.4 -1.0 -0.6 
CI                            Lower Bound                                                                                                        
U                             Upper Bound 
50.2
56.6 
52.0
55.7 
51.0
54.7 
ns
  
ns ns 
 
CI – Confidence Interval, SD – significant difference (at 5.0% level), ns – no significant difference  
                                                                                                                                              
In 2009, 2012 and 2015, more than half the British public agreed with the statement: ‘if 
welfare benefits weren't so generous, people would learn to stand on their own feet’. 
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These findings show that not only do members of the public believe that generosity and 
dependence are an issue, to a greater extent than the belief that social security recipients 
are undeserving of help or are defrauding the system in some way. They also show that 
the British public appear to feel more strongly that generosity and dependence is an issue 
to a greater extent than the need for income redistribution. 
 
Table 5.3.1.2: Percentages and percentage point difference of ‘if welfare benefits weren't 
so generous, people would learn to stand on their own feet’, by year and socio 
demographic and economic characteristics (analysis based on BSAS 2009, 2012 and 
2015)  
 
Socio demographic and economic 
characteristics 
‘Agree’ 
% 
pp change 
 2009 2012 2015 2009 -12   2012 – 15 2009 – 15 
All 53.5 53.9 52.9 +0.4 -1.0 -0.6 
Gender 
Male 
Female 
ns 
56.2 
50.7 
ns 
54.6 
53.2 
ns 
54.1 
51.8 
 
-1.6 
+2.5 
 
-0.5 
-1.4 
 
-2.1 
+1.1 
Age 
18-34 
35-64 
65+  
** 
60.2 
48.3 
57.4 
*** 
53.4 
50.3 
63.9 
*** 
50.5 
50.3 
61.4 
 
-6.8 
+2.0 
+6.5 
 
-2.9 
0.0 
-2.5 
 
-9.7 
-2.0 
+4.0 
Ethnic group ns * ns    
White ethnic groups 53.0 53.1 52.8 +0.1 -0.3 -0.2 
BAME groups 58.9 60.5 54.0 -1.6 -6.5 -4.9 
Income 
High 
Middle 
Low 
*** 
45.7 
58.9 
47.2 
* 
50.0 
56.3 
51.3 
** 
48.3 
56.0 
49.6 
 
+4.3 
-2.6 
+4.1 
 
-1.7 
-0.3 
-1.7 
 
+2.6 
-2.9 
+2.4 
Benefit status 
Yes 
No 
ns 
51.1 
57.1 
ns 
53.0 
55.1 
ns 
52.7 
53.0 
 
+1.9 
-2.0 
 
-0.3 
-2.1 
 
+1.6 
-4.1 
Employment Status 
In employment 
Not in employment 
** 
57.2 
47.5 
* 
55.7 
51.7 
ns 
54.4 
50.9 
 
-1.5 
+4.2 
 
-1.3 
-0.8 
 
-2.8 
+3.4 
Qualifications * *** ***    
Degree and above 44.7 44.3 43.4 -0.4 -0.9 -1.3 
Below degree 55.8 53.9 55.1 -1.9 +1.2 -0.7 
None & Other 54.5 61.7 59.3 +7.2 -2.4 +4.8 
Occupation 
Managerial & Professional 
Occupations 
Intermediate occupations 
Routine and Manual occupations 
ns 
59.9 
 
57.1 
56.0 
*** 
49.4 
 
59.2 
56.3 
** 
49.3 
 
57.7 
55.1 
 
-10.5 
 
+2.1 
+0.3 
 
-0.1 
 
-1.5 
-1.2 
 
-10.6 
 
+0.6 
-0.9 
Statistical Significance test results represented by asterisk symbol: *p<0.05 **p<0.01 ***p<0.001, ns – not 
significant 
 
In 2009 53.5% of the public agreed that welfare generosity led to dependency, this 
proportion increased, albeit slightly, in 2012 (53.9%), before falling to a level lower than 
those seen in 2015 (52.9%). Although these changes appear minimal and do not appear to 
support the claim made by Dorey (2010), they appear to show how ideas of generosity and 
dependence remain consistent amongst at least half the British public. To understand 
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which groups are more likely to hold this view, the socio-economic and demographic 
characteristics of the public were also explored (Table 5.3.1.2).  
 
Attitudes towards welfare generosity and benefit dependency varied by gender. It was 
expected that these findings would reflect the literature, with women less likely to agree 
that the generosity of benefit payments led to dependency. Given that this group are often 
more likely to be vulnerable to the onset of inequality, and more likely to need access to 
social security provision (Oxfam, 2012; Conley, 2012; Ginn, 2013; UKCES, 2014; De 
Henau and Reed, 2016). Though not statistically significant, as expected in comparison to 
women, men were consistently more inclined to hold this view.  
 
As Figure 5.3.1.1 shows, a relationship between attitudes and age is however evident. 
Though it is feasible to suggest those most likely to be in receipt of benefits themselves 
will be less likely to hold negative perceptions toward benefit recipients, Section 5.1.1 and 
5.2.1 show that this is not always necessarily the case. Older members of the public, aged 
65 and over, were more likely to perceive of benefit recipients as undeserving of help in 
2009, 2012 and 2015. In 2012 and 2015, this group were also more likely to agree that the 
majority of people in receipt of benefits were doing so fraudulently. A similar pattern is 
evident in Table 5.3.1.2. In 2009 people aged 18-34 (60.2%) were more likely to believe 
that welfare generosity led to dependence (χ2= 11.412, df =2, p=0.003), comparatively 
people aged 35-64 were the least likely to hold this view. However, in both 2012 (χ2= 
31.002, df =2, p<0.001) and 2015 (χ2= 23.312, df =2, p<0.001) people aged 65 and over 
were more likely to agree that welfare generosity resulted in dependency.  
 
Figure 5.3.1.1: Levels of agreement with: ‘if welfare benefits weren’t so generous, people 
would learn to stand on their own feet’, by year and age group (analysis based on BSAS 
2009, 2012 and 2015) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Between 2009-2015, overall, levels of agreement fell amongst those aged 18-34 
(decrease of 9.7 pp) and 35-64 (decrease of 2.0 pp) yet increased amongst older 
0
50
100
2009 2012 2015
Changing attitudes, by year and age group
18 - 34 35 -64 65 and over
P
e
rc
e
n
ta
g
e
 %
191 
 
members of the public, aged 65 and over (4.0 pp). Thus, suggesting that older members of 
the public’s attitudes toward people in receipt of social security payments, changed over 
the course of austerity examined here. 
 
Table 5.3.1.2 shows how attitudes differ by ethnic identity. In 2009, 2012 and 2015, in 
comparison to the minority group, people from white ethnic backgrounds were less inclined 
to agree, though not all of these changes are statistically significant. In 2012, however, a 
relationship between ethnic background and attitudes is evident, with people from BAME 
groups (60.5%) more likely to agree that welfare generosity resulted in dependence, than 
those from white ethnic (53.1%) backgrounds (χ2= 5.133, df =2, p=0.023). Given that 
people from BAME groups were more likely to support the redistribution of income in 2012 
and 2015 and that much of the literature suggests that minority ethnic groups fared worse 
during austerity, are a group more vulnerable toward inequality, and are therefore more 
likely to need social security provision or indeed access financial support, this was 
surprising (Platt, 2007; Longhi and Platt, 2008; Hills et al.,2010; Oxfam, 2012; Catney and 
Sabater, 2015; Fisher and Nandi, 2015; Khan, 2015; TUC, 2017).  
 
Notably, where an individual placed themselves in relation to (self-rated) income band, 
also impacted on the likelihood of agreement. Given that the level of income received 
impacts lifestyle and opportunities (Holman, 1978; Fong et al., 2003; Busemeyer, 2009; 
Finch, 2015; Lansley and Mack, 2015; JRF, 2016), it was expected that people further 
from need, would be more likely to believe that generous payments resulted in 
dependence. By extension, the opposite was expected of those in receipt of a low income, 
given that this group are more likely to benefit from social security provision. As Table 
5.3.1.2 shows, a different picture emerged. Not only were high income earners less likely 
to perceive of those in receipt of benefits as fraudulently claiming benefits in 2009, 2012 
and 2015, this group were also less likely to assert that welfare generosity led to 
dependency. Instead, middle-income group earners were more likely to agree in 2009 (χ2= 
13.161, df =2, p=0.001), 2012 (χ2= 7.339, df =2, p=0.025) and 2015 (χ2= 11.562, df =2, 
p=0.003). By comparison, people on low incomes were the second most likely to agree.  
 
That said, between 2009-2015, whilst levels of agreement increased amongst those in the 
low and high-income band groups, levels declined amongst those in the middle-income 
group (decrease of 2.9 pp). Despite these changes, these findings show that people with 
self-rated high incomes, were the least likely to agree in 2009, 2012 and 2015. Given that 
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this group are further removed from the vulnerability of poverty compared to low and 
middle-income earners and are a group who are more likely to contribute more in taxation, 
this was an unexpected finding, but one that is also evident in Table’s 5.1.1.2 and 5.2.1.1.  
 
Given the relationship between income and benefit status, it was expected that people in 
receipt of benefits (or whose spouse was) would be less likely to hold negative opinions 
toward the social security system, given that they recipients of the services offered (or their 
spouse is). By extension, it could be assumed that non-claimants would be more likely to 
agree. That said, as noted in Section 5.1.1 and 5.2.1, in 2015 in comparison to people who 
did not claim benefits, people who were in receipt of benefits (or had a spouse in receipt of 
benefits) were more likely to agree that benefit recipients did not really deserve any help, 
and that the majority were fraudulently doing so. As Table 5.3.1.2 shows, a different 
picture emerged in this analysis. The highest proportion of agreement is amongst those 
who were not in receipt of benefits, who were more inclined to agree, in comparison to 
people who were in receipt of benefits (or their spouse was). These findings point to the 
disparities in attitudes toward the level of benefits received and dependence amongst 
people close to benefit recipients, or in receipt themselves, in comparison to people not in 
receipt of benefits, nor spouse to someone who is. That said, these findings are not 
statistically significant.  
 
Attitudes varied by employment status. Section 5.1.1 demonstrated that people who were 
not in employment in 2009, 2012 and 2015 were more inclined to agree that the majority of 
benefit recipients were undeserving of help. This was surprising given that those outside of 
the labour market are often in receipt of low incomes or are in receipt of social security 
assistance. It was expected that people in employment, and therefore less likely to claim 
benefits themselves and instead more likely to contribute toward the redistribution of 
income through income taxation, would be more likely to agree. This was also an 
assumption made in this analysis. As Table 5.3.1.2 shows, as expected, people in 
employment were more likely to agree that benefit generosity resulted in dependency in 
both 2009 (χ2 = 8.382, df =1, p=0.004) and 2012 (χ2 = 4.377, df =1, p=0.036), than those 
who were not in employment.  
 
Notably, although people who were not in employment were less likely to agree, this group 
became more likely to agree over time (increase of 3.4 pp), whereas comparatively the 
level of agreement amongst people in employment fell (decrease of 2.8 pp between 2009-
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2015). These findings show that in 2009 and 2012 a relationship between attitudes toward 
welfare generosity and dependence is evident, with those not in employment and thus 
more likely to benefit from social security provisions less likely to agree.  
 
As Table 5.3.1.2 and Figure 5.3.1.2 shows, attitudes varied by educational attainment, with 
attitudes toward benefit generosity and dependence related to level of education 
attainment. Given that educational attainment often dictates employment opportunities, 
furnishing those with higher levels of attainment with greater access to better paid roles 
(UKCES, 2014 Finch, 2015; JRF, 2016) it was expected that people with no (or other) 
qualifications would be less likely to agree, given that this group may perhaps be more 
likely to need to claim benefits to top up their incomes. As Table 5.3.1.2 shows, between 
2009-2012, levels of agreement declined amongst those with qualifications below degree 
level (decrease of 1.9 pp) and those with degree or above level qualifications (decrease of 
0.4 pp). 
 
Figure 5.3.1.2: Levels of agreement with: ‘if welfare benefits weren’t so generous, people 
would learn to stand on their own feet’, by year and educational attainment (analysis 
based on BSAS 2009, 2012 and 2015) 
 
 
Conversely, amongst those who held no qualifications (or other) levels of agreement 
increased considerably (7.2 pp). Similar changes are also notable between 2009-2015. 
Mirroring the findings outlined in Section 5.1.1 and 5.2.1, the expectation that those with 
no or other qualifications would be the least likely to agree, was not reflected in this 
analysis. 
 
Instead, people with higher level qualifications were not only less likely to agree that 
benefit recipients did not deserve any help and less likely to perceive the majority of social 
security recipients as fraudulently claiming ‘in one way or another’. This group were also 
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less likely to agree that ‘if welfare benefits weren’t so generous, people would learn to 
stand on their own feet’ in 2009 (χ2 = 6.520, df =1, p=0.038), 2012 (χ2 = 33.027, df =2, 
p<0.001) and 2015 (χ2 = 35.198, df =2, p<0.001). Comparatively, in 2012 and 2015, people 
with no qualifications (or other) were the most likely to state that welfare generosity led to 
dependency.  
 
A similar expectation was by occupation position. Occupational position often reflects the 
income of the public, meaning that those employed in routine and manual occupations are 
often expected to be paid less, with those in managerial and professional occupations 
receiving a higher income and again better labour market access. For these reasons it can 
be assumed that this will be reflected in the analysis with people in managerial professions 
more likely to perceive of benefit payments being too generous and leading to a lack of 
independence. Instead, people employed in intermediate occupations were more likely to 
agree that the generosity of welfare payments resulted in dependence, in both 2012 (χ2 = 
17.285, df =2, p<0.001) and 2015 (χ2 = 12.501, df =2, p<0.002). By comparison, reflecting 
similar findings to those outlined in Section 5.1.1 and 5.2.1, in 2012 and 2015 people 
within managerial and professional occupations were less likely to agree. In summary, the 
findings suggest that the likelihood of agreeing with the statement: “if welfare benefits 
weren’t so generous, people would learn to stand on their own feet” is significantly greater 
amongst people working in intermediate occupation, and is surprisingly, less likely 
amongst those in managerial and professional occupations, where levels of agreement 
also decreased between this latter group over time. These findings are discussed in 
Chapter 6.  
 
The following section builds on this analysis, using BLRA and confidence intervals to 
explore the relationship between the dependent variable “if welfare benefits weren’t so 
generous, people would learn to stand on their own feet” and the independent variables 
(year, age, employment status, benefit status, gender and income).  
 
5.3.2 BLRA 
 
Intent on exploring these findings further, merged data from 2009, 2012 and 2015, allows 
for the inclusion of BLRA. Table 5.3.2.1 shows the results of this analysis.       The focus of 
this section is on exploring the relationship between the independent variables: year, age, 
employment status, benefit status, gender and a two-category income band group 
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included within the analysis and the final dependent variable: “if welfare benefits weren’t so 
generous, people would learn to stand on their own feet”.  
Controlling for all the other variables (age, gender, income, benefit and employment 
status), in comparison to 2009, people in 2012 appeared more inclined to agree, whereas 
people in 2015 were less inclined to agree, though these findings are not significant 
(p>0.05). In comparison to women, the analysis also showed that more men than women 
held this view, though this was not a significant finding. Taking into account all the other 
factors in the analysis, in comparison to people aged 65 and over, people aged 18-34 
were 0.514 times less likely to agree (p<0.001), whereas people aged 35-64 were 0.430 
times less likely to agree (p<0.001). 
 
Table 5.3.2.1: BLRA of the levels of agreement with: “if welfare benefits weren’t so 
generous, people would learn to stand on their own feet”, with C.I ’s, by variable (analysis 
based on BSAS 2009, 2012 and 2015)  
 
Variables included in the analysis 
 
Variable                       Categories    
Odds 
Ratio (OR) 
 
Exp (B) 
95% C.I. for Exp 
(B) 
 
Lower        Upper 
Year                              2009 
                                      2012 
                                      2015 
1.000 
1.036 ns 
0.959 ns 
    -                  - 
 0.892          1.204 
 0.825          1.115 
Gender                         Male 
                                      Female (base category) 
1.043 ns 
1.000 
 0.943          1.153 
     -                  - 
Age                               18-34 
                                      35-64 
                                      65+ (base category) 
0.514 *** 
0.430 *** 
1.000 
 0.434          0.608 
 0.369          0.502 
    -                  - 
Income                         middle-high income 
                                      low income (base category) 
1.174 * 
1.000 
 1.057       1.304 
    -                   - 
Benefit status              Yes 
                                      No (base category) 
0.893 * 
1.000 
 0.798       1.000 
    -                  - 
Employment Status    In employment 
                                     Not in employment (base category) 
1.577 *** 
1.000 
 1.393       1.785 
     -                  - 
                                     Constant 1.561***      -                  - 
Statistical Significance of OR’s represented by asterisk symbols: *p<0.05 **p<0.01 ***p<0.001, 
ns not significant, - no figure to display 
 
 
Based on this analysis, a significant relationship between income and attitudes is also 
evident, with people in receipt of middle-high incomes 1.174 time more likely to agree, 
than those in receipt of low incomes. Whilst benefit status also appears to influence 
attitudes (p=0.05), with people in receipt of benefits (or whose spouse is) 0.893 times less 
likely to agree than those who do not claim benefits, the confidence intervals suggest that 
this is not a significant effect. Employment status does however show a significant effect, 
with people in employment 1.577 times more likely to agree than those not in employment 
(p<0.001). 
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5.3.3 Summary  
 
To summarise, this section has highlighted how people perceive of social security 
recipients, and the ‘generosity’ of the payments afforded to benefit recipients. The analysis 
explored whether these opinions have changed over time. Though the analysis suggested 
that the increase in levels of agreement between 2009-2012, and the decreases between 
2012-2015 and 2009-2015 are not significant, the findings nevertheless, demonstrate that 
over half the British public shared negative views of welfare recipients each year. This 
section has shown that the likelihood of agreement is also greater amongst particular 
groups. These include: people aged 18-34 in 2009, older members (65 and over) of the 
public in 2012 and 2015. People from BAME groups in 2012, people in receipt of self-rated 
middle incomes, people in employment, those in intermediate occupations, people with 
below degree level qualification in 2009 and those lacking (or holding other forms) 
qualifications in 2012 and 2015.  
 
BLRA has also suggested that, having taken into account all the variables in the analysis, 
people on middle-high incomes were more likely to agree than those on low incomes. In 
comparison to non-claimants, benefit recipients were less likely to agree. With further 
attitudinal differences seen by age group and employments status. To explore the 
relationship between negative attitudes toward welfare recipients and support toward 
redistribution, and how this changed over time (if at all), the following sections builds on 
this analysis, comparing the findings outlined in this chapter so far. 
 
5.4 The relationship between perceptions of deservingness and the redistribution of 
income, Introduction 
 
Chapter 2 and 5 explored how people in receipt of welfare benefits have been 
characterised as undeserving for a number of generations. It has also been stressed that 
perceptions of inequality reflective of stereotypical rhetoric, can stand in the way of 
initiatives to combat societal issues. Where a lack of support from the British public toward 
redistributive strategies poses problems (Monnickendam and Gordon, 2010; Wu and 
Chou, 2015). Chapter 4 emphasised that just over two fifths of the British public supported 
the redistribution of income in 2009. This proportion increased slightly into 2012 and once 
again into 2015. Whilst support for income redistribution amongst the public increased 
between 2009-2015, support remained low. Chapter 4 also highlighted that support toward 
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the redistribution of income is, however, more likely amongst people who also believe that 
‘the gap between high and low income is too large’. Suggesting a relationship between 
attitudes towards income inequality and income redistribution.  
 
Although increasing support toward redistribution amongst the public is notable, much 
smaller proportions agreed with redistributive measures than those who agreed the 
income gap was ‘too large’. To understand how, if at all, other perceptions relate to 
support toward redistribution, this section explores the extent of the relationship between 
negative perceptions of welfare recipients and support toward the redistribution of income. 
Focused on investigating the question: of the proportion of people who agreed that “many 
people who get social security don’t really deserve any help”, what proportion also agreed 
that “the government should redistribute income from the better-off to the less-well-off”?, 
the following section presents the findings of this analysis.  
 
5.4.1 Deservingness and redistribution, findings 
 
Section 5.1.1 demonstrated that in 2009 and 2012 over a third of the British public agreed 
that many social security recipients were undeserving, by 2015 this proportion had fallen to 
28.7%. At the same time, the public appeared to hold stronger views toward the 
redistribution of income, with 37.3% in agreement that the government should redistribute 
between income groups in 2009, 42.1% in 2012 and 44.7% in 2015. To understand how 
negative perceptions, relate to the support expressed toward the redistribution of income, 
Table 5.4.1.1 shows the level of support toward redistribution expressed amongst people 
who also perceive benefit recipients as undeserving of help.   
 
The analysis suggests that in 2009, amongst the proportion of the public who agreed that 
many benefit recipients were undeserving of help (35.3%), support toward redistribution 
was considerably lower (28.5%). Comparing these findings to those outlined in Section 
4.2.1, this is a pp decrease of 8.8. These findings suggest that in 2009, amongst people 
that perceive benefit recipients as largely undeserving of the help they receive, support 
toward the redistribution of income is less likely (χ2=11.361, df=1, p=0.001). Thus, negative 
attitudes toward welfare recipients relate to the level of support expressed toward the 
redistribution of income, where such views are held, support toward income redistribution 
declines and this is problematic.  
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In 2012, as Section 5.1.1 shows, the public became more likely to believe that many social 
security recipients were undeserving of help, but also more likely to support the 
redistribution of income (Section 4.2.1). Amongst the proportion of people who said that 
recipients were largely undeserving, just 36.9% also agreed with the redistribution of 
income. Comparing these findings, this analysis suggests that in 2012, amongst the public 
who felt that benefit recipients were largely undeserving of help, redistributional support 
was reduced by 5.2 pp. 
 
Table 5.4.1.1: Percentages and percentage point difference of ‘many people who get 
social security don’t…deserve help’, and ‘the government should redistribute income from 
the better-off to the less-well-off’, by year and socio demographic and economic 
characteristics (analysis based on BSAS 2009, 2012 and 2015) 
 
Socio demographic and economic 
characteristics 
‘Agree’ 
% 
pp change 
 2009 2012 2015 2009 -12   2012 – 15 2009 – 15 
All ***28.5 ***36.9 ***39.2 +8.4 +2.3 +10.7 
Gender 
Male 
Female 
ns 
28.7 
28.7 
ns 
37.3 
36.5 
ns 
40.8 
37.7 
 
+8.6 
+7.8 
 
+3.5 
+1.2 
 
+12.1 
+9.0 
Age 
18-34 
35-64 
65+  
ns 
32.2 
25.2 
30.5 
ns 
34.9 
34.7 
43.1 
ns 
40.4 
35.6 
44.5 
 
+2.7 
+9.5 
+12.6 
 
+5.5 
+0.9 
+1.4 
 
+8.2 
+10.4 
+14.0 
Income 
Middle-High 
Low 
*** 
21.1 
40.7 
** 
32.6 
42.2 
*** 
33.3 
48.4 
 
+11.5 
-1.5 
 
+0.7 
+6.2 
 
+12.2 
+7.7 
Benefit status 
Yes 
No 
ns 
28.1 
29.0 
* 
39.9 
32.4 
** 
43.7 
32.9 
 
+11.8 
+3.4 
 
+3.8 
+0.5 
 
+15.6 
+3.9 
Employment Status 
In employment 
Not in employment 
* 
24.6 
35.5 
*** 
31.5 
43.6 
ns 
36.0 
43.1 
 
+6.9 
+8.1 
 
+4.5 
-0.5 
 
+11.4 
+7.6 
Statistical Significance test results represented by asterisk symbol: *p<0.05 **p<0.01 ***p<0.001 ns – not 
significant 
                                                                                                                                             
These findings suggest that in 2012 negative perceptions related to the level of support 
expressed toward the redistribution of income, with negative opinions reducing the support 
expressed toward redistribution (χ2=16.562, df=1, p<0.001).  
 
This pattern reoccurred in 2015. Whilst 44.7% of people believed that the government 
should redistribute income, 28.7% of the public also felt that the majority of those in receipt 
of support did not deserve any help. Of the proportion of people who held this view, 
support toward the redistribution of income was lower (39.2%). Thus, in 2015 negative 
perceptions of welfare recipients were related to the level of support expressed toward 
monetary redistribution, reducing this support by 5.5 pp (χ2=11.029, df=1, p=0.001).  
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To summarise, this analysis highlights how perceptions of those in receipt of social 
security are related to the likelihood of agreement with the redistribution of income. Where 
people agree that people in receipt of benefits do not deserve help, they are also less 
likely to support initiatives to combat inequality, like that of the redistribution of income. 
Although this may have been expected, due to the complex formation of social attitudes, 
this required evidencing and exploring further. To understand which groups are more likely 
to share these opinions, the findings were also explored in relation to specific socio-
economic (self-rated income group, benefit status and employment status) and 
demographic (gender and age) characteristics.  
 
As Table 5.4.1.1 shows, in comparison to the level of support toward redistribution 
amongst the public by gender (Section 4.2.1), support toward the redistribution of income 
is lower amongst men and women who also agree that people are largely underserving of 
help. These findings appear consistent with those highlighted in Section 4.2.1, where men 
were identified as a group more likely to support the redistribution of income in comparison 
to women. Although these findings show how attitudes toward income redistribution 
amongst men and women who also agree that ‘many people who get social security 
benefits don’t really deserve any help’ differ, these findings are not significant.  
Table 5.4.1.1 also shows how perceptions by age also suggest that support toward the 
redistribution of income is reduced, amongst people who feel welfare recipients are 
undeserving of the assistance received. Largely mirroring the findings outlined in Section 
4.2.1, with exception to 2009, older members of the public remained more inclined to 
support the redistribution of income, despite holding negative perceptions of those in 
receipt of social security assistance. Though these findings show how attitudes toward 
redistribution differ amongst people based on their age, and perceptions of social security 
recipients, these findings are not significant.  
 
Table 5.4.1.1 shows how opinions continued to differ by income group. Section 4.1.1 
showed how people on low incomes were more likely to agree that the income gap is ‘too 
large’, this group were also more likely to support the redistribution of income (Section 
4.2.1) than those in receipt of middle or high incomes. This was expected, given that 
people in receipt of lower incomes are expected to have personal experiences of income 
inequality and are more likely to benefit from the redistribution of income. Section 5.2.1 
however, also showed that this group were more likely to agree that benefit recipients 
were largely defrauding the system in some way in 2012 and 2015, but that low income 
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earners felt less strongly that recipients were undeserving of help (Section 5.1.1). Given 
that perceptions of benefit recipients as undeserving, reflect stigmatising views of those in 
receipt of assistance it was expected that support toward redistribution amongst those who 
held this belief, would be lower than those identified in Section 4.2.1. This assumption is 
reflected in this analysis.  
 
Comparing the findings outlined in Section 5.2.1, as Table 5.4.1.1 shows, support toward 
redistribution by income group, is lower amongst people who perceive benefit recipients as 
undeserving. In 2009, 44.9% of low-income earners supported redistribution, as Table 
5.4.1.1 shows, amongst those in receipt of a low income who felt that social security 
recipients were undeserving, this proportion fell to 40.7% (a decrease of 4.2 pp). Similarly, 
in 2009 redistributional support was also less likely amongst those in the middle-high 
income group (χ2=14.229, df=1, p<0.001). This pattern reoccurred in 2012, where 
redistributional support was significantly lower amongst low and middle-high income 
groups, if they also agreed that benefit recipients were undeserving of help (χ2=9.677, 
df=1, p=0.002).  
 
In 2015 amongst people in receipt of low and middle-high incomes, redistributional support 
was less likely amongst both groups if they also agreed that social security recipients were 
undeserving of help (χ2=17.666, df=1, p<0.001). These findings suggest that in 2009, 2012 
and 2015 amongst those who agreed that people in receipt of social security provisions did 
not deserve any help, their own financial positions, significantly related to their opinion 
toward the redistribution of income. In other words, amongst people in receipt of low and 
middle-high incomes who agreed that welfare recipients were undeserving of help, support 
toward income redistribution reduced in 2009, 2012 and 2015.  
 
The benefit status of members of the public or their spouses, also related to attitudes. 
Whilst people who were in receipt of benefits (or whose spouse was) were more likely to 
support the redistribution of income in 2012 and 2015, they were also more likely to agree 
that many people in receipt of benefits ‘don’t really deserve any help’ in 2015. This was 
particularly surprising given that this particular group are in receipt of benefits themselves, 
or they have a spouse in receipt. As Table 5.4.1.1 shows, in comparison to the level of 
support noted in Table 4.2.1.2, support toward redistribution was lower amongst benefit 
claimants (or people whose spouse claimed) who agreed that benefit recipients were 
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undeserving of help, and amongst people who did not claim benefits who also shared this 
perspective in 2012 (χ2=5.792, df=1, p=0.016) and 2015 (χ2=9.025, df=1, p=0.003).  
 
In 2009, though not statistically significant, support toward redistribution was reduced to a 
greater extent amongst benefit recipients (decreasing from 38.3% to 28.1%), in 
comparison to non-claimants (decreasing from 35.8% to 29.0%). In 2012, this was 
reversed, with falling levels of support greater amongst non-claimants (decreasing from 
39.8% to 32.4%) than benefit claimants or those with a spouse in receipt (43.7% to 
39.9%). This pattern continued into 2015, where support amongst non-claimants fell from 
42.2% to 32.9%, and from 46.9% to 43.7% amongst benefit claimants (or those with a 
spouse in receipt). To summarise, these findings show that support toward redistribution, 
is significantly lower amongst benefit recipients and non-claimants who also agree that 
social security recipients are undeserving of help.  
 
Employment status also related to perceptions. As Table 4.2.1.2 shows, people who were 
not in employment were consistently more likely to support redistribution than people who 
were in employment. This was expected, given that people who are not in employment are 
often more likely to benefit from income redistribution, even if those in employment are 
also struggling in work. Amongst the proportion of people that felt welfare recipients were 
undeserving of help, people who were not in employment were also more likely to support 
redistribution, than those in employment in 2009 and 2012. In 2009 amongst those who 
felt that benefit recipients were undeserving of help and were in employment support 
toward redistribution fell from 35.5% to 24.6% (a decrease of 10.9 pp). Support toward 
redistribution fell by 5.9 pp in 2012, and by 0.4 pp in 2015.  
 
Accordingly, for those in employment, support toward redistribution is lower amongst 
people who also perceive social security recipients as undeserving. This was also 
apparent amongst people who were outside of the labour market, where support declined 
in 2009 (falling from 39.9% to 35.5%), 2012 (47.9% to 43.6%) and 2015 (47.2% to 43.1%). 
To summarise, amongst those who agreed that benefit recipients are undeserving, support 
toward redistribution declined amongst both groups in 2009, 2012 and 2015. These 
findings suggest there is a relationship between negative attitudes toward benefit 
recipients, support towards redistribution and employment status in 2009 (χ2=4.407, df=1, 
p=0.036) and 2012 (χ2=9.025, df=1, p<0.001). 
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5.4.2 Summary 
 
To summarise this section has explored how perceptions toward social security recipients 
are related to support toward the redistribution of income. Amongst members of the public 
in agreement that ‘many people who get social security don’t really deserve any help’, 
support toward the redistribution of income is significantly reduced. This suggests that 
negative attitudes towards people in receipt of social security benefits are related to 
redistributional support, where negative opinions reduce the likelihood of the public 
support income redistribution between groups. The following section explores how 
attitudes toward the level of benefits awarded may also relate to the level of support 
toward redistribution.  
 
5.5 Perceptions of dependence and the redistribution of income, introduction 
 
This section explores how members of the British public perceived the level of benefit 
payments awarded and how (if at all) this related to attitudes toward the redistribution of 
income. As Section 4.2.1 highlighted, support for redistribution increased between 2009-
2015, yet remained particularly low. In 2009, less than two fifths of the British public 
agreed that income should be redistributed from the ‘better-off’ to the ‘less-well-off’. This 
proportion increased in 2012, before increasing again in 2015. Concurrently, perceptions 
of the generosity of social security payments and consequent dependency amongst 
recipients, were also notable. 
  
A considerable proportion of the British public agreed that welfare generosity resulted in 
dependence amongst people in receipt of benefits. In other words, if people did not receive 
state benefit payments this would enable them to provide for themselves, independent of 
support from the welfare state. Once presented with the statement ‘if welfare benefits 
weren’t so generous, people would learn to stand on their own feet’, over a third of the 
public agreed in 2009, this proportion increased in 2012 and decreased to less than a third 
in 2015. Although levels of agreement fell, a considerable proportion of people, maintained 
that welfare generosity resulted in dependence amongst benefit recipients. These findings 
appeared to support much of the literature, which also highlighted how people’s 
perceptions of the welfare state and benefit claimants, often impact the willingness to 
support initiatives to combat inequality, like that of the redistribution of income (McKendrick 
et al., 2008; Clarke and Newman, 2012).  
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To understand these findings further and the extent, if at all, negative attitudes toward 
welfare impact on support for monetary redistribution, the focus of this section is on 
exploring the proportions of people who agreed that that welfare generosity resulted in 
dependency, also agreed that the government should redistribute income. The following 
section presents the findings of this analysis. 
 
5.5.1 Benefit dependency and redistribution, findings 
 
Table 5.5.1.1 shows the proportion of people in agreement that that welfare generosity 
resulted in dependency, whom also agreed that the government should redistribute 
income. The findings in Table 5.5.1.1 can be interpreted in different ways. 
 
Table 5.5.1.1: Percentages and percentage point difference of: ‘if welfare benefits weren’t 
so generous people would learn to stand on their own feet’, and ‘the government should 
redistribute income from the better off to the less well off’, by year and socio demographic 
and economic characteristics (analysis based on BSAS 2009, 2012 and 2015) 
 
Socio demographic, Socio 
economic and geographic 
characteristics 
 
‘Agree’ 
% 
 
        pp change 
 2009 2012 2015 2009 -12   2012 – 15 2009 – 15 
 
All 
*** 
30.5 
*** 
36.4 
*** 
36.0 
 
+5.9 
 
-0.4 
 
+5.5 
Gender 
Male 
Female 
ns 
32.5 
28.6 
ns 
37.0 
35.9 
ns 
38.5 
33.7 
 
+4.5 
+7.3 
 
+1.5 
-2.2 
 
+6.0 
+5.1 
Age 
18-34 
35-64 
65+  
*** 
41.9 
23.8 
28.6 
ns 
35.3 
35.2 
40.4 
ns 
33.8 
34.5 
40.8 
 
-6.6 
+11.4 
+11.8 
 
-1.5 
-0.7 
+0.4 
 
-8.1 
+10.7 
+12.2 
Income 
High 
Middle 
Low 
*** 
14.3 
25.1 
41.9 
*** 
21.1 
31.7 
43.7 
*** 
31.0 
31.0 
43.9 
 
+6.8 
+6.6 
+1.8 
 
+9.9 
-0.7 
+0.2 
 
+16.7 
+5.9 
+2.0 
Benefit status 
Yes 
No 
ns 
28.4 
33.5 
ns 
37.8 
34.4 
*** 
41.5 
29.6 
 
+9.4 
+0.9 
 
+3.7 
-4.8 
 
+13.1 
-3.9 
Employment Status 
In employment 
Not in employment 
ns 
30.1 
31.2 
*** 
31.5 
43.2 
*** 
32.4 
41.4 
 
+1.4 
+12.0 
 
+0.9 
-1.8 
 
+2.3 
+10.2 
Statistical Significance test results represented by asterisk symbol: *p<0.05 **p<0.01 ***p<0.001 ns – not 
significant 
 
Firstly, the findings suggest that amongst those who agreed that welfare generosity 
resulted in dependency, levels of agreement with the redistribution of income increased 
between 2009-2015 yet remained low. 
204 
 
In 2009 just 30.5% of people shared this attitude also supported the redistribution of 
income between groups, this proportion increased to 36.4% in 2012 before declining again 
in 2015, to 36.0%. Comparing these findings to those identified in Section 4.2.1 show how 
support toward redistribution amongst people who held negative perceptions of welfare 
recipients relates toward redistributional support. Section 4.2 showed how support toward 
income redistribution increased in 2012 and 2015, comparatively amongst people who 
agreed that benefit generosity led to dependency support declined in 2015.  
 
These findings also highlight how perceptions of those in receipt of benefits relate to 
attitudes toward income redistribution. Comparing the findings outlined in Section 4.2.1 
and Table 5.5.1, the findings show that support toward income redistribution is significantly 
reduced amongst people who also agree that welfare generosity leads to dependency. For 
instance, in 2009 Table 4.2.2 shows that 37.3% supported the redistribution of income, 
whereas Table 5.5.1.1 shows that of the proportion of people who agreed that ‘if welfare 
benefits weren’t so generous people would learn to stand on their own two feet’ just 30.5% 
supported redistribution. These findings suggest that in 2009 redistributional support fell by 
6.8 pp amongst people who perceived welfare generosity as resulting in dependency 
(χ2=16.233, df=1, p<0.001).  
 
This also occurred in 2012. As Table 4.2.1.2 shows, 42.1% of the public supported income 
redistribution, yet of the proportion of who agreed that generosity led to dependence, 
support toward income redistribution declined by 5.7 pp to 36.4% (χ2=41.157, df=1, 
p<0.001). In 2015, support toward income redistribution (44.7%) amongst people who held 
this negative perception (36.0%) fell to a greater extent, declining by 8.7 pp (χ2=82.146, 
df=1, p<0.001). These findings suggest that there is a significant relationship between 
negative attitudes toward benefit recipients and support toward income redistribution 
amongst the public.  
 
To understand how attitudes changed (if at all) between groups, attitudes were also 
explored in relation to specific socio-economic (self-rated income group, benefit status and 
employment status) and demographic (gender and age) characteristics. Not only were 
men more likely to support the redistribution of income in comparison to women, this group 
were also more inclined to agree that welfare payment generosity led to dependency 
amongst benefit recipients. Though it was surprising that men were more likely than 
women to support income redistribution, given that women are more likely to access social 
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security provisions due to positions of disadvantage relating to their gender (Longhi and 
Platt, 2008; Conley, 2012; Nandi and Platt, 2012; Oxfam, 2012; Ginn, 2013; UKCES, 
2014; De Henau and Reed, 2016), it was posited that these findings may have been a 
reflection of a growing awareness of income inequality and of changing positions amongst 
men. That said, as Table 5.3.1.1 shows, men despite this awareness, were more inclined 
to agree that independence was lost due to more than adequate welfare provision 
amongst benefit recipients.  
 
As Table 5.5.1.1 shows, a greater proportion of men than women also agreed that income 
should be redistributed, despite also agreeing welfare generosity resulted in dependence 
in 2009, 2012 and 2015. Table 5.5.1.1 also shows that support toward redistribution 
amongst men and women decreased amongst men and women who also agreed that 
welfare generosity led to dependence in 2009. Whilst 56.2% of men agreed that ‘if welfare 
benefits weren’t so generous, people would learn to stand on their own feet’, of this 
proportion just 32.5% also supported the redistribution of income, compared to the 40.9% 
of men that supported the redistribution of income (Table 4.2.1.2), this is a decrease of 8.4 
pp.  
 
This pattern also occurred amongst women, where 50.7% agreed that independence was 
lost due to generous benefit payments and of this proportion, support toward redistribution 
fell by 5.4 pp to just 28.6%. In 2012, 54.6% of men held this negative perception, of this 
proportion just 37.0% supported monetary redistribution. Compared to the support toward 
income redistribution identified in Table 4.2.1 this is a decrease of 7.4 pp. Support toward 
income redistribution amongst women (39.9) who also agreed that benefit recipients were 
dependent due to generosity (35.9) also fell by 4.0 pp.  
 
Falling levels of support toward redistribution continued in 2015, where support toward 
income redistribution amongst men (50.2%) and women (39.6%) as identified in Section 
4.2, were lower amongst men (38.5%) and women (33.7%) who also agreed that benefit 
recipients were dependent on their payments due to generosity. Although these findings 
show how attitudes towards redistribution differ amongst men and women who also agree 
that welfare benefits are too generous and lead to dependency, these findings are not 
significant.  
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Age however related to perceptions in 2009. Section 4.2.1 demonstrated that income 
redistribution is more favourable amongst older members of the public, but with exception 
to 2012, was less favourable amongst younger people aged 18-34. Perceptions of benefit 
claimants as dependent due to generous benefit payments, were also more likely amongst 
older members of the public in 2012 and 2015, though in 2009 this perception was more 
likely amongst people aged 18-34. Table 5.5.1.1 shows how attitudes toward redistribution 
amongst people who also agreed that ‘if welfare benefits weren’t so generous, people 
would learn to stand on their own feet’ changed. For the most part, amongst people who 
agreed that high benefit payments led to dependency, support toward redistribution 
decreased amongst each age group, in each year.  
 
In 2009, amongst people who perceived of benefit payments creating dependency, 
support toward redistribution decreased by 13.8 pp amongst people aged 35-64, and by 
9.3 pp amongst people aged 65 and over. Support toward income redistribution, however, 
increased by 5.4 pp amongst people aged 18-34, increasing form 36.5% (Table 4.2.1.2) to 
41.9%. These findings show that perceptions are related to age in 2009 (χ2=15.111, df=2, 
p=0.001). For the most part, negative attituded towards benefit recipients reduces the 
likelihood of support toward redistribution by age, with exception to 2009, where young 
people became more likely to agree if they also agreed that ‘if welfare benefits weren’t so 
generous people would learn to stand on their own feet’. 
 
As Figure 5.5.1.1 and Table 5.5.1.1 show, attitudes toward the redistribution of income 
amongst people who agreed that the generosity of welfare benefits led to dependency, 
also differed by income group. Section 4.2.1 showed how people with low incomes were 
more likely to support the redistribution of income in 2009, 2012 and 2015. People in 
receipt of high income in 2009 and 2012 were less likely to support monetary 
redistribution, in 2015 however it was people on middle incomes who were least likely to 
agree that the government should redistribute income.  
 
It was expected that similar findings would be observable in this analysis, with low income 
earners remaining more likely to support income redistribution, despite also agreeing that 
welfare generosity led to a lack of independence. It was also expected, however, that 
support toward redistribution would be lower than the proportions observed in Table 
4.2.1.2, given that benefit dependency is reflective of a common negative attitude toward 
welfare recipients.  
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As Table 5.5.1.1 shows, this latter expectation was reflected in this analysis. Support 
toward the redistribution of income is less likely amongst people in receipt of middle-high 
and low incomes who also agreed that a lack of independence was fostered amongst 
benefit recipients due to the generosity of the benefit payments awarded. 
 
Figure 5.5.1.1: Levels of agreement with: ‘if welfare benefits weren’t so generous people 
would learn to stand on their own feet’, and ‘the government should redistribute income 
from the better off to the less well off’, by year and income group (analysis based on BSA 
Survey, 2009 and 2015). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In 2009 support for the redistribution of income fell amongst low income earners, 
decreasing by 3.0 pp, from 44.9% (Table 4.2.1.1) to 41.9%. These findings show that 
support toward income redistribution remained much higher amongst low income earners 
in 2009, but that attitudes are also related to perceptions of welfare recipients, where there 
is a relationship between negative attitudes and redistributional support (χ2=16.654, df=1, 
p<0.001).  
 
Similarly, in 2012 support toward redistribution amongst middle-high income earners fell 
amongst those who also agreed that welfare generosity resulted in a lack of independence 
amongst benefit claimants. Of the proportion of low-income earners who agreed with this 
perspective (51.3%) support toward income redistribution declined (decreasing by 2.0 pp, 
from 45.7% to 43.7%). These findings suggest that in 2012 there is a relationship between 
negative perceptions and support toward redistribution, where negative perceptions 
amongst low income earners reduce this groups willingness and the likelihood of this 
group supporting income redistribution (χ2=24.823, df=1, p<0.001).  
 
People in receipt of low incomes were also less likely to support redistribution, if they also 
agreed that welfare benefits were too generous in 2015. As Table 4.2.1 and Table 5.5.1.1 
show, support toward government income redistribution decreased from 50.0% to 43.9%. 
These findings suggest that there is a relationship between attitudes toward welfare 
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recipients as dependent and support toward redistribution by income group in 2015 
(χ2=24.441, df=1, p<0.001). 
 
Similar findings were observed by benefit status. As Table 5.2.1.1 shows, people who 
were in receipt of benefits were more likely to support the redistribution of income in 
2009,2012 and 2015 (though in 2009 the findings were not significant), this was expected 
given that this group benefit from the redistribution of income. As Table 5.3.1.1 shows, in 
comparison to non-claimants, this group were also less inclined to agree that ‘if welfare 
benefits weren’t so generous, people would learn to stand on their own two feet’, though 
these findings were not significant in 2009, 2012 or 2015. Table 5.5.1.1 shows how 
attitudes towards redistribution amongst benefit recipients and non-claimants differed, if 
they also shared this common negative opinion.  
 
People who were in receipt of benefits (or whose spouse was) and whom are therefore 
more likely to be in receipt of lower incomes, were more likely to agree with the 
redistribution of income in 2015, in comparison to non-claimants in 2015, despite holding 
this perception. These findings also show that compared to the findings outlined in Section 
4.2.1, support toward the redistribution of income is less likely amongst benefit recipients 
(or those with a spouse in receipt) and non-claimants in 2009,2012 and 2015. Support 
amongst benefit recipients decreased by 9.9 pp, falling from 38.3% to 28.4% in 2009, 
decreasing further by 2.3 pp amongst claimants (or those with a spouse in receipt). These 
findings appear to suggest that amongst benefit claimants and non-claimants who agreed 
welfare generosity led to dependency, support toward income redistribution was reduced, 
though these findings are not significant.  
 
In 2012 support toward redistribution continued to decrease amongst both groups who 
shared this view, falling from 43.7% to 37.8% (decrease of 5.9 pp) amongst benefit 
recipients (or those with a spouse in receipt) and by 5.4 pp amongst non-claimants (falling 
from 39.8% to 34.4%), though these findings are not statistically significant. In 2015, the 
findings show that attitudes amongst claimants and non-claimants who held this negative 
perception, changed, with the likelihood of supporting redistribution decreasing. These 
findings suggest that in 2015 negative perceptions toward welfare recipients amongst 
claimants and non-claimants are related to redistributional support, with benefit recipients 
remaining more likely to support income redistribution, but with this proportion falling 
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amongst benefit recipients who also agree that welfare generosity leads to dependence 
(χ2=21.755, df=1, p<0.001). 
 
Similarly, as Figure 5.5.1.2 shows, in 2009, 2012 and 2015, amongst people who agreed, 
support for the redistribution of income were lower amongst those in employment, than 
those not in employment. In both 2012 (χ2=21.316, df=1, p<0.001) and 2015 (χ2=12.059, 
df=1, p<0.001), people who were not in employment were more likely to support the 
redistribution of income, than those in employment, despite also expressing the opinion 
that generosity of benefit payments resulted in dependence amongst benefit recipients. 
These findings also show how attitudes changed amongst people who shared a negative 
assumption toward benefit recipients.  
 
In comparison to the support toward income redistribution by employment status outlined 
in Section 4.2, and with exception to 2009, support amongst people in and outside of the 
labour market was significantly reduced in 2012 and 2015. Redistributional support 
amongst people outside of the labour market who also agreed that welfare generosity 
fostered dependence fell by 8.7 pp in 2009, though this change was not significant. In 
2012, support amongst people outside the labour market declined significantly, if they also 
agreed that a lack of independence was a result of generous benefit payments 
(decreasing from 47.9% to 43.2%) and by 5.8 pp in 2015 (decreasing from 47.2% to 
41.4%). 
Figure 5.5.1.2: Levels of agreement with: ‘if welfare benefits weren’t so generous people 
would learn to stand on their own feet’, and ‘the government should redistribute income 
from the better off to the less well off’, by year and employment status (Analysis based on 
BSAS, 2009 and 2015). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This pattern also occurred amongst people who also shared this opinion, who were in 
employment in 2012 and 2015. Support fell by 5.9% in 2012, decreasing from 37.4% to 
31.5% (Table 5.5.1.1) and by 10.3 pp in 2015, decreasing from 42.7% to 32.4%. These 
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findings suggest that support toward income redistribution, amongst both those inside and 
outside of the labour market, is reduced where negative attitudes are also held.  
 
5.5.2 Summary  
 
This section investigated the relationship between redistributional attitudes and attitudes 
reflective of stereotypical and negative discourse toward benefit recipients. This analysis 
has shown that amongst people who agree with the statement: if welfare benefits weren’t 
so generous people would learn to stand on their own feet’, support toward income 
redistribution is considerably lower. The findings suggest a relationship between negative 
attitudes and support toward redistribution amongst people by age group in 2009, income 
group in each year, by benefit status in 2015 and by employment status in 2012 and 2015. 
Prior to their analytical discussion in Chapter 6, the following section provides a conclusion 
to this chapter, discussing these findings in relation to the findings identified throughout 
this chapter.  
 
5.6 Conclusion  
 
This chapter has shown how attitudes towards people in receipt of support from the 
welfare state changed during the period of austerity examined here and how attitudes are 
related to the support expressed toward the redistribution of income. Section 5.1 began by 
exploring the extent of agreement with the statement: ‘many people who get social security 
don’t really deserve any help’. Demonstrating that this perception was one shared by a 
considerable proportion of the public in 2009, 2012 and 2015. Though the level of 
agreement increased between 2009-2012, this increase was minimal and was not 
significant (Table 4.1.1.1). In comparison, the changes between 2012-2015 and between 
2009-2015 are significant, with people becoming less likely to perceive of benefit recipients 
as undeserving. Perceptions of welfare recipients as undeserving were also more likely 
amongst particular groups. This includes, people aged 65 and over and people with no or 
other forms of qualifications in 2009, 2012 and 2015, the white majority ethnic group in 
2012, the middle-income group and people in receipt of benefits in 2015, and people 
occupied in intermediate positions in 2012 and 2015. With exception to people working in 
intermediate positions, for the most part, between 2009-2015 the level of agreement fell 
within each group. 
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Comparing the findings outlined in Section 5.1, to those in Section 5.2 suggested some 
similarities. Between 2009-2012, members of the public became more inclined to agree 
with the statement: ‘most people on the dole are fiddling in one way or another’, though as 
Table 5.2.1 shows, this increase was not significant. The changes between 2012-2015 and 
overall between 2009-2015 are, however, significant and show how people became less 
likely to perceive fraud as an issue amongst benefit recipients. In 2012 and 2015, people 
aged 65 and over were also more likely to hold this perception, though in 2009 this was an 
opinion more likely amongst younger members of the public aged 18-34. People in receipt 
of benefits themselves (or with a spouse in receipt) were again more likely to hold negative 
opinions toward welfare recipients in 2015, as were people from minority ethnic groups. In 
2009, middle income earners were more likely to agree, whereas in 2012 and 2015 low 
income earners were more likely to hold this view.  
 
In 2012 and 2015 people working in routine and manual occupations were more likely to 
perceive fraud as an issue amongst benefit claimants. Mirroring the findings outlined in 
Section 5.1, people who lacked qualifications were more likely to hold negative 
perceptions of those in receipt of benefits. This finding also reoccurred in Section 5.3, with 
this group also more likely to perceive of benefit recipients as dependent due to generous 
benefit payments, though in 2009 this was more likely amongst people with below degree 
level qualifications. In 2009, younger members of the public were, as they were in Section 
5.2, more likely to share negative perceptions, though in 2012 and 2015 people aged 65 
and over were more likely to agree.  
 
People from BAME groups in 2012 were also more likely to agree than people from the 
majority white ethnic group. Comparatively, in 2009, 2012 and 2015, people in receipt of 
middle incomes were more likely to perceive of benefit recipients as lacking dependence 
due to generous welfare payments. This view was also more likely amongst people in 
employment in 2009 and 2012 and employed in intermediate occupations in 2012 and 
2015. Overall between 2009-2015, with exception to women, people aged 65 and over, 
high and low-income groups, benefit recipients (or those with a spouse in receipt), people 
not in employment, with no (or other) qualifications and people employed in intermediate 
occupations, the level of agreement declined.  
 
Section 5.4 and Section 5.5 sought to understand how attitudes toward benefit recipients 
related to support toward income redistribution. Section 5.4 demonstrated that support 
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toward income redistribution continued to increase between 2009-2012, 2012-2015 and 
overall between 2009-2015, but that the proportions observed in Table 5.4.1 were smaller 
than those identified in Section 4.2. With exception to 18-34-year olds, Section 5.5 
demonstrated that support toward income redistribution was lower overall and by socio-
economic and demographic characteristics than the support identified in Section 4.2.  
These findings suggest that amongst people who agree that ‘many people who get social 
security don’t deserve any help’ and amongst people who agree with the statement: ‘if 
welfare benefits weren’t so generous people would learn to stand on their own feet’, 
support toward income redistribution by the government is less likely and this, as identified 
throughout this research is a problem. These findings are discussed in more detail in the 
following discussion chapter, which in providing a critical narrative of perceptions of the 
welfare state and its clients, discusses public perceptions alongside wider social and 
economic changes in austerity Britain between 2009-2015.  
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Chapter 6 
 
Public perceptions, an analytical discussion 
 
6.1 Introduction and structure of the discussion 
 
Responding to the research questions, this chapter provides an analytical discussion of 
the findings outlined in Chapter 4 and 5. Providing a backdrop to austerity Britain, this 
chapter begins with a short, yet critical narrative of the observable social and economic 
consequences of life lived in austere Britain. Having set the scene, to explore attitudinal 
changes amongst the British public during the period of austerity examined here, this 
chapter provides a discussion of attitudinal findings by year. Having discussed perceptions 
of inequality, poverty and redistribution by year, thus allowing for an overall picture of 
attitudes in austerity Britain, attitudinal differences are presented and discussed 
thematically. Having re-identified why the inclusion of socio-economic and demographic 
characteristics allows for a greater understanding of attitudes toward inequality, poverty 
and redistribution, it is argued that this approach will not only inform future attitudinal 
sociological research but will also highlight where future support may need to be targeted.  
 
During this discussion, not only is recent research drawn upon, the theories identified in 
Chapter 2 are also revisited alongside the research findings. Thus, the Rational Choice 
Theory, the spiral of silence model (Scheufele, 2008), the theory of risk aversion and risk 
exposure (Leon, 2012) are revisited, whilst critically examining social inequalities, 
alongside attitudinal findings. To further explore attitudinal changes and differences within 
this chapter, the reference group theory and the reference group reality blend theory 
(Evans and Kelley, 2017) is considered. The role of altruism, social values and of 
“empathy and socio-cultural distance” (Orton and Rowlingson, 2007:34) are also restated, 
alongside the inclusion of Cannadine’s “vernacular model” of “us and them” (Cannadine, 
1998:19-20). 
 
The first section (6.3.1) begins by discussing perceptions by gender. Drawing on 
sociological literature, alongside theory, gendered inequalities are thus explored, noting 
how gendered identities may relate to perceptions. To provide a more nuanced 
understanding of perceptions of inequality, poverty and redistribution amongst men and 
women during this period of austerity, the findings outlined in Section’s 4.1-4.3 and 5.1-5.5 
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are therefore rexamined together, drawing out both comparisons and disparities in the 
findings by gender. Having presented an analytical discussion of the findings by gender, 
the chapter moves to a discussion of attitudinal findings by age (Section 6.3.2).  
 
To provide a broader understanding of perceptions of inequality, poverty and redistribution 
by age, the findings presented in Section’s 4.1-4.3 and 5.1-5.5 are again refocused within 
this chapter, drawing out disparities, alongside similarities. Concurrently, perceptions by 
age are further considered in relation to sociological literature, highlighting inequalities of 
age, understood in relation to redistributional theories and preferences. Having highlighted 
how age relates to perceptions, alongside experiences of disadvantage, the same 
approach is taken to critically understand perceptions by ethnic group. Restating the 
findings outlined in Section’s 4.1-4.3 and 5.1-5.5, perceptions by ethnic group are thus 
examined in relation to widening instances of inequality (Section 6.3.3). Having provided 
an analytical account of the experiences of inequality, alongside perceptions the final 
section brings together the remaining characteristics.  
 
To simplify the analysis, the research findings from Section’s 4.1-4.3 and 5.1-5.5, by 
educational attainment, employment status, occupation, income and benefit status are 
incorporated into one discussion section (Section 6.3.4). Social inequalities are considered 
critically, alongside the attitudinal findings, intent on providing a more nuanced 
understanding of perceptions, drawing on redistributional theories to explore similarities, 
alongside differences in perceptions toward inequality, poverty and redistribution. Having 
provided an analytical discussion of the findings by year and characteristic, drawing on 
research to explore attitudinal changes, sociologically, this chapter is summarised, prior to 
the introduction of the final chapter of this thesis. 
 
6.1.1 Austerity Britain, backdrop 
 
Following the Beveridge Report in 1942, the Welfare State was restructured, bringing to 
the fore “a new political commitment; a rewritten social contract between the state and the 
people” in the UK (Esping-Anderson, 1999:34). Yet, following its inception, it has been 
considered “contested terrain” (Esping-Anderson, 1999:147), its function questioned 
(Bartholomew, 2013), alongside who should be responsible for paying for it. For some 
members of the British public, social security may be regarded as a beneficial resource, for 
others however, it is regarded a needless expenditure (Alcock and May, 2014). For 
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Bartholomew, the price to be paid for the welfare state is not only financial, but also social, 
where for him, it has generated both “morally and culturally impoverished” individuals 
(2013:352). Whose only prerogative, for others (Humpries, 2013), is to take all they can 
and input nothing. Similarly, Lowe maintained that the welfare state is accused of being 
responsible for depleted levels of initiative and for the “creation of a dependency culture or 
nanny state” (1994:38).  
 
However, and as already emphasised, the “threat of the scrounger” (Deacon, 1978:120) 
and such “negative sentiments toward the welfare state and a perceived culture of 
idleness” (Finlay et al., 2013:13) are not new. What is notable, however, is that such 
attitudes have arguably become more explicit throughout the period of austerity examined 
here. This kind of rhetoric was also reflected in responses toward the programmes 
discussed in Chapter 2 and more generally, reflected in attitudes toward inequality and 
poverty, as a whole. What was less understood was how over the course of austerity 
examined here, such narratives were reflected amongst the British public, how these 
related to redistributional support and to what extent this changed over this period of time.  
 
Notably, despite increasing hostility toward taxation (Alcock and May, 2014), the welfare 
state and its recipients as a whole, the welfare state has nevertheless, survived “one crisis 
after another” (Esping-Anderson, 1999:147). The latest test was, arguably, brought about 
by the Coalition and subsequent Conservative government. Where, accompanied by 
reignited “moral panics” over the welfare state, like those seen during Thatcher’s reign 
(Friedmann et al.,1987:16), a new attempt to dismantle the welfare state began (Mendoza, 
2015), with a familiar target. In the wake of the recession, neo-liberal austerity measures 
were implemented in an effort to “roll back the state” and thus reduce public spending and 
the deficit (HM Government, 2010; Crawford et al., 2012; Levitas, 2012; Brady and Bostic, 
2015). These changes placed increasing strain on this social contract, where both “tension 
and anxiety about the role and the future of the welfare state” appeared to intensify 
(Castell and Thompson, 2007:11), alongside “fears and anxieties” toward people who 
accessed it (Tyler, 2013:9) or indeed those accused, once again, of “sponging” off of it 
(Holman, 1978:81).  
 
Whilst previously, the welfare state promised a “guarantee against social risks” (Esping-
Anderson, 1999:31), contemporarily, it is accused of creating welfare dependency, rather 
than that of “opportunity” (O’Hara, 2014:17). Like before, the idea that the “welfare state 
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cosseted the people, ‘sapped their moral fibre’, ruined character and destroyed…sturdy 
independence”, returned (Seabrook, 2015:149). The welfare state, understood as a 
system that not only “feather-bedded” people, but “provided a refuge for the idle and 
workshy” was thus reignited (Seabrook, 2015:149). 
 
The introduction of austerity measures focused on reducing the deficit by reducing welfare 
spending and making cuts and changes to the benefit system, have placed further strain 
on individuals already struggling (Cooper and Whyte, 2017). Indeed, as Esping-Anderson 
highlighted, “a paradox of our times is the more that welfare states seem unstable, the 
greater…the demands for social protection” (1999:145). Social protection has arguably 
been reduced by the consequences of this economic, or indeed ideological plan, and 
these consequences have been widely evidenced throughout this research. To reiterate, 
food bank use has increased, signalling the rise of hunger and food poverty (O’Connell 
and Hamilton, 2017), as have reports of fuel poverty (London, 2017) and personal debt 
(Ellis, 2017). Alongside this, suicide rates have increased (O’Hara, 2017), as have 
mortality rates (Dorling, 2017). People have found themselves increasingly more likely to 
be evicted from their homes, or have seen them repossessed (Paton and Cooper, 2017), 
and as McCulloch (2017) argues, whilst the prevalence of homelessness has increased, 
so too has the violence toward rough sleepers. 
  
Whilst these changes have occurred, rising “anxieties and hostilities” toward those in 
receipt of benefits, also re-emerged (Tyler, 2013:9; Toynbee and Walker, 2015), with the 
rhetoric of the ‘skiver’, of the ‘work shy’ and fraudulent benefit claimant, appearing in 
tabloid newspapers, broadcasted media, alongside political rhetoric and manifestos 
(Castell and Thompson, 2007; Mooney and Hancock, 2010; Shildrick and MacDonald, 
2013; Burnett, 2017). People in receipt of benefits were depicted as individuals who had 
nothing to offer society, but much to draw from it. Borrowing from Seabrook, this perhaps 
signalled the onset of a reinvigorated “attack on the poor” (2015:151), where as Cooper 
and Whyte suggest, “pro-austerity governments” found their “scapegoats for the financial 
crisis”, and these were benefit recipients (2017:7-8). Those ‘living off the social’, were thus 
the ‘others’, and needed to be stopped from ‘bleeding society dry’ (Castell and Thompson, 
2007; Bamfield and Horton, 2009).  
 
Issues of whether people were deserving of their circumstances, became of public interest, 
once more. Those who had made “poor personal choices” (Horton and Gregory, 2009:11), 
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who failed to strive in a meritocratic society like that of Britain, were the objects of scorn 
and ridicule (Castell and Thompson, 2007; Dorey, 2010). Notably, both representations 
and discussions of poverty and inequality, often emphasise how notions of others as 
“selfish, self-determined, free-riding, anti-social individuals, taking the system for what they 
can get” predominate (Castell and Thompson, 2007:14-15). Where welfare recipients are 
often described with both “pejorative and emotive language”, including the label ‘chav’ 
(Tyler 2008; Tyler 2013).   
 
What is often emphasised less, is that although people are mostly supportive of the 
welfare state, largely because it corresponds with “deeply held norms of reciprocity and 
conditional obligations to others” (Fong et al.,2003:1), this conditionality often centres 
around why people believe others are in the situation they are in, and their apparent “moral 
failings”, thus whether they could have avoided it, had they tried harder (Clarke and 
Newman, 2012: 310). Contemporary explanations for why people are impoverished and 
experiencing inequality, appear to chime with those present in Victorian England, where 
“fears…about the disorderly, dangerous and depraved lower orders” predominated (Clarke 
and Newman, 2012:310). Although the demeaning language used to describe the ‘less 
well off’, is not new and has been in use for a number of generations, it is however 
powerful, acting as a form of symbolic violence (Mooney and Hancock 2010; Mckenzie, 
2015).  
 
The apparent “dysfunctionality” of the poor seeks to “construct and reinforce…attitudes to 
poverty and welfare”, often hardening attitudes and justifying “harsher welfare policies”, 
aimed at individuals and groups that need the most support (Mooney and Hancock, 2010: 
no pagination). By contrast to developing countries, the existence of poverty and inequality 
in the UK, fails to illicit the same response, where an unwillingness to offer “the same kind 
of sympathy and support” is often observed (Castell and Thompson, 2007:10). Like the 
language used to describe people in inequality and poverty, stereotypical assumptions and 
beliefs are also powerful, directing people’s attitudes and behaviours toward others (Glynn 
et aI.,1999; Tyler, 2013). In this way stigma and stereotypical assumptions have “practical 
consequences” of which are of “great significance for poverty prevention” (Horton and 
Gregory, 2009:88).  
 
Horton and Gregory argue that the stigmatising process: 
influences social behaviours in ways that can directly affect policy 
effectiveness; for example, resulting in low take-up of benefits or lack of 
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compliance with policy on the part of the stigmatised. But it is in its effect on 
social relations, and the resulting negative attitudes towards welfare 
recipients, that stigma exerts its most pernicious effect (2009:88). 
 
It can be argued then, that the reinforcement of negativity and prejudice towards those 
living with the experience of inequality and poverty, has many possible significant 
outcomes. Not only can they work against preventative strategies, but they also have a 
detrimental impact on those in receipt of support from the welfare state. The 
consequences of stereotypes are thus not only “profound” but are also formed as a result 
of “direct” and indirect experiences, “from what we are told by other people or by the 
media”, alongside what we observe for ourselves (Glynn et al.,1999:148). Although the 
effects of mediated discourse are questionable (McQuail, 1994), and the extent of impact 
the media has on shaping attitudes, and behaviours, remains subject to debate (Holman, 
1978), this is one that is not entered into here. Instead, it is recognised that the world is 
largely “saturated by media sounds and images” (McQuail, 1994:327), and that this does 
“have some impact” (Holman, 1978:210) on people’s perceptions of others, at least.  
Hanley reinforces this view, arguing that the media remains a “major influence on public 
debate, in being both reflectors and shapers of attitudes” (2009:6).  
 
As Chapter 2 demonstrated, more recently the British media has become “saturated” 
(McQuail, 1994:327) with newly televised images of people who are poor, yet are 
represented as engaging in the “abuse” of the “social security system”, who “chose 
[choose] not to work” and who are “scroungers”, who “deserve their poverty” (Holman, 
1978:212-213). In the midst of crisis, a genre termed ‘poverty porn’ (Jensen, 2013) thus 
emerged, enabling what Shildrick refers to as ‘poverty propaganda’ (2018). Concurrently, 
concern that these programmes would result in the reinforcement of the perception that 
people who experience inequality and poverty, do so at their own hands grew (Horton and 
Gregory, 2009; Toynbee and Walker, 2015; Lansey and Mack, 2015; Shildrick, 2018).  
 
Much like Holman observed in the late 1970’s, today people experiencing poverty and 
inequality are, thus, “cast in an unfavourable light” (1978:212). This genre of television 
programme, alongside headlines from the printed media and political rhetoric, as 
emphasised in Chapter 2, can be considered ‘poverty propaganda’ (Shildrick, 2018) and 
have an important function and even more important consequences. Because the media 
has the capacity to “connect people”, it also has the capacity to “build public support for 
addressing poverty” (Hanley, 2009:7), to provide space to debate, to inform, but also to 
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neglect important issues. Rather than instances of poverty and inequality in the UK being 
neglected, however, the consequences of living life on little to no income has become 
something of a “spectator sport” (Hanley, 2009:7). Thus, as emphasised in Chapter 2, 
instead of mediated representations seeking to inform others of the extent of poverty and 
inequality in the UK, the prevalence of ‘scroungers’ has predominated, where the term 
“scroungerphobia” (Golding and Middleton, 1982:59) can, once again, be utilised to 
describe the public’s feelings and “intolerance towards those at the bottom” (Shildrick and 
MacDonald, 2013:296).  
 
Notably, this research has emphasised how people’s attitudes towards those at the “top”, 
are thus, often considerably different to those directed at people on lower incomes, where 
“negative and punitive” attitudes prevail (Bamfield and Horton, 2009:6; Dorey, 2010). 
Programmes like Benefit Street arguably seek to reinforce this and, as Burnett argues “to 
reduce their subjects to objects of ridicule and contempt, turning human struggles into a 
sneering form of entertainment” (2017:217). People in receipt of benefits or those who are 
unemployed, have thus become “figurative scapegoats” who are now “imagined to be a 
parasitical drain and threat to scarce…resources” (Tyler, 2013:9). Whilst the media has the 
scope for information to be presented to the public, for the stimulation of debate 
(McKendrick et al., 2008:6), it also has the scope to reinforce these ideas (Tyler 2013), 
and to reinforce the rhetoric of the undeserving poor, as whole.  
 
For Shildrick and MacDonald these kinds of narratives prove more salient, and “sell better 
than would the mundane reality” (2013: 296). These “mundane” realities would, should 
they become the focus of the British tabloid press, and indeed politicians, include 
headlines concerning the reliance on food that is past its sell-by date, how working for a 
minimum wage means “drudgery”, and how many individuals and families are “going 
without”; instead they are focused on fraud, and the imagined “luxurious lives of families 
on benefits” (Shildrick and MacDonald, 2013:296). Whilst an analyse of the relationship 
between the media and perceptions of inequality, poverty and redistribution is beyond the 
scope of this thesis, the prevalence of ‘poverty porn’ (Jensen, 2013) and ‘poverty 
propaganda’ (Shildrick, 2018) have been incorporated to highlight the social and cultural 
climate in austerity Britain.  
 
Whilst is has been noted that these representations are not, nor are the associated 
stereotypical assumptions, new; they are frequent and have incited “outrage against 
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people in poverty” (Shildrick and MacDonald, 2013:296). Resulting, further, in members of 
the public struggling to imagine people experiencing disadvantage “in positive terms” 
(Bamfield and Horton, 2009:6). Indeed, whilst research demonstrated how people did 
believe that the recession had negatively impacted the lives of others, including those on 
low incomes, attitudes remained centred around the idea of a “culture of poverty” and an 
“intergenerational transmission of disadvantage” (Fahmy et al., 2012:6). Some considered 
how structural inequalities created disadvantage, yet highly individualistic “moral 
distinctions” were also drawn-out between those who deserved help, and those who did 
not (Fahmy et al., 2012:6).  
 
Both representations, explanations of and attitudes towards people experiencing poverty 
and inequality, like these are important (Leon, 2012), often feeding into a “widespread 
belief that, where poverty does exist, it must be self-imposed” (Shildrick and MacDonald, 
2013:296).  It is argued that stigmatising expressions towards others, function as tool 
insuring “a form of governance”, resulting in the legitimatisation of both the “reproduction 
and entrenchment of inequalities and injustices” (Tyler, 2013:8). This is also supported by 
Shildrick (2018). Thus, the longer people experiencing poverty and inequality are framed 
as deserving of their circumstances, the more difficult these attitudes will be to overcome 
(Williamson, 1974; Larsen and Dejgaard, 2013).  
 
Understanding how people experiencing poverty and inequality are represented, alongside 
how people conceive of others in these situations, “provides…insights into the legitimation 
of social and economic inequality”, alongside the “legitimacy of collective responses” 
towards these social issues, like that of initiatives to combat inequality and poverty, and 
perceptions of the welfare state (Oorschot, 2000:3). As Evans and Kelley stress, if 
inequality fails to be recognised, “it may have no political consequences; but if it is 
recognised (or imagined) it will have consequences, perhaps grave ones” and it is for 
these reasons “it is essential to understand how people perceive their society” (2017:316). 
As Prabhakar adds, the attitudes of the British public “act as a constraint upon politicians 
and policy-makers” (2012:78), where public support is necessary to combat inequality and 
poverty in the UK. Yet, to reiterate, hardening attitudes may also mean that “harsher 
welfare policies” are supported (Mooney and Hancock, 2010: no pagination) by the British 
public, rather than challenged. Whilst it is beyond the scope of this research to determine 
whether the public supported austerity polices between 2009-2015, the relationship 
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between negative attitudes toward people experiencing inequality and poverty and support 
toward redistribution during this period are examined critically.   
 
For Horton and Gregory, writing before austerity measures were enacted, both diminishing 
levels of “support for redistribution and declining sympathy for those in poverty” were 
already “reaching crisis proportions” (2009:50-51). Given the level of public resistance 
towards redistribution, and that much of the literature suggests that attitudes towards those 
in receipt of benefits are often negative (Holman, 1978; Castell and Thompson, 2007; 
Mooney and Hancock, 2010; Orton and Taylor, 2010; Tyler 2013; Shildrick and 
MacDonald, 2013; O’Hara, 2014; Toynbee and Walker, 2015), it was expected that this 
would be reflected in the analysis. Thus, it was expected that increasing hostility toward 
benefit recipients would be observable, and these attitudes would reduce the likelihood of 
people expressing support toward redistribution. However, it was also expected that the 
inequality faced by a significant proportion of the British public would also be reflected in 
the analysis, and that particular groups may not only be more likely to recognise the extent 
of income inequality, but also found to be becoming increasingly more likely to support 
measures to combat disadvantage over time. 
 
As Chapter 2 demonstrated, however, attitudes are complex, contradictory and change, 
and this is also reflected in societies in which they are formed (Orton and Rowlingson, 
2007; Voas, 2014; Evans and Kelley, 2017). The findings of the analysis presented in 
Chapter 4 and Chapter 5 further support this contention. With this in mind, whilst this 
section has set the scene, the following section draws on the available research, alongside 
the research questions, critically discussing the findings outlined in Section’s 4.1-4.3 and 
5.1-5.5 to explore public perceptions of inequality, poverty and redistribution over the 
course of austerity examined here (2009-2015). 
 
6.2 Public perceptions, by year  
 
This section focuses on exploring British social attitudes between 2009-2015 and on the 
research questions outlined in Section 1.3. A range of the available social, political and 
economic literature is drawn on to explore the attitudes of the British public, bringing 
together the findings from Section’s 4.1-4.3 and 5.1-5.5, to understand how people 
perceived of income inequality between groups, the extent of support for redistribution and 
how benefit recipients were perceived during this period. Concurrently, the relationship 
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between negative attitudes toward those in receipt of benefits and support toward income 
redistribution is also considered critically.    
 
In doing so, this discussion is focused on exploring the following research questions: 
 To what extent have attitudes towards poverty and inequality changed following the 
introduction of austerity measures in 2010? 
 How are people in receipt of social security benefits perceived by others? 
 To what extent do negative attitudes towards those in receipt of benefits 
relate to the level of support expressed toward income redistribution? 
Over the course of austerity examined here, inequality and poverty have increased, with 
the consequences of austere policies already emphasised (Chapter 2). As this chapter 
sought to reiterate, the social, cultural, political and economic environment in austerity 
Britain has been a key part of the focus of this research. Intent on the provision of a 
sociological exploration of social inequalities and attitudes during this period, this meant 
drawing on a wide range of research to explore austerity Britain through a sociological 
lens. Demonstrating the importance of sociological research, this section focuses on 
bringing key elements of this research together, discussing social inequalities and 
attitudinal differences, to explore attitudes toward inequality, poverty and redistribution by 
year. To do so, the available literature is drawn on, alongside the provision of a critical 
narrative, highlighting the findings but also the expectations, prior to analysis. 
 
Whilst Orton and Rowlingson (2007) suggest that concern for inequality should rise in line 
with increasing inequality, it was however, unclear whether the findings outlined in Section 
4.1 would reflect this assumption. Despite growing social inequalities, the prevalence of 
‘poverty porn’ (Jensen, 2013) and ‘poverty propaganda’ (Shildrick, 2018) also 
predominated during the period of austerity examined here. Though not unchallenged 
(Section 2.5.2), not only was this present in broadcasted and printed media, this was 
discussed on social media platforms and reflected in political rhetoric. Given these factors, 
it might be expected that this would be reflected in the analysis, where the extent of 
income inequality would be underestimated, and perhaps reduce over time. In this way, 
not only would a small proportion of the public agree that ‘the gap between people on high 
and low incomes is too large’, this proportion would decrease from 2009, into 2012 and 
2015.  
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Instead, Orton and Rowlingson’s assumption is, in part, reflected in the analysis. Not only 
did a substantial proportion of the public agree that the income gap is ‘too large’, levels of 
agreement increased significantly between 2009-2012 (Section 4.1.1). Findings from Table 
4.1.1.1 also support this, suggesting that in comparison to people in 2009, people in 2012 
were significantly more likely to agree. Thus, rather than reflecting popular discourse, 
these findings appear to echo those of Irwin’s (2016) and Fahmy et al. (2012), suggesting 
that people were both aware of and concerned about the prevalence of income inequality 
in Britain. Perhaps then, given these findings it could be argued that the “mundane” 
realities (Shildrick and MacDonald, 2013:296) of life lived on a low income, began to 
resonate amongst the public to a greater extent than before austerity measures were 
enacted.  
 
Between 2012-2015, however, attitudes changed (Table 4.1.1). Concern toward income 
inequality, declined significantly, falling to a level lower than observed in 2009. The 
findings identified in Table 4.1.1.1 also reflect this, where compared to people in 2009, in 
2015 people were less likely to recognise the income gap as ‘too large’. In the context of 
austerity Britain, this attitudinal change amongst members of the British public occurred 
following key changes to the administration of benefits and cuts to public spending, with 
the changes implemented resulting in further inequality of income, (Fawcett, 2013; Ginn, 
2013; WBG, 2013; Rubery, 2015; Fisher and Nandi, 2015; Mendoza, 2015; UNCESCR, 
2016), thus widening the gap between those on high and low incomes.  
 
Alongside these changes, what is also particularly interesting to consider, is how between 
2012-2015, there was a rise in the number of broadcasted television programmes, 
depicting those in receipt of low incomes and in receipt of benefits, in often exploitative 
and derogatory ways (Mooney and Hancock, 2010; Penny, 2013; Jensen, 2013). The 
programmes noted in Section 2.3, reinforce a number of long running stereotypes 
attributed to benefit claimants, this includes: fraudulence, dependence, criminality, over 
reproductivity amongst mothers on benefits, and an unwillingness to work (Baker and 
McEnery, 2015; Brooker et al., 2015; Paterson et al., 2016; van der Bom et al., 2018). 
Another focus within these programmes concerned the consumption patterns of those 
experiencing inequality, here responses to these programmes involved queries 
surrounding purchases made, including tobacco and alcohol. Thereby implying that 
benefits were generous, but also that those featured in these programmes were both 
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‘flawed consumers’ (Bauman, 2007) alongside irresponsible (Mooney and Hancock, 2010; 
Brooker et al., 2015; Paterson et al., 2016; van der Bom et al., 2018).   
 
Alongside broadcasted media, tabloid newspapers and politicians also, arguably, engaged 
in the spreading of ‘poverty propaganda’ (Shildrick, 2018). This was particularly prevalent 
in 2015’s General Election and the Conservative Manifesto (Conservative Manifesto, 
2015).Theorists’ have, subsequently, questioned both the timing of these programmes and 
the producers’ intentions, suggesting the focus sought to divide the public, in order to 
validate austere cuts to benefits and public spending (Mooney and Hancock, 2010; Penny, 
2013, Shildrick and MacDonald, 2013; O’Hara, 2014; Shildrick, 2018). Whilst it is beyond 
the scope of this research to suggest that the media directly influenced the attitudinal 
changes observed in this research, as McKendrick et al. (2008) explain, how individuals 
come upon poverty, and by extension inequality, not only guides their understanding, but 
also their responses toward it. In this way, not only are the processes of attitude formation 
complex (Orton and Rowlingson, 2007), attitudes occur as a result of social and cultural 
interaction (Voas, 2014), varying, as do the “cultural and social conditions” (Underwood, 
2009:113) wherein they are formulated. It is therefore necessary to understand what 
available narratives were prevalent during the period of austerity examined here.  
 
Whilst it remains unclear how members of the British public formed their attitudes, what is 
clear from the findings outlined so far, is that following the onset of the recession and the 
implementation of austerity measures, concern toward income inequality rose as inequality 
did. Yet, as key changes were ushered in and the effects of austerity became explicit, 
concern toward inequality of income between groups, declined. These declining levels of 
agreement also occurred alongside the rise of the programmes considered ‘poverty porn’ 
(Jensen, 2013) or containing what Shildrick (2018) refers to as ‘poverty propaganda’ and 
following the election of a new Conservative government in 2015. That said, despite falling 
levels of agreement, a large proportion of the public continued to recognise the extent of 
income inequality, through the shared view that the income gap is ‘too large’. 
 
As Evans and Kelley (2017:316) remind us, there is an ongoing conflict, one that exists 
“between the equality advocated by the left and inequality favoured by the right” and this 
conflict has shaped “modern western politics” and continues to do so. This conflict was 
arguably observable in both 2010 and 2015’s General Elections. Alongside the enactment 
and continuation of austerity policies, what has also been increasing, is what 
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Hatzisavvidou described as a rise in the number of “agents of [an] anti-austerity rhetoric” 
(2018:no pagination) and this has included: UK Uncut, the People’s Assembly, Left Unity, 
SNP, and the Green Party. In the 2015 General Elections, leader of the Labour Party, 
Jeremy Corbyn, became an influential voice in the wider anti-austerity campaign, 
demonstrating the need to end austerity and highlighting the consequences of the related 
policies over time (Grierson and Slawson, 2017). Whilst it might have been expected that 
this would also have been reflected in these findings, given that these findings were 
collected (July) shortly after the election (May), the decrease in the number of people 
subscribing to the view that income gap is too large could suggest that this may not be the 
case.  
 
That said, More recently, as Clery and Dangerfield highlight, “the proportion favouring the 
view that the income gap is too large has remained relatively stable across the lifetime of 
the survey”, and this, they highlight, has fluctuated between 72% and 85%, meaning that 
“the proportion expressing this view has remained relatively stable over the past decade” 
(2019:13). As a result, they question whether “attitudes here align more closely with 
objective trends in inequality”, as opposed to “political and media discourse around this 
issue” (Clery and Dangerfield, 2019:13). Clery and Dangerfield also add, however, that 
“the fact that a substantial majority support this view” also means there may be “less 
potential to see an upward shift in views” (2019:13). 
 
The extent of support expressed toward the redistribution of income by the British public 
was another key focus of this research. Whilst, as already emphasised, Fong et al. note 
that as a result of “norms of reciprocity” people are largely supportive of the welfare state, 
they also stress the conditional element of this support (2003:1). Thus, support is often 
extended only toward those who are considering ‘deserving’ of help. Prior to the 
introduction of austerity measures, and the rise of ‘poverty propaganda’ (Shildrick, 2018), 
Horton and Gregory had already observed falling levels of redistributional support, 
alongside diminishing levels of “sympathy for those in poverty” (2009:50-51). Given these 
observations and that, as Section 2.4.1 and 2.5.1 emphasised, negative attitudes towards 
people in receipt of redistributed income prevail (Holman, 1978; Castell and Thompson, 
2007; Mooney and Hancock, 2010; Orton and Taylor, 2010; Tyler 2013; Shildrick and 
MacDonald, 2013; O’Hara, 2014; Toynbee and Walker, 2015), it was expected that this 
would be reflected in the analysis. Thus, that low levels of agreement with the statement 
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‘the government should redistribute income from the better off to the less well off’ would be 
observable, alongside declining levels of redistributional support, as austerity continued.  
 
Notably, these assumptions are partly reflected in the findings outlined in Section 4.2. 
Support for the redistribution of income between groups is particularly low, resonating 
amongst less than half of the British public in 2009, 2012 and 2015. This suggests that 
whilst the British public largely agree the income gap between those with a high and low 
income is ‘too large’, much fewer support a method to reduce this income gap. What Table 
4.2.1 also shows, however, is a significant increase in the redistributional support 
extended by members of the public between 2009-2012 and 2009-2015. Table 4.2.1.1 
also suggest that year has a significant effect on attitudes, where in comparison to people 
in 2009, people were 1.242 times more likely to agree in 2012 and 1.383 times more likely 
to support redistribution in 2015.  
 
Given these findings, public perceptions of redistribution appeared to be reflective of the 
thermostat effect in both 2012 and 2015 (Curtice, 2010), and more recent data suggests 
that this continued to be reflected amongst attitudinal data post 2015 (Curtice, 2016). As 
Curtice highlighted, in 2016 there were “signs of a reaction against the fiscal discipline of 
recent years”, where reflecting the ‘thermostat’ (Curtice, 2010), and with a greater 
proportion than in a decade, 48% of the British public felt that “the government should 
increase taxes and spend more” (2016:1). Perhaps then, based on this argument, the 
findings outlined in this research, could be understood as signalling a loss in support 
toward austerity policies or at the very least, some agreement amongst the public “that 
government cuts back on spending” resulted in the provision of “less satisfactory” services 
(Curtice, 2016:3) and indeed greater levels of inequality. That said, despite these 
increases, again in comparison to the perceived need of intervention to reduce the income 
inequality gap, these proportions remain particularly low.  
 
These findings appeared contradictory and led to further analyse, focused on exploring the 
possible relationship between perceptions of the income gap and of the redistribution of 
income. Section 4.3 illustrated how attitudes are often marked by contradiction. This 
statement is supported by the disparities between the proportion of people who agreed 
that ‘the gap between high and low incomes is too large’ and the proportion amongst this 
group, who also agreed that ‘the government should redistribute income from the better-off 
to the less-well-off’. These proportions are, however, observably greater than those 
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identified in Section 4.2. Whilst this analysis may have seemed common-sense and thus 
futile, with the results expected; given that attitudes are often inconsistent, this ‘puzzle’ 
(Rowlingson et al., 2010) warranted further investigation during this period.  
 
These findings can be interpreted in two ways. Firstly, support for the redistribution of 
income is more likely amongst people who also agree that income inequality between 
groups is ‘too large’. Thus, members of the public whom recognise income inequality as an 
issue, are more likely to support measures to combat it. Secondly, and further 
demonstrating the contradictory nature of attitudes, although people may regard the 
income gap between those with high and low incomes as one that is too large, this does 
not mean they too are entirely supportive of the redistribution of income as a method intent 
on “narrowing the gap between rich and poor” (Mack and Lansley, 1985:223). 
 
Since McKendrick et al. (2008), Monnickendam and Gordon (2010) and Prabhaker (2012) 
place strong emphasis on the role of the public and social policy, these findings are 
problematic. Both McKendrick et al. (2008) and Clarke and Newman (2012) consider how 
members of the public are often supportive of measures to tackle inequality (like that of 
redistribution) but stress how attitudes relating to why people are experiencing hardship 
may stand in the way of full support being extended. Mack and Lansley support this, 
highlighting that a “moralistic stance” is taken by the public, thus reflecting the contention 
that “some groups are poor or are in need because of their own personal failing than 
society’s” (1985:210). In this way, if personal circumstances reflect “individual 
inadequacies” like that of “fecklessness, mismanagement and feebleness”, then 
“disapproval” will often follow (Mack and Lansley, 1985:210). By extension, this may 
reduce the likelihood of people extending their support toward redistribution.  
 
This is descriptive of the “conditional obligations” considered by Fong et al. (2003:1), 
further implying that if people fail to meet these conditional requirements, support for 
redistribution will be lacking. Given this, and the evidence drawn on in Section’s 2.4.1 and 
2.5.1, Chapter 5 explored negative attitudes towards those in receipt of benefits, reflective 
of some of the key themes drawn out in the literature. Accordingly, emphasis was placed 
on the rhetoric of the undeserving poor, of fraudulence amongst benefit recipients and a 
culture of dependency as a result of generous benefit payments. As Section 2.5 
emphasised, much like Townsend (1979:427) observed, “punishing attitudes to poverty” 
continue, with the “the notion of the undeserving poor” remaining popular (JRF, 2016:8). 
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Toynbee and Walker note the contrasts between the two groups, one distinguished as 
“moral” and “deserving”, the latter depicted as “undeserving” and “immoral (2015:9).  
 
Seabrook sought to understand how this has occurred, exploring the historical 
representations of people in poverty and reactions towards them (2015). Noting 
continuities over time, he argues whilst “the savagery is mitigated with time; the odium 
remains” (2015:45). Here, Seabrook is referring to the practice of branding those 
considered Vagabonds with the letter V, more contemporarily, however, people 
experiencing inequality continue to be represented unfavourably (Holman, 1978), 
figuratively branded “immoral, godless, ignorant, feckless, infantile” (Ferdinand, 2010:175), 
alongside ‘shirkers’, ‘lazy’, ‘profligate’, ‘work shy’ (Pantazis, 2016). Because these 
descriptions are individualistic (Pantazis, 2016), as Shildrick and MacDonald note, such 
portrayals lead to the assumption that hardship is “self-imposed” (2013:296). This has 
continued to occur during austerity, with welfare claimants arguably framed to reinforce 
this rhetoric in programmes like Benefits Street (Paterson et al., 2016; Shildrick, 2018).  
 
Given these factors, Chapter 5 thus explored the extent of negative attitudes towards 
recipients of welfare support, but also considered again, support toward income 
redistribution. Not only did this Chapter respond to the first research question: How are 
people in receipt of social security benefits perceived by others? This section also sought 
to respond to the third research question: to what extent do negative attitudes toward 
those in receipt of benefits relate to the level of support expressed toward income 
redistribution? Further, in considering attitudinal differences between years, the second 
research question: to what extent have attitudes towards poverty and inequality changed 
following the introduction of austerity measures in 2010? was also explored. 
 
It was expected that the findings outlined in Chapter 5 would reflect the growing body of 
literature discussed in this research (Section 2.5), which suggests that attitudes toward 
benefit recipients and people experiencing inequality are hostile, alongside punitive. 
However, as Table 5.1.2 shows, a different picture emerged. In 2009, in the aftermath of 
the economic crash, a little over a third of the British public agreed that ‘many people who 
get social security don't really deserve any help’. Concurrently, Table 5.2.2 also showed 
that a similar proportion of the public also agreed that fraudulence was an issue amongst 
“most people” in receipt of benefits in 2009. These findings initially suggested that in the 
wake of recession, the majority of the public expressed more benevolence towards people 
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receiving benefits, than negative sentiments toward this group. Thus, supporting those of 
Taylor-Gooby, who demonstrated that in times of national economic hardship, like that of 
recessions, people are often more compassionate towards those in receipt of social 
security benefits (2004).  
 
That said, the findings in Table 5.3.2 suggest, however, that this may not be reflective of 
the whole picture. Not only did the public regard welfare generosity and dependency as an 
issue amongst benefit claimants, by comparison to the findings outlined in Table 5.1.2 and 
5.2.2, this was an issue that resonated amongst more members of the public. In 2009, 
over half the public agreed that ‘if welfare benefits weren’t so generous, people would 
learn to stand on their own feet’. This latter finding points to research that has shown how 
this perception is one that is reoccurring (Mooney and Hancock, 2010; Hills, 2015) and as 
Mooney and Hancock (2010) and Penny (2013) argue, was one given prominence in 
programmes depicting the lives of people in receipt of benefits. This, for Mooney and 
Hancock, was achieved with a focus on their consumption patterns, or rather on “non-
essentials” like alcohol, cigarettes and electrical goods, thus they argue, leading viewers to 
conclude that “the benefits which claimants receive must be ‘too much’…” (2010: no 
pagination). As already stated, this was also reflected amongst political rhetoric.   
 
By 2012 however, not only had the Coalition been in office, driving a programme of 
austerity for two years, The Welfare Reform Act had also passed, receiving royal assent in 
March of that year (Park et al., 2012b). This acts purpose was to ensure “far-reaching 
changes” were made to the “benefits and tax credits system”, thus over time, seeking to 
“reduce the underlying demand for welfare support” (Park et al., 2012b:3). Given these 
changes, alongside mediated and political coverage, it was expected that the analysis 
would reflect this, and that as a result greater proportions of the public may express a 
more punitive attitude towards those in receipt of benefits.  
 
As expected, attitudes towards those in receipt of benefits did change in this period. The 
proportion of people agreeing that benefit recipients were undeserving of help and 
fraudulently claiming in some way, increased. Perceptions of benefit recipients as 
dependent, due high benefit payments also increased during this period. The greatest 
changes were, however, observable amongst people who agreed that benefit recipients 
were ‘fiddling in one way or another’ (Table 5.2.1). These attitudinal changes suggest that 
between 2009-2012, attitudes toward those in receipt of benefits hardened. Whilst these 
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changes could reinforce the idea that as a climate of austerity continued, as did rising 
hostility towards those in receipt of benefits, the public’s view too changed direction, 
hardening as a result. As Park et al. emphasise, such perceptions of others as 
‘undeserving’ have been observable for some time (2012b), and as the findings presented 
in Table’s 5.1.1, 5.2.1 and 5.3.1 suggest, these increases between years are not 
significantly different.  
 
Despite what could be considered as only a small proportion of the British public holding 
views that chime with the rhetoric of the ‘skiver’ and ‘undeserving poor’ (Holman, 1978; 
Castell and Thompson, 2007; Mooney and Hancock, 2010; Orton and Taylor, 2010; Tyler 
2013; Shildrick and MacDonald, 2013; O’Hara, 2014; Toynbee and Walker, 2015), it would 
however be a mistake to offset concerns over the erosion of social cohesion (Orton and 
Taylor, 2010), and to draw conclusions of the possible impact of ‘poverty porn’ and 
‘poverty propaganda’, during the period of austerity, based on these findings alone. 
Instead, because a considerable proportion of the British public have remained consistent 
in the view that many people are ‘undeserving’ of help, with the lowest levels of agreement 
seen in 1993, climbing thereafter, until peaking to 40% in 2005 (Park et al., 2012b:24), this 
is suggestive of shifts (Tyler, 2008) amongst the British public, with the gaps in social 
distance (Bottero 2005) arguably extending and retracting over time.  
 
The findings drawn on so far, suggest that the public were not only aware of the income 
gap, but wished to see income redistributed, though to a much lesser extent. Indeed, those 
unsure whether they agreed with redistribution, alongside those who disagreed, were 
closer to the proportion of individuals whom recognised the income gap between groups is 
‘too large’. Suggesting that although the income gap was perceived of as ‘too large’, 
redistributing income was considered less of a priority. Further, these findings reflect a 
sense of “mistrust” (Penny, 2013: no pagination) among people, who alongside holding 
these views, were also seemingly dubious of benefits claimants in relation to fraud and to 
a greater extent dependency, alongside concerned with ensuring help reached the most 
‘deserving’.  
 
Between 2012-2015, however, attitudes toward benefit recipients appeared to change 
again. These changes were expected to reflect the political rhetoric during this period, and 
further the discourse surrounding benefit recipients and the welfare state as a whole. 
Thus, it was expected that these findings would be comparable with those of the dominant 
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political narrative of this period. This assumption can be supported by considering the 
rhetoric drawn on by George Osborne, the then chancellor of the exchequer, at a 
Conservative party conference in 2012 further, where he remarked:  
where is the fairness…for the shift-worker, leaving home in the dark hours 
of the early morning, who looks up at the closed blinds of their next-door 
neighbour sleeping off a life on benefits (in Jowit, 2013: no pagination). 
 
Such narratives reinforce the rhetoric of the undeserving poor, where the shirker is held in 
stark contrast to the worker, intensifying public mistrust of those who pay taxes and those 
in receipt of benefits. This rhetoric also reinforces notions of a dualism between the “bad 
benefit claimant” and the “good worker” (Patrick, 2012:10). Osborne, was moreover, not 
the only political figure that expressed such views, nor did he appear to be unsupported by 
the Conservative government in their manifesto. Indeed, this is observable in the reforming 
welfare section, where a discussion of the changes to be implemented (should they gain 
office), concluded with the Conservatives exclaiming that help would be available for those 
“who really need it” but that the “days of something for nothing” had come to end 
(Conservative Manifesto, 2015:26).  
 
Had the proportions of people in agreement increased, alongside observably low levels of 
redistributional support, this could at least partially, be understood as further evidence of 
how “beliefs about the characteristics and behaviour of claimants” are often taken into 
consideration (Elizabeth Finn care, 2012:14). With “the latter being strongly influenced by 
media representations and the assertions of politicians”, alongside personal experience 
(Elizabeth Finn care, 2012:14). However, growing intensity in punitive attitudes toward 
people in receipt of benefits is not observable within the findings. Instead, the proportion of 
people agreeing that people were undeserving of help fell, as did the proportion of people 
agreeing that fraudulence was something “most” benefit recipients engaged in, and these 
changes are significantly different. Whilst the proportion of people agreeing that generous 
welfare benefits resulted in dependency also fell, this change was not only small but also 
not significant.  
 
Tables 5.1.1.1, 5.2.1.1 and 5.3.1.1 also show how, having taken a number of other factors 
into account (gender, age, income, benefit status and employment status), the findings by 
year were related to attitudes. Table 5.1.1.1 suggested that in comparison to people in 
2009, people were 0.717 times less likely to agree that many benefit recipients were 
undeserving of help in 2015. Comparatively, Table 5.2.1.1 suggested that levels of 
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agreement toward the prevalence of fraud was also less likely in 2015, in comparison to 
2009 (0.776 times less likely). These findings were surprising. It was expected that wider 
social and cultural changes would have been reflected in the findings, with people 
becoming more likely to express punitive attitudes toward benefit recipients. Indeed, what 
was notable over this period was how the Coalition was replaced by a Conservative 
government, who were further united in their efforts to continue the programme of 
austerity, still headed by the then Prime Minister, David Cameron in 2015. Further, and as 
emphasised in Chapter 2, the rhetoric of the ‘undeserving poor’, and ‘the work shy’ was 
rehearsed not only amongst politicians, but also by the media, where ‘poverty porn’ 
(Jensen, 2013) and the promotion of ‘poverty propaganda’ emerged on a grand scale.  
 
Concurrently, the Conservatives promised reform, and implied the benefits system 
“allowed or even encouraged” benefits as a choice, rather than encouraging people to 
seek employment (Conservative Manifesto, 2015:27). This pledge came a year after the 
British public were introduced to the controversial Benefits Street (Ch4, 2014) and the 
residents of James Turner Street, Birmingham and those from Stockton-on-Tees. As 
Chapter 2 demonstrated, segments of the British public were ‘outraged’ (Mooney and 
Hancock, 2010; Shildrick and MacDonald, 2013) alongside disgusted (Mooney and 
Hancock, 2010), once again by those who are “at the bottom” (Bottero 2005:29). Whilst 
such perceptions did, arguably, resonate with a considerable proportion of the British 
public in 2009, 2012 and 2015, these changes were not only not as great as expected, and 
the proportion of people sharing these attitudes each year, was also expected to be larger.   
It has been argued that class polarisation and rising moral panics of the ‘lower orders’ 
were reignited (Clarke and Newman, 2012) during the period of austerity examined here.  
 
The intensification of negative and punitive representations of and behaviour toward those 
facing inequality, portrayed as ‘others’ from ‘lower’ social strata, however, also reignited 
debate over social injustice, public manipulation and political (and mediated) agendas 
(Castell and Thompson, 2007; Bamfield and Horton, 2009; Mooney and Hancock, 2010; 
Levitas, 2012; Baumberg et al., 2012; Tyler, 2013; Who Benefits?,2014; Mckenzie, 2015; 
Alston, 2018; Shildrick, 2018). Perhaps then, the majority of the British public resisted 
reflecting the rhetoric of the undeserving poor and of fraudulence amongst benefit 
recipients. The findings presented in Table 5.3.1, however, suggest that for more than half 
of the public at least, the rhetoric of a culture of dependency did resonate to a greater 
extent. Possible solutions to these findings are discussed in Chapter 7.  
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Focusing on the contradictory formation of social attitudes and of how negative 
perceptions of people experiencing poverty and inequality can hinder measures to combat 
these social issues, the analysis presented in Section’s 5.4.1 and 5.5.1 sought to explore 
possible relationship between negative attitudes toward benefit recipients and support 
toward redistribution. Focused on two popular stereotypical assumptions, the undeserving 
poor and dependency, Table 5.4.1 first shows the results of the analysis concerned with 
understanding how perceptions of benefit recipients as undeserving related to support 
toward redistribution. The findings suggest, unsurprisingly, that support toward monetary 
redistribution is considerably less likely amongst people who also share the view that 
‘many people who get social security don’t…deserve help’. This finding appears to reflect 
those of Fong et al. who suggest that perceptions of why need is necessary can impede 
the likelihood of supporting policy initiatives (2003).  
 
This was also reflected in Table 5.5.1. Amongst those who agreed that ‘if welfare benefits 
weren’t so generous people would learn to stand on their own feet’, support toward the 
redistribution of income was both less likely and lower than the proportions observed in 
Table 4.2.2, in each year. Though this may have been expected, this nevertheless 
strengthens the assumption that whilst punitive attitudes are shared by the British public, 
support toward redistribution will be lacking and this is a problem in need of addressing.  
Chapter 7 discusses this issue further, suggesting what could be done to reduce the 
impact of negative attitudes toward people in receipt of inequality and poverty on support 
toward redistribution. The following section summarises the attitudinal findings drawn on in 
this discussion. 
 
6.2.1 Summary  
 
In exploring the research questions, drawing on findings from Sections 4.1-4.3 and 5.1-5.5, 
alongside the available literature, this chapter has thus far enabled a sociological 
discussion of attitudinal changes. Alongside an understanding of the social, economic, 
cultural and political environment in austerity Britain between 2009-2015. In summary, this 
section has highlighted that between 2009-2012 the proportion of the British public 
believing that income inequality is a gap ‘too large’ increased. But by 2015, the proportion 
in agreement fell. Despite decreasing levels of agreement, perceptions of the income gap 
as ‘too large’ however, remained prevalent amongst a large majority of the British public.  
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Despite the majority of the public acknowledging the existence of large income gaps 
between groups, support for the redistribution of income was much lower. Although the 
public became more likely to support redistribution, reflecting the ‘thermostat effect’ 
(Curtice, 2010) this was an initiative supported by less than half of the British public in 
2009, 2012 and 2015. As demonstrated in Section 4.3, support towards the redistribution 
of income is, however, related to perceptions of the income gap. More specifically, support 
for the redistribution of income is significantly greater amongst people who agree that ‘the 
gap between high and low incomes is too large’. But, as these findings suggest, 
recognition of the extent of the income gap does not necessarily result in support toward 
measures to close this gap.  
 
Alongside these attitudinal differences, attitudes that arguably reflect the ‘poverty 
propaganda’ Shildrick (2018) observed, are also present amongst the public. Between 
2009-2015, attitudes toward benefit recipients fluctuated. In 2009, more than half of the 
British public regarded benefit payments as too generous and thus resulting in 
dependency. Though to a lesser extent, over a third of the public, also agreed that ‘many’ 
people in receipt of social security do not ‘really deserve help’, with slightly fewer in 
agreement that many of those in receipt of benefits were doing so fraudulently in some 
way. By 2012, shared attitudes reflective of this stereotypical discourse, appeared to 
increase. Though these increases between years were not statistically significant, they 
show how attitudes changed from those observed in 2009 and those collated in 2012. By 
2015, however, the likelihood of agreement fell again. Suggesting that the contention that 
‘if welfare benefits weren’t so generous, people would learn to stand on their own feet’ 
remained more of a concern (52.9%), relative to concerns about deservingness (28.7%), 
or indeed fraudulence amongst claimants (29.8%).  
 
To reiterate, though much larger proportions of the public recognise the gap between low 
and high incomes as one that is too large, this does not mean they are also likely to be 
fully supportive of the redistribution of income. Though the prevalence of stereotypical 
attitudes is lesser than those expected, as this research has identified, these attitudes are 
related to support toward redistribution. Thus, attitudes reflective of stereotypical 
assumptions like that of welfare generosity and dependency or indeed deservingness, 
reduce the support needed to combat inequality, meaning that efforts to close the gap 
between groups, thus reducing social inequalities, are hindered if not halted entirely.  
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With this issue is mind, further exploration was needed. Having discussed the findings in 
relation to the literature by year, the following sections explore each research question 
again, focussing the analysis by discussing the socio-economic and demographic 
characteristics of the British public. Accordingly, the following section draws on the findings 
outlined in Chapter 4 and 5, discussing the findings in relation to the available literature to 
explore attitudinal differences in relation to socio-economic and demographic 
characteristics. The section begins with an introduction, noting how attitudes are 
understood in this research. Not only does this section draw on redistribution preference 
theories (2.6.2.1), Cannadine’s (1998) two-sided model is considered, critically, alongside 
the findings and the literature presented in Chapter 2.  
 
6.3 Public perceptions by socio-economic and demographic characteristics, 
introduction  
 
The British public’s attitudes have been explored by socio-economic and demographic 
characteristics, not only to understand how aspects of social identity relate to perceptions, 
but to also identify the direction of future attitudinal research and where future support may 
need to be targeted. This is, however, a complex endeavour. Chapter 2 highlighted how 
attitudes are formed in a number of ways, including through interaction, with attitudes often 
reflective of social distance and as ways in which people position themselves relative to 
others (Goffman, 1959; Hogg and Terry, 1980; Bottero, 2005, Underwood, 2009; Voas, 
2014). Not only do attitudes reflect personal experiences, some may reflect the attitudes of 
others or may even differ markedly within some social situations (Goffman 1959; Bottero, 
2005). What is also acknowledged, is how individuals possess an array of overlapping 
social identities and that the possession of certain identities, means that some groups are 
more vulnerable to the experience of inequality and poverty than others (Taylor and 
Spencer, 2004; UKCES, 2014).  
 
Despite the complex and contradictory intersection of a number of these identities, it is 
argued that social attitudes can, nevertheless, be predicted based on these identities 
(Luttig, 2013). In the following sections, alongside the available sociological literature, a 
range of alternative theories are considered. These theories include: Reference group 
theory, reference group and reality blend theory (Evans and Kelley, 2017), Rational Choice 
Theory, the spiral of silence model (Scheufele, 2008) and the theory of risk aversion and 
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risk exposure (Leon, 2012).To explore attitudinal changes, the role of altruism, social 
values and of “empathy and socio-cultural distance” (Orton and Rowlingson, 2007:34) are 
also drawn on. Alongside this, Cannadine’s understanding of “us” and “them” (Cannadine, 
1998:19-20) and Bottero’s explanation of the consequences of “images of inequality” 
(2005:18) are also incorporated. 
 
Prior to this, it is however, necessary to contextualise further and recognise the shifting 
landscape of Britain over this period (2009-2015). To reiterate, these data were collected 
in the wake of an economic crisis, a crisis that was to send “shock waves” throughout the 
UK (Schifferes and Knowles, 2015:46). Such financial instability paved the way for 
“unprecedented” and “far reaching” reforms (Lupton et al., 2015:1) to the benefit system, 
including cuts, sanctions and a subsequent increase in inequality and poverty (O’Hara, 
2014; Butler, 2015; Toynbee and Walker, 2015; Kyprianou, 2015). By 2015 the UK had 
been headed by the Coalition government, one that was keen to roll out austerity, reduce 
the deficit and ensure that the country was performing better economically, for a total of 
five years. Although the Coalition declared that this form of governmental invention was to 
create a bigger and better society (Building the Big Society, 2010), unequivocally across 
these years, Britain became a more unequal and a more divided country.  
 
Notably, this polarisation did not just occur economically, but as Chapter 2 and 5 
demonstrate, also socially. The rhetoric of the ‘skiver’, of benefit dependency and 
fraudulent benefit claimants, arguably, intensified this division. As illustrated in Chapter 2 
and Chapter 5, this discourse was not only prevalent in the print media but also broadcast 
media and was deliberated further across social media platforms (Mooney and Hancock, 
2010; Skeggs, 2013; Penny, 2013; Kyprianou, 2015; Mckenzie, 2015; Shildrick, 2018). 
Importantly, this discourse was also verified and adopted by the Coalition and the 
subsequent Conservative government (Penny, 2013; O’Hara, 2014; Mckenzie, 2015; 
Kyprianou, 2015; Toynbee and Walker, 2015). Chapter 2 highlighted widening social 
inequalities in the wake of the crisis and subsequent austerity measures. To understand 
how people perceived of benefit recipients, the income gap and redistributional support, 
this section seeks to explore the experiences of austerity by social identity.  
 
Whilst it is important to collate statistical data and demonstrate how poverty and inequality 
manifests and changes over time for, and between different social groups, to really 
understand poverty and inequality and moreover perceptions of them, statistical evidence 
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alone is often insufficient (Holman, 1978). Perceptions are thus not formulated within a 
vacuum, they are intrinsically entwined with societal experiences, personal feelings and 
moreover attitudes (Holman, 1978). In this way, rather than merely predicting how people 
will behave, based on their social identities, a level of understanding as to why they may 
hold certain views is also pertinent. It is for these reasons that the prevailing social, 
economic, cultural and political environment in austerity Britain were also closely 
considered. 
 
From a sociological standpoint, it is posited that different groups of people, bound by the 
same social identities have been repeatedly identified as being at risk or indeed may 
already be suffering the ill effects of economic disparities in income, and these 
experiences may better explain attitudinal patterns and changes. Social inequalities in the 
context of austerity have thus been emphasised, where to be at risk is to possess certain 
social identities, including yet not limited to being disabled; a child or a woman; from an 
ethnic minority and or in receipt of a low income (UKCES, 2014; Fisher and Nandi, 2015; 
UNCESCR, 2016). Though, as this section highlights, further groups became vulnerable 
over the course of austerity examined here.  
 
Notably, individuals often possess multiple social identities, which may seek to reinforce 
inequalities or indeed privilege (Taylor and Spencer, 2004; UKCES, 2014). How each 
intersect is both complex and contradictory, it is nonetheless often possible to gauge social 
attitudes based on these identities (Luttig, 2013) and in doing so, gain a firmer 
understanding of which groups are more likely to support redistributive measures. What 
has however become increasingly clear, is that whilst “widening income 
inequalities…heightens the need for redistribution” (Wu and Chou, 2017:738), this does 
not mean there will be resounding support toward this process amongst the British public. 
Indeed, Section 4.2 and 4.3 highlighted this. 
 
Having reiterated how identity relates to the experiences of inequality, alongside attitudes, 
the thematic discussion begins by exploring perceptions by gender, followed by age, 
ethnic group and finally by educational attainment, employment status, occupation, income 
and benefit status. This discussion chapter will end with a summary, reflecting on the 
findings of this research, before concluding this chapter. 
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6.3.1 Perceptions of inequality, poverty and redistribution, by gender 
 
Drawing on research, sociological theory and the findings outlined in Section’s 4.1-4.2 and 
5.1-5.5, this section begins by exploring perceptions by gender, using the available 
literature, to explore the attitudinal findings further.  
As Chapter 2 emphasises, gender inequalities persist, despite legislative and attitudinal 
changes in the UK (Banyard, 2010). The disparities between men and women manifest in 
a number of ways and appear stubborn. Women are over represented amongst those on 
low incomes, living in poverty and subject to disadvantage in comparison to men (Longhi 
and Platt, 2008; Nandi and Platt, 2012; Conley, 2012; UKCES, 2014). Due to such 
subordinate positioning, it is assumed that women are often more altruistic than men and 
hold more egalitarian views (Goerres and Jaeger, 2016). For these reasons, it is often 
assumed that women will be more likely to recognise growing income inequality and, in 
this context, more likely to state that the income gap is ‘too large’. By extension, it can also 
be assumed that women rather than men, will also become increasingly more likely to 
recognise income inequality over time.  
 
Assumptions toward the redistribution of income are also understood in relation to those 
outlined in accordance with self-interest (Rational Choice Theory). This hypothesis 
stresses that those who are more likely to benefit from the redistribution of income, will be 
more likely to support the process, than those that stand to gain little (Wu and Chou, 
2017). Similarly, Whiteley (1981:465-6) describing need explanations and attitudes toward 
welfare spending, explains how perceptions are often a reflection of “personal and social 
circumstances”, suggesting that people who are in “greatest need” will prove more 
supportive than those who are “in least need”. Noting further, that the latter group will 
express more concern toward the necessary taxation required to fulfil this objective 
(Whiteley,1981). Similarly, Leon (2012) points to how ‘risk-exposure’ and ‘risk-aversion’ 
may also influence opinions. In this way, those who face greater exposure will be more 
supportive of redistribution, in an effort to evade future difficulties.  
 
Accordingly, it could be assumed that women will be more likely to support the 
redistribution of income relative to men, because they are more likely to benefit from these 
measures than men would. In contrast, it could be posited that men may be more 
concerned with the level of taxation required to enable redistribution, as a group least likely 
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to be in need. By extension, it could be assumed that women will be less likely to hold 
negative attitudes towards those in receipt of benefits. The findings presented in Section 
4.1, partially support these assumptions. A relationship between gender and attitudes is 
evident in 2015. As expected, more women than men agreed that income inequality 
between groups is ‘too large’. However, the gap in levels of agreement between men 
(77.9%) and women (78.1%) is particularly small. Whilst levels of agreement between both 
men and women declined over the period, this fall is also greater amongst women, than 
men. The expectation that the gap in levels of agreement between men and women would 
widen, as the polarisation of income intensified, is therefore not supported by the findings.  
 
The findings outlined in Section 4.2 are also at odds with the expectation that women will 
be more likely than men to support the redistribution of income, based on the principles of 
self–interest, risk aversion, altruism and indeed, need explanations. Instead, Table 4.2.2 
shows the relationship between gender and attitudes and how men were consistently more 
likely to support redistribution, in comparison to women. Whilst support for the 
redistribution of income grew amongst both men and women throughout the period of 
austerity explored here, support toward this initiative appeared stronger amongst men. 
Section 4.3 also illustrated how, compared to women, men were more likely to support the 
redistribution of income, if they also believed that the income gap is ‘too large’. Though 
men were also identified as the group more inclined to hold negative attitudes toward 
benefit recipients, relative to women these findings were not significant (Table 5.1.2, 5.2.2, 
5.3.2). 
 
To summarise, based on these findings, attitudes towards the redistribution of income and 
of income inequality, are related to gendered identities. The analysis revealed that despite 
women being more likely to perceive of income inequality as ‘too large’ in 2015, men were 
more likely to support measures to combat inequality, like that of redistribution in 2009, 
2012 and 2015. The analysis also highlights how both men and women are more likely to 
support redistribution, if they also agree that income inequality is ‘too large’. Though 
greater proportions of men appeared to hold negative attitudes toward benefit recipients, 
the findings do not suggest a significant relationship between gender and attitudes toward 
benefit recipients. 
In accordance with the assumptions of the Rational Choice Theory, risk aversion, need 
explanations and altruistic understandings and relevant literature, these findings appeared 
surprising. A number of reports noted how women had and would continue to be ‘hit’ 
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harder than men by austerity policies (Oxfam, 2012; O’Hara, 2014; De Henau and Reed, 
2016). In the aftermath of the recession, concerns were also raised as to how austerity 
measures may result in greater disparities and worsening gendered inequalities (Fawcett, 
2013; WBG, 2013; Rubery, 2015). Policies that were accused of being “gender-blind” 
(McKay et al., 2013:120) were enacted and fears that these polices posed a real risk of 
undoing the gains achieved in the ongoing quest for gender equality intensified (Fawcett, 
2013; WBG, 2013). In response to these fears, the Fawcett Society (2013) highlighted how 
measures outlined within The Equality Act 2006 were being infringed upon within the 
Coalition’s budget. Whilst their efforts were unsuccessful; their motion for a judicial review 
of the budget was thus denied in the Royal Court of Justice (Millins, 2017), whereby the 
policies implemented by the Coalition, were not judged as ‘unlawful’ (Fawcett, 2013), this 
illustrates further how austerity was set to increase polarisation between groups and how 
this would impact women, relative to men.  
Prior to the recession, women were disproportionately represented amongst those 
vulnerable to poverty, occupying positions in often precarious, low paid and part-time 
employment roles relative to men (Browne, 2011; Conley, 2012). Not only do men work 
more hours and have access to higher paid roles, gender disparities within the labour 
market also have “significant effects on the…gender pay gap” (UKCES, 2014:41), where 
women are often paid less than men for the same or equivalent roles. Women also 
continue to fulfil traditional gendered roles within the family, including unpaid domestic 
labour and childcare responsibilities (Conley, 2012). Women’s position in and access to 
the labour market and higher earnings, are moreover further inhibited due to the fulfilment 
of the “primary carer role” (De Henau and Reed, 2016:2) and as a result of the associated 
“interrupted employment histories” (Longhi and Platt, 2008:1). These gendered roles are 
also notable within the labour market, where occupational segregation and gendered 
expectations result in “the largest concentration of women’s unemployment in what have 
been called the five C’s: caring, cashiering, catering, cleaning and clerical” (Catney and 
Sabater, 2015:14).  
Although more women are now entering the labour market and there has been a rise in 
women occupying ‘female breadwinner’ roles in dual households, women remain 
disproportionately represented amongst those economically inactive, due to ‘looking after 
the home’, in comparison to men (ONS 2015). In many households’ women are also 
responsible for budgeting and often seek to prioritise the needs of others within the 
household (Pankhurst, 2002), often to the detriment of their own needs and health 
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(Bennett and Daly, 2014; Bennett, 2015). Conley stresses that this means women often 
become both “the managers” and the “shock-absorbers of poverty” (2012:16), so not only 
do women seek to provide for their families, but they will prioritise the needs of others and 
in doing so, ‘absorb’ the negative implications (shock) of living in poverty. Such disparities 
are further evident and compounded within lone parent families, headed by ‘female 
breadwinners’ (Karamessini, 2014:183), where women make up 90% of lone parents 
(Ginn, 2013). De Henau and Reed argue that this is further evidence of how ‘gender 
norms’ stifle women’s progression in the labour market; meaning women are often in 
receipt of low incomes (2016) and are occupationally segregated.  
As Bennett and Daly point out, although the “risks are also increasing for some men”, 
poverty is often calculated based on household income and much of the evidence across 
countries show that more women live in poverty, than do men (2014:17). Bennett and Daly 
further note, how calculating income and indeed poverty at the “household level” bring 
forth further complications (2014:17). Documenting further, that income may not be shared 
equally amongst couples and how this unfair sharing often results in instances of “hidden 
poverty” (2014:17) or perhaps even control. In this way, whilst it is known that women are 
more likely to experience income inequality and poverty relative to men, the existence of 
hidden poverty mean that statistics detailing these experiences amongst women, may not 
reflect the whole picture. That said, although the picture may not be entirely clear, women 
as a group were already economically vulnerable and were thus expected to feel and be 
‘hit’ harder by the consequences of austere policy changes, relative to men (Oxfam, 2012; 
Conley, 2012; Ginn, 2013; O’Hara, 2014; De Henau and Reed, 2016).  
This was in part, due to continued subordinate positioning in the labour market and the 
consequent reliance of women on a number of public services and social security 
provisions, in comparison to men (Oxfam, 2012; Conley, 2012; Ginn, 2013; De Henau and 
Reed, 2016). Changes such as the funding withdrawal for Sure Start centres, of which 
were created to support children from low income families (Ginn, 2013), cuts to Child 
Benefit and Tax Credits and funding for childcare were enacted, alongside restrictions to 
Local Housing Allowance and Housing Benefit and changes to Council Tax Benefits 
(Conley, 2012; Fawcett, 2013; De Agostini et al., 2014). For O’Hara these austere 
changes meant that a number of groups, including women and children, “were enduring 
inexplicable suffering on top of existing disadvantage” (2014:4). Subsequently, concern 
grew for women, as men were in a far better position to “weather the crisis” (Seguino, 
2010:185).  
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That said, the emphasis placed on women and their experiences of austerity, resulted in 
the accusation that discussions of the impact of austerity (through a gender lens), focused 
too heavily on women, thus disregarding (McKay et al., 2013) men and their experiences. 
Rather than women alone feeling the brunt of austere ideology, it was feared that more 
men were being adversely affected, not only in Britain and the UK but also in the United 
States (McKay et al., 2013). In the aftermath of the recession, levels of employment, 
unemployment and economic inactivity fluctuated amongst both men and women. 
Accordingly, although men may have been in a better position to ‘weather’ the 
consequences of a dwindling economy and austerity measures, this did not necessarily 
mean they would be free from the associated consequences.  
To explore these attitudinal differences, changes in the labour market were explored. As 
Table 6.3.1.1 shows, unemployment rates increased between 2008-2009 and 2009-2012. 
Alongside these increases in the overall rates of unemployment, the proportion of people 
believing that income inequality is ‘too large’ also increased. These observations seem to 
suggest that as changes in the labour market occurred, attitudes towards the income gap 
also changed. Increasing unemployment rates amongst both men and women are 
observable between 2008-2009, this increase was, however, higher amongst men in 
comparison to women. These findings appear to reflect literature suggesting that men 
were “worst hit” by the recession initially (Hills et al., 2015:14). By 2015, the unemployment 
rate appeared to fall back to the pre-recession rate, as these changes occurred, further 
attitudinal changes are also notable, where members of the public became less likely to 
state that income inequality between groups was ‘too large’ (Table 4.1.2).  
Table 6.3.1.1: Rates of Employment, Unemployment and economic inactivity, by 
year and gender (Source derived from ONS Labour Market Statistics, 2015) 
Status Changes over time Percentage (%) point change 
 
Unemployment 
 
2008 
 
2009 
 
2012 
 
2015 
 
2009/12 
 
2012/15 
 
2009/15 
All 
Men 
Women 
5.7 
6.1 
5.2 
8.1 
9.1 
6.9 
8.2 
8.8 
7.6 
5.7 
5.8 
5.5 
+0.1 
-0.3 
+0.7 
-2.5 
-3.0 
-2.1 
-2.4 
-3.3 
-1.4 
Employment        
All 
Men 
Women 
74.6 
78.6 
 70.3 
72.5 
75.8 
68.9 
71.2 
76.3 
 66.1 
73.5 
78.3 
68.8 
-1.3 
+0.5 
-2.8 
+2.3 
+2.0 
+2.7 
+1.0 
+2.5 
-0.1 
Economic 
Inactivity  
       
All 
Men 
Women 
20.8 
16.2 
25.8 
21.1 
16.6 
26.0 
22.4 
16.3 
28.5 
22.1 
16.9 
27.2 
+1.3 
-0.3 
+2.5 
-0.3 
+0.6 
-1.3 
+1.0 
+0.3 
+1.2 
Unemployment rates between both men and women had also fallen to similar levels found 
in 2008, with the gap between men and women’s rates of unemployment closing. At the 
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same time, the proportion of men and women in agreement that the income gap was ‘too 
large’ fell. So far, this suggests that exploring changes in the labour market, alongside 
attitudinal changes, is beneficial in aiding an understanding of decreasing levels of 
concern toward inequality, alongside aiding an understanding of attitudinal differences by 
gender. Thus, suggesting that as unemployment rates improve, concern toward the 
inequality of income is reduced.                       
Given that the unemployment rates decreased amongst men at a faster pace than women, 
with the unemployment rate for women remaining higher in 2015 than prior to the 
recession, these observations may also account for the attitudinal differences amongst 
men and women, where were more likely than men to perceive the income gap as ‘too 
large’. Concurrently, as the proportion of people believing that the income gap is ‘too large’ 
increased from 80.6% in 2009 to 84.4% in 2012, Table 6.3.1.1 shows that the employment 
rate also decreased slightly over the same period (fall of 1.3 pp). These findings suggest 
that as employment rates worsen, concern for the prevalence of the income inequality gap 
grows. Yet, as employment rates are strengthened, like those between 2012-2015, 
concern toward inequality decreases. Whilst employment rates amongst men in 2015 
returned to a similar rate observed in 2008, for women a slower recovery is notable. 
Despite improvements, in 2015 the employment rate remained lower than that observed in 
2008 and 2009, which may further account for the attitudinal differences between men and 
women, where women were more likely to agree that the income gap is ‘too large’ in 
comparison to men.  
Changes in the labour market and the improvements amongst males, appeared to signify 
the partial end of the “mancession” (Bennett, 2015:59). For others, however, the changes 
and further the social policy changes enacted, were the beginning of what has been 
termed the “womancession” (McKay et al., 2013:120). Further, the assumption that women 
given their notably precarious positioning within the labour market, would prove more likely 
to support redistributive measures based on the support offered by the redistribution of 
income, appears unsubstantiated within this research, at least. Comparative analyse of 
labour market statistics and attitudinal changes by gender, may thus account for attitudinal 
changes amongst men and women. Suggesting further, that gendered employment 
positions impact upon perceptions of inequality, where once positions are improved in the 
labour market, perceptions of income inequality also change. This may also account for 
the attitudinal changes amongst the British public, as a whole, whom became more likely 
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to state that income inequality is ‘too large’ between 2009-2012 but became less likely to 
hold this view in 2015.  
What this explanation does not account for is the higher levels of support toward 
redistribution amongst men, relative to women. Closer inspection of the labour market 
statistics and attitudinal differences in Sections 4.1-4.3, however, also illuminate the extent 
of the differences between men and women. Whilst women were more likely to state that 
income inequality is ‘too large’ in 2015, the gap between men and women’s levels of 
agreement is particularly small. That said, the gap between the proportion of men and 
women who stated that they supported the redistribution of income is however much 
greater (see Section 4.2), with Table 4.2.1.1 also suggesting that gender has a significant 
effect on attitudes toward redistribution, with men more likely to support redistribution, 
compared to women. The labour market statistics were thus revisited.  
Between 2009-2012, the employment rate fell as both economic inactivity and 
unemployment rates increased, as this occurred the proportion of people in support of the 
redistribution of income also increased. Suggesting that as positions in the labour market 
weakened, the public became more likely to support redistribution. Yet, upon closer 
inspection of the labour market statistics, the extent of change and indeed improvements, 
appear minimal. Perhaps then, the slow recovery notable within the labour market, may 
also explain why people became more likely to support the redistribution of income, 
alongside asserting that income inequality between groups is ‘too large’.  
As Table 4.2.2 shows, men are consistently more likely to support the redistribution of 
income than women, with the proportion of men in agreement increasing between 2009-
2012 and 2012-2015 and largely at a faster pace than amongst women. At the same time, 
the gap in levels of agreement between men and women closed between 2009-2012 
(falling from 9.6 pp, to 6.8 pp). Within the labour market, more men moved in to 
employment over this period, whilst more women moved away from employment. These 
changes, though slight, perhaps explain the increased levels of agreement amongst 
women, relative to men. At the same time, labour market statistics show that the 
employment rate increased amongst both men and women during this period, suggesting 
that as women’s positions improved, the desire for the redistribution of income was not as 
great, as the desire amongst men.  
Looking to the different rates of unemployment amongst men and women and seeking to 
account for these attitudinal differences, these statistics demonstrate that despite some 
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improvements, men’s rates of unemployment were consistently higher than those 
observable amongst women, perhaps accounting for disparities in redistributional support 
by gender. Thus, due to the proportion of men facing unemployment, the perceived need 
for redistributive spending may have been considered higher amongst men, thus 
increasing their likelihood of supporting the redistribution of income.  
 
6.3.1.1 Perceptions, by gender summary 
To summarise, whilst much of the literature suggests women, relative to men, are more 
economically vulnerable and are disadvantaged in the Labour market (Longhi and Platt, 
2008; Browne, 2011; Conley, 2012; Oxfam, 2012; Ginn, 2013; O’Hara, 2014; UKCES, 
2014; Catney and Sabater, 2015; De Henau and Reed, 2016; Scruton, 2016), this was not 
reflected in the analysis in the way it was initially expected. Instead, men, who faced 
greater levels of unemployment in comparison to women, were consistently more likely to 
agree with the redistribution of income. Although these findings do not meet the 
assumptions of self-interest, need explanations nor risk aversion theories in the way they 
were initially intended, this does not necessarily mean that these theories are not useful in 
understanding why men are more likely to support the redistribution of income.  
On the contrary, these theories suggest that those who stand to gain the most from 
redistributive measures will be more likely to express support. Perhaps then, stronger 
redistributional attitudes amongst men can be understood in relation to greater instances 
of unemployment amongst men during these periods. In this way, these findings suggest 
that men became increasing more likely to anticipate future needs, or perhaps that their 
attitudes reflected present ones. That said, these attitudinal changes may relate more 
closely with the social values held (Wu and Chou, 2015), reflecting the experiences of 
austerity for many people or indeed reflecting the assumptions of the rational choice theory 
(Prabhakar 2012). Thus, men were perhaps becoming more aware and concerned as to 
how austerity was increasing inequalities and men as result became more empathic 
towards those in similar positions (Orton and Rowlingson, 2007). By extension, the limited 
support toward the redistribution of income amongst women during these periods, may 
also be explained in relation to self-interest. Rather than women being free from need and 
the support redistribution offers, the economic cost of supporting the redistribution of 
income may have been a concern for women, already identified as a group more 
vulnerable towards inequality and poverty and therefore offsetting the possible benefits of 
monetary redistribution of income. 
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This section has emphasised the experience of men and women during the period of 
austerity examined in this research, suggesting that men and women’s attitudes toward 
the income gap and redistribution may have been a reflection of their own needs, and 
indeed financial positions, but in differing ways. Having explored attitudes by gender, the 
following section continues to explore attitudinal differences, focussing the analytical 
discussion on perceptions in austerity Britain, by age group.  
 
6.3.2 Perceptions of inequality, poverty and redistribution, by age 
Much like it is expected that women are more likely to hold more altruistic and egalitarian 
views than men, the age of an individual often influences preferences towards social 
policies, the need of social services (Busemeyer et al., 2009) but also their perceptions of 
and experiences of inequality and poverty. With this in mind, this section explores 
attitudinal differences by age group. 
The experience of poverty amongst pensioners is “stubbornly persistent” (Vass, 2014:3), 
with approximately 1 in 6 pensioners living in poverty in the UK (Age UK, 2017). 
Pensioners continue to live on less than adequate incomes, where 1.2 million are in 
receipt of incomes that fall “just above the poverty line”; meaning pensioners have 
incomes of more than the median 60%, but incomes that are less than 70% of median 
income (Age UK, 2017:3). Although not focused upon here, differences are further 
compounded by gender and ethnicity. For example, female pensioners are more likely to 
experience poverty than men, especially if they are single (Ginn, 2013; Age UK, 2017). 
Pensioners from BAME groups are also featured more prominently amongst those of 
pension age living in poverty, relative to those from white ethnic backgrounds (Age UK, 
2017). Although pensioners have, at least in part, been financially protected (Lupton et al., 
2015), it is postulated that many will have been affected by a reduction in public services.  
Nevertheless, it has been argued that incomes amongst those of pension age have 
increased considerably (MacInnes et al., 2015) and that pensions are protected further by 
the ‘triple lock’ (MacInnes et al., 2015). As Stewart (2015:no pagination) explains, the 
‘triple lock’ means state pensions will increase “each year by inflation, average wages, or 
2.5%, whichever is the highest”. Although, this has “helped to cushion pensioners’ 
incomes” (Stewart, 2015: no pagination), it would be a mistake to consider most older 
people as “well-off”, for many are far from it (Ginn, 2013; JRF, 2016). Whilst Wu and Chou 
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highlight, “not all of the elderly are poor”, they also highlight that the majority of this group 
“need more healthcare and other types of social assistance” (2015:4).  
Although changes have occurred, and efforts have seen the lives of pensioners improve 
over recent years (MacInnes et al., 2015), progress has seemingly halted (Age UK, 2017) 
with large numbers of vulnerable pensioners continuing to live on incomes that are 
inadequate. Because pensioners have been identified as at risk and as individuals who 
may be more vulnerable to age related ill health and disabilities (Ginn, 2013), it can be 
assumed that due to personal experiences, older members of the public may be more 
aware of inequality and thus more likely to state that the income gap was ‘too large’ and in 
the context of this research, more likely to support the redistribution of income. This latter 
assumption is supported by Habibov, whom asserts that “support for redistribution will 
increase with age” (2013:271). This is reflective of the Rational choice theory, where older 
members of the public, as a group more likely to gain from redistributional measures, will 
be more likely to support income redistribution. By extension, it could also be assumed 
that older members of the public may be less likely to hold negative or stereotypical views 
of people in receipt of benefits.  
As Table 4.1.2 demonstrates, these assumptions are partly reflected within the data. 
People aged 65 and over were consistently more likely to agree that the income gap is ‘too 
large’. Notably however, the analysis showed that over time, older members of the 
population were becoming increasingly less likely to specify that the income gap is ‘too 
large’, as income inequality was increasing in Britain. A greater likelihood of agreement 
amongst older members of the public, is nevertheless, also identifiable in Table 4.1.1.1, 
where in comparison to people aged 65 and over, people aged 35-64 were less likely to 
agree, and people aged 18-34, were even less likely to agree.  
Concurrently, attitudes towards people in receipt of benefits also varied by age. In 2009, 
despite the findings outlined in Table 4.1.2, Table 5.1.2 shows that older people were also 
more likely to agree that benefit recipients were undeserving of help, whereas people aged 
18-34 were more likely to agree that benefit recipients were fraudulently claiming in some 
way (Table 5.2.2), and reliant upon benefits as a result of welfare generosity (Table 5.3.2), 
closely followed by those aged 65 and over. The least likely to agree in 2009, in each 
analysis, was people aged 35-64. People aged 65 and over, however, were identified as a 
group more likely to hold negative attitudes in 2012 and 2015 (Table 5.1.2; Table 5.2.2 and 
Table 5.3.2). Table’s 5.1.1.1, 5.2.1.1 and 5.3.1.1.1 also show that age significantly effects 
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attitudes toward benefit recipients, where in comparison to people aged 65 and over, 
negative attitudes toward benefit recipients were less likely amongst the younger and 
middle-aged groups.  
It was expected that older members of the public (those aged 65 and over) would be more 
likely to support the redistribution of income, in comparison to younger participants. But 
that the findings would also reflect the financial strain facing younger individuals (18-34), 
and that they would, consequently, also become increasingly more inclined to support 
redistribution. The findings presented in Section 4.2, though not significant, supported this 
expectation, in part. People over the age of 65 were the most inclined to agree, yet despite 
their position, younger members of the public (18-34) remained the least inclined to hold 
this view. That said, what is particularly noticeable is how the gaps between older 
members (65 and over), and younger members (18-34) levels of agreement is narrower 
than those found in the section 4.1. In 2009, the gap between older members of the public 
stood at 1.4 pp, by 2012 this had widened to 3.4 pp. By 2015, this gap had closed, yet 
remained higher than in 2009.  
Although the assumptions of the Rational Choice Theory (Wu and Chou, 2015) appear to 
have been partially met and the need explanation strengthened based on the findings 
outlined in Chapter 4, evidently wider attitudinal changes also occurred. As demonstrated 
above, the effects of austerity have not been felt the same both across and within groups, 
this is also true by age. Kingman and Seager (2014) emphasise that the intergenerational 
income gap has been widening since 1997, prior to the recession and introduction of 
austerity measures; cautioning that these kinds of differences can result in further issues, 
of which continue within and across the life course. Between 2009-2015, austerity 
measures widened the differences both within and across age cohorts (Kingman and 
Seager, 2016). Changes in labour market participation, including earnings, hours and 
opportunities have occurred, alongside changes in housing tenure, benefits and access to 
services. These changes have had a different impact on people, depending on their age 
and life stage.  
Despite persistent levels of poverty amongst pensioners, it has been suggested that young 
people were the most adversely affected by the recession and austerity measures 
(MacInnes et al., 2015; Catney and Sabater, 2015). It is estimated that young adults on 
average, are now earning less in ‘real terms’ than other generations, at the same age 
(Kingman and Seager, 2014; Kingman, 2016). Young people in receipt of housing benefit, 
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are more likely to be noticing a deficit between the benefit received and their housing costs 
(Lupton et al., 2015). Due to falling earnings, young people are earning less and thus 
saving less. This often means that they are unable to secure a mortgage and are less 
likely to purchase their own home and more likely to be found within private rented housing 
or remaining in the parental home (Falkingham et al., 2014; Kingman and Seager, 2014; 
Lupton et al., 2015). Issues of housing tenure by age, is often discussed with the label 
“generation rent”, used to describe the phenomena whereby more and more young people 
find themselves unable to own their own homes and are instead, reliant on the private 
rented sector (Kingman and Seager, 2014:3).  
Further, it has been estimated that for people in their 20’s, money spent on renting 
properties has increased by around 35% in the ten years prior to 2012 (Kingman and 
Seager, 2014). Therefore, for many young people their incomes are no longer sufficient. 
With the rise in “tenuous arrangements” like zero-hours contracts, this can prove 
particularly problematic, given that these types of employment result in unreliable, 
fluctuating hours and thus earnings (Kingman and Seager, 2014). The changes seen in 
earnings, particularly among younger workers are expected to have lasting detrimental 
effects and there is now “a real danger” that what is happening in relation to falling wages, 
could be “a sign of a cohort effect”, subsequently for Kingman and Seager “condemning 
today’s young workers to a lifetime of lower wages throughout their careers than previous 
generations have enjoyed” (2014:6). As others have noted, this could have implications in 
later life, where low-earnings may mean a reduced standard of living at pension age (Age 
UK, 2017). People aged 31-64 were ‘less affected’, yet growth has been slow, meaning 
that their incomes have only slightly improved from pre-recession levels (Hood and 
Waters, 2017).  
As evidenced above young people appeared to be hit harder by austere policies and 
changes in their participation and gains within the labour market. Because experience 
often influences perceptions, it could also be assumed that as inequality increased 
amongst younger members of the public, so too should the proportion of people in 
agreement that the income gap is ‘too large’, notably however, this was not reflected in the 
analysis. These findings can be explained in two ways. Falling levels of agreement 
amongst those of pension age could be a reflection of the improvements discussed above, 
this would however not explain why people of pension age (aged 65 and over) are more 
likely to agree that the income gap between groups is ‘too large’ in comparison to younger 
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members of the public (18-34, 35-64), nor does this explain entirely why older members of 
the public were more likely to hold negative attitudes toward people in receipt of benefits. 
Indeed, although improvements were notable amongst people of pension age, many still 
face a lower standard of living (JRF, 2016), especially older single female pensioners 
(Ginn, 2013). Further, because there have been a number of cuts that have impacted 
services, such as those to Local Authorities, transport and the NHS, services that older 
members of the population may access more frequently, this could explain why such large 
proportions maintain that the income gap is ‘too large’, but again does not explain why 
negative attitudes are more prevalent amongst this group. Although those of pension age 
are not free from risk nor experience, it has however been argued they are now in 
considerably better positions than younger generations; whom are now more likely to face 
poverty (MacInnes et al., 2015).  
Notably then, although the incomes of young people were more severely affected by the 
economic downturn (Belfield et al., 2014) and subsequently adversely affected by the 
policies enacted thereafter, this was not reflected within this analysis, where younger 
generations were consistently the least likely to conceive of the gap as ‘too large’. To 
reiterate, this was particularly striking, given evidence highlighting the risks faced by a 
number of young people and further how the recession adversely impacted upon their lives 
and opportunities (UKCES, 2014; Kingman and Seager, 2014; Belfield et al., 2014; 
MacInnes et al., 2015; Hood and Waters, 2017), and moreover the intergenerational gaps 
that appeared to be widening.  
It could be concluded that the findings outlined in Chapter 5 reflect the fears of Kingman 
(2016) whom believes that solidarity and understanding between generations are 
seemingly being eroded due to a lack of interaction and arguably widening social distance. 
Indeed, although many older members of the public may need to access services, 
perceptions towards the receipt of benefits, are often negative and are, as Whiteley 
stressed, centred around how older people have been “socialized into…a time of limited 
welfare provision” and periods where “welfare was often associated with personal failure 
and charity handouts” (1981:468). Whilst this argument was formulated in relation to 
changes following WWII, The Great Depression and consequent double dip recession 
(Elliott, 2012), in part, Whiteley’s observations remain feasible given the popular discourse 
over this period.  
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Although, prior to the programme of austerity and deficit reduction plan, welfare rather than 
limited, was based on means tests, set obligations and criteria, and has more recently 
been subject to greater conditionality, the negative connotations attributed with welfare 
receipt, thus remain. Concurrently, these findings could also be reflective of the social 
values hypothesis in operation amongst older members of the public, whom continue to be 
aware of the adverse impact of inequality, recognising the extent of the income gap, due in 
part to their own experiences within austerity Britain (Wu and Chou, 2015).  
 
6.3.2.1 Perceptions by age, Summary 
To summarise, this section has discussed the research findings in relation to the available 
literature. Drawing on perceptions, redistributional theories, alongside inequalities of age, 
to provide a thorough examination of attitudes toward inequality, poverty and redistribution 
during this period of austerity. These findings suggest that as inequality increased 
amongst people by age group (Ginn, 2013; Age UK, 2014; MacInnes et al.,2015), the 
perceived need and support for the redistribution of income also increased. At the same 
time, despite showing signs of increasing levels of agreement amongst people aged 35-65 
and over, between 2009-2012, negative attitudes toward people in receipt of benefits fell 
between 2012-2015.  
Despite the poor position held by younger people in the aftermath of the recession and 
throughout austerity, this group (18-34) remained the least inclined to support the 
redistribution of income. This group also became increasingly less likely to hold negative 
attitudes toward benefit recipients. Thus, as expected, the older the individual, the more 
inclined they were to agree that income should be redistributed from the ‘better-off to the 
less-well-off’. Section 4.3 also emphasised how attitudes differed by age, amongst those 
who agreed that ‘the gap between high and low income is too large’ and also stated that 
income should be redistributed. Though support toward redistribution increased amongst 
this group, the variations by age are not statistically significant.  
 
Having focused the analysis on perceptions by age, the following section continues to 
explore perceptions by demographic characteristics. Thus, the next section focuses on 
exploring the attitudinal differences identified in Section’s 4.1-4.3 and 5.1-5.5 and the 
available literature, by ethnic group. 
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6.3.3 Perceptions of inequality, poverty and redistribution, by ethnic background 
It is clear that a number of groups have been affected by the recession and the cuts 
pursued by austerity measures, where there have been a number of ‘losers’ as a result of 
these policies (Lupton et al., 2015:8). As O’Hara (2014), amongst others (Falkingham et 
al., 2014; Khan, 2015; Age UK, 2017) note, people from BAME groups are amongst those 
‘losing’, relative to the people from white ethnic backgrounds. This section focuses on 
exploring attitudinal differences by ethnic group, drawing on the inequality faced by people, 
often as a result of their ethnic group.  
People from ethnic minorities are disproportionately represented amongst those 
experiencing poverty and inequality, relative to those from white ethnic backgrounds (Platt, 
2007; Longhi and Platt, 2008; Hills et al., 2010; Fisher and Nandi, 2015; Khan, 2015; 
Catney and Sabater, 2015; Equality and Human Rights Commission, 2015; TUC, 2017). 
Gulliver emphasises how such disadvantage can be further elucidated by considering the 
prevalence of homelessness by ethnic background (2017). As already emphasised, 
homelessness in the wake of the recession and period of austerity, was cited as a one of 
the key concerns for the UNCESCR in 2016. Chapter 2 further evidenced the rise of 
homelessness during this period. Although instances of homelessness were increasing 
across the board, they have been found to be accelerating at a faster pace amongst 
people from BAME communities. Gulliver (2017:8) emphasises this point, noting changes 
over time, in 2001, 28.0% of the “total statutorily homeless households” were of BAME 
backgrounds and that this figure increased in 2011 (33.0%) and 2013 (37.0%).  
A number of disparities also exist between ethnic groups, with some groups fairing worse 
than others (Oxfam, 2012; Fisher and Nandi, 2015; Catney and Sabater, 2015; Khan, 
2015; TUC, 2017). Although not focused upon here, these differences are further 
compounded both between people from BAME groups, but also when considering levels of 
educational attainment, age and gender (UKCES, 2014; Bennett and Daly, 2014; Khan, 
2015; Catney and Sabater, 2015). For instance, it is widely evidenced that BAME women 
have been affected at a disproportionate level (Conley, 2012; Jasper, 2015; Khan, 2015), 
with gender differences also differing amongst ethnic minority groups, where for instance, 
Bangladeshi and Pakistani women are estimated to be “less than half as likely to be 
employed” in comparison to the average rates of employment amongst women (EHRC, 
2015:99).  
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What is also made clear throughout a number of sources (Khan, 2015; Jasper, 2015; 
Fisher and Nandi, 2015), is how, despite ethnic identities being a listed as a protected 
characteristic (The Equality Act, 2010), the UK has failed to eradicate prejudice. Thus, as a 
result of an ascribed at birth ethnic identity, people continue to face discrimination (Khan, 
2015; JRF, 2016), institutional racism (Jasper, 2015) and struggle to participate in and 
enter the labour market (UKCES, 2014), alongside society. Although it is beyond the 
scope of this research to detail the extent of racial discrimination in operation, it is 
understood that this discrimination operates in a number of indirect and direct ways, 
creating and sustaining barriers, and this is observable beyond the labour market and 
education system. Although this is acknowledged, to enable discussion the labour market 
and education system are employed as two sites of ethnic inequality.  
Such ‘ethnic penalties’ are observable in the UK labour market and the initial employment 
application process (Catney and Sabater, 2015). Research conducted in 2009 highlighted 
how racial discrimination featured prominently in the job application process. Distributing 
curricula vitae (CV) to (unrevealed) companies, across both region and skill levels, Wood 
et al. wished to identify how racial discrimination on the basis of names occurred (2009). 
The names attached to each, were chosen based on the assumption that they were 
considered as “widely” recognised by ethnic groups (Wood et al., 2009:2). These included, 
yet were not limited to, names such as Anthony Olukayode (Black African), Cho Xiang 
(Chinese), Sunita Kumar (Indian), Nazia Mahmood (Pakistani/Bangladeshi) and a White 
British name (Wood et al., 2009:19). Wood et al. found clear advantages in favour of the 
applications with typically white ethnic names, who received a “positive response” in 
comparison to the other applications (2009:31). This research suggests that individuals 
from BAME groups face disadvantage prior to entry in to the labour market, restricting 
equal access.  
What has thus become increasingly apparent, is how after approximately “forty years of 
race relations and equality and human rights legislation”, there have been “positive 
effects”, yet both “disadvantage and discrimination persist” (Gulliver, 2017:8). Jasper 
proclaimed that following the Coalition's 2010 budget this became more pronounced, 
where it was feared that the “economic impact of austerity measures…disproportionately 
impacted Black British and ethnic minority groups” (2015; no pagination). From recession 
through to austerity, earnings fell sharply amongst people from ethnic minorities, what was 
clear however, was how these disparities also differed amongst and within ethnic groups 
(Fisher and Nandi, 2015). As the EHRC demonstrated, Black African and Black Caribbean 
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people faced the greatest fall in income and pay (2015). Most notably, people from BAME 
groups often find that access to employment is problematic, highlighting how the ‘ethnic 
penalty’ (TUC, 2017) impacts upon the lives of many people from BAME backgrounds. 
Both “racism and discrimination” thus operate as barriers, inhibiting minority ethnic groups 
from advancing in employment roles (JRF, 2016:16). Subsequently, people from BAME 
groups are more likely to be unemployed or economically inactive (Brewer et al., 2012) 
and thus in receipt of lower incomes.  
Further, as Fisher and Nandi (2015:8) highlight whilst “there is variation across and within 
different ethnic minority groups” in comparison to “the white majority group, most ethnic 
minority groups are more economically disadvantaged”. Expanding on this point further, 
Fisher and Nandi note how “Indian and Chinese groups fare well” in comparison to white 
ethnic groups, conversely people from “Pakistani and Bangladeshi, Black African and 
Black Caribbean” ethnic groups do less well, with both Bangladeshi and Pakistani minority 
ethnic groups observably the “most severely disadvantaged” (2015:8). As noted above, 
further disparities manifest within minority ethnic groups, whereby “a complex relationship 
between groups characteristics and their performance in the labour market” exists 
(UKCES,2014:41).  
Given these factors and the disproportionate levels of poverty and inequality experienced 
by people from ethnic minorities (Longhi and Platt, 2008; Hills et al., 2010; Fisher and 
Nandi, 2015; Khan, 2015; Catney and Sabater, 2015) it was expected that people from 
BAME groups would be more likely to assert that the income gap was ‘too large’ and by 
extension, more likely to support redistribution. Similarly, it could also be expected that this 
group may be less likely to hold negative attitudes towards people in receipt of benefits. 
These assumptions are based in part on the unequal experiences of austerity Britain 
amongst people from BAME backgrounds, who are often found to be living on low 
incomes, their levels of disadvantage perpetuated further by instances of racism and 
discrimination. These assumptions are, however, also based on the application of the 
Rational Choice Theory and of need explanations, which points to how people most 
vulnerable and in need of support are more likely to recognise income inequality, but to 
also support measures to address these issues (Wu and Chou, 2015).   
Section 4.1 demonstrated, as expected, that in 2009 the majority of people who said that 
the income gap was ‘too large’ were from BAME backgrounds. By 2012, however, this had 
changed. Instead, the majority of people in agreement were from white ethnic 
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backgrounds. This was also true in 2015, with people from white ethnic backgrounds more 
likely to agree that the income gap is ‘too large’, than people from BAME backgrounds.  As 
Table 4.1.2 demonstrates, people from BAME backgrounds were becoming increasingly 
less inclined to perceive of the gap as ‘too large’ over time, whereas people from white 
ethnic backgrounds were become increasingly more inclined to perceive the income gap 
as ‘too large’. These findings do not appear to support the assumptions of the Rational 
Choice Theory and appeared surprising given evidence suggesting that inequality and 
poverty was increasing amongst individuals from BAME backgrounds (Oxfam 2012; 
EHRC, 2015; Catney and Sabater, 2015; Hills et al., 2015; Fisher and Nandi, 2015; Khan, 
2015; TUC, 2017).  
Based on the assumptions of self-interest and of need explanations, it was also expected 
that people from BAME groups would be more likely to support the redistribution of 
income, in comparison to people from white ethnic backgrounds, based on present and 
anticipated need. As Section 4.2 illustrated, in 2012 and 2015 people from ethnic 
minorities (BAME groups) were more likely to support the redistribution of income, in 
comparison to people from white ethnic groups, and as identified in Section 4.3, of those 
who agreed that the income gap is too large in 2012, people from BAME groups were also 
more likely to agree with the redistribution of income.  
Attitudes toward benefit recipients differed. Focusing on the significant findings, whilst 
Table 5.1.2 showed how, in comparison to people in the minority ethnic group, people from 
the majority ethnic group were more likely to agree that benefit recipients were 
undeserving of help in 2012, at the same time people from the BAME group were more 
likely to agree that generous benefit payments led to dependency (Table 5.3.2). In 
comparison to the ethnic majority group, people from BAME groups were also more likely 
to agree that recipients were ‘fiddling in one way or another’ in 2015 (Table 5.2.2). To 
understand these findings further, data from the UK labour market statistics were explored, 
not only to understand how disadvantage operates both amongst and between ethnic 
groups, but to also explore the changing attitudes amongst people from ethnic minorities.  
Exploration revealed changing labour market positions amongst these groups, of which 
coincided with changing attitudes towards inequality. Between 2008-2009 levels of 
employment amongst BAME groups appeared to worsen, down from 60.4%, to 59.2% 
(TUC, 2017), at the same time levels of employment also deteriorated amongst people 
from white ethnic backgrounds, though at a faster pace, falling from 74.1% to 72.5%. 
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Despite greater decreases, in contrast to employment levels amongst minority ethnic 
groups, the employment rate remained higher amongst the white ethnic group. As Table 
4.1.2 shows, alongside lower levels of employment, levels of agreement with ‘the gap 
between high and low incomes is too large’ are also greater amongst the ethnic minority 
group. By 2012 although there was an increase in the number of people from BAME 
communities now holding this view, larger increases in the levels of agreement (8.4 pp) 
amongst the white ethnic group, meant that the white ethnic group formed the majority of 
those in agreement in 2012.  
Employment levels amongst BAME groups improved and continued to increase into 2015 
(TUC, 2017), although the initial growth appeared minimal (up by 0.3 pp), the increase in 
the employment rate appears to coincide with changing attitudes amongst this group. As 
levels of employment increased amongst minority groups, the proportion of people from 
the minority ethnic group who agreed that income inequality was too great fell by 9.5 pp. 
These findings show how the gap in levels of agreement between white ethnic groups and 
BAME groups appeared to narrow between 2009-2015, falling from 4.8 pp in 2009 to 2.8 
pp. By 2015, however, this gap rewidened by 6.5 pp, with people from the white majority 
ethnic group more likely to agree than income inequality between groups was ‘too large’, 
than people from minority ethnic groups.  
At the same time as these attitudinal changes occurred, employment rates amongst both 
groups saw signs of improvement, but to a greater extent amongst the ethnic minority 
group (3.4 pp) than amongst the white ethnic group (2.8 pp). Thus, the change in attitudes 
towards inequality amongst people from BAME groups, appeared consistent with the 
improvements seen in the levels of employment in the labour market. Thus, levels of 
agreement amongst people from BAME groups appeared to change, falling from 2012 
through to 2015 and overall between 2009-2015. For the white ethnic group, agreement 
levels increased overall, rising substantially between 2009-2012, before declining between 
2012-2015.  
Utilising labour market statistics to explore attitudes in this way, suggests that as ethnic 
minority groups became better situated within the labour market, with more people moving 
into employment, concern for the gap between high and low incomes fell. That said, 
Section 4.2 and 4.3 emphasised how support for the redistribution of income differed by 
ethnicity and how people from BAME groups were more likely to support the redistribution 
of income in 2012, in comparison to people from white ethnic groups, despite improving 
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positions within the labour market. Thus, whilst changes in the Labour market appear to 
explain why people from white ethnic groups in 2015 were more likely to agree that income 
inequality is ‘too large’, these changes did not impact upon perceptions towards the 
redistribution of income. These changes may however explain why negative attitudes 
toward benefit recipients were less likely amongst this group in 2012 and 2015.  
In the wake of the recession and consequent austere programme, as Section 4.2 
illustrated support for the redistribution of income increased significantly (12.9 pp) amongst 
people from BAME groups, as inequality and poverty were also said to increase amongst 
these groups (Platt, 2007; Longhi and Platt, 2008; Hills et al., 2010; Oxfam, 2012). 
Comparatively, the overall increase in levels of agreement amongst people from white 
ethnic groups, stood at just 2.0 pp, a 10.9 pp disparity. Thus, suggesting that as inequality 
and poverty worsened amongst BAME communities (Fisher and Nandi, 2015; Khan, 2015; 
Equality and Human Rights Commission, 2015; Jasper, 2015; TUC, 2017), the perceived 
need for redistribution increased, where people from BAME groups became increasingly 
more likely to agree with the redistribution of income.  
This contention is further demonstrated in Section 4.3, Table 4.3.1 whereby in 2012, of 
those who agreed that income inequality between groups is ‘too large’, support for the 
redistribution of income was more likely amongst people from the minority ethnic group 
(54%), than amongst the majority ethnic group (44.9%). The latter findings thus appear to 
reflect the assumptions of self-interest and those of need explanations, in understanding 
attitudes and redistributional preferences. What is less clear is why this group were less 
likely to perceive of the income gap as ‘too large’ in comparison to the white majority 
group. Although positive changes did occur within the labour market, the employment level 
amongst people from ethnic minority groups remained lower than those observed amongst 
the white majority ethnic group.  
6.3.3.1 Perceptions, by ethnic background Summary 
This section has demonstrated how attitudes toward inequality and poverty differ by ethnic 
group, exploring how aspects of identity, like ethnic background, may impede or 
advantage individuals. Drawing on labour market statistics, and self-interest, alongside 
need explanations and the spiral of silence of model, attitudinal changes and patterns 
have been explored. Moving beyond self-interest, to include the ‘spiral of silence’ model, a 
different explanation for these patterns may thus be considered. The ‘spiral of silence 
model’ is based on the premise that people from marginalised and minority groups, often 
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mirror the opinions and attitudes of those of the more dominant majority groups 
(Scheufele, 2008). This behaviour is explained as a result of the “fear of isolation”, where 
people from disadvantaged groups, remain silent rather than voicing their concerns or 
indeed their opinions, for fear their opinions may illicit a negative response or that they 
may find themselves supporting an issue that is not supported by the majority (Scheufele, 
2008:175).  
Perhaps then, whilst the findings did seem to coincide with the labour market 
improvements, the attitudes recorded could also have been subject to the processes 
outlined above. In this way, due to a ‘fear of isolation’ the opinions shared by people from 
marginalised and disadvantage groups, do not always reflect their attitudes or indeed 
feelings toward the subject matter. This may account for the perceptions observed 
amongst people from BAME groups, whom were less likely to assert that the inequality 
gap is ‘too large’, despite as evidenced above, increasing levels of inequality and 
disadvantage amongst this group. This model may also explain why this group were also 
more likely to hold negative attitudes toward benefit recipients in 2012 and 2015 (Table 
5.2.2 and 5.3.2). 
Having explored attitudes, alongside experiencing of inequality and poverty by ethnic 
group, to further explore how attitudes, relate to experiences and identity, the following 
section explores the findings by the remaining characteristics included within the analyse 
(educational attainment, employment status, occupation, income and benefit status). To 
simplify the analysis, perceptions by educational attainment, employment status, 
occupation, income and benefit status are discussed in one section.  
6.3.4 Perceptions of inequality, poverty and redistribution, by educational 
attainment, employment status, occupation, income and benefit status 
The impact of the changing economic and social climate over the past ten years on living 
standards, have been described as the ‘toughest’ period since the 1930’s (Padley et al., 
2017). As demonstrated throughout this Chapter and in Chapter 2, large groups of people 
have been adversely affected by policy changes and further changes in their incomes, 
alongside rising costs, including increasing housing, food and fuel costs (Fisher and Nandi, 
2015; JRF 2016). Whilst almost anyone can find themselves experiencing the 
consequences of poverty, there are a number of groups who are more at risk than others 
(Holman, 1978; JRF, 2016). What is also increasingly apparent, is how poverty and 
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inequality and moreover the risk of encountering them, is not a result of just one factor 
alone (JRF, 2016).  
Alongside disparities in relation to age, gender and ethnicity, factors such as 
unemployment, occupation, low wages, high costs and insecure employment, alongside 
an “inadequate benefit system” also seemingly impact upon individuals (JRF, 2016:8). 
Given this, this section draws on the findings outlined in Chapter 4 and 5, alongside the 
available literature to critically explore perceptions by educational attainment, employment 
status, occupation, income and benefit status. Although education is not considered an 
“economic outcome”, it does arguably impact labour market position (Hills et al., 2010:12). 
People who are said to fall “at the bottom of educational ratings” (Holman, 1978:39) often 
face restricted access to greater life chances, compounded further by an apparent “lack of 
skills” (JRF, 2016:8). For Finch, “educational attainment provides a further indication of the 
risk of poverty” because “qualifications have a strong bearing on future earnings potential” 
(2015:7). It is understood, therefore, that people with few or little in the way of 
qualifications, also face fewer prospects for both employment and earnings (Esping-
Anderson, 1999; UKCES, 2014; Finch, 2015).  
Thus, people lacking qualifications or possessing lower levels, are more likely to occupy 
lower paid positions within the labour market and may, subsequently, often rely on social 
security provision for additional support. Comparatively, people who hold higher levels of 
educational attainment, have greater access to better opportunities and improved life 
chances, in both the short and long-term and are thus less likely to claim benefits, nor 
need additional support. Higher educational attainment, therefore, often results in greater 
monetary rewards, given that qualifications result in access to better paid occupational 
roles (Hills et al., 2010; UKCES, 2014; Finch, 2015; JRF, 2016).   
Accordingly, it can be argued that educational attainment often strengthens or weakens an 
individual’s position within the labour market (Hills et al., 2015; Finch, 2015; JRF, 2016). 
The “risks of poverty” (McKendrick et al., 2008:8) are, therefore, further intensified 
amongst people who have little or no educational qualifications, people who live in 
workless households and amongst those claiming benefits (Holman, 1978). Notably, 
educational attainment, occupation, employment status, level of income and benefit status 
also intersect, strengthening an individual’s position further or constraining it. For these 
reasons, and to simplify the analysis, these characteristics are explored together, 
alongside the literature in this final discussion section. 
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Not only are these characteristics interrelated, as already stated, perceptions of inequality 
and redistribution also differ amongst these groups. People who are in receipt of lower 
incomes and/or are in receipt of benefits, including although not limited to unemployed 
people, are often found to be less likely to tolerate inequality (Medgyesi, 2013; Wu and 
Chou, 2015). This is explained as a result of the fact that the people occupying such 
positions, are in receipt of low, less than adequate incomes and thus may be more aware 
of the consequences of struggling to manage financially (Holman, 1978; Finch, 2015). 
Subsequently, it can be assumed that people who are unemployed, on low incomes or are 
in receipt of benefits will be more likely to acknowledge growing inequality and 
subsequently more likely to state that the income gap is ‘too large’, in part because of their 
direct experiences of inequality (Wu and Chou, 2015). By extension, reflective of the 
assumptions of the Rational Choice theory, these groups are also expected to be more 
likely to support the redistribution of income (Wu and Chou, 2015).  
This may also mean that attitudes amongst people with little or no qualifications and those 
within lower occupational paid roles, will mirror those above, with this group also more 
likely to state that the income gap is ‘too large’ and more likely to support redistribution. 
Given these assumptions, the opposite might be expected of those in employment, people 
who do not claim benefits, those with higher incomes, qualifications and thus stronger 
occupational positions. Orton and Rowlingson propose that these attitudinal differences 
may be explained in relation to differential social experiences (2007). Thus, people in 
receipt of higher incomes and those who are in employment, whom have qualifications and 
are not in receipt of benefits, often have access to more financial resources. Subsequently, 
they are also often socially distant (Orton and Rowlingson, 2007) from and further shielded 
from the consequences of inadequate incomes.  
Based on both self-interest and need explanations (Whitely, 1981; Wu and Chou, 2015), it 
was expected that this would be reflected in attitudes towards income inequality and 
redistributional preferences, with these groups less likely to assert that the income gap is 
‘too large’ and less likely to support redistribution. Similarly, given the vulnerability 
associated with these positions, it might be expected that people in receipt of benefits (or 
whose spouse is), on low-incomes, working in routine or manual occupations, and those 
lacking qualifications (or holding other forms) may have been less likely to hold negative 
views of benefit recipients. As Table 4.1.2 shows people in receipt of low incomes were, as 
expected, more likely to agree that the income gap was ‘too large’ in 2009, 2012 and 2015. 
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This group were also more likely to support the redistribution of income in 2009, 2012 and 
2015 (Table 4.2.2).  
Attitudes also differed amongst benefit recipients, or those with a spouse in receipt. Not 
only were benefit recipients consistently more likely to agree that the income gap is ‘too 
large’, this group were also more likely to support the redistribution of income in 2012 and 
2015. These findings appear to support those of need explanations and self-interest. Thus, 
both people in receipt of benefits (or whose spouse is) and people in receipt of low 
incomes are more likely to recognise income inequality, but also more likely to support the 
redistribution of income. These findings, thus, appear to reflect current or indeed, 
anticipated future need amongst these groups. Suggesting further, that higher levels of 
support towards redistribution may be explained in relation to anticipated personal benefit 
rather than as a result of altruism or reciprocity (Anderson and Curtis, 2015; Padley et al., 
2017). These findings also further support those of Anderson and Curtis, whom note that 
people with “low economic standing have the most to gain from supporting government 
intervention” and this they argue is “regardless of the level of inequality in society” 
(2015:267). Given that these groups not only saw the income gap as ‘too large’ but also 
supported measures to close this gap, these findings also support the contention that 
people in receipt of lower incomes are more likely to oppose income inequality (Medgyesi, 
2013; Wu and Chou, 2015). 
Comparatively, perhaps reflecting a lack of experience (Evans and Kelley, 2017), as 
Section 4.1 shows in 2009, 2012 and 2015, people who self-rated their income as ‘high’ 
were less likely to conceive of the income gap as ‘too large’. Similar findings were also 
observable in the BLRA in Table 4.1.1.1, where based on all the other variables in the 
analysis, in comparison to people in receipt of low incomes, people on middle-high 
incomes were 0.536 times less likely to agree that the income gap is ‘too large’. The 
findings shown in Table 4.1.2 are not surprising, given that people in receipt of high 
incomes are less likely to be affected directly by growing income inequality. What was 
surprising, however, was the shift in attitudes towards redistribution amongst high and 
middle-income groups in 2015. Although low-income earners remained more likely to 
support income redistribution, the gap between this group and high-income earners 
narrowed. Falling from 17.1 pp in 2009, to 7.6 pp in 2012, to 6.1 pp in 2015.  
Given the findings outlined in Section 4.1 and 4.2, it may have been feasible to suggest a 
similar pattern would occur amongst those who stated that the income gap is ‘too large’, 
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alongside expressing support toward the redistribution of income. Section 4.3 found that 
despite this trend being observable in 2009, with low-income earners more likely to 
support redistribution, if they also believed the income gap is ‘too large’, by 2012 and 2015 
attitudes appeared to change. Amongst those who said that the income gap is ‘too large’, 
people who stated they received high incomes were more likely to support the 
redistribution of income. Comparatively, amongst these proportions, people in receipt of 
middle-incomes were less likely to support the redistribution of income in 2012 and 2015, 
despite also agreeing that ‘the gap between high and low incomes is too large’.  
The findings in Section 4.3 suggest that initially, and as expected, in 2009 people who 
stood to gain the most from redistributive measures (low-income groups) were more likely 
to support the redistribution of income, if they also agreed that income inequality between 
groups is a gap ‘too large’. Whilst people in receipt of low incomes are more likely to 
recognise income inequality, perhaps reflecting their own experiences (Holman, 1978; 
Finch, 2015), as demonstrated in Section 4.3, this does not, however, necessarily mean 
they are entirely supportive of measures to eradicate it, like that of the redistribution of 
income. This further emphasises Orton and Rowlingson’s (2007) point that attitudes are 
often somewhat incongruous. This finding also strengthens the assumption that self-
interest and altruism, alone, may be unable to explain redistributional preferences (Wu and 
Chou, 2015). 
Whilst theories of self-interest appear to explain higher levels of redistributional support 
amongst benefit recipients and people in receipt of low incomes, this theory does not 
provide an explanation for the levels of agreement amongst people with high incomes. Of 
those who agreed that income inequality was too great, and also supported redistribution, 
high income earners were more likely to support the redistribution of income in 2012 and 
2015. Despite high income earners standing to lose, rather than gain, from the 
redistribution of income (Whitely, 1981). Moving away from self-interest, toward the social 
values hypothesis, these patterns have been explored. Wu and Chou (2015) consider how 
redistributional preferences may differ, depending on the individual and their 
understanding of the prevalence of inequality and why this persists. Accordingly, Wu and 
Chou propose that because “even individuals who are financially strong may be 
sympathetic towards heightened welfare redistribution”, as was the case in Section 4.3, 
this suggests that “more stable factors such as social values or ideologies may affect the 
demand for redistribution” (2015:6).  
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Wu and Chou explain the social values hypothesis further, whereby they state: 
based on the social values hypothesis the perceived causes of income 
inequality, magnitude of income inequality and causes of poverty are all 
associated with public attitudes to redistribution. In particular individuals 
who perceive income inequality as a consequence of providing benefits of 
the rich, who are living in a less equal society, and who attribute poverty to 
social injustice, are more inclined to call for redistribution (2015:6). 
In the context of this research, the social values hypothesis, as highlighted by Wu and 
Chou, offers a possible explanation for the findings outlined in Section 4.3. Whereby not 
only did income disparities between groups become more unequal (Clarke et al., 2016), 
and arguably more visible, people who were in receipt of a high income were more likely to 
support redistribution, if they also believed that income inequality between groups was a 
gap ‘too large’. In this way, attitudes toward redistribution were significantly impacted by 
the level of income received, and perceptions of the widening income gap, despite this 
latter issue not impacting upon this group directly. Such attitudes toward inequality and 
redistribution, may thus be a reflection of rising income inequality between classes. This is 
succinctly explained by Curtis and Anderson (2015:270), where they state: 
as income inequality rises, people from other classes become 
increasingly affected and thus also become much more likely to 
support government intervention. In other words, the effects of 
inequality ‘climb up’ the class ladder as inequality grows. 
 
Drawing on this explanation, irrespective of whether people in receipt of higher incomes, or 
those who are more socially distant from the vulnerability of financial inequality will gain 
from redistribution, they may support this to avoid the perceived non-financial 
consequences. This appears, in part, to be reflected in this analysis. 
Alongside pervasive income inequality between groups, those occupying disadvantaged 
social positions are further disadvantaged by the value placed on the differential societal 
positions available. This is explained by Hills et al. where they state (2010:1):  
where only certain achievements are valued and where large disparities in 
material rewards are used as the yardsticks of success and failure, it is hard 
for those who fall behind to flourish. 
 
In this instance, for those falling behind, “the risk of social need tends to be concentrated 
in the lower skills strata” (Busemeyer et al., 2009:199) and thus amongst people who do 
not hold qualifications. Disabling them from full participation in society, as a result of often 
low earnings and restricted access to the labour market. As McKendrick et al. note 
“working age adults living in families in which the adults have no educational qualifications 
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are more at risk” (2008:10), as are those in workless households. Both “unemployment 
and low skills” may thus “keep individuals in poverty and can lead to long-term hardship” 
(JRF, 2016:8).  
 
Research from the JRF also emphasise how the labour market has changed, with “many 
of the jobs that previously allowed workers with few qualifications to support their families 
to a decent standard” (2016:8) disappearing, further restricting opportunities. As a result of 
these changes, those people with less financial resources and lower skills, face 
disadvantaged access to the labour market, and thus face “low pay and insecurity, 
unemployment, discrimination and paying more for essentials, like energy and credit” 
(JRF, 2016:8). Based on the assumptions of self-interest, and this evidence, it was 
expected that people not in employment and those with no qualifications (or other forms) 
would be more likely to recognise growing income inequality and also more likely to 
support the redistribution of income.  
 
As Section 4.1 illustrated, in comparison to people in employment, in 2009 and 2012 
people not in employment were more likely to agree that the income gap is ‘too large’. 
Suggesting that employment status is significantly related to perceptions of income 
inequality. That said, the BLRA outlined in Table 4.1.1.1 demonstrated that, having taken 
into account all the other variables in the analysis, in comparison to people not in 
employment, people who were in employment were 1.186 times more likely to agree.  
Section 4.2 also demonstrated that those not in employment were also more likely to 
support the redistribution of income, in comparison to those in employment, in 2009, 2012 
and 2015. Because people who are not in employment often experience greater levels of 
inequality and are a group whom stand to gain more from the redistribution of income, this 
was not surprising. Table 4.2.1.1 demonstrated similar findings. Having taken all the other 
variables in the analysis into account, in comparison to people who were not in 
employment, people in employment were 0.722 times less likely to agree. Section 4.3 also 
showed how opinions appeared consistent. Thus, of the proportion of people who stated 
that the income gap is ‘too large’, people who were not in employment, were also more 
likely to support the redistribution of income in 2012 and 2015, and these proportions are 
greater than those identified in Table 4.2.1.   
 
Self-interest appears to account for the observably lower levels of agreement amongst 
people who are in employment, whom are less likely to recognise income inequality, and 
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less likely to support the redistribution of income. Whilst employment, as Section 2.3 
discusses, does not always protect people from the experience of inequality and poverty, 
people “in workless household’s fare worse than those in working poor households” (Hick 
and Lanau, 2017:14). Further, because redistributional measures often result in higher 
levels of taxation, people in employment may stand to lose rather than gain financially 
during this process. The findings appear to strengthen Wu and Chou’s assertion that since 
“unemployment is widely considered to be associated with the perceived vulnerability of a 
worsening standard of living”, as a group, unemployed people are “expected to support 
redistributive programmes” (2015: 4-5). 
 
Similarly, because of the “risks” associated with poor educational attainment, Busemeyer 
et al. maintain that people who are “poorly skilled will…be more in favour of spending 
increases than the rich” (2009:199). Due to the relationship between qualifications and 
income and that people in receipt of lower incomes are more vulnerable to poverty, 
inequality and financial constraints (Holman, 1978; Hills et al., 2010; UKCES, 2014; Finch, 
2015; JRF, 2016), it was expected that this would be reflected in this analysis. More 
specifically, that people lacking formal qualifications would be more likely to agree that the 
income gap is ‘too large’ and more likely to express more support toward redistribution. 
 
Concurrently, it may have been feasible to suggest that the opposite would be observable 
amongst people with higher levels of educational attainment. Reflecting higher incomes 
from better paid occupational roles, people with higher level qualifications are often 
expected to be further removed from the risk of experiencing poverty and inequality. Given 
this, it was expected that those with a higher level of educational attainment may be less 
likely to recognise the gap between high and low incomes as ‘too large’, and less likely to 
support redistribution. As Section 4.1 demonstrated, in 2015 this expectation was not 
reflected in the analysis. Instead people with higher levels of educational attainment were 
more likely to perceive of the income gap as ‘too large’, and as Section 4.2 shows, more 
likely to support the redistribution of income. By comparison, people with no or ‘other’ 
qualifications were less likely to agree that the income gap was ‘too large’ in 2015.  
Given that a number of cuts were to impact the chances of both young people and adults 
entering or indeed returning to education to bolster their opportunities and thus eventually 
strengthen their financial positions, this was particularly interesting. Due to changes in 
funding for adult learning centres and courses, who faced particularly large cuts, between 
2009-2013/14 it has been evidenced that the number of adult learners declined by 17.0% 
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(Lupton et al., 2015). Or presented differently, there were 511,400 adults (Lupton et al., 
2015) who failed to return to education to strengthen their position and their economic and 
social outlooks, due to grants being transformed into loans. Further research has also 
since suggested that “an estimated five million adults in the UK lack core literacy or 
numeracy skills” and a further “12.6 million lack basic digital skills” (JRF, 2016:11) of which 
is expected to impact upon access to the labour market, and by extension earnings.  
That said, as Table 4.2.2 shows, in both 2009 prior to austerity measures being enacted 
and in 2012, people with no or ‘other’ types of qualification were found to be more likely to 
support the redistribution of income, followed by people with a degree and above level 
qualification. Those with below degree level qualifications were the least likely to agree. 
Thus, whilst in 2009 and 2012, the group who stood to gain more from the processes of 
income redistribution were more likely to support this initiative, by 2015 attitudes had 
changed. Instead, following nearly five years of austerity measures, the group least likely 
to be the beneficiaries of income redistribution, became more likely to support income 
redistribution.  
As Table 4.3.1 shows, amongst those who said the inequality gap is ‘too large’ in 2012, 
support for the redistribution of income was however more likely amongst people with 
higher levels of educational attainment (degree or above). Attitudes towards inequality and 
redistribution in 2015, however, appeared consistent with the findings outlined in Table 
4.1.2 and 4.2.2. Not only were people with higher levels of educational attainment more 
likely to agree that the income gap is ‘too large’, they were also more likely to support the 
redistribution of income, if they held this perception. Suggesting support toward 
redistribution remained more prevalent amongst those with higher levels of educational 
attainment and thus those who stand to gain least from this process.  
Whilst the attitudinal differences observed in 2009 and 2012 (Table 4.2.2) suggest the 
assumptions of self-interest have been met. The findings suggest that in 2015 attitudinal 
differences do not reflect these assumptions. Instead, they suggest another reason for 
redistributional support amongst these groups, the prevalence of social values. In this way, 
though people with higher levels of educational attainment may not be the direct 
beneficiaries of income redistribution, greater levels of support toward redistribution may 
be a result of the perceived benefit to society as a whole during pervasive spells of 
economic inequality and disadvantage (Wu and Chou, 2015). It has, moreover, been 
widely evidenced that “people on low incomes face disadvantage that lock them out of 
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social and economic participation” (JRF, 2016:20), and that the risks of experiencing 
inequality grew during austerity.  
Not only are these risks are often heightened amongst people, based on the type of 
occupation fulfilled, these differential positions are also expected to continue to impact 
upon perceptions of inequality and policy preferences toward redistribution. Based on the 
assumptions of self-interest, it would be feasible to assume that people occupying 
managerial and professional roles would be less likely to recognise the income inequality 
gap, and by extension, less likely to support the redistribution of income. By extension, 
people working in routine and manual occupations, who are expected to receive lower 
levels of pay by comparison, could be expected to demonstrate a greater likelihood of 
agreement that ‘the gap between high and low incomes is too large’. As Section 4.1 
demonstrated, these assumptions were partially reflected in the findings. In 2015 people 
occupying positions in managerial and professional roles were less likely to agree, as 
expected. This was unsurprising, given that managerial and professional occupational 
positions, often signify greater wages and thus a lower likelihood of experiencing income 
inequality directly.  
Yet, rather than people occupying routine and manual occupations being more likely to 
hold this view, it was instead more prevalent amongst people occupying intermediate 
positions. Whilst similar patterns may have been expected in Section 4.2 and 4.3, a 
different picture emerged. In both 2012 and 2015, as Table 4.2.2 shows, people who were 
employed in routine and manual occupations, and thus more likely to benefit from 
redistribution, were found to be the most likely to support redistribution. Comparatively, in 
2012 and 2015, people employed within intermediate occupations were the least likely to 
hold this view. To understand changing attitudes by occupational position, Section 4.3 
sought to understand which occupational groups were more likely to support the 
redistribution of income, if they also stated that the income gap is ‘too large’. As Table 
4.3.1 shows, opinions towards the redistribution of income, remained consistent. Thus, of 
the proportion of people who stated that the income gap is too large in 2012 and 2015, 
people who were employed in routine and manual occupations were more likely to support 
the redistribution of income. By comparison, people working in intermediate positions, 
remained the least likely to do so. These findings show how occupational position 
significantly impacts upon perceptions, with those standing to gain most from redistributive 
measures, more likely to support them.  
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This discussion has emphasised how perceptions of inequality and redistribution of income 
differ amongst people by characteristic and over time. The focus has been on exploring 
these attitudinal differences and explaining these findings, drawing on need explanations, 
and the assumptions of self-interest, extending the analysis to consider how social values 
relate to perceptions. Observably high levels of agreement with the prevalence of income 
inequality have been emphasised, with much lower levels of support toward income 
redistribution between these groups. Chapter 5 explored this contradiction, intent on 
understanding why support toward redistribution remained so low over the period of 
austerity examined here, despite increasing social inequalities. 
Whilst, as this section has suggested, the impact of widening income inequality may “climb 
up the class ladder” (Curtis and Anderson, 2015: 270), Chapter 2 demonstrated that there 
is also a curious interest in the “social and moral habits” (Bottero, 2005: 24) of people 
occupying lower positions in the British social hierarchy. Much of the literature drawn on 
emphasises how stereotypical and negative attitudes prevail and how these attitudes may, 
in turn be reflected amongst the public in their perceptions of others and in particular, 
those in receipt of benefits (Holman, 1978; Castell and Thompson, 2007; Dorey, 2010; 
Mooney and Hancock, 2010; Orton and Taylor, 2010; Tyler 2013; Shildrick and 
MacDonald, 2013; O’Hara, 2014; Toynbee and Walker, 2015). Chapter 5 explored the 
extent of negative attitudes toward people in receipt of benefits (or those with a spouse in 
receipt) and how these attitudes may relate to support toward income redistribution.  
Research has continued to demonstrate the prevalence of individualistic attitudes toward 
poverty and inequality (Christie and Warburton, 2001; Dorey, 2010; Perry, 2014; Lansley 
and Mack, 2015; Toynbee and Walker, 2015; Pantazis, 2016; O’Connell and Hamilton, 
2017). Notably individualistic accounts, where poverty is expected to have been “self-
imposed” (Shildrick and MacDonald, 2013; 296) and reflective of poor choices (Wu and 
Chou, 2015) have a detrimental impact on those experiencing inequality but are also 
expected to be reflected in attitudes toward income redistribution. Here support toward 
redistribution is often a reflection of other attitudes, more specifically, why people are in 
need of support (Fong et al., 2003).  
Toynbee and Walker (2015:9) point to the imagined prevalence of two opposing groups, 
those who are “moral and deserving” and those who are, in contrast, “immoral and 
undeserving”.  People in receipt of welfare support have been depicted as deserving and 
undeserving for some time, and whilst this may not be a new revelation (Bottero, 2005; 
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Mooney and Hancock, 2010; Hall et al., 2014; JRF, 2016), these distinctions have 
increasingly been drawn out during the period of austerity examined here, and have 
gained further prominence as a result of ‘poverty porn’ (Jensen, 2013) and ‘poverty 
propaganda’ (Shildrick, 2018). The ‘images of inequality’ (Bottero, 2005) drawn on by 
members of the public, may thus enable them to make sense of inequality and poverty and 
thus decipher who is in need and conversely who is not.  
Although it may be expected that people who have experienced inequality, poverty and 
have claimed benefits themselves (or have a close relationship with someone in receipt) 
may be reflected in their attitudes toward benefit recipients, Chapter 5 demonstrated that 
this is not always the case. Amongst people who agreed that ‘many people who get social 
security don’t…deserve help’, support toward income redistribution was less likely by 
income, benefit and employment status. Levels of agreement with the statement “many 
people who get social security don't really deserve any help”, were also consistently lower 
amongst high income earners. In comparison in 2009 and 2015, the highest levels of 
agreement were observable amongst middle income earners, and low-income earners in 
2012. In 2012 and 2015, a similar pattern emerged by occupation, with people in 
managerial and professional roles the least likely to hold this view and people in 
intermediate roles most likely. This was surprising, given that both groups are less likely to 
need access to benefits, nor experience income inequality due to higher earnings. 
What was more surprising, however, was that in 2009, 2012 and 2015, greater levels of 
agreement were observable amongst people in receipt of benefits (or with a spouse in 
receipt), those who were unemployed and those with no (or other forms of) qualifications, 
than in comparison to non-claimants, people in employment and people with higher level 
qualifications. People who are unemployed and those who lack qualifications might have 
been expected to express more sympathetic attitudes toward people in receipt of benefits. 
With those in receipt of benefits themselves (or with a spouse in receipt) not expected to 
express negative attitudes toward fellow benefit claimants, thus arguably labelling 
themselves or indeed their spouses as ‘undeserving’.  
Benefit recipients were also more likely to agree that people in receipt of benefits were 
“fiddling” in some way in 2015. Whereas, levels of agreement amongst high income 
earners were consistently lower. Whilst in 2009, this view was most likely amongst middle 
income earners, by 2012 and 2015, low income earners were more likely to hold this 
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perception. In 2009, 2012 and 2015, levels of agreement were also higher amongst people 
occupied in routine and manual occupations and those with no (or other) qualifications.  
Welfare benefit generosity and dependency is cited as a further issue that remains 
prevalent amongst benefit recipients (Lowe, 1994; Dorey, 2010; Wiggan, 2012; Toynbee 
and Walker, 2015; Humpage, 2016; Pantazis, 2016) and a concern that was reflected 
amongst the public in this research. Amongst people who agreed “if welfare benefits 
weren’t so generous people would learn to stand on their own feet’, support toward income 
redistribution was lower by income, benefit and employment status. Levels of agreement 
with the statement “if welfare benefits weren't so generous, people would learn to stand on 
their own feet” were consistently more likely amongst middle income earners, those in 
employment and amongst non-claimants. Comparatively levels of agreement were 
consistently lower amongst people with higher levels of educational attainment, and in 
2012 and 2015, amongst people in managerial and professional roles. Yet in 2012 and 
2015, greater levels of agreement were observable amongst people occupied in routine 
and manual occupations, a group more likely to access social security support.  
These findings can be considered in relation to the stereotypical assumptions attributed to 
benefit recipients, or rather how particular ‘images of inequality’ (Bottero, 2005) discussed 
in Chapter 2, have consequences. As already stated, perceptions of people in receipt of 
help as undeserving, are not new, nor are the stereotypical assumptions that often 
accompany individualistic explanations of poverty and inequality (Bamfield and Horton, 
2009). Throughout the period of austerity examined here, the rhetoric of the undeserving 
poor has however predominated (Mooney and Hancock, 2010; Jensen, 2013; Toynbee 
and Walker, 2015; Pantazis, 2016; Shildrick, 2018). Bamfield and Horton (2009) also note 
how, alongside this, the public are often found to be concerned that their money will be 
redistributed to individuals that are underserving or lazy, with fraud amongst benefit 
recipients also cited as an issue (McKendrick et al., 2008; Dorling, 2014; Brooker et al., 
2015). This appears to be reflected throughout this analysis.  
Whilst this may explain why people in positions of advantage, relative to other groups, may 
be more likely to hold negative attitudes, this does not account for higher levels of 
agreement amongst people in receipt of benefits, low-incomes and those in positions of 
vulnerability. Though these attitudes may be a reflection of the stereotypical discourse that 
predominated, these attitudes may be further explained by incorporating the reference 
group theory, the reference group reality blend theory (Evans and Kelley, 2017),  
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Cannadine’s understanding of “us and them” (1998:19-20) and Bottero’s understanding of 
the consequences of “symbolic demarcations between us and them” (2005:234).  
Cannadine proposes that historically people in Britain have attempted to “make sense of 
the unequal social worlds they have inhabited”, relying on different “versions or variants 
of…three basic and enduring models” (1998:19). Cannadine describes these models, 
succinctly: 
the hierarchical view of society as a seamless web; the triadic version with 
upper, middle and lower collective groups; and the dichotomous, 
adversarial picture, where society is sundered between ‘us’ and ‘them’ 
(1998:19-20). 
The two-model system refers to how individuals are conceived of as belonging to one of 
two groups and are thus for Cannadine “polarised between…two extremes…them and us” 
(1998:164). Members of the ‘us’ group are often characterised as ‘hard working’, ‘strivers’, 
‘responsible’, ‘decent’ and ‘self-sufficient’. In stark contrast, those labelled ‘them’ can be 
understood as a group who are ‘work shy’, ‘skivers’, ‘delinquent’, ‘irresponsible’ and ‘lazy’ 
(Pantazis, 2016). This can be further understood in relation to “good worker-bad benefit 
claimant dualisms” (Patrick, 2012:10). Patrick, using the language of duty and citizenship, 
argues that people who are in paid employment are “characterised as independent, 
responsible citizens”, whereas those who are not working are described as “dependent, 
irresponsible and…even conceptualised as second-class citizens, given their failure to fulfil 
the most central of citizenship obligations” (2012:9). 
The distinctions drawn out above and throughout this research are descriptive of the 
polarisation between ‘skivers’ or ‘them’ and ‘strivers’ or ‘us’ (Hills, 2015). These can be 
understood as “images of inequality” or “social pictures”, which enable people to be placed 
categorically and arguably stereotypical, determining “social worth” and highlighting “social 
distance” between groups (Bottero, 2005:5-15). Both Cannadine (1998) and Dorling (2014) 
note that people are not only concerned with where they belong in society, but also how 
they are regarded by others. This concern for how they are perceived by others, may 
further embed stereotypical assumptions, where in an effort to avoid fulfilling the ‘them’ 
status, people contribute to the maintenance of “scroungerphobia” by labelling others 
(Golding and Middleton, 1982:59). Thus people engage in a process of ‘disidentifying’ from 
“othered groups” in order “to shore up their own identity” (Irwin, 2016:213).  
Considering the processes inherent in social perception formation, as understood in 
relation to reference group theory, people draw on their own experiences, but also the 
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experiences of others, including their family members and their friends, and this may 
solidify these distinctions (Irwin, 2016; Evans and Kelley, 2017). Moreover, given that “both 
reference group forces and the actual material structure of society” impact on perceptions, 
and that social interaction and “information exposure” is not merely reducible to “social 
networks” alone, since “interactions with strangers to encounters with institutions to media 
stimuli” (Evans and Kelley, 2017:322) will also have an impact on social perceptions, this 
may mean that instances of ‘poverty propaganda’ may further solidify, rather than 
challenge these distinctions (Shildrick, 2018).Due to the prevalence of stigma and 
stereotypical labels attributed to those in receipt of benefits, this may explain hostile 
attitudes amongst people in positions of vulnerability and in receipt of benefits (or those 
with a spouse in receipt). These findings are similar to those observed by Paterson et al., 
who found that their research participants, discussing Benefits Street and benefit 
recipients, were “slightly more sympathetic” toward other benefit recipients, but that these 
participants stressed their difference relative to other benefit recipients (2016:212).  
These findings also support Bottero’s contention that: 
the marking of inequality through the images of other…can also be 
observed between groups in very similar social positions, as people attempt 
to avoid the negative collective labels attributed to them by invoking finer 
social distinctions (2005:28). 
Following this perception, benefit recipients (or those with a spouse in receipt) alongside 
low income earners are perhaps identifying whom they consider “social inferiors” and in 
doing so, are marking out their own social location (Bottero, 2005:27). In this case, benefit 
recipients, in labelling other recipients as undeserving, defrauding the system and being 
reliant on benefits due to generous payments, are marking themselves out as 
independent, the opposite of deceitful and deserving. What is, moreover, notable is how 
attitudes towards benefit recipients, hinder support toward redistribution. Amongst those 
who express punitive attitudes, whom are reflecting wider stereotypical discourse toward 
the welfare state and welfare recipients, support toward income redistribution is lower. 
6.3.4.1 Perceptions, by educational attainment, employment status, occupation, 
income and benefit status, Summary 
This section discussed perceptions of inequality, poverty and redistribution, by educational 
attainment, employment status, occupation, income and benefit status. Notably, 
perceptions of the income gap amongst the British public remained significant over time 
and between groups. Whilst the proportion of people in agreement that the income 
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inequality gap was ‘too large’ between 2009-2012, increased by 2015, this proportion had 
fallen, as the consequences of austere policies grew. The findings suggest, for the most 
part, that people’s perceptions of the income inequality gap may be related to their own 
experiences of income inequality. This is supported by the attitudinal findings amongst 
benefit recipients and people in receipt of low incomes. People in receipt of benefits (or 
those with a spouse in receipt) and people in receipt of a low-income were more likely to 
agree that the “gap between high and low incomes is too large” in 2009, 2012 and 2015. 
Those not in employment were also more likely to agree in 2009 and 2012, perhaps further 
reflecting the widening income inequality gap.  
Similar findings are also notable by group amongst people who agreed that the 
government should redistribute income, with people who stand to gain from redistribution 
more likely to support this initiative. What was also notable, however, was that benefit 
recipients and low-income earners were also more likely to perceive people in receipt of 
benefits as undeserving of help and as fraudulently claiming. This is particularly 
interesting, given that those in receipt of benefits are seemingly labelling themselves (or 
their spouses) as undeserving, alongside fraudulent. That said, as already suggested, this 
may be a reflection of the wider rhetoric of the undeserving poor and prevalence of fraud 
amongst welfare recipients during this period. Reflecting, further, a ‘them’ and ‘us’ 
mentality where welfare recipients, and people occupying positions of vulnerability, attempt 
to distance themselves from derogatory and damaging stereotypical labels (Cannadine, 
1998; Bottero, 2005; Paterson et al., 2016).  
6.4 Conclusion 
Notably, this Chapter has reiterated how inequality of income impacts groups based on the 
possession of a number of specific social identities and how these positions in turn, are 
often related to perceptions of inequality, poverty and redistribution. Whilst income 
inequality in the UK predates the recession of 2008/09, following this particular crisis, a 
number of people and households saw their incomes fall (Clarke et al., 2016). As Padley 
et al. highlighted, the use of Minimum Income Standard [MIS] measures, enables a 
thorough understanding of how people were affected following the recession and through 
austerity (2017). This measure is based on what the public believe are requirements for a 
decent and thus “acceptable standard of living” (Padley et al., 2017:8). This study 
highlighted how the proportion of people failing to achieve MIS increased over this period, 
rising from 15.2 million in 2008/09, to 19.1 million in 2014/15 (Padley et al., 2017).  
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As demonstrated in Table 4.4.1, levels of unemployment and employment also fluctuated 
between 2008-2015. Although in 2015, the unemployment rate returned to its 2008 level, 
in both 2009 and 2012 it peaked. At the same time, the employment rate also saw 
changes, decreasing from 2008, to 2009, and 2012. Although unemployment rates 
increased again slightly in 2015, this was still a lower rate than in 2008 (ONS, 2009; 2010; 
2012 and 2015). These changes suggest that a number of households continued to be in 
receipt of lower incomes, especially for those who remained unemployed, or moved into 
unemployment. This also reflects the findings of others whom suggest that the number of 
working households struggling to manage on low working incomes was increasing 
(Kingman, 2014; MacInnes et al., 2015; JRF, 2016; Oxfam, 2016; Kingman and Seager, 
2014; CPAG, 2017). Furthermore, Households Below Average Incomes ([HBAI], 2016) 
data showed how 31.6 million working age adults were in working families, where 3.1 
million were in relative low incomes BHC. Thus, emphasising how the protection from 
poverty employment is said to offer, is not necessarily reflected within austerity Britain 
(Patrick, 2012; Habibov, 2013).  
As McKendrick et al emphasise, there are increasing numbers of people who are 
struggling, which highlights how “work is not necessarily always a means to escape 
poverty” (2008:55). Accordingly, the rise in levels of ‘in work poverty’ (Patrick, 2012) 
appear to correlate with the rise in the proportion of employed people noting that the 
income gap is ‘too large’ and increasing proportions of people in employment in support of 
the redistribution of income. Throughout the period of austerity, there has also been an 
increase in those working part-time, undertaking precarious, low-paid forms of 
employment, often working to insecure contracts, such as zero hours (Oxfam, 2016; TUC, 
2017). Whilst initially it seemed that improvements were observable in the UK labour 
market given the employment trends, given the types of roles undertaken by members of 
the public, closer inspection reveals a more complex picture.  
What is also clear is how the social identities of those occupying such roles, appears to 
both reflect but also reinforce the existence and prevalence of poverty and inequality 
amongst certain groups. For instance, more women than men are found to work part-time, 
in low-paid positions, this is also true of people from ethnic minority backgrounds (UKCES, 
2014; Bennett and Daly, 2014; Falkingham et al., 2014; Catney and Sabater 2015; TUC, 
2017; Hick and Lanau, 2017). Furthermore, what these findings also suggest is how the 
attitudes of people often fluctuate, are subject not only to the role of self-interest (Orton 
and Rowlingson, 2007), but also subject to what Leon explains as ‘risk-exposure’ and ‘risk-
aversion’ (2012:201).  
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Moreover, as inequality peaks, people who are said to occupy ‘relatively high economic’ 
positions, will often feel the consequences of a number of ‘social ills’ (Anderson and Curtis, 
2015:267). Thus, people on higher incomes, become more aware of, and likely to 
experience these consequences. This may, in part explain why people from the high-
income band groups appeared to become increasingly more likely to regard the income 
gap as ‘too large’ and more likely to support the redistribution of income. Taken together, 
these findings seem to suggest that as inequality and poverty increases in a society, the 
disparities in levels of support amongst groups, do appear to lessen, where convergence 
means that the ‘social ills’, stigmatically associated with the prevalence of poverty and 
inequality, may be subverted (Anderson and Curtis, 2015).  
 
This chapter incorporated the research findings, alongside literature to explore perceptions 
of inequality poverty and redistribution during austerity Britain 2009-2015. Having set the 
scene and incorporated redistributional theories, alongside sociological theory, this 
research has attempted to contribute to a growing body of literature concerned with 
understanding the impact of austerity. The following, final chapter, concludes this 
research. Drawing out key findings from this research, recommendations are made, 
detailing further the contribution of this research.  
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Chapter 7 
Conclusion 
 
7.1 Introduction 
 
This research was conducted with the intention of exploring public perceptions of 
inequality, poverty and redistribution in austerity Britain between 2009-2015. To achieve 
this, quantitative secondary analyses of three sets of BSAS microdata have been 
conducted. The aim of the research was to respond to four research questions: 
 How are people in receipt of social security benefits perceived by others? 
 To what extent have attitudes towards poverty and inequality changed following the 
introduction of austerity measures in 2010? 
 To what extent do negative attitudes towards those in receipt of benefits 
relate to the level of support expressed toward income redistribution? 
 To what extent do socio-economic and demographic characteristics relate 
to perceptions of inequality and poverty? 
Notably, these research questions overlap. To address these questions, and to do so 
within the limitations of secondary data analysis, meant also selecting consistent variables 
from BSAS to explore and subsequently analyse. Consistent with the fourth research 
question, attitudes were investigated in relation to specific characteristics. This includes 
demographic characteristics: gender, age, ethnic background and educational attainment, 
and socio-economic characteristics: employment status, self-rated income band, benefit 
status and occupation. These characteristics are consistent with the social inequalities 
prevalent in austerity Britain and meant that patterns of disadvantage amongst and 
between groups could be considered, alongside attitudinal differences. 
 
Similarly, three of the remaining five variables selected for investigation were reflective of 
the stereotypical assumptions and discourse associated with people experiencing 
inequality and poverty. The intention was to understand who is more likely to agree with 
the following statements, and whether perceptions changed over time and between 
groups: 
 ‘many people who get social security don’t deserve any help’ 
 ‘most people on the dole are fiddling in one way or another’ 
 ‘if welfare benefits weren’t so generous, people would stand on their own feet’ 
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To understand how people perceived of income inequality and whether members of the 
British public supported redistribution, two further statements were included within the 
analysis: 
 ‘the gap between high and low incomes is too large’ 
 ‘the government should redistribute income from the better-off to the less-well-off’ 
Focusing on the significant findings, this chapter summarises the key findings of this 
research. Further demonstrating how these research questions were responded to and 
specifying the contribution of this research. Following this, the research is brought to an 
end, highlighting the need to challenge attitudes toward inequality, poverty and 
redistribution. Thus, the need for further research is emphasised, providing further 
recommendations for the direction of this research. 
 
7.2 Research Findings 
 
Public perceptions of inequality, poverty and redistribution in austerity Britain, between 
2009-2015, have been the focus of this research. Emphasis has, however, also been 
placed on the need to provide a sociological analysis of the social, cultural, political and 
economic environment, in which these data were collected. This has been achieved by 
considering the data in relation to sociological theory and theories of redistribution, with 
further emphasis also placed on prevailing social divisions and inequalities. This section, in 
focusing on the significant findings, highlights the key research findings. Demonstrating 
further how attitudes toward redistribution, inequality and people experiencing poverty, 
differ between groups and over time.  
 
Chapter 4 suggested that the British public are aware of large disparities in income 
between groups. There is a strong sense of agreement amongst the public that income 
inequality between groups is a gap ‘too large’. What was notable was how perceptions of 
the income gap appeared to change, albeit slightly, yet nevertheless remained substantial. 
In 2009 over 80% of the British public agreed that income gap was ‘too large’ and in 2012, 
this increased to a little over 84%. Increasing levels of agreement were notable amongst 
and within each characteristic group. The largest change in attitudes was, however, 
observable amongst people in receipt of high incomes, partially supporting Anderson and 
Curtis, whom suggest that concern toward inequality will grow as inequality does (2015).  
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By 2015 however, following five years of austerity measures, this recognition amongst the 
public decreased. The proportion of people in agreement that income inequality was too 
great fell to a level lower than observed in 2009, yet at 78% remained substantial. 
Interestingly, the findings in Chapter 4 highlighted that of those becoming less inclined to 
recognise the extent of income inequality, those with the highest likelihood of experiencing 
income inequality and poverty, were amongst those becoming less inclined to agree that 
the income gap is too large. Thus, between 2012-2015, concern toward the income gap 
fell overall, but this change was particularly striking amongst women, people aged 18-34, 
people from BAME backgrounds, those in receipt of a low income, people not in 
employment, and those working in routine and manual occupations.  
 
Despite declining levels of agreement, these findings support those of Fahmy et al. (2012), 
suggesting people are able to recognise the extent of growing income inequality. These 
findings also suggest that recognition of the income inequality gap is more likely amongst 
particular groups. In 2015, this included women, people with higher levels of educational 
attainment, those in intermediate occupations, and people from white ethnic backgrounds. 
In 2009, 2012 and 2015, people in receipt of benefits (or whose spouse was), those in 
receipt of a low income, and people aged 65 and over were more likely to agree. Finally, 
agreement was also more likely amongst people who were not in employment in 2009 and 
2012. These findings further suggest that people are able to recognise the extent of 
income inequality, evidencing Irwin’s claim that people do “care about inequality” (Irwin, 
2016:15). 
Whilst it might have been expected that support toward redistribution would reflect these 
attitudes, the findings suggested otherwise. Support toward income redistribution did not 
resonate amongst more than half of the British public in 2009, 2012 or 2015. In 2009, a 
little over 37% held this view, though redistributional support increased in 2012 and 2015, 
support toward a measure to close the income inequality gap, remained low in comparison 
to the perceived need. As demonstrated in Table 4.2.1.2, some of the attitudinal changes 
are relatively small, particularly so between 2012-2015 (an increase of just 2.6pp). Given 
the perceived need for income redistribution as a result of austerity policies, these 
attitudinal changes were also smaller than anticipated. Keen to understand this disparity, 
the proportion of people who agreed that the income gap was too large and also supported 
redistribution was also investigated. This analysis revealed that amongst people who 
agreed that the income inequality gap is too large in 2009 (80.6%), just 40.1% also 
expressed support toward income redistribution. In 2012, 84.4% felt the gap was too large, 
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whereas just 45.8% also supported income redistribution. Similarly, in 2015, of the 78.0% 
whom said that income inequality was too great, just 50.5% also wished to see income 
redistributed.  
 
These findings suggest that amongst those that recognise income inequality between 
groups as a gap ‘too large’, support toward redistribution is more likely. However, these 
findings also show that recognising the extent of income inequality, does not necessarily 
mean people will also support the redistribution of income to close this gap. This is a 
problem in need of addressing, and given this, this research sought to identify which 
groups were more likely to support income redistribution and conversely, which groups 
were less likely.  
 
Chapter 4 highlighted that redistributional support was greater amongst people from BAME 
backgrounds. Given the disproportionate levels of poverty and inequality faced by people 
from ethnic minorities (Longhi and Platt, 2008; Hills et al., 2010; Fisher and Nandi, 2015; 
Catney and Sabater, 2015), this was not surprising. The analysis also identified gendered 
attitudinal differences, where women were more likely to recognise the extent of the 
income gap than in comparison to men, though these attitudinal gaps are again, relatively 
small. Despite this, since women not only face ongoing inequality but were also expected 
to feel the consequences of austerity to a greater extent than men (Oxfam, 2012; Conley, 
2012; Ginn, 2013; O’Hara, 2014; De Henau and Reed, 2016) this attitudinal difference was 
not surprising. What was, however, surprising initially was the attitudinal findings amongst 
men, who were consistently more likely to support the redistribution of income. The gap 
between male and female levels of agreement were not only greater than those observed 
in Table 4.1.1.2, between 2012-2015, they widened.   
 
That said, as McKay et al. purported, focus of the gendered impact of austerity policies 
concentrated too heavily on the experiences of women, excluding men (2013). Given 
fluctuating employment rates, and the increasing financial strain placed on men during 
austerity it is suggested that these attitudinal disparities reflect the assumptions of self-
interest and the prevalence of social values (Wu and Chou, 2015). In this way, it has been 
argued that men may have desired more redistributional spending as a result of their own 
economic difficulties, whilst at the same time, becoming more aware of and concerned as 
to how austerity was increasing inequalities amongst others (Orton and Rowlingson, 
2007). 
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Reflecting self-interest (Wu and Chou, 2015), need explanations (Whitely, 1981) and risk-
exposure (Leon, 2012), people in receipt of low incomes and those not in employment 
were consistently more likely to support the redistribution of income. In 2012 and 2015, 
people in receipt of benefits or those with a spouse in receipt, were also more likely to 
express support toward redistribution. These findings suggest that amongst these groups, 
those standing to gain the most from the redistribution of income, were more likely to 
support this combative measure.  
 
Attitudinal disparities by age group have also been identified. Whilst younger people were 
the most severely affected by the economic downturn and austere policies (UKCES, 2014; 
Kingman and Seager, 2014; Belfield et al., 2014; MacInnes et al., 2015; Hood and Waters, 
2017), this did not appear to be reflected in this attitudinal analysis. Instead, younger 
people were consistently the least likely to conceive of the income gap as ‘too large’, 
whereas older members of the public were more likely. For the most part, people aged 65 
and over were also more likely to perceive of people in receipt of benefits at undeserving, 
fraudulently claiming (with exception to 2009) and reliant on benefits as a result of welfare 
generosity (with exception to 2009). Amongst those aged 65 and over who agreed with 
this perception, support toward redistribution was also much lower. These findings not only 
reflect those of self-interest, but also of an assumption made by Whiteley in the early 
1980’s, where welfare remains “associated with personal failure and charity handouts” 
(1981:468) amongst older generations.  
 
This latter statement is reflective of a “moralistic stance” amongst the public, and one that 
has persisted for some time (Mack and Lansley, 1985:210). This stance is made visible 
further through the “moral distinctions” (Fahmy et al., 2012:6) made between those who 
are ‘deserving’ of help, and those who are not. Much like Townsend (1979:427) cautioned, 
“punishing attitudes to poverty” remain and as this thesis has demonstrated, these were 
observable amongst the British public. Between 2009-2012, increasing proportions of the 
British public felt that benefit recipients were undeserving, were fraudulently claiming in 
some way and that the generosity of benefit payments resulted in welfare dependency. In 
2009, 2012 and 2015 the public felt more strongly toward this latter statement than they 
did toward the government redistributing income between groups. Between 2012-2015, 
negative perceptions of those in receipt of benefits declined. That said, negative attitudes 
related to perceptions of the redistribution of income. People who perceived of benefit 
recipients as undeserving or as reliant on support, thus resulting in the loss of 
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independence, were less likely to support income redistribution. These findings highlight 
the consequences of stereotypical discourse and the relationship between negative 
attitudes, reflective of this discourse and redistributional support. Public support is a 
necessary component in policy making, sustaining interest and alleviating inequality, this 
relationship is therefore problematic (McKendrick et al., 2008; Monnickendam and Gordon, 
2010; Prabhaker, 2012).  
 
What was also particularly striking were the attitudes of people in receipt of low-incomes, 
people without qualifications, those in routine and manual occupations and benefit 
recipients (or those with a spouse in receipt). Whilst it might have been expected that 
people in receipt of low incomes or those susceptible to low incomes, would, reflecting 
their own positions of precarity and disadvantage, be less inclined to hold negative views 
toward benefit recipients, this analysis demonstrated that this is not always the case. In the 
context of benefit recipients themselves, or people who are spouse to those in receipt, 
greater levels of agreement are observable. Indeed, the analysis identified benefit 
recipients (or those with a spouse in receipt) as more likely (than non-claimants) to agree 
that benefit recipients were undeserving of help in 2015. In comparison to non-claimants, 
this group were also more likely to agree that “most…on the dole are fiddling” in 2015.  
 
Whilst it may seem surprising that benefit recipients, or those with a partner in receipt of 
benefits, perceive of others in receipt of benefits as undeserving or indeed fraudulent, 
Cannadine’s (1998) model was incorporated to explain these attitudinal findings. 
Cannadine (1998:19-20) refers to a binary “adversarial picture” where people consider 
themselves in relation to two different, opposing, groups; “us” and ‘them’”. In light of this 
picture, it has been posited that those who claim benefits, or those with a spouse in 
receipt, regard themselves as deserving and therefore situated amongst those in the “us” 
group. Thus, not only are they labelling other welfare recipients as “them” in the process, 
or in this case the “undeserving” and fraudulent, they are also attempting to exonerate 
themselves from these stereotypical labels. Thus, these findings appear to provide further 
evidence of the consequences of the “symbolic demarcations between them and us” noted 
by Bottero (2005:234). Where, in an attempt to distinguish themselves as different from the 
popular stereotypical rhetoric and stigma attributed to benefit recipients, “distinctions of 
social worth” are being made by benefit recipients themselves (Bottero, 2005:15). The 
consequences of these distinctions are clear, stereotypical assumptions are reinforced and 
social relationships are eroded.   
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In short, the findings thus suggest that perceptions of the income inequality gap amongst 
the public matter, particularly in relation to strategies to narrow or indeed eradicate income 
inequality through the redistribution of income. Support for the redistribution of income is 
significantly greater amongst people who agree that ‘the gap between high and low 
incomes is too large’. But, as these findings suggest, recognition of the extent of the 
income gap, does not necessarily result in support toward measures to close this gap. 
Given the rise of and indeed extent of ‘poverty propaganda’ (Shildrick, 2018) over the 
period of austerity examined here, the proportion of the public in agreement that people in 
receipt of benefits were undeserving of help, were fraudulently claiming and dependent of 
benefits due to welfare generosity, were smaller than initially anticipated.  
 
Nevertheless, negative attitudes amongst the British public remain prevalent and 
problematic. Not only do such attitudes impact social relations, they also impede the 
support necessary to implement policies intended to reduce social inequalities. Whilst 
public support toward the redistribution of income increased over the period of austerity 
examined here, the attitudinal changes between 2012-2015 in particular, were quite small. 
Whilst greater increases are observable between 2009-2015, support toward the 
redistribution of income between groups, remained particularly low in comparison to the 
perceive need, and as Chapter 5 demonstrated, these negative attitudes reduce this 
support further. Based on the findings identified in this research, Section 7.4 proposes 
recommendations for future research, and where redistributional support may need to be 
targeted to bolster support.   
 
7.3 Contribution 
 
As Chapter 6 emphasised, it was unclear whether “negative and punitive” (Bamfield and 
Horton, 2009:6) attitudes towards people experiencing inequality and poverty would be 
observable within the analysis of BSAS data. Nor was it clear whether negative attitudes 
would increase amongst the public over time, or whether this would be observable 
amongst particular groups. However, what was understood prior to the initial analyse, was 
the importance of exploring social inequalities alongside attitudinal data. This research has 
contributed to a wider body of research intent on studying the adverse effects of austerity 
measures in Britain. In a period of diverse social, cultural, political and economic change, 
this thesis has explored attitudinal changes between 2009-2015. This research, therefore, 
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has been conducted with a commitment to understanding and highlighting some of the 
social inequalities faced by a number of groups.  
 
Emphasis has been placed on the social, cultural and economic consequences of 
austerity, considering the role of political rhetoric throughout this period. The findings of 
this research, should therefore, be understood against this critical backdrop to austerity 
Britain. Exploring attitudes in relation to these conditions, has enabled a broader 
understanding of how life is experienced in austerity Britain. Seeking to reframe austerity 
and the people living and experiencing further disadvantage as a result of it, anti-austerity 
campaigns, and new programmes may have emerged. However, despite these acts of 
resistance and reframing, this was occurring later in the programme of austerity examined 
here. As a result, much of the research collated has shown how attitudes towards those in 
receipt of benefits, and the welfare state as a whole, are often coloured by unease, 
antagonism and negativity. Chapter 2 demonstrated that following the onset of austerity in 
Britain and throughout the period focused on in this research, this has been both 
observable, and consistent.  
 
It has thus been evidenced that people in receipt of benefits, whom are experiencing 
inequality and poverty, have been collectively considered a group who take what they can, 
but contribute little or nothing back to society (Humphries, 2013). Reflective of these 
accusations, it has been suggested that quality of life in the UK, would have been much 
better without the welfare state (Bartholomew, 2013), with the welfare state itself accused 
of producing people who are reliant on the state for support rather than themselves, whom 
have little incentive, nor ingenuity (Lowe, 1994). And this position was verified by the 
Conservative government, where they declared the “days of something for nothing” were 
“over” (Conservative Manifesto, 2015:26).  
 
Those already experiencing disadvantage have become “figurative scapegoats”, 
collectively portrayed as group of people who are “a parasitical drain” and thus a “threat to 
scarce…resources” (Tyler, 2013:9). This collective portrayal is evidenced in programmes 
like Benefits Street, where those featured were ridiculed and considered with “contempt” 
(Burnett, 2017:217). With the rise of ‘poverty porn’ (Jensen, 2013) and ‘poverty 
propaganda’ (Shildrick, 2018), not only are people able “to harshly judge and embarrass” 
(Couldry, 2011:37) others, “human struggles” have been transformed “into a sneering form 
of entertainment” (Burnett, 2017:217). For Paterson et al. however, this is not considered 
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entertainment, but an arena for the “perpetuation of existing stereotypes about benefit 
claimants” (2016: 212). Not only does this seek to encourage “negative evaluations of poor 
people and benefit recipients” (Paterson et al., 2016: 212), this further perpetuates 
stereotypical rhetoric and their consequences.  
 
Poverty and the experience of inequality has thus been trivialised, or as Hanley (2009:7) 
remarked previously, has been turned into a “spectator sport”. As Shildrick emphasises, 
such programmes are better understood in relation to ‘poverty propaganda’ and thus as “a 
form of stigmatisation that damages those with the least and provides a critical resource 
for those with power” (2018:794). Deacon once referred to the presence of 
“scroungerphobia” (1978:124) amongst the public, within an austere Britain this has 
arguably returned. Notably, the consequences of austerity are profound, and this has been 
evidenced throughout this research. These stereotypical assumptions have predominated 
prior to the implementation of austerity in Britain, however, what was less understood was 
whether these attitudes would be reflected over the course of austerity examined here. In 
producing this thesis, this research has filled this gap.  
 
7.4 Recommendations 
 
As Chapter 3 highlighted, this research has enabled exploration of attitudes toward 
inequality, poverty and redistribution between 2009-2015, of which would not have been 
possible had the research design not been selected. Quantitative secondary data analysis 
has thus demonstrated how attitudes changed over the period of austerity examined here, 
demonstrating further attitudinal differences between groups. As highlighted in Chapter 4 
and 5, some of the changes observed over time, and between groups, were particularly 
small, and these are discussed, alongside greater attitudinal changes, in more detail in 
Chapter 6. Thus, in each of the finding’s chapters, and within the analytical discussion 
chapter, attitudinal changes are outlined, noting relatively small changes, and highlighting 
patterns within the data. Having completed this research, however, further questions have 
arisen.  
 
For instance, whilst this research has shown how attitudes toward redistribution differ 
amongst groups, are related to perceptions of income inequality and toward people 
experiencing poverty, it has been unable to determine explicitly why this occurs. Similarly, 
whilst this research has also shown that negative attitudes toward people in receipt of 
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benefits relate to perceptions toward redistribution, this research has been unable to 
determine where these attitudes stem from. Whilst this was not the focus of this research, 
it has become increasingly clear that support toward redistribution is lacking and to attempt 
to bolster this support, further enquiry is necessary.  
 
Accordingly, further attitudinal research is necessary to explore perceptions and to 
understand why people do not support income redistribution, despite so many perceiving 
the income gap between groups as ‘too large’. Future research should seek to target 
particular groups, with the intention of seeking a deeper understanding of underlying 
perceptions of social security recipients, inequality, poverty and income redistribution. 
What has been made clear is that attitudes towards social security recipients are related to 
the level of support expressed toward redistribution. In this way, to increase support 
toward redistribution, underlying attitudes must be understood, making way for the 
expungement of popular myths about welfare recipients, and a lack of both empathy and 
understanding of the existence and consequences of inequality of income and poverty in 
Britain.  
 
Whilst quantitative investigation alone cannot explain why, it can pave the way for future 
research and this research has highlighted which groups may need to be targeted. 
Accordingly, efforts to increase redistributional support should be targeted toward 
particular groups and this includes people who do not receive benefits, women, high 
income earners, and those in employment. Concurrently, it is imperative that stigmatising 
and stereotypical labels be addressed, investigating why negative perceptions continue, 
despite research invalidating common claims. The focus of this research must not only 
include those who have lived experiences of income inequality and poverty but needs to 
be extended to those who lack understanding, and indeed experience. The output from 
such research should, in an effort to achieve greater impact, be presented in an accessible 
format, intent on widening its reach. As Larsen and Dejgaard pointed out, stereotypical 
attitudes may be “difficult to change” (2013: 298), but without further intervention and 
research, support toward social policies intent on reducing or indeed eradicating 
disadvantage will be lacking. Though this may prove a challenge, this is a problem that 
needs to be addressed. 
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